If Iran turns down the nuclear deal

By Daniel Pipes, ISRAEL HAYOM

Whether congressional Democrats accept or reject President Barack Obama’s Iran deal has great importance and is rightly the focus of international attention. But there’s another debate taking place over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that may be even more critical: the one in Iran.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who makes the country’s decisions, just might reject the laboriously worked-out agreement that he helped negotiate.

On one level, that makes no sense. As a plethora of analyses have established, the Vienna deal is enormously favorable to the Islamic Republic of Iran, legitimizing its nuclear research, assuring its future nuclear weapons program, helping the economy, and boosting its aggressive international goals. These advantages would make it appear absurd for Khamenei not to accept the deal. Plus, most Iranians celebrate the accord.

But rejecting it makes sense if one focuses not on those immediate advantages and instead looks at its future dangers to the Iranian regime’s surviving. Leaders of fanatical and brutal government such as Khamenei’s invariably make ideological purity and personal power their highest priorities, and he is no exception. From this point of view — its impact on the regime’s longevity — the deal contains two problems.

First, it betrays Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s vision of unyielding enmity to the United States, a core principle that has guided the Islamic republic since he founded it in 1979. A substantial portion of the leadership, including Khamenei himself, hold to a purist vision that sees any relations with the United States as unacceptable and bordering on treachery. For this reason, Tehran has long been the world’s only capital not seeking improved relations with Washington. These rejectionists disdain the benefits of the deal; they refuse it on grounds of principle.

Their position is hardly unique. Similarly, Palestinian rejectionists oppose treaties with Israel, regardless of their potential benefits, not wanting to truck with the enemy. (Think of the 1993 Oslo accords, which brought land, money, legitimacy, and guns.) Principle trumps practicality.

Second, Iranian opponents of the deal worry about its eroding the Islamist values of Khomeini’s revolution. They fear that the businessmen, tourists, students, artists, and so on, perched soon to descend on an newly opened Iran will further tempt the local population away from the difficult path of resistance and martyrdom in favor of consumerism, individualism, feminism and multiculturalism. They despise and dread American clothing, music, videos and education. Khamenei himself talks of the U.S. government seeking a way “to penetrate into the country.” From their point of view, isolation and poverty have their virtues as means to keep the Iranian revolution alive.

In short, the Iranian debate over the deal is a genuine one, pitting those who argue in favor of the deal’s short-term benefits against those fearful of its long-term dangers. Khamenei must make a difficult choice.

Back in the West, opponents of the deal will, of course, rejoice if Khamenei rejects the deal. But his doing so also presents them with a problem. After claiming that Obama has given away the store, they must confront the awkward fact that the Iranian leadership turned down his offer. As Obama emerges as an apparent hard-liner who protected American interests and out-bargained the bazaar merchants, their argument collapses. His accusation about their “making common cause” with the Iranian rejectionists will look newly convincing and terribly damning. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, currently in Obama’s dog house, is especially at risk of being dismissed as foolish.

To avoid this fate, the deal’s opponents must immediately prepare for the possibility of an Iranian “no.”

That means their taking several steps: Pre-empt Khamenei by foreseeing and even predicting his rejection of the deal. Explain (as I have done here) that his reasons have nothing to do with its substance and everything with the purity of ideology and maintaining a revolutionary spirit. Develop a familiarity beyond the terms of the deal and learn the intricacies of Iran’s domestic scene. Hone anti-Obama arguments (such as that he deluded himself into thinking he had a negotiating partner when none existed). Devise a detailed policy toward Tehran that renews economic sanctions and enforces other penalties. Find allies internationally to help implement this renewed sanctions regime. Prepare the public for the possibility of destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Khamenei’s rejection of the Vienna deal would be great news for everyone, and especially for the deal’s opponents — but they urgently need to prepare for this eventuality.

Daniel Pipes (DanielPipes.org, @DanielPipes) is president of the Middle East Forum.

August 21, 2015 | 3 Comments »

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  1. I have great respect for Daniel Pipes but in this case I disagree with him.

    The supreme leader pulls the strings and the legislature will vote as he desires. By personally standing clear of either endorsing the agreement or rejecting it he gains the best of both possible worlds.

    The Iranian vote takes place after the congressional vote. Assume that Congress votes to reject the deal and Obama either mounts a campaign for a successful override of the veto, or failing that proceeds on the basis of executive agreement.

    The supreme leader has announced that he will not take a stand on the agreement leaving it up to the legislature. The negotiators and the foreign secretary have said that the agreement will be interpreted as it is interpreted by the supreme leader.

    Where do we stand. The Americans have signed a purchase order which is in fact a blank check. The Iranian’s can demand US and international actions based on the specifics of some of the provisions. Iran can equivocate, contradict, not follow, and/or backpedal on any of the provisions that pertain to them as they see fit.

    The supreme leader by not accepting the deal maintains his purity. The supreme leader by not accepting the deal still benefits from the rewards and does not become penalized by having any countervailing obligations (except those in which he defines and chooses to “comply with”)

    In short form Dr. Pipes should review the situation and ask: exactly how the skilled Iranian players will maximize their position under any contingency and under any group circumstances.BECAUSE THIS IS HOW THEY WILL ACT.

  2. The Supreme Lowlife might be a wacky psychotic nutmuffin, but even wacky psychotic nutmuffins do not refuse $150 billion.