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Turkey-US relations: A rocky road ahead: Galip Dalay, Middle East Eye, Feb. 17, 2021 Iran and Turkey appear to be on collision course in Iraq – analysis: Seth J. Frantzman, Jerusalem Post, Mar. 1, 2021 Doubts over Turkey’s tactical move to extend olive branch to Egypt: Menekse Tokyay, Arab News, Mar. 5, 2021 Rare visit to Israel by Egypt’s oil minister sends signals to Biden, Erdogan: Lazar Berman: Times of Israel, Feb. 22, 2021 ______________________________ Turkey-US relations: A rocky road ahead “Turkey clearly believes its own interests are better served through a balancing act among different centres of power. From the US perspective, this purchase manifests Turkey’s new geopolitical identity and realignment, away from the West and closer to Russia” As a great power competition looms, the health of Turkish-US relations will be decided more by Ankara’s ties with Russia and China than by developments in the Middle East. Conscious of their inferior position in the geopolitical and security realm, Russia and China are telling US partners that they don’t have to choose between Moscow, Beijing and Washington – instead, they can work with all sides. In contrast, the US, with its upper hand, is demanding that treaty allies such as Turkey make a choice – essentially pushing its partners to take a side. But Turkey clearly believes its own interests are better served through a balancing act among different centres of power. From the US perspective, this purchase manifests Turkey’s new geopolitical identity and realignment, away from the West and closer to Russia During the Cold War superpower competition, Turkey was in the western camp, largely due to its threat perception stemming from the Soviet Union’s geopolitical calculations. According to the official historiography, in 1945, the Soviets demanded the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan, along with special rights in the management of the Turkish Straits. Even though the veracity of this account has been contested, the notion became a key driver of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War, pushing Turkey to seek membership in different western clubs – most importantly, NATO in 1952. Unlike during the Cold War, Turkey does not have a similar threat perception stemming from the current geopolitical situation. Instead, it sees more opportunities. But as great power competition gains steam, countries such as Turkey will likely find themselves increasingly facing unpalatable binary choices, each with costs and consequences. System-level developments in international affairs will present the main test for Turkish-US relations in particular, and Turkish-western relations more broadly. Once the US partnership with the Syrian Kurds is set aside, the Biden administration’s emerging Middle East policy is not inimical to Turkish interests. US President Joe Biden’s more critical stance on Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as well as his plan to reverse the Trump regime’s maximum-pressure policy against Iran, line up with Turkish interests. Still, Turkey will likely support efforts to curb Iran’s regional influence. … [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.] Iran and Turkey appear to be on collision course in Iraq – analysis “Turkey has long preyed on the Kurdish region, claiming to fight the PKK, and set up dozens of bases. Swaths of villages have been depopulated because of PKK-Turkish fighting in the otherwise peaceful, mountainous region.” While the region’s eyes are on recent tensions with Iran in the Gulf of Oman and Syria, a simmering dispute between Iran and Turkey in Iraq appears to be growing. The dispute has origins going back years as Iran has sought greater influence in Iraq, and Turkey has long viewed northern Iraq as its area of influence. The recent tensions have grown after Turkey threatened an invasion of Iraq’s Sinjar region. This region was home to the Yazidi minority prior to 2014. ISIS attacked Sinjar in 2014 and committed genocide and around 500,000 Yazidis were forced to flee. After Sinjar was liberated by Kurdish forces, a tense time resulted as various Kurdish factions sought control. What matters is that in 2017, the Iraqi government supported pro-Iranian militias, called Hashd al-Shaabi, to retake Sinjar from the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government. Disputes in Sinjar over whether the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) might remain led to Turkish threats the Sinjar is harboring “terrorists.” In fact, some Yazidis had joined far-Left groups allegedly linked to the PKK as part of the struggle against ISIS. Turkey wanted to use this as an excuse to invade. Turkey has a long track record of invading and ethnically cleansing Yazidis and Kurds, in Afrin in Syria in 2019, and Tel Abyad in Syria in October 2019. It appears that Iran, having helped the Iraqi government grab Sinjar from the Kurdistan region, doesn’t want Turkey entering Sinjar now. For the minorities, like Yazidis, no one seems to care. Even the pope will be arriving in Mosul soon, but not Sinjar. In that context, the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Iraj Masjedi told Rudaw, a Kurdish media outlet, that Ankara should not be violating Iraq’s sovereignty. “We reject military intervention in Iraq and Turkish forces should not pose a threat or violate Iraqi soil,” Masjedi told Rudaw’s Mushtaq Ramazan last week in an exclusive interview. “The security of the Iraqi area should be maintained by Iraqi forces and [Kurdistan] Region forces in their area.” Masjedi appeared to go even further than opposing an invasion of Sinjar, he said Turkey should withdraw forces from bases in northern Iraq’s Kurdish region. Turkey has long preyed on the Kurdish region, claiming to fight the PKK, and set up dozens of bases. Swaths of villages have been depopulated because of PKK-Turkish fighting in the otherwise peaceful, mountainous region. Recently Turkey launched operations striking PKK bases. … [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.] Doubts over Turkey’s tactical move to extend olive branch to Egypt “experts regard such a deal to still be far-fetched, at least in the short-term, because Egypt has had an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement with Greece since last year. This pact angered Turkey because it has had longstanding disagreements with Greece over the extent of their mutual continental shelves.” With Turkey hinting at a potential deal with Egypt on exclusive maritime zones in the gas-rich Eastern Mediterranean, the impact of such an agreement on energy transit routes and the political concessions that Turkey might be obliged to make have come under the spotlight. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu on Wednesday said that the country wanted to sign a deal over maritime boundaries. But this willingness is currently limited to declarations from the Turkish side, with no tangible reaction from the Egyptians. Turkey’s tactical move indicates a willingness to reduce escalatory policies in the region in order to bypass any criticism from Brussels and US President Joe Biden’s administration. Potential sanctions against Turkey’s controversial exploratory activities in the Eastern Mediterranean would be discussed at the European Summit on March 25-26, pushing it to not make aggressive moves ahead of that meeting. But experts regard such a deal to still be far-fetched, at least in the short-term, because Egypt has had an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement with Greece since last year. This pact angered Turkey because it has had longstanding disagreements with Greece over the extent of their mutual continental shelves. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis had a phone call on Wednesday evening, after Cavusoglu’s statement, on regional issues of common interest, with a special emphasis on energy and Eastern Mediterranean issues, another strong signal that Greece would do its best to not let a Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement happen. Turkey said the deal between Greece and Egypt did not include a disputed zone to the south of the Greek island of Kastellorizo which Turkey claims under its own EEZ. Relations with Egypt have been strained after the Turkish-backed Mohammed Mursi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was ousted by El-Sisi in 2013. Last year, Egypt, Cyprus and Greece released a joint declaration accusing Turkey of carrying out “provocations” in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Egypt has been involved in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum since 2019 without involving Turkey. Turkey and Egypt have also backed opposing sides in Libya’s civil war. … [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.] Rare visit to Israel by Egypt’s oil minister sends signals to Biden, Erdogan “Analysts say that one of the key purposes of the meetings — beyond the energy discussions — was to send a message to Turkey, and its president Recep Tayyip Erdogan.” Although the visit of Egypt’s Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister to Israel on Sunday had the trappings of a routine discussion about energy cooperation by regional partners, it also sent a message to rivals and to the United States. Tarek el-Molla’s trip was noteworthy for the mere fact that he was the first Egyptian minister to visit Israel since foreign minister Sameh Shoukry met with Netanyahu in 2016. And El-Molla is no minor player. “El-Molla is very close to [Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah] el-Sisi,” pointed out Gabriel Mitchell of the Mitvim Institute, an Israel-based think tank. “He is arguably one of the most visible Egyptian ministers outside the presidency.” There is certainly no shortage of weighty energy issues for El-Molla to discuss with Israel. Israel and Egypt agreed Sunday to link up Israel’s Leviathan natural gas field with Egyptian liquid natural gas facilities through an underwater pipeline, from which it can be exported to European markets. What’s more, a UAE-Israel plan to pump oil from Eilat on the Red Sea to Ashkelon on the Mediterranean concerns Egypt, but Cairo has largely refrained from publicly criticizing the project. A deal to provide Israeli natural gas to Gaza is nearing approval, and anything that happens in the coastal enclave could have a direct impact on Egyptian security. Analysts say that one of the key purposes of the meetings — beyond the energy discussions — was to send a message to Turkey, and its president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. For the better part of a decade, Turkey has been engaged in a bitter rivalry with Egypt that began when Erdogan backed the Muslim Brotherhood after the group was ousted from power in Cairo In the Mediterranean, Egypt has aligned itself with Greece and Cyprus, which accuse Turkey of illegally drilling for natural gas in their exclusive economic zones. Together with Israel, the countries formed the EastMed Gas Forum, headquartered in Cairo, and have conducted joint military exercises. “A meeting between Israel and Egypt, even if it isn’t the primary purpose of the visit, does send a message to Turkey, especially in the context of the other meetings that are taking place this month,” said Mitchell. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis visited Israel on February 8, and Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades met with Netanyahu on February 14. “There s a clear message of unity, that these partners are working together, that they have their diplomatic ducks in a row, they have their energy ducks in a row.” … [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.] For Further Reference: Turkish curriculum takes anti-Israel turn under Erdogan: Dean Shmuel Elmas and ILH Staff, Israel Hayom, Mar. 7, 2021 — Not only did the political cooperation between Turkey and Israel deteriorate ever since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan took office almost 16 years ago, but the Turkish school curriculum has been radicalized to reflect the country’s anti-Israel stance, a new report published by IMPACT-Se, an international research and policy institute that monitors culture tolerance in schools, and the Henry Jackson Society, revealed. Amid resistance from Turkey, Kosovo embassy may not be in Jerusalem: Zenel Zhinipotoku and Lazar Semini, Times of Israel, Mar. 2, 2021 — Kosovo’s prime minister-designate has found himself in a difficult diplomatic position ahead of taking the post following his country’s diplomatic ties with Israel. Turkey’s continuous weapon transfer to Libya: 3 Turkish military cargo planes land in Wattayah and Misurata: Walaa Ali, Egypt Today, Mar. 1, 2021 — Ankara continues to transfer arms and ammunition to cities in western Libya, as the head of the national interim government, Abdel Hamid Dabaiba, hands over the ministerial formation to the presidency of the House of Representatives. Russia, Turkey see ‘window of opportunity’ to salvage Iran nuclear deal, urge US to lift sanctions on Tehran: Arab News, Mar. 5, 2021 — Russia and Turkey both see a ‘window of opportunity’ to salvage the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement and have called on the US to lift crippling sanctions imposed against Tehran. Mapping Kurdish Optimism for a Biden Administration: Turkey and Iran: John Saleh, Washington Institute, Feb 16, 2021 — Across the region, Kurds are looking forward to a Biden presidency. Many have high hopes, seeing Biden as potentially the Kurds’ most supportive U.S. president to date. |
Menu There is no diplomatic solutionIsrael should declare three nos;
no to nuclear Iran, no to two-state solution, no to bi-national state
no to nuclear Iran, no to two-state solution, no to bi-national state
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