PA armored vehicles agreed to by Israel move into position as Israeli citizens begin taking countermeasures

Residents of the Samarian towns of Eli and Shiloh formed a human blockade on Route 60 after learning that flatbed trucks were delivering armored vehicles to the PA. According to Israeli media, the IDF arrived on the scene after one of the trucks was intercepted by the residents, who refused to allow it to continue to its destination in PA-occupied Shechem. The IDF initially insisted the truck be let through, but finally arrested the driver and confiscated the vehicle only after “heavy pressure” and a “prolonged blockade by the residents who refused to leave the area.”

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The PA continues to receive upgraded weapons and armored vehicles. The Biden administration last month sent the PA a fresh shipment of armored vehicles and “modern automatic weapons equipped with laser [sights].”

“The weapons that were distributed to the PA through the Oslo Accords resulted in over a thousand dead,” said one citizen who participated in the blockade. “The weapons and materiel being transferred now will exact a much higher price.”

He was referring to the Israel government’s agreement in the 1994 Oslo Accords to allow the “Palestinian police” to “possess…up to 45 wheeled armored vehicles of a type to be agreed between the two sides [Israel and PA]…The use of wheeled armored vehicles…in the vicinity of the Settlements shall be approved through the relevant District Coordinating Office.” (Oslo Accords, Annex I, Article III, para. 5a3)

In the thirty years since, the United States and European Union provided the PA with hundreds of armored vehicles. The Jerusalem Post claims the vehicles “are supposed to be used to bring increased law and order,” although there has been no application for armored personnel carriers in protecting PA installations.

The Palestinian first strike capability is a strategy developed in the early stages of the Middle East peace process. According to the strategy, a first strike attack would be preceded by a long period of demonization, misery, and random murder, intended to wear down Israeli will of to continue living in and defending Judea and Samaria.

The strategy assumes that mere “terrorism” is insufficient, because there are about 30 or 40 Jewish communities that are likely to be recalcitrant and hold on, despite the various forms of harassment that “terrorism” involves.

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Frontline News Director Mordechai Sones explained: “Palestinian statehood becoming a fait accompli will require the sudden collapse of a select number of vital Jewish towns. This can only be achieved in a coordinated overnight first strike involving both advancing PA and retreating IDF units.”

He continued: “Therefore, security in Judea and Samaria has been specifically designed in a way that will be vulnerable to a certain type of key that is not immediately perceptible to residents encountering them. Thus, the gates and armaments of Judea and Samaria (and in general the entire security apparatus) have been designed, selected, and controlled universally to be uniquely vulnerable to a specific tool that has been then semi-secretly given to the PA – armored vehicles.

“Armored vehicles are a particular threat to Jewish communities because they can easily smash their way through town gates. As we saw in the south, the armored vehicles could roam within the community because the IDF has withheld anti-armor weapons from Jewish stockpiles. The IDF also appears to be withholding information about Arab armored vehicles in Judea and Samaria.”

Sones stressed: “The PA did not secretly conspire to come up with a force of armored vehicles. It was given to them at Oslo. The gates were built a certain way, and certain weapons are denied to the communities. For example, there exist 7.62mm armor-piercing rounds that could penetrate through PA armored vehicles, but there is no such armor-piercing ammunition in the Jewish communities, and even the 7.62 weapons that have been selected for them jam up almost universally. So in every stage, Jewish defenses have been picked to set up a back-door option for their easy removal.”

Sones concluded: “The eviction and attack plans have one key vulnerability, however: The complex plans to abandon/evict Judea and Samaria’s Jews depend on secrecy to succeed.

“If the Jewish communities of Judea and Samaria prepare to conduct an effective self-defense, and stay alert for a sudden Israeli abandonment, such a collapse can be prevented. The PA would then be forced to mount a sustained attack against a determined defense.”

Residents of Jewish towns like Eli and Shiloh remain surrounded by PA forces, but are beginning to understand their situation is not hopeless.

While the IDF facilitates armored vehicle deliveries to the PA, Jewish towns are starting to take responsibility for conceptualizing an adequate defense doctrine, after decades of pleading to the IDF by residents. As detailed in the Report On the Acquiescence of the Israeli Government in Palestinian Authority First Strike Preparations in Judea and Samaria, security officials in Judea and Samaria have  pointed out that their priority is to provide the local Jewish residents with the “feeling of security,” or as former Yesha Council Executive Director Aharon Domb once said, Judean and Samarian leadership was “afraid that if we presented the true security situation in all its aspects, people wouldn’t want to move to [Judea and Samaria]. . .”

Civilian security coordinators in Judea and Samaria did not respond to a Frontline News inquiry into whether defense teams can repel armored vehicles, or whether they had been briefed on PA attack capabilities. However, a document currently circulating Jewish communities entitled Judea Samaria Defense Initiative points out that Israel itself was conceived in a lopsided struggle, with poorly-armed defenders nevertheless succeeding in repelling armored forces.

Thus, a plaque at Kibbutz Degania in northern Israel recalls: “…Degania bore the brunt of the Syrian attack…Syrian troops sought to destroy it and open the route to Galilee and the Valley of Jezreel.  The turning point came on the 18th May 1948.  The battle raged three full days following the fall of nearby Tzemach.  Syrian tanks tried to overrun the settlement and one penetrated the perimeter.  But they were halted by members of the kibbutz equipped with small arms and Molotov cocktails.”

The proposed system calls for a triple-layered defense to be added to Judea and Samaria’s rapid response team’s capabilities, and actually consists of three separate elements, deployed in sequential zones.

The first element is an Early Warning system.  This is provided by a network of trained observers, each of which is equipped with communication and optical equipment that makes them capable of warning the rapid response teams when a first strike is imminent.  This first element is capable of ruining the shock of surprise and therefore makes the Palestinians less confident about committing to a first strike in the first place.

The second level of Judea/Samaria defense utilizes the early warning of the first element.  A network of interceptor vehicles, each of which carries and can deploy barriers that are capable of blocking, disabling, or destroying PA armored vehicles before they reach the town, provides this defense.

The third component of the system is a community defense system that is designed to destroy armored and other forces that manage to escape the second level.

“The Yesha Defense Initiative system is designed to increase Yesha’s ability to survive and respond to a Palestinian first strike, and thus acts as the strongest possible deterrent to one,” said Sones.

“Individually, each component of the system in itself offers tremendously increased deterrence.  Taken as a whole, however, the system provides a deterrent to first strike planners that can neutralize the Judea/Samaria eviction threat.”

Sones concluded: “If the Judea Samaria Defense Initiative is implemented, the Palestinian Authority can no longer be even remotely comfortable with the predicted effectiveness and destructiveness of a first strike.

“That certainly can only make them far more hesitant even to consider such a strike.”

Jewish towns have begun organizing their first response teams into “anti-tank killer teams.”

In a section entitled “Knocking out armored vehicles,” the Yesha Defense Initiative outlines what it calls “effective techniques that have been developed for poorly-armed defenders to defeat an armored vehicle attack with the resources available to them.”

The document explains: “600 Hungarian army deserters together with 13-14 year-olds destroyed two Soviet armored divisions this way – 150 armored vehicles each.

“In Chechnya, 62 Russian tanks were destroyed using these anti-tank killer teams in the first month of fighting there (December 1994).”

The document details the techniques:

“Organize your rapid-response team into anti-tank killer teams, which include:

1. Five anti-tank firebombers:  Five men rushing an armored vehicle are less likely to be hit than 1 or 2 men, and there will be confusion who to shoot, causing them to shoot at the crowd and miss all;
2. Machine gunner;
3. Sniper;
4. Additional personnel will be needed to serve as ammunition and firebomb bearers and as assistant gunners.

“Select anti-armor ambush areas in sections of the town where buildings restrict and canalize the movement of armored vehicles.

“Lay out the ambush in order to seal off vehicles inside your pre-selected kill zone.  Try to maneuver vehicle columns into streets where destruction of the first and last vehicles will trap the column and allow its total destruction.

“First slow or stop the vehicle in your preplanned kill zone, such as by dropping in front of it an obstacle, fake mine, tree, burning tires, or even a modest barricade;

“Then, with firebombs ready to go, use multiple firebomber teams of 5 to engage armored vehicles from basements, ground level and from second- or third-floor positions.

“Engage each target simultaneously with five or six firebombs, rushing crisscross to another hidden or covered location if that can be coordinated.  People should not be slowed down by turning around.

“Aim for center of mass when trying to kill these vehicles – there is no point in a firebomber aiming for a particular little section of an armored vehicle if that will increase likelihood of missing altogether;

“Have several waves of bottles ready; keep the flame going until it incinerates.

“Meanwhile, the sniper and machine gunner should pin down any supporting infantry as the anti-tank firebombers engage the armored vehicles.

“Remember – armored vehicles are complicated and vulnerable systems.  Just because you are a rifleman doesn’t mean you can’t seriously hurt that tank.  Here is a list of vulnerable things to shoot, thus degrading the combat effectiveness of the vehicle:

• External lights:  Headlights, tail lights, spotlights, and infrared spotlights – all vulnerable to rifle fire;
• Tires on wheeled APC’s:  Shoot these and you can cause the vehicle to run slower and with less control.  Tires also burn well.
• Antennae:  Shoot these off for obvious reasons;
• Armor-glass periscopes:  Shoot these out and the crew will have to expose their heads to see and fight; then you eliminate them;
• Externally mounted fuel tanks:  Sometimes in drum form on the rear, sometimes rectangular mounted on the rear side fenders.  Don’t expect big flaming explosions like in movies – most of these tank engines are diesel;
• Spare ammunition stored externally:  Mainly MG ammunition, sometimes missiles;
• External laser range finders:  Older vehicles are often upgraded with these, since there’s no room inside.  Very vulnerable to small arms fire;
• Smoke dischargers:  Usually not bullet proof.  Keeps them from deploying protective smoke screen;

“Engage armored targets from the top, rear and sides. Shots against frontal armor only serve to expose the gunner. If you can place a sniper in second- or third-floor level positions, engage accompanying air-defense guns first.”

“The Soviet BTR-152 armored troop carrier was produced from 1950 to 1960, and has appeared in many variants and seen action on many fronts, including the Middle East and Afghanistan. The BTR-152 in Palestinian hands has a mount for the 12.7mm D.Sh.K. heavy machine gun.  It has a 6×6 wheel drive configuration.  It can hold 2 crew members (driver + commander) and 17 fighters.  The BTR-152 is equipped with night vision equipment for the driver.  It weighs 8950 kg and can travel at a speed of 75 km/h.  It’s power-to-weight ratio is 12.29 hp/100kg making it capable of taking down the gates of any yishuv.”

“The BRDM-2 is a fully armored, four-wheel-drive, amphibious reconnaissance vehicle.  It has two-pairs of belly wheels and a centralized tire pressure regulation system for increased cross-country capability.  The BRDM-2 has a box-like hull with a boat-shaped bow.  The engine is mounted in the vehicle rear and there is a small conical turret mounted on the hull above the belly wheels.  The driver sits at the front of the hull on the left with the vehicle commander to his right.  To enter the vehicle, the crew must climb through two roof hatches.  The hull, which is constructed of welded steel, provides the crew with protection from small arms and shell splinters.  The turret, which is very similar to that of the BTR-60PB and Czechoslovak OT-64, is located in the center of the vehicle and is armed with a 14.5-mm KPVT or 7.62mm PKT machine gun.  On either side of the hull adjacent to the crew position, there is a firing port.  Immediately behind the firing port are three vision blocks that protrude from the outside of the hull, giving some vision to the front and rear of the vehicle.  The belly-wheels are chain driven and are lowered by the driver and give the BRDM-2 improved cross-country performance and the ability to cross ditches.  The driver can adjust the tire pressure on all four tires or individual tires while the vehicle is in motion to adjust to the ground conditions.  The BRDM-2 is fully amphibious.  It is propelled in the water by a single water jet at the rear of the hull.  The vehicle has an over-pressure NBC system.  The BRDM-2 is equipped with infrared driving and searchlights, a radio and an inertial land navigation system.  At the front of the vehicle is a winch that has 30m of cable and has a maximum load of 4000-kg.

“Other armored vehicles residents should learn to recognize because the PA army may have them already or can easily get them from countries supporting the PA, such as Egypt or others:

“Tracked vehicles or Half-tracks:  White M2 Half-track;  BTR-50, PT-76, BMP

“Wheeled armored personnel carriers:  BTR-60, OT-62.”