The operative successes of the Arab struggle against Israel put the spotlight on the depth of its strategic failure. Israel’s regional isolation is dissipating, and the principal oil producers are part of a coalition with it.
By Dan Schueftan, ISRAEL HAYOM
Positive momentum in Israel’s regional standing is underway as can be seen by the visits of senior Israeli officials – among them its previous and present prime minister, and the foreign and defense ministers – to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and Morocco, and the visit of a military delegation to Sudan, as well as a military flight over Saudi airspace.
Following the signing of the Abraham Accords, legitimization of ties between Israel and Arab states have moved from being barely justifiable and only in exchange for the return of lands captured in 1967 to the opposite pole of close defense ties and use of Israel’s strength, credibility and capability as an important component of Arab national security. The ties and normalization that were offered in the “Arab peace initiative” as a reward for the territorial and political dictates of the Arabs and the Palestinians are now seen as an Israeli contribution to the defense and welfare of the Arabs.
Deep-rooted, multi-generational national conflicts, with a highly emotional cultural component, are examined through the prism of a key historical component regarding the perceptions of the sides on the question, “who has time on their side?” In other words, who holds the upper hand in the accumulative historical trend in the balance of power: which party gets stronger over time and which side loses important components of its bargaining power.
The crux is the motivation to continue the struggle: the side that sees its optimal expectations reinforced draws, as a result, the resilience required for a resolute stand; the side that experiences constant failure loses its ability to persuade the public to bear the cost of ongoing mobilization.
The radical forces that have operated over the past hundred years to mobilize the Arab public “from the [Atlantic] ocean to the [Arab] Gulf” to fight Israel, managed for many long years, despite Israel’s impressive achievements, to maintain expectations for an Arab victory, by drawing on the historical dimension. They relied primarily on the enormous gap in resources between the sides and took comfort in the deep-rooted perception of the Arabs as a people who from time immemorial were “destined for greatness.”
From their point of view, even if the Jews had managed to establish a state in 1948, to defend it in 1967, to maintain its conquest of “Palestine” and Jerusalem, and to build a modern and developed state, its resources were still pitiful when compared to those of the hundreds of millions of Arabs surrounding it, and the Jewish State was vulnerable and its durability was short-lived. The Arabs not only possessed oil and international status, but most of all they had an unlimited ability to absorb blows and boundless determination.
Over time, Israel would not be able to stand up to the tenacity of the Arabs in boycotting it in the region, the violent threats to the lives of its citizens, and its survivability in the face of its de-legitimization in the international arena and among Western democracies.
The Arab struggle had many operative successes. The radicals indeed managed to mobilize the Arab countries to boycott Israel for generations. This went on for decades after the revolutionary peace agreement with Egypt and the accords with Jordan. The Arabs’ oil resources succeeded, primarily in the 1970s, to sabotage important Israeli interests. The repeated wars, the ongoing terrorism, and the recognition that the existential and daily threats were a permanent fixture harmed and hurt Israel’s society and economy.
Delegitimization in international organizations has been a challenge and is worsening. The absurd defamation of Israel has found a receptive audience among the mainstream in Europe, and even among groups that are no longer on the fringes in the United States.
But these operative successes paradoxically shine a light on the depth of the strategic failure. Israel’s regional isolation is dissipating in front of our very eyes in the Gulf and Morocco and relations with Egypt and Jordan are undergoing a marked improvement.
The principal Arab oil producers are de facto members of a coalition with Israel. The big wars have come to an end, the Iranian threat is grave, but primarily it threatens the Arabs and moves them closer to Israel. In the ultimate terrorist war (“the Second Intifada”) it was the Palestinians who initiated it that broke. Isolation in international organizations has not dented Israel’s firm standing among the countries that set the tone in the international arena, and the effects of defamation among the Western democracies are limited.
Above all, Israel is, in the eyes of its residents, in the eyes of the leading countries in the world, and to a growing extent among the Arabs themselves, an outstanding success story that consistently proves its ability to deal with enormous challenges. Time, therefore, is on Israel’s side.
Also consider that now oil and gas as fossil fuels are evaporating assets both real and political as the World shifts to wind and solar or insulation in order to survive.
Further the Arab World still has to sort out its own relationship with its Moslem identity and ability to govern themselves. The anti-Israel campaign was a diversion to avoid these two problems but you can not drown sorrows in drink and they have to be faced. There is also the little problem of feeding and watering the populations of 100 million Egyptians, ditto Turks and ditto Iranians.