Qatar aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood which it saw as the rising power. Obama did likewise. In fact Obama and Qatar worked together in this gambit. Both have fallen along with the MB. To see how far Qatar has fallen, read my Dec 2012 post, Tiny Qatar casts a giant shadow. A few months earlier I had written Obama’s Islamist connection and agenda .
See also, Meotti’s EXPOSÉ: Qatar’s takeover of Europe.
As far as snubs go, Egypt’s precipitous return of $2 billion in aid from Qatar earlier this week couldn’t have been any clearer. Then Egypt’s civil aviation ministry turned down a Qatar Airways request to increase the number of flights between the two countries. For weeks Egyptian authorities had been hounding Qatar’s flagship satellite news network Al Jazeera, storming its local offices, deporting its correspondents and forcing the station off the air.
Qatar, Egypt’s new leadership seems to be saying, is no longer a friend. And Egypt isn’t the only one: Libya, Turkey and Saudi Arabia all have, in one way or another, ganged up on Qatar. The tiny Persian Gulf nation that once seemed poised to take a decisive role in the politics of the Middle East by dint of its copious natural gas wealth and aggressive foreign policy was frequently said to be punching above its weight. Now it seems, others are punching back.
Last October, Qatar’s then Emir Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani electrified the region with an unprecedented visit to Gaza to deliver $400 million in aid to the Hamas government, becoming the first head of state to break, in the most public way possible, an Israeli blockade that had been in place since 2007. Qatar was riding high on successes in Libya and Syria, where military aid and weapons seemed to be turning the tide against loathed despots. Al Jazeera was celebrated world-wide for its fearless—some would say biased—coverage of the Arab revolutions, most notably in Egypt where its reporting on the young revolutionaries of Tahrir Square bordered on adulation. Back then al Jazeera was considered the voice of the Arab Street, and Qatar, as the channel’s host, basked in its reflected glory.
Qatar, as a tiny nation overshadowed by regional behemoths Iran and Saudi Arabia, has long sought to prove its worth on the world stage through the judicious disbursement of cash and diplomacy—helping to broker peace accords from Lebanon to Sudan. After the fall of Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and other regional strongmen, Qatar stepped up its efforts by backing the Muslim Brotherhood, not just in Egypt, but also its counterparts in Libya, Tunisia and Syria. The Qatari monarchy has no great affiliation with the Brotherhood; in fact the group has a very limited presence in Qatar. But Qatar’s leadership saw the Brotherhood gaining in the region, and they wanted to be on the winning side, says David Roberts, director of the Qatar branch of the UK-based Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies.
When the Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi became President of Egypt, Qatar backed his government with investments and aid worth $8 billion. It helped the brotherhood-dominated Hamas government in Gaza, and in Syria funded rebel groups that hewed close to an Islamist agenda. Betting on the Brotherhood was the culmination of Qatar’s longstanding goal to supplant the Middle East’s traditional powerbrokers Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, by visibly allying itself with a rising power. Eighteen months ago, that was a reasonable gamble, says Roberts. “The Muslim Brotherhood had been a political force in the region for decades, and finally, in the wake of the Arab spring, it was on the ascendency. It was quite plausible that the Brotherhood would have had a lasting foothold in the region, so Qatar leveraged its money and contacts to bet on the Brotherhood.”
The bet has not paid off. On July 3 Morsi was ousted in a popularly backed military coup. Saudi Arabia, which has long viewed the Brotherhood, with its grassroots organization and potent mix of politics and religion, as a threat to the monarchies of the Gulf, breathed a sigh of relief and offered the new military leadership $5 billion in aid. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates soon followed with an additional $7 billion. Morsi is now in jail, as are an estimated 2,000 high-ranking members of the organization. On Sept. 23 an Egyptian court outlawed Brotherhood activities and ordered the seizure of the groups’ assets. An outright ban is expected to come soon. Qatar, as the most visible backer of the Brotherhood, has borne the brunt of Egypt’s about-face. “Egypt won’t be governed by Islamists anytime soon, so Qatar has lost a major channel of influence in the region,” says Shadi Hamid, director of research for the Brookings Doha Center, an international policy and research organization.
Elsewhere, resentment against the Brotherhood, and by extension Qatar, is cresting. Libya’s interim government has lambasted the Emirate for its support of what it says are Islamist militias. “It’s not just a major blow to Qatar’s foreign policy, but the pro-Islamist bloc in the entire Middle East,” says Hamid. “Since the two are so linked, it is difficult to see how either will fully recover.” Even the Taliban, who in June opened an office in Doha to great fanfare and Western hopes for a peace agreement with the Afghan government, is now thinking of relocating. Afghan President Hamid Karzai, suspicious of Qatar’s aggressive push for negotiations, has threatened to call off talks if the Taliban keep their office in Doha.
Morsi’s fall came at a significant transition point for Qatar. A little more than a week before, the 61-year-old emir, who had been in power for 18 years, abdicated in favor of his 33-year-old son, Sheik Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. A few days later, Qatar’s indefatigable Foreign Minister Sheik Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, author of Qatar’s aggressive foreign policy, was replaced by 46-year old Khalid bin Mohamed al-Attiyah, ushering in a new generation of leaders just as Qatar’s old foreign policy investments started earning negative returns. In many ways the end of Morsi and the Brotherhood’s rise in the Middle East offers Qatar’s new emir and his foreign minister the opportunity to start over with an evolved policy, says Brookings’s Hamid. “I think we will see a lighter, less confrontational approach with the new leadership.” With the flamboyant HBJ, as the former foreign minister was known, out of the picture, Qatar is likely to move more slowly on regional issues, and less likely to grab headlines by making bold moves, he adds. “We might even see a return to Qatar’s pre-Arab Spring policy of maintaining links to all sides so that it can play more of a negotiation and mediation role.” Given the evolution of events in the Middle East today, more mediation and less taking sides is probably the best bet of all.
Ted Belman Said:
Here is a quote from a leader of Al Nusra
I stumbled on another which relates to what I have been saying regarding the GCC connection to Jihadis in syria and the GCC relation to Israel:
They, and the GCC, IMHO, want Israel in on their side and I believe that going back to the qatar brokered gaza cease fire and before(faux state and confed talk), that this offering explains a great deal of Israel’s unexplained behavior.
Of course, if things don’t go as planned then things change and jihadis might stay in syria.
Report: Israel warned Kenya of Nairobi attack
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4433982,00.html
Debka has said kenya was angry that US and Israel gave no warnings
with debka their track record is spotty, one has to always wonder if it is disinfo.
They might be right they might be wrong
Ted Belman Said:
I am not accusing the particular source, however, when an entity wishes to project images and disinformation such institutes and the media are where the disinfo is floated.
the following statements, in my view are indicators of disinfo:
the only example given here is libya which is still a non entity defacto: a collection of jihadis with some in govt. As for KSA and Turkey or any other GCC member of the sunni arab monarchies there is no evidence. Also, it is ludicrous to think that KSA is not funding jihadis and that with qatar gone this jihadis will disappear.
Ted Belman Said:
The saudis also voice oppostion agains salafis and AQ but they still fund AQ. The MWL is based in Saudi and it is my understanding that many of the MB “charities” in the west are funded by KSA. The egyptian MB IMHO is too independent for the Saudis who are used to the wahabbi subservience. However, the MB has done their agenda sending jihadists to syria,etc. I suspect that they will seek,with their partner qatar,and egypt to influence the MB and attempt to set you leadership over MB which is more comliant to GCC. The covert arm of the MB can still be influenced by qatar whereas whatever is allowed to remain, or return, overtly can be influenced by saudi through egyptians. the question should be asked as to what is the difference between the saudi goals and the qatari goals?
Ted Belman Said:
I do not disagree with tha public face. However, this does not imply htat the KSA and qatar are at odds over this issue. I am aware of the background information and media hype on this subject but facts demonstrate that the influence of qatar has been in sync with the goals of GCDC inc saudi. It was qatar that weaned hamas from Iran and brokered the gaza cease-fire. It was qatar that got Morsi to turn on hamas and operate in the Sinai. Now the army under KSA has increased the war on hamas and sinai which was begun by Morsi and qatar. My suspicion is that the Morsi MB leadership was still trying to relate to Iran and this was unacceptable to the GCC; Israel and US were rumbling that Morsis “terror war” appeard cosmetic. Qatar worked with US and saudi in getting arms and training to the syrian islamist. It is convenient, and intelligent, to maintain the public image for the street both arab and western. The current position allows the GCC to influence both the AQ, salafi, and MB. The westerners are now buying the story that saudi supports more moderate elements in syria (which is absolute rubbish).What is said is often BS but observe that there is no space between saudi goals and aqtar goals.Ted Belman Said:
Can anyone tell the difference? What does it matter and what effect does it have that there are different islamists. What is the difference between a saudi financed islamist and a qatar financed islamist when the financiers are on the same page with the same goal. It is only the hype which avers they are in conflict, there is no evidence in fact that saudi and qatar are in conflict especially wrt their main goal against Iran and proxies. The money I will wager goes back to the GCC. There are at least 11-13 groups but this is part of the BS story which pretends that these are all unrelated groups with “ideologies”. It is a convenient narrative to the cover of different players which enables flexibilty in projecting images, goals and working with jihadis.
@ bernard ross:
It is no secret that SA backed Mubarak and Qatar backed the MB. While it is true that they both back Islamists in Syria, they don’t back the same Islamists.
Qatar hosts the Brookings Institute in Doha. It has been instrumental in developing Obama’s embrace of the Brotherhood. Meanwhile the Saudis have continually voiced their opposition to the MB.
I see no evidence for this statement, especially saudi. There is no space between the GCC members regarding Iran and its proxies. It is only in media hype that we see this concept. GCC members, especially saudi and qatar are in the enviable position of controlling the jihadis regardless of their designated media position.
a beautiful obfuscation. What about the pro islamist bloc controlled by the saudis? It appears that the attempt to link qatar with Islamism has given the saudis a cleaner image. Almost as if they do not have Jihadi ties. Isn’t that convenient. Saudi will b e linked next with moderation and pro democratic forces. LOL. Good cop, bad cop? However you cut it the GCC sunni, arab monarchies are in control of the muslim clerical and jihadi network that is non Iranian controlled. The creation of seeming conflicts, multiple group names, etc are all tactics to appear that it is all fragmented and uncontrolled. I will buy this story when I see that qatar and Saudi goals are not intertwined and the same.
the sauds and qataris control the “winning sides”. The “winning side” is the GCC and qatar is still a winner. perhaps the saudi image is being re-invented as it has been too often associated with muslim terror.
You might almost get the impression that qatar knew what was coming, perhaps even were part of the plan. It’s all very convenient and the GCC retains influence over the various jihadis and clerics whether MB /salafi/AQ. Who will control the MB if it comes back, or if is allowed to re appear in egypt with a reinvented leadership, or its international exiled cadre.