A different two-state solution

U.S. President Donald Trump threw out the term “two-states” at the United Nations Thursday, giving hope to proponents of the supposedly irreplaceable two-state solution and even spurring assurances from the likes of Haaretz editor-in-chief Aluf Benn that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would be handled with kid gloves should he take this path. Let us assume that Trump really does love the idea and that in a matter of months, he will present this plan as the “deal of the century,” what would it look like? The Clinton Parameters that were meant to be the basis for further negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in 2000? Why would the Palestinians, who have already rejected this framework in the past, now suddenly accept it?

The only good thing about the “two-state solution” is the fact that the Palestinians reject it time and again, thereby saving us from ourselves.

But why do they reject the two-state solution?

First and foremost because it does not relate to their central ethos: The “right” of return – in other words, the right to drown Israel in millions of Palestinians. As long as they insist on this demand, there is no chance of finding a solution to the conflict.

But the truth is the Palestinians have better reasons to reject this framework. They know that a state divided between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip in which, according to the framework, the “right of return” will be realized, will need to absorb and provide for the descendants of the descendants of “refugees” and, as such, is unsustainable. Such a country would be incapable of supporting itself and its residents and will be unable to defend itself. Such a country would be a pressure-cooker society that the Palestinians would divert to marches of return and attempts to cross the border. Such a state would mean inevitable war.

This is clearly a lose-lose situation and a bad framework for both sides involved.  From our perspective, the significance of such a framework would be the loss of our defensible borders, the transformation of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area of Gush Dan and Jerusalem into the Judea and Samaria periphery area, the relinquishment of national assets including territory that is not so densely populated, the division of Jerusalem and the mass eviction of Israeli citizens from Judea and Samaria.

We must look for another two-state solution, one that lies outside the tiny strip of land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. If we look outside the box and expand the search to include all of the territory from the desert to the sea, this could allow for an appropriate solution that would see the State of Israel with defensible borders and sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, greater Jerusalem, the settlement blocs, the Judean Desert and areas not densely populated by Palestinians and a Palestinian-Jordanian state situated in the majority of the historical land of Israel; all of Jordan, territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority and other populated territories in Judea and Samaria and maybe even the Gaza Strip. From the Jordan River eastward, this Palestinian-Jordanian state would have full sovereignty and a strong military. In the territory to the west of the Jordan River, the state would be demilitarized.

An excellent solution, I am told. But the problem is, they argue, there is no “partner.” The funny thing is that the same people who cite the lack of a partner as a reason this plan cannot work are the ones who continue to adhere to the two-state solution, for which we already know there is no partner. Instead of pushing a dangerous “solution” for which we know there is no partner, Israel would be wise to try and create a partner for an appropriate solution.