Hezbollah, Hamas seem slow to realize Israel’s military successes have decimated their populations and changed the status quo
Israel has launched aerial attacks on Beirut, Lebanon, in its campaign against Hezbollah. Image: YouTube Screengrab
After some optimism that lasted less than 24 hours, Hezbollah and Israel seem as far from a ceasefire as ever, which begs the question: How else will the war end?
Earlier in the week, the Israeli army had declared its mission accomplished and removed protective barriers it had set up against Hezbollah’s Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) in Israel’s northernmost towns, near the Lebanese border.
The moves signaled Israel’s confidence that its campaign to neutralize the Iran-backed militia’s threat was going as planned. Yet Hezbollah’s high-trajectory fire continued. Israel, in effect, has been fighting two wars against the Iran-backed Lebanese militia.
The first war, now seemingly over, was particular to Israeli communities that live within of 5,500 meters (3.4 miles) from the border, the range of Hezbollah’s hand-held ATGMs. The border itself posed another threat.
After Hamas burst out of the Gaza Strip and massacred 1,200 Israelis, on October 7, 2023, Israelis lost faith in security fences like the one that separated them from Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s ATGMs and the unreliable border fence forced the displacement of over 60,000 Israeli northerners. While Israel wanted to repopulate its north, fastest, the relatively small size of its army forced it to wait until it had overcome Hamas’s threat in the south.
On October 1, Israel launched a ground maneuver with the goal of clearing Lebanese territory from Hezbollah, both under and above ground. The Jewish state has lost close to 70 troops since and has pushed up to three kilometers inside Lebanon, thus neutralizing Hezbollah’s ATGM threat.
Then, to keep this threat away, and given the absence of a reliable Lebanese government that can control its side of the border, the Jewish state will likely hold Lebanese territory until further notice.
If Beirut complains against occupation, Jerusalem may offer the Lebanese a trade: Disband Hezbollah and enter into a security arrangement, then take your land back. Until then, Israel will have to maintain this territory as a buffer zone— a no-man’s land.
Israel is fighting another war with Hezbollah, one in which the Iran-backed militia uses high-trajectory fire to hit anywhere in Israel. In response, Israel has been hitting missile stockpile depots and eliminating Hezbollah’s chain of command.
The Jewish state has also imposed an arms embargo on resupply shipments from Iran to its proxy militia, on land and via air to the Beirut airport.
To deny Israel victory, Hezbollah and Hamas have usually set two metrics: Israel’s inability to kill the militias’ leaders, and its failure to stop high-trajectory fire on Israel. Hezbollah added a third metric: It promised Israel that it would not be able to bring its citizens back to their northern towns without a political settlement on the militia’s terms.
Hamas also added a third metric: Israel would not be able to free some 100 hostages that the Palestinians kidnapped on October 7, without Israeli concessions on hard-earned security achievements. But since October 7, 2023, Israel has managed to largely crush the “victory” metrics of both Hezbollah and Hamas. It has decimated the leadership of both militias.
In Gaza, Israel has also managed to eliminate the high-trajectory fire threat. Estimates suggest that, since October 7, Hamas has fired over 20,000 rockets on Israel. By August 2024, however, Hamas had depleted its reserves. Its launches became few and far between.
Hezbollah’s missile stockpile was much bigger, estimated at 150,000 before the war. By October 2024, Hezbollah’s stock had reportedly fallen to 27,000. If Hezbollah maintains its daily average launches of 100 projectiles, its missiles will last until early July, after which the militia’s high projectile fire withers away.
Without the ability to shoot across the border or throw missiles on Israel, the very existence of Hezbollah will become irrelevant.
For Israel to preserve its gains, however, it will have to either continue to police and prevent arms resupply to Hezbollah and Hamas, while holding onto a buffer zone inside both Lebanon and Gaza, or the Lebanese and the Palestinians will have to produce responsible governments that take the war keys out of the hands of their militias.
World and Arab capitals can play an instrumental role in helping and guiding both the Lebanese and Palestinians from living under militias to standing up for reliable governments. But the Lebanese and the Palestinians have to want such an outcome first, and to ask for it. After all, one can only lead a horse to the river, but can never make it drink.
Hezbollah and Hamas seem slow to realize that Israel’s military successes have resulted in disasters for their populations and a change in the status quo. The militias seem to think that they can turn back the clock to October 6, 2023, a vintage “resistance” way of wishful thinking that has hampered peace and produced wars over the past century.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD).
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