Peloni: The following is the final third of Dyer’s most recent column. In her analsyis here she shares her conclusion that:
“As I noted a month ago in a more extended treatment, the main actor the U.S. operational profile in CENTCOM is in no position to deter is Iran.”
And she suggests that this might well “explain everything bizarre and operationally inexplicable about how the Biden administration has run the counter-strikes so far.”
Deterrence and credibility deficit.
J.E. Dyer, The Optimistic Conservative, February 9, 2024
What we haven’t been told is what the Air Force’s squadrons of strike-fighters at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar were doing.
Refueling tankers flew from Al-Udeid, apparently to support the strike package. At a minimum this support would have been for the B-1s. I’d typically assume the bombers had fighter escort as well. It seems likely that it came from Al-Udeid. But it’s an assumption that Al-Udeid-based escorts were used – and there’s an information hole for the question whether strike-fighters from Al-Udeid participated in the strikes on ground targets.
It’s possible that no Air Force strike-fighters from Al-Udeid participated. If that’s the case, the likely reason is that Qatar wouldn’t allow it (the link is to my article a few weeks ago previewing that possibility). My guess would have to be that the Saudis wouldn’t agree to attack sorties staging from Prince Sultan Air Base either. Notably, Air Force Times reported no information that strike-fighters deployed to Qatar participated in the strikes, although it did report on 5 February that F-16s from the D.C. Air National Guard had deployed in mid-January to augment the squadrons already in CENTCOM.
Qatar (and/or the Saudis) might be allowing the U.S. to launch non-lethal (or non-attack) support flights from Al-Udeid, but not attack sorties by strike-fighters going after land targets. Such a prohibition may affect Iraq, Syria, or both, and could also affect Yemen – where targets we would strike are Houthi-controlled facilities and weapons.
If that’s the case, we can assume it will affect our options in Iran as well. The effect for Iran would probably include preventing Air Force fighters from providing escort for bombers from CONUS attacking land targets in Iran, as well as shutting down land-attack sorties by strike-fighters.
The geographic obviousness of wanting to fly U.S. strike-fighters from Qatar for strikes in Iraq and Syria is such that failure to mention it has to stand out. A bit more from the email commentary trail:
We may be stringing things out because we can’t fly strike-fighter attack sorties from Qatar. That’s my deduction from the 2 Feb strikes, which apparently involved – most oddly – the much-touted B-1s, some Jordanian F-16s in Syria, and some helicopters in Iraq. I’m not even sure the B-1s had fighter escort while they were over Iraq (usually de rigueur, but there’s no sign of it). It may be that the Iraqi government agreed not to do anything to interfere with them. The Iraqi militias don’t have the capability to.
More on this in an upcoming article. The B-1s carry a lot of bombs, but by the nature of their load and delivery design, they can’t administer the more geometrically agile punch a 6-, 8-, 14-ship attack package with F-15s or F-16s can. To do the concentrated, complex attack profile on a heavy-weight target set, the kind that’s required in a short period of time to really give Iran’s militia pals a gut punch, you have to have the tactical aircraft. They fly out of Doha, but they apparently didn’t fly on 2 Feb.
(Additional note: it’s conceivable that USAF strike-fighters participated on 2 February, but with a basically invisible profile from the standpoint of detectability to civilian enthusiasts operating remotely. The purpose would have been a requirement by Qatar that such participation be as stealthy as possible. I consider that unlikely, however, because it would be too easy for observers in the area, whether foreign militaries or civilians, to see what was happening. There would have been reports if it happened.)
Please be clear on this: not being able to fly strike sorties from Al-Udeid would be a severe constraint on our ability to execute deterrent strikes quickly, responsively, and in adequate numbers to actually deter. In fact, that condition alone would explain everything bizarre and operationally inexplicable about how the Biden administration has run the counter-strikes so far.
The silence from Al-Udeid doesn’t bode well, moreover, for the U.S. “option” of attacking Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Doing that would involve a huge target set, not even so much for the nuclear weapons program itself as for neutralizing Iran’s air defenses and means of retaliation. The U.S. assets at Al-Udeid are already stretched, and they would be needed as the core of a campaign against Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Such a campaign would require both the USAF – global strike assets (B-2, B-1, B-52) and CENTCOM-deployed tactical and support aircraft – and the USN in the form of a whole carrier strike group operating in the Persian Gulf (at least one; better two, in my view).
Both services’ assets are needed. The Air Force can’t do it without facilities at the same level of capacity and preparedness as Al-Udeid, and the Navy can’t do it from the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden. In today’s environment in the theater, I would actually want to have a carrier strike group outside the Strait of Hormuz as insurance for the strike group inside the Persian Gulf. I’d also want the Marines – a whole amphibious ready group – close to the Gulf ready to respond immediately to threats to U.S. facilities in the Gulf nations, and/or as needed to bolster host-nation security (especially in UAE and Bahrain, but potentially Iraq. The remaining theater reserve maintained by the Army in Kuwait would ideally suffice for Kuwait and Iraq).
The voids haven’t closed. As I noted a month ago in a more extended treatment, the main actor the U.S. operational profile in CENTCOM is in no position to deter is Iran.
Read the beginning of the article hear
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