The Window Is Closing for Diplomacy to Stop Iran’s Nuclear Program

Of the many challenges facing Israel, the most immediate is to ensure the release of all the hostages being held in Gaza and remove Hamas from power. But our highest priority must be denying Iran – whose rogue regime denies Israel’s right to exist – the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

As a former brigadier general in the Israel Defense Forces who has followed Iran’s nuclear program since its inception, I am encouraged by President Donald Trump’s efforts to negotiate an agreement that will end any risk of Iran building or acquiring nuclear weapons. But if U.S. efforts to stop Iran’s nuclear program by nonmilitary means do not succeed within a few months, military action may be required.

The U.S. president understands the urgency of the situation and took steps last week to resolve the problems with Iran’s nuclear program peacefully by sending Iran a letter about starting negotiations. He noted last Friday that the U.S. is down to “the final moments” with Iran and that the world “can’t let them have a nuclear weapon.” He said that might mean using force: “There are two ways Iran can be handled: militarily, or you make a deal.”

Because Iran is currently very vulnerable, there is a slight possibility that the United States can use the pressure of sanctions and diplomacy – and the threat of a credible military option – to block Iran from having the capability to produce nuclear weapons. That would be ideal.

But if serious diplomacy fails, military action is needed given Tehran’s dangerous behavior. Last July, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said publicly that Iran has the capability to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon within one to two weeks. The regime in Tehran has demonstrated its willingness to attack Israel directly, firing hundreds of ballistic missiles over our border in the past year. China, meanwhile, is supplying Iran with a large amount of propellants for future strikes.

I believe that if Israel were to attack, it has a good chance of causing damage that would make it very difficult for Iran to proceed with building a weapon. American support could yield even greater damage to the Iranian program.

The Iranian regime also faces threats from its own population amid severe inflation and frequent blackouts from energy shortages. There has been a resurgence of opposition to censorship and policing of women’s dress, issues that drove the massive “Women, Life, Freedom” protests in 2022 and 2023. This month, the Iranian parliament removed the finance minister for mismanaging the economy, and Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian vice president for strategic affairs and former foreign minister who negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal, tendered his resignation under pressure from hard-liners who don’t want to negotiate with the U.S. and regarded him as too Western-friendly.

Meanwhile, Tehran’s regional proxies have been significantly defanged. For years, Israel restrained itself from attacking Iran, among other reasons, because of the fear of mass retaliatory rocket attacks by Iranian allies Hezbollah and Hamas.

But in the aftermath of the Hamas attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel has fought back and severely weakened Hezbollah by assassinating its top leaders, targeting the terror group via exploding pagers and destroying large weapons stores. Now that the Iran-aligned Assad regime in Syria has also fallen, it’s much more difficult for Tehran to cross the country to resupply Hezbollah.

Though Hamas still wields power in Gaza, as demonstrated through the recent degrading ceremonies in which Israeli hostages and bodies of hostages were released, the group is also much weaker than it was on Oct. 7.

At the same time, neighboring Arab countries are unlikely to aid Iran or act against Israel; in fact, some pragmatic countries may quietly welcome the action, as Iran and its ideology is a threat to them as well. Recall that Jordan helped to shoot down Iranian drones headed for Israel during Tehran’s April attack, while other Arab countries allowed their airspace to be used for Israel’s defense.

Importantly, Israel feels it has strong support from the Trump administration to eliminate Iran’s capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. The rhetoric of officials has made this clear, as have recent U.S. arms shipments to Israel. Trump no doubt understands that denying Iran the capabilities to develop nuclear weapons lessens the threat its terror groups pose to the world, including the Yemen-based Houthis who are attacking global shipping routes.

If Iran is no longer a nuclear weapons threat, that further opens the door for normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, or at least to implementing vast economic, technological and security cooperation. Adding Saudi Arabia and other countries to the first Trump administration’s Abraham Accords, which established relations between Israel and several Arab states, is a major goal of this White House.

Saudi Arabia will inevitably seek to be on the side of strength – which is Israel, backed by the United States, when it has eliminated Iran’s nuclear capabilities. In addition, with Iran’s proxies now weakened, especially Hamas, there may be less pressure on Israel to make a Palestinian state a prerequisite for peace and cooperation with the Saudis. After Hamas’ brutal invasion in 2023, it is clear that such a state would be a threat to Israel and is therefore unrealistic.

The security of Israel, of the pragmatic Arab countries in the region and of the West depends on making sure in the near term that Iran is prevented from developing a nuclear weapon.

Yossi Kuperwasser, a retired Israeli brigadier general, leads the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. Formerly he was the head of research for the Israel Defense Forces’ military intelligence directorate and director-general of Israel’s Ministry of Strategic Affairs.