Turn them into teenage Shari’a enforcers: jihad’s generational wedge, Part 4

The “straight path” to Islam is Shari’a. Most Muslims demand Shari’a because they are supposed to demand Shari’a, but they have no idea what they are demanding because lay Muslims are not supposed to know Shari’a. Such knowledge is the preserve of the “scholars”.

ANJULI PANDAVAR

While political or cultural youth movements are not necessarily created for nefarious political ends, they are easy to manipulate to such ends. The Soviet Union had its All-Union Pioneer Organisation, Nazi Germany had its Hitler-Jugend, China had its Red Guards, the Muslim Brotherhood in its Egyptian heyday had its Kashafa and Jawala youth wings, ISIS had its Cubs of the Caliphate and, of course, the infamous Hamas summer camps. For a totalitarian system to endure, certain conditions have to be met. One of these is the creation, as early as a possible, of a generation that, from cradle to grave, has known nothing but totalitarianism. In its childhood, it will have been thoroughly indoctrinated that good equates to all that is good in the eyes of their leader, whether that leader be dead or alive, and all that is bad is what he says is bad.

During youth, their identity is formed by their aspiring to be part of a highly visible and obviously privileged subset of their peers. Membership of this select group is to be earned, both by assiduous commitment to self-improvement in order to better serve the polity, be it the Emperor, the State, the Reich, the Party, the Leader, the Deen, the Motherland or the Caliphate, and by demonstrating readiness to deal harshly with all who fail to show sufficient enthusiasm for whatever is valued, or sufficient denunciation for what is despised. This includes, especially, beating up those they can physically overpower, and reporting those they cannot, such as their parents and their teachers. Most youths fail to earn entry to such hallowed organisations, no matter how hard they try. Their hopes for social recognition they have to carry forward into adulthood.

Kawakami felt keenly the need to prove that he was no mere “academician.” Like Yoshida Shdin, who had come from the same province of Yamaguchi and had been Kawakami’s hero and guiding star in his youth, he set out on the road to possible martyrdom, leaving his protesting wife in tears. After a period of open activity within the Communist-backed New Labor-Farmer Party, for which he ran as a candidate in one election, he was eventually forced underground. Shortly thereafter he finally gained formal admission to the Communist Party, an event which moved him deeply. (Ryu?saku Tsunoda, Sources of Japanese Tradition, Columbia University Press, 1964, p314)

As adults they become yes-men and petit tyrants who have learnt how to avoid the wrong labelling. They ideally assume positions within the state apparatus, or in adjunct professions that buttress the society’s ideological infrastructure, such as in law enforcement, the media, universities and religious institutions. But failing that, they can always be middle managers in state enterprises. From this point on, they are no longer looking for people to beat up or expose, only to ensure that none of their colleagues earns the favour of their superior before they do. At this stage of their lives, everyone is on the make. Vigilance now means ensuring that everyone beneath them is, likewise, on the make. By this point, they will be sidling up to their superior so he or she might put in a good word somewhere so their child might gain entry to the youth league. Thus is the circle closed and totalitarianism becomes the normal condition. Even if it should now be interrupted, there will be an entire generation ready to restore it. In the case of the Islamic State, Terrorism Monitor reports:

After a multi-year hiatus, one possibly due to restructuring within the group after the fall of the “territorial caliphate” in 2019, “The Empowerment Generation” from ISWAP [Islamic State West Africa Province] highlights that IS is still interested in investing resources into grooming youngsters for its next generation of fighters. The video features similar themes as previous IS videos, including an emphasis on religious education and classroom studies; military-style physical and arms training; and the execution of hostages. In essence, this exemplifies the three key aspects of an IS fighter, which are ideological indoctrination, the need to fight, and the ability to execute enemies. (IS and the “Cubs of the Caliphate” in Nigeria) (My emphasis)

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani) is a member of that restoration generation, and he has his work cut out. In countries where Muslims constitute a small minority, the chances are that Muslim parents enrol their children into two parallel education system: the official state system; and an unofficial madrassa system. In their madrassa classes, children will be warned about what they will be taught in the state system, and that if they should believe certain parts of what they are taught there, they will fall into kufr, that is, cease to be Muslim. Many Muslim children sit through such classes absolutely petrified that they might hear a wrong thing, and repeat over and over in their heads La-illaha-illallah Muhammadur-rasoolullah, just in case they had unwittingly “fallen into kufr” during the lesson. One way to prove that their iman, faith, remains strong despite going to school is by failing the exams. One particularly notorious jihad terrorist outfit makes opposition to such education the very heart of its identity. It calls itself Boko Haram, “Western Education is Forbidden”.

Recep Tayyip Erdo?an is a sickly old man coming to terms with the realisation that he will not see the caliphate restored, let alone lead it. For jihad strategists, historic dates are everything. Erdo?an, who celebrates the jihad victory over the Byzantine Empire at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 that heralded the start of the Islamisation of Anatolia, saw 3 March 2024, the centenary of the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, come and go without his restoring it. Besides, he has left it too late to start creating a “pious generation” that would form the bedrock of that caliphate. Turkey has been far too secular and far too stable for far too long for there to be a groundswell of Turks ready to sacrifice their children fi-sabi-lillah. His failure to secure popular support for his degrading of the education system into an Islamic one (parents withdrawing their children from school en mass, and “gen Z” showing anything but enthusiasm for the Islamic “scholars” who have replaced their dismissed teachers) leaves Erdo?an with only one hope: his protégé, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the emir of Hayat Tahrir al-Shams.

Measures to turn children into Shari’a enforcers

  1. Delete the entire worksheet

Without knowing the particular worksheet, such diktat is consistent with complete contempt for any education that is not “for the sake of Allah”, i.e., Islamic education. How much more so education that contradicts Islam, such as biology, evolution, geography, astronomy, and history, to name but a few.

A worksheet, of course, is work that a teacher assigns to a class. It is something that most average students and those weaker than them find a chore or worse, and only the threat of coercion keeps them submitting to the worksheets, even if only to cheat their way through it. The imperative “Delete the entire worksheet” serves three purposes: it conveys contempt for the education system; it belittles the work of teachers; and it serves as a war cry to pupils, especially teenagers, to abuse their teachers. It keys into the same receptors as Allahu-akbar! It places the teacher under surveillance by the entire class, each pupil ready to report anything to the authorities. Woe betide a teacher who now asserts his or her authority over a pupil. Add some further rewards to this, like a guaranteed “A” in the exams, whether you actually sit them or not, and your next generation of fascist enforcers is pretty much in place.

  1. Change the phrase “the straight path is the path of goodness” to “the path of Islam”

What is generic, even if it is good for everyone, is never good enough for Muslims, unless it is specifically Islamic. Consider, for example, the replacement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with a Shari’a-compliant edition, the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, a scandal in which the UN is complicit.

The only “path of goodness” is “the path to Islam” and “the straight path” to Islam is Shari’a. Most Muslims demand Shari’a because they are supposed to demand Shari’a, but most Muslims have no idea what they are demanding because lay Muslims are not supposed to know what they are demanding. Such knowledge is the preserve of the “scholars”, who direct lay Muslims to particular jihad activities, some to “kill and be killed in the cause of Allah”, the rest, the so-called “peaceful Muslims” to help and protect the killers going about their killing, but otherwise remain nice, peaceful, law-abiding citizens that naïve Westerners go out of their way to protect.

Muslims will deny all of this, employing the full battery of sacred Muslim lying to ensure that “the path to goodness” is as short as can be. Preparing the ground for the killers, providing them with information, sustenance and transport, and protecting them from the law is the role of the Muslims who wouldn’t hurt a fly. They all know who is being readied for the next killing and even if they do not provide actual logistical support, then they look the other way, because they wish to have nothing to do with it, which is precisely how they have everything to do with it. The communal obligation is that the killing gets done. This is how every single Muslim is responsible. The infidel Al-Assad, who oppressed Sunni Muslims under his rule, interrupted their jihad and deserves to die.

Da’wa, Islamic propaganda, i.e., verbal jihad (jihad of the tongue) never stops, because every single Muslim, simply by virtue of declaring, whether verbally or non-verbally, I am a Muslim, engages in da’wa. Shari’a obliges the Muslim to always put Islam, and anything pertaining to Islam, in a good light. It is forbidden for a Muslim to put another Muslim in a bad light, especially in front of non-Muslims, regardless of all else. This is why, incidentally, a Muslim judge will never find in favour of a non-Muslim against a Muslim. In light of that, consider this!

Leaving aside the clichés, linguists determine that the Inuit of north-eastern Canada have “a dozen basic words… referring to snow, and about ten words referring to ice”. One could just as easily say that Muslims have about ten words for different kinds of lying, the most commonly known to non-Muslims being Taqiyya, Tawriya, Kitman and Muruna. This quantity might be less impressive than what an Inuit dictionary can boast of for snow and ice, but what Islamic lying has going for it puts it in a league well above (or below, depending on your point of view) the Inuit lexicon. Islamic lying is sacred, and to engage in it is an act of worship, because it pleases Allah. It is also the engine of da’wa.

Hence, the more of the Qur’an a Muslim has memorised, the more nimbly he or she is able to lie about Islam. But nowadays, opponents of Islam, apart from having carefully studied the Qur’an themselves (forbidden to Muslims who are not “scholars”, how much more so to the kufaar) are able to quickly look up whatever claims are being made about Islam. Fewer opponents of Islam know their way around the hadith, especially its more arcane features, such as the ludicrous isnad, “chain of narrators” (“chain of transmission”), and the pseudo-scientific “grading” system according to which one of the following “levels of reliability” is assigned to each hadith: sahih, “sound/authentic”; hasan, “fair”; and da’if, “weak”.

Should an opponent of Islam confront a Muslim with any hadith that puts Islam or Muhammad in what is today a bad light, the Muslim will immediately reject the hadith as weak, even if he knows it to be authentic, hoping that the non-Muslim does not know this. If it turns out that the non-Muslim does know this, then the Muslim is in a trap, after which things can get very entertaining, especially as Muslims have no cognitive training other than lying.

An even more staggering waste of brainpower than being hafiz (knowing the entire Qur’an by heart), is “the mnemones of Islam, those scholars who had memorised at least one hundred thousand hadiths with their chains of transmission” (Reliance of the Traveller, Book X, Introduction). There has to be a better way, and there is: simply avoid publicising the weak hadiths. If someone emerging from such an education encounters a hadith that he or she has never heard of, they can safely dismiss it as weak, and if they have heard of it, then it must be fair or authentic, and instead of getting ensnared, they can escape with, “I have to ask a sheikh about that”. This might be why Hayat Tahrir al-Shams is taking the trouble to:

  1. (expunge weak hadiths from the Syrian education system)
  • “The generous is close to Allah” (very weak hadith).”Two traits do not combine…” (weak hadith).
  • “Indeed, among the most complete believers” (weak hadith)
  • Warning: “There is no person who kills a sparrow…” (weak hadith)
  • Warning: “By Allah, if they placed the sun in my right hand…” (weak hadith).

Syrian children will quickly learn that they do not have to be continually defending Islam. They can go on the offensive and change what non-Muslims say about them and their religion. And if they become good at this, they can even get the non-Muslims themselves to defend Islam. This is why Hayat Tahrir al-Shams proposes to:

  1. Replace “and going along with his people” with “adjusting the discourse to his people”

This launches the transition from da’wa, jihad of the tongue, to warfare, jihad of the sword. The transition involves moving beyond always defending and saying nice things about Islam and Muslims, to getting non-Muslims to do this and feel virtuous for doing so. That way, non-Muslims themselves will criticise critics of Islam and Muslim, either for criticising at all, or for they way in which they do it, taking offence at any indelicacy they perceive in the critique. The wholesale Western adoption of “Islamophobia” as a supposed social ill signifies a milestone in this transition.

Western obsession with Muslim sensibilities is exactly the condition that allows the transition to proceed to the next stage: undermining the laws and norms of Western society both by demanding that society adopt Shari’a norms and by getting actual Shari’a stipulations adopted “only for Muslims,” of course, one of the greatest taqiyya coups. As soon as Muslims manage to get a handful of their number elected to public office, chaos ensues that rapidly descends into the violent imposition of Shari’a on all.

But what does this have to do with Syria, the reader might ask. They are already Muslim and the new government is consolidating Shari’a. Ah, but these pupils are not primarily earmarked for Syria. They are the future diplomats, students, businessmen and “refugees” who will fan out from Syria to advance “the cause of Allah” outside of Syria, including Israel, through da’wa, engendering public insecurity and eroding the institutions of state. Not all of them need to leave Syria to accomplish this. Once Western money starts rolling in, you know, now that Al-Jolani has promised not to hurt US soldiers, generous scholarships to Syrian universities will attract especially Palestinians, who will return with more than just certificates. Just another consequence of Israel not taking Damascus when she had the chance.

So what else might the make-over ISIS regime in Damascus have in store for the country’s youth? We turn to Terrorism Monitor again:

Their daily schedule appears to be highly regimented and includes Quran recital sessions, multiple prayer sessions, a classroom study session where they learn aqidah (Islamic creed), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), hadith (sayings of the Prophet), and Arabic language. There is also a session where they watch IS propaganda videos and another that involves two physical training sessions that include self-defense and arms training. The group of trainees are also shown making the bayah (oath of allegiance) to Abu Ibrahim al-Quraishi, the former IS leader who was reportedly killed on February 3 (thearabweekly.com, February 8). Towards the end of the video, the children are finally seen engaging in urban warfare exercises where they move into an abandoned building in a highly coordinated manner. They capture several hostages, who are actually Nigerian soldiers caught by ISWAP in previous battles, and then proceed to execute them.

We’ve seen it all before, and no doubt, we will see it again.

 

Part 5/…


Picture credits:

Red Guards (China) – Scan of cover of elementary school textbook from Guangxi 1971, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=9737620

Bundesarchiv, Bild 147-0510 / CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0 de, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5337795

Flicr via Oliver, Mark. “Death By Tire Fire: A Brief History Of “Necklacing” In Apartheid South Africa.” AllThatsInteresting.com, May 19, 2018, https://allthatsinteresting.com/necklacing. Accessed January 13, 2025.

 

January 16, 2025 | Comments »

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