The Ultimate Alternate Israel-Palestine Solution (Jordan Option)

50 Comments / 152 Comments

1. @ Sebastien Zorn:

   I think that As Sissi is an Egyptian patriot. Not an Islamist.
   He knows that the anti-Israeli hysteria hurts Egypt. He knows that real peace with Israel would be good for for Egypt.

2. @ vivarto:
   Good point. Let’s continue to live like fools.

3. There just is not way to know what would have been if we did not give Sinai to Egypt.

4. …”Spying[edit]
   In December 1970, Marwan started working for the Mossad.[citation needed] Egypt had begun preparing a war with the aim of retaking the Sinai Peninsula that it had lost to the Israelis in the 1967 Six Day War. Marwan’s unparalleled access to his nation’s best-kept secrets, especially after his promotion in May 1971, allowed him to provide Israel with information about the coming war—including the full Egyptian war plans, detailed accounts of military exercises, original documentation of Egypt’s arm deals with the Soviet Union and other countries, the Egyptian military Order of Battle, the minutes from meetings of the high command, accounts of Sadat’s private conversations with other Arab leaders, and even the protocols of secret summit meetings in Moscow between Sadat and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.[15] As a senior Israeli intelligence officer had said, by providing these documents Marwan turned his country, Israel’s main enemy, into an open book.[16]
   The information Marwan provided made its way to the desks of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) chief of staff in raw form. It shaped Israel’s strategic and tactical approach to Egypt and allowed the Israelis a direct look at Egypt’s war calculus, including Sadat’s minimal requirements for launching a war. These were mainly long-range attack aircraft and Scud missiles, without which Egypt would not be able to overcome Israeli air superiority.
   Yom Kippur War[edit]
   In October 1972 Sadat decided to launch war without waiting for these arms and Egypt accelerated its war preparations. Marwan reported on Sadat decision and the military preparations for war but personally he expressed the estimate that ultimately Egypt would be deterred from militarily challenging Israel. Nevertheless, in April he (as well as other Mossad sources), warned that Egypt planned to attack in mid-May. Israel raised its state-of military readiness, but war did not come, probably because President Assad of Syria convinced Sadat to delay it until Syria was better prepared to occupy the Golan Heights.[citation needed] Known in Israel as “the Blue-White” alert, this episode eroded Israeli fear of an Arab attack. Consequently, by fall 1973, when Egypt and Syria geared to war, military intelligence leaders, including Eli Zeira, refused to accept, despite numerous warnings and warning indicators, that the Arabs plan to attack. Accordingly, Israel’s leadership avoided the mobilization of the reserve army which in 1973 constituted 80% of the IDF ground forces.[17]
   On Thursday, 4 October, about 45 hours before war launched, Marwan called Dubi, his Mossad handler in London, and asked to meet urgently the Mossad chief in order to talk about “a lot of chemicals” (code –name for war). The meeting took place on Friday late at night in London and Marwan informed Zamir that “war would start tomorrow.” As became evident recently, he did not know the exact D-Day when calling Dubi on Thursday and learned about it only after arriving in London on Friday morning. Because of this warning, Israel began mobilizing its forces on the morning of 6 October—hours before the attack was launched. Marwan’s warning prevented a complete Egyptian surprise. Without it, the entire Golan Heights would have been lost, and the war likely would have ended with far greater Israeli losses of both territory and life.[18]
   Marwan continued working for the Mossad until 1998 and was handled throughout this period by his single case officer, Dubi.[19] His identity as a spy for Israel was revealed in December 2002, by the London-based Israeli historian Ahron Bregman, who claimed that Marwan was a double-spy who deceived the Israelis. Bregman’s source was Maj. Gen. (ret.) Eli Zeira, the director of Israel’s Military Intelligence in the 1973 War and the main culprit in the intelligence fiasco prior to the war.[20]…” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashraf_Marwan

   Wow. Double wow.
   We have friends in unexpected places. I have sometimes wondered if that was why the Israeli intelligence brass is so dovish. Maybe they are afraid of losing that?

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5. I was looking for the article I read somewhere that said that the journalist and close confidante who accompanied Sadat to Jerusalem wrote, shortly after, that all of the Jews deserve to wind up in ovens. Though unsuccessful in finding it, I found something else very interesting. Two things.

   “Ashraf Marwan (Arabic: ???? ?????) (2 February 1944 – 27 June 2007) was an Egyptian billionaire and the husband of Mona Gamal Abdel Nasser, daughter of former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. Since 1969 Marwan served in the Presidential Office, first under Nasser and, then as a close aide to his successor, President Anwar Sadat. In 2002 it became known that, during the period leading up to the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, Marwan spied for Israel (under the Mossad code-name “The Angel”), disclosing some of Egypt’s best-kept secrets.[citation needed] His warning on 5 October 1973 that “war will start tomorrow”, triggered an emergency Israeli military mobilization and prevented a complete surprise on 6 October and the complete occupation of the Golan Heights by the Syrian Army a day later.[citation needed] Marwan died under mysterious circumstances in June 2007, falling from the balcony of his expensive London house.
   Maj. Gen. (ret.) Zvi Zamir, the Mossad Chief who was one of Marwan’s handlers, describes him as “the best source we have ever had.[1]”Simon Parkin, a British journalist who investigated the case, regards him as the “20th century’s greatest spy.[2]” Others claim that Marwan was a “double-spy” who worked for Sadat and deceived the Israelis. Recent evidence[3] has questioned this claim.[4]”

   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashraf_Marwan

   “Eli Zeira (Hebrew: ??? ???????) (born 1928) is a former major general in the Israel Defense Forces. He was director of Aman, Israel’s military intelligence, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. He is most remembered for his ill-conceived prewar assessment that Egypt and Syria would not attack (also known as “The Concept”),[1][2] despite intelligence to the contrary.
   The postwar Agranat Commission, set to investigate the reasons for the costly war, found Zeira to be negligent of his duty, and he resigned.[3]
   In 2004, former Mossad Director-General Zvi Zamir accused Zeira of leaking the identity of Ashraf Marwan, an Egyptian billionaire who served as a Mossad informant. The State Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal investigation, which proved inconclusive and was closed in 2012.[4]”
   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eli_Zeira

   Two of the most important individuals you never heard of. For everyone who has praised Sadat and blamed Golda. Food for thought.

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6. @ yamit82:
   Exactly. Moreover, not even Morsi broke the treaty. If they thought they had a chance, they’d break it in a second.

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7. @ adamdalgliesh:
   From the above excerpt:

   “[ “Major-General George Keegan, former head of the U.S. Air Force Intelligence, has said that a “profound change in Arab strategy is now underway… It is not understood in the U.S. I have seen intelligence which very few Americans have access to, that persuades me that the first element of that strategy is that the feudal leadership in the Arab world strikingly remain committed, Messianically, to the extermination of Israel as a nation and as a people. What has changed about that Messianic determination … is the apparent Arab realization that after four futile wars, the direct [i.e., military] approach now appears to be one of such high risk that they are beginning to use the strategy of the indirect approach [namely, diplomatic duplicity].” (Jerusalem Post Magazine, August 5, 1977, p. 5 et seq.) 11]”

   i.e., There would have been a cold peace anyway.

   Sisi is also pressuring Israel to give up Yesha and he’s done a miserable job of stopping terror despite all the repression, if he’s even really trying. Please read the Eidelberg.

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8. @ adamdalgliesh:

   Benefits? Why do you assume that if Israel remained in Sinai we would have had another war with Egypt?? I doubt there would have been another war…… That said even Sadat admitted he would have settled for half of Sinai or less….. Israel made a terrible deal. Egypt now has several top brigades in Sinai nullifying the only real benefit to Israel in the Camp David accords…. The demilitarized Sinai principle is now void and dead. BS he has the strenthe to defeat the few thousand Bedouin Terrorists in Sinai but doesn’t want to…. He will demand Israel agree to more Egyptian troops in Sinai to deal with terrorists…The cost savings to Israel using the canal is marginal and is not worth the price of Sinai with gas and oil and tourist potential. Israel gave away not only the store but the kitchen sink and we will pay dearly down the line for our stupid myopic leaders…..Our Forward air bases in Sinai we gave away would have put Iran 500 miles closer and no need to deal with third parties for flyover permissions.

9. @ Sebastien Zorn: While all this is certainly true, it leaves out some important facts. Although the Begin_Sadat peace has been a “cold peace,” it has resulted in some benefits for Israel. Outright war with Egypt has been avoided since 1977, in contrast to almost continual war from 1948-74. Egyptian troop concentrations in the Sinai have been minimized. Egyptian sponsorship of terrorism against Israel has largely ended, accept for the Morsi-Obama Period (2010-13). Recently, the Sisi government has been quietly cooperating with Israeli counterterrism efforts against Hamas, albeit very quietly. The blockade of Israeli shipping in the Canal ended in 1979 in return for Israel allowing for its reopening. This has been an important boon for the Israeli economy, since it is now possible for Israel to import and export goods much more cheaply than during the blockade years. This has contributed to Israel’s economic boom. I am a pragmatist. Even incremental improvements in Israel’s security and economic viability (related goals) are better than no progress at all.

10. Another Excerpt:

    “Hardly had Sadat returned to Egypt than various Israeli politicians, some even within the coalition, called upon the Begin government to “compensate” Sadat for his risk-taking in coming to Jerusalem. Sadat, of course, repeatedly referred to those risks in his Knesset speech. He thus made it easier for people in this Orwellian universe to regard the risks of one man as equivalent to, if not more important than, the security of a nation. Little did the world realize that the mere fact that Sadat was taking risks, be it of assassination or of a coup, is all the more reason why Israel should be very reluctant to take risks. No nation can afford to base its security on the longevity or political fortunes of a single man, even if his intentions were—as it seems clear Sadat’s were not—unquestionably benevolent. (Sadat came, he said, with a “message of security, safety, and peace to every man, woman, and child in Israel.” He offered Israel, if it would but return to its pre-1967 borders, “all the guarantees you want”—hardly reassuring to those who recall Hitler saying “I am ready to give a formal guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia.”) Nevertheless, such were the domestic (and international) pressures that Israel came forth with the Begin Peace Plan. In response to Sadat’s demand for self-determination and statehood for Arabs on the West Bank, the Begin Plan offered “autonomy” with the question of sovereignty to be taken up at the end of a five year period. In addition, the plan gratuitously acknowledged Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai, thereby surrendering the strategic port of Sharm el-Sheikh and compromising retention of the Sinai air bases, the backbone of Israel’s defense forces. At the Camp David Summit, Israel of course agreed to relinquish control of the Sinai air bases.

    But this was not enough for Anwar el-Sadat. He demanded “complete withdrawal” from all “occupied territories” including “Arab Jerusalem.” “To speak frankly, our land does not yield to bargaining …We cannot accept any attempt to take away…one inch of it nor can we accept the principle of debating or bargaining over it.” Hitler put it this way in Mein Kampf: “There is no bargaining with Jews; there can only be the hard either-or.”16

    The Begin Peace Plan won only the grudging approval of a majority in the Knesset. Voices of criticism were heard within Begin’s coalition: the plan gave too much away and endangered Israel’s security. Even Labour thought the wholesale surrender of the Sinai was dangerous. The major difference, however, was over the West Bank. The Labour Party argued that the autonomy plan would eventually lead to the establishment of an independent Arab state. Labour preferred a “territorial compromise” the effect of which would be to place most of Judea and Samaria under Jordanian sovereignty.17 Meanwhile, the “Peace Now” movement was formed. Some of its spokesmen went so far as to suggest that Israel should even relinquish the Golan Heights, Israel’s only barrier against Soviet-armed Syria. The “Peace Now” movement was of course praised by Sadat. Eventually it was more or less embraced by the Labour Party. The country was confused and divided, just as Sadat had calculated. He had achieved the second objective of the Nazi Model of Conquest. Sadat’s success in Israel was only surpassed by his success in the United States. His Jerusalem visit or visitation made him the darling of American television. The pipe-smoking dictator with his studiously cultivated Oxonian manners covering up the military disciplinarian won the hearts of the American people. When he subsequently visited Washington, President Carter hailed him as a “great man,” a “man of destiny”; and with gushing sentimentalism declared “we’ll miss you” as Time’s “Man of the Year” was taking his leave from the White House.

    Sadat accomplished what all the oil in Saudi Arabia could not accomplish: the American mass media were now openly pro-Arab and anti-Israel. It was this dramatic reversal of American public opinion that enabled Carter to propose, and the Senate to approve (by a narrow margin), the unprecedented Middle East arms package, allowing Egypt and Saudi Arabia to obtain, respectively, F-5E fighter aircraft and the even deadlier air superiority fighter-bomber, the F-15.* Sadat could hardly have achieved more by his “peace initiative.” He had succeeded in undermining Israel’s “special relationship” with the United States—what Clausewitz would have called Israel’s “center of gravity.”18 He thereby fulfilled the third objective of the Nazi Model of Conquest — alienating the enemy from his friends or allies.

    Nor, at home, did he cease from threats and anti-Semitic attacks upon Israelis and Jews, between which he clearly has difficulty distinguishing. For example, in an interview with October magazine on January 14, 1978, over a year after his supposed decision that there would be “no more war” with Israel, Sadat said: “What the Israelis in particular and the Jews in general do not understand is that the tolerance and wish for peace which appeared after my initiative could, I fear, turn into something else against them. Then the Jews would complain anew of a wave of hatred, bitterness and mistrust of them …They are a people who do not desire peace, nor do they desire natural coexistence among peoples because they want war and hatred to continue in order to profit from them…. Fear is the second skin of every Israeli or Jew who is not content with fear but seeks to frighten or make others afraid also.”

    “It may of course be asked why, if Sadat is carrying out the pan-Arab goal of Israel’s destruction, there has been so much hostility toward his initiative in the Arab world…The very intensity of Arab hatred and the lack of sophistication of the Arab masses makes it difficult to accept and make understandable a subtle strategy of game-playing, maneuvering, and carrying a ball around opponents. Once a peace offensive is in full swing, the goal can only be hinted, no longer stated baldly. In addition, interArab rivalry for leadership of the Arab world makes even Arab leaders who understand what Sadat is trying to do take advantage of the inevitable ambiguities of his overt position to rally support around themselves and against Egypt, whose position of traditional leadership of the Arab world has so far been hard for the others to challenge…”

    Chapter 2: SADAT-SOVIET COOPERATION Sadat’s plan to bring about Israel’s downfall did not begin with his Jerusalem “peace initiative.” It began with his preparations for the October War of 1973. The October War was the culmination of a year-and-a-half long campaign of deception. The facts about that deception are available to the government of the United States. The evidence to be presented in this chapter is taken mainly from the testimony of the Sovietologist and Middle East expert, Professor Uri Ra’anan, who appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 2, 1976.19 On the first anniversary of the October War, the Cairo weekly Rose alYusuf, published excerpts from a book by its military correspondent ‘Abd al-Satar al-Tawila, called The Six Hour War. The paper explained that the correspondent was encouraged in his work and was even instructed by Sadat personally in the revision of his book, being given access to secret documents. Al-Tawila states that Sadat’s “brilliant plan of camouflage prior to the October War was based on large-scale diplomatic activity” and that “the Egyptian deception plan exploited” the issue of Soviet arms and the attitude of the USSR “in a spectacular manner to mislead the opponent.” He goes on to reveal that: “the various government agencies spread rumors and stories that were exaggerated, to say the least, about deficiencies, both quantitative and qualitative, regarding the weapons required to begin the battle against Israel, at the very time when the two parties—Egypt and the USSR—had reached agreement concerning the supply of quantities of arms during the second half of 1973—weapons which, in fact, were beginning to arrive. And there came a time when we saw how the majority of habitues of coffee houses turned into arms experts and babbled about shortages in this or that type of hardware. Speaking in the jargon of the scientist and the expert, they would say that the Soviets were refusing to supply Egypt with missiles of a certain type and were even cutting off the supply of spare parts in such a manner that our planes, for example, had turned into useless scrap… Moreover, the Egyptian press frequently gave prominence to an inclination [in Cairo] to seek arms in the West…. All this talk about armaments and their shortage was intended to create the impression in the ranks of the enemy that one of the reasons why Egypt was incapable of starting war was the absence of high-quality weapons…. And the whole world was taken by surprise when zero hour arrived. The Egyptian camouflage to deceive the enemy was expanded to include Egyptian-Soviet relations. This was done to such an extent that many among the Arabs themselves cast doubt upon Egyptian-Soviet friendship…The episode of July 1972, when Egypt decided to make do without Soviet experts, was exploited and many…failed to hear the words of President Sadat…that this was no more than ‘an interlude with our friend.'” One year later, in an interview broadcast by Cairo Radio in Arabic on October 24, 1975, Sadat confirmed the Rose al-Yusuf version, calling his July 1972 expulsion of 15,000 Soviet experts “a strategic cover… a splendid strategic distraction for our going to war.”

    …
    “…This is not to deny that Egyptian-Soviet relations have their ups and downs, including sharp exchanges of words between the capitals, the closing down of consulates, and even the abrogation of treaties. However, all this does not significantly affect the military relationship between the two regimes. As for Sadat’s turning to Western military suppliers, this is bound to strengthen pro-Egyptian interests in countries where public sympathy has tended to favor Israel. At the same time, it enables Egyptian forces to become familiar with the very same technology that constitutes the mainstay of the Israeli army. But as to whether Western suppliers can replace Soviet arms, here is what Sadat said on August 21, 1975, in an interview reported by Cairo Radio in Arabic: “If I wanted to replace the quantities of Soviet arms I have, I would need at least twenty years. The war factories in Europe [and this applies to the United States] are owned by companies which cannot produce the same quantities as those produced by the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union allocates an enormous part of its industries to war production. Therefore it can give quantities which are difficult for others…” While the estimate of “at least twenty years” seems exaggerated, it should be borne in mind that the Egyptian General Staff would require fundamental reeducation from its Moscow Frunze Academy training, were it to switch to an entirely new systems of planning, logistics, and operations, based upon different hardware and the military doctrine that accompanies it. Sadat himself showed awareness of this factor when he said on December 9, 1975: “90 percent of my arms come from the Soviet Union, and I am not mad enough to think I can change my arms in a few years. It is not feasible.” “

    http://www.afsi.org/pamphlets/SadatsStrategy_Eidelberg%5B1%5D.pdf

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11. Another excerpt:

    “This strategy exploits not only the language but the media of democracy. It is not mere vanity that moves autocrats like Sadat to grant frequent interviews to American television and other news media. The media provide the most effective means of manipulating democratic public opinion by the systematic use of propaganda. Sadat, whose ambition as a youth was to be an actor, is a master at dissembling. His mentor was Hitler, whose ability to deceive democracies needs no documentation. The text? Mein Kampf—required reading at Egypt’s Military Academy. Mein Kampf serves a double purpose at the Egyptian war college. It reinforces Islamic hatred of Jews while teaching students fundamental principles of psychological warfare to be used against the Jewish state of Israel. Needless to say, the same principles can be (and are) used against Israel’s ally, the United States.

    Some of these principles are developed in Mein Kampf’s chapter on “War Propaganda.” Propaganda, writes Hitler, “must be addressed always and exclusively to the masses.” “Its effect for the most part must be aimed at the emotions and only to a limited degree at the intellect.” “The function of propaganda is… not to weigh and ponder the rights of different people, but exclusively to emphasize the one right which it has set out to argue for. Its task is not to make an objective study of the truth, in so far as it favours the enemy, and then set it before the masses with academic fairness; its task is to serve our own right, always and unflinchingly.”2 Therein is the source of the Big Lie. The lie, to be big, must be manifestly false, so false as to arouse some doubt as to its falsity. To be effective, however, it must be repeated over and over again (with some variation) and in the form of slogans. To disarm democracies, the lie must be pleasing to democratic emotions and prejudices, such as the love of peace and the belief that peace is equally the aim of dictatorships. It was not Sadat but Hitler who coined the slogan “no more war.”

    The Big Lie can be made more effective if punctuated with candor. In fact, nothing is more deceptive than candor, as any accomplished dissembler knows. Take, for example, Sadat’s admission in his “autobiography” of having urged his boyhood friends to follow Hitler’s example. (Let us assume Sadat is telling the truth when he says he was twelve years old at the time.) Why this compromising confession, especially in a book published in America and aimed at an American audience?’ Sadat is certainly aware of the horror evoked by Hitler’s name. He is also aware that his imprisonment for pro-Nazi activities in World War II is known to people who might seek to discredit him. Sadat is a voracious reader. He has studied and he understands the temperament of Americans. He knows how their very benevolence, which disposes them to “let bygones be bygones,” renders them the more prone to disregard

    and forget unpleasant facts about the past.* Accordingly, by admitting to having once had the ambition to follow Hitler’s example, Sadat would very likely elicit something like the following response from most readers: “Surely he does not harbor such a dreadful ambition today, else he would not have been so candid or so incautious as to reveal it in his autobiography.” Consider, therefore, the following. In September 1953, several news agencies reported that Hitler was still alive. On the basis of this report, a Cairo weekly, Al Musawwar, asked a number of Egyptian personalities the following question: “If you wished to send Hitler a personal letter, what would you write to him?” One of those questioned was Colonel Anwar el-Sadat. Here is his answer:

    ‘My Dear Hitler, I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart. Even if you appear to have been defeated, in reality you are the victor. You succeeded in creating dissensions between Churchill, the old man, and his allies, the Sons of Satan. Germany will win because her existence is necessary to preserve the world balance. Germany will be reborn in spite of the Western and Eastern powers. There will be no peace unless Germany once again becomes what she was. The West, as well as the East, will pay for her rehabilitation—whether they like it or not. Both sides will invest a great deal of money and effort in Germany, in order to have her on their side… Substitute Islam for Germany and we behold, in this remarkable letter, the Mein Kampf of Anwar el-Sadat. Indeed, the letter to Hitler ends with these words: “We will not be surprised if you appear again in Germany or if a new Hitler rises in your wake.” Two years later, in a speech celebrating the birthday of Muhammed, Sadat declared, with reference to the Jews: “The most splendid thing the Prophet Muhammed did was to drive them out of the whole Arabian peninsula…. They are a nation of liars and traitors, contrivers of plots, a people born for the deeds of treachery …. I promise you … we shall send them back to their former status … as the Koran said of them ‘condemned to humiliation and misery.’”

    see the rest here:

    http://www.afsi.org/pamphlets/SadatsStrategy_Eidelberg%5B1%5D.pdf

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12. If it’s too small, enlarge the screen by pressing ctrl + or going to the browser settings in and increasing the magnification.

    or buy it;

    Sadat’s strategy (History in the making) Paperback – 1979
    by Paul Eidelberg (Author)
    Be the first to review this item
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    Paperback
    from $0.64
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    Note: This item is only available from third-party sellers (see all offers).

    https://www.amazon.com/Sadats-strategy-History-making-Eidelberg/dp/0969000103

    Certain details are dated but not the gist. He not only said if first, I have never seen this argument anywhere else. It explains what’ s baffling everybody NOW. The Arab strategy is an old and persistent one and the differences between them are just bumps in the road. Sadat was assassinated by his comrades who didn’t understand what he was doing even though he explained it to them. Then as Now: They don’t lie in Arabic. Everything documented. He was making these statements about what he was really doing AT THE TIME. In print. Only in Arabic. Read. Please.

    And, I am not an Eidelberg groupie. The few recent things I have read, I have thought, “very nice.” But this is truly a gem.

13. This is a link to a free PDF version of an out of print book courtesy of AFSI, Americans For A Safe Israel, co-founded by Schmuel Katz. Please click on it.

    http://www.afsi.org/pamphlets/SadatsStrategy_Eidelberg%5B1%5D.pdf

14. @ adamdalgliesh:

    Why won’t anybody read the Eidelberg before replying? If you’d even looked at the table of contents you’d have seen the section on the Soviet Union.

    Opinions based on personal impressions only have zero value.

    excertpt:

    Contents
    Chapter 1: The Model For Conquest…………………………..1
    Chapter 2: Sadat-Soviet Cooperation……………………….13
    Chapter 3: “Peace in Our Time” – The American Role…20
    Notes…………………………………………

15. @ Sebastien Zorn: I believe that Sadat was genuinely interested in peace with Israel, and possibly even in an alliance with Israel, despite his pro-Nazi past. There were several reasons for his change of heart. One, he had become convinced that his real enemies, those who threatened his regime and his life, were not the Jews but his fellow Arabs. He was particularly worried about Libya and Iraq. I remember that when Begin flew to Egypt after Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s nuclear installations, Sadat ran out to the plane and enthusiastically embraced Begin as he was deplaning. This body language was captured on American television at the time, and said everything. Before he was assassinated, he and Begin were on a first-name basis. This was the main reason he was assassinated, of course. Sadat was also very alarmed, and with good reason, about the Muslim Brotherhood threat to him in Egypt. (The did kill him in the end). He was also very worried about street protests about Egyptian’s increasing poverty (“Oh Hero of the Crossing, where is our breakfast?) and realized that he had to shift some government spending from the military to improving the economy. He was desperate to end Egypt’s slavery to Russia, and wanted to forge an alliance with the U.S., which he recognized was the only country that could bail Egypt out of its economic crisis. And he had concluded from watching American internal politics that the way to America went through Israel. He also had a very personal motive for wanting peace with Israel. While Egypt’s reinvasion of the Sinai in 1973 was touted by him as a great victory, he was shocked when one of his brothers, whom he had appointed a general, was killed when the very first shots were fired. His brother decided to lead from the front like a good general. As his pontoon boat was crossing the Canal, the Israelis fired on it and he was killed instantly. Sadat confided in an American reporter that he was shocked that a general could be killed in battle! Of course it must have occurred to him that the same thing could happen to him and his other close relatives if the war with Israel continued. He decided (incorrectly as it turned out) that his personal survival and the survival of his regime required reconciliation with Israel. In spite of his dubious past, his assassination was a loss for Israel.

16. @ vivarto:
    @ Edgar G.:No need to apologize, Edgar. I hope that I was of some assistance in clarifying this history
    @ Sebastien Zorn:

17. @ vivarto:
    @ Edgar G.:No need to apologize, Edgar. I hope that I was of some assistance in clarifying this history

18. @ yamit82:
    Much truth in what you are saying.
    Many if not most Israeli Arabs are not loyal patriotic citizen. Many are outright the enemy (some 20% according to public opinion studies hate Jews).
    But I disagree with your assessment that removing 1/2 the Arab population would not be be beneficial to Israel.
    If removal is successful, and if they are happy in Jordan doing well financially we have achieved two important goals:
    1) changed the world perception of the conflict
    2) encouraged other Israeli Arabs to move there.

    Of course you are right that our laws and our tax money must not support Arab colonists in our country.
    Agree with you that the affirmative action, must be stopped.
    Denying welfare and other government services selectively to Arab citizens is not possible. Yet it is important that Jewish taxpayers stop supporting the enemy population within the Jewish state.
    A possible solution would be to make all welfare including medical, retirement and child support community based.
    Members of the Jewish community would pay taxes to the Jewish community, etc. The Government could collect taxes on behalf of the communities.
    In Denmark the Gov collects the taxes for Church, Mosque, Synagogues from the members of the respective communities. Of course the Danish communities are not providing healthcare or retirement, but Israeli communities could be charged with such responsibilities.

    In such model the Jewish community should represent all Jews rather than being monopolized by the Orthodox religious establishment.

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19. @ Bear Klein:
    Not only that but the reason that Trump is dragging his feet about outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood is that they have 16 seats in the Jordanian parliament and he doesn’t want to alienate any part of the Jordanian status quo.

20. @ adamdalgliesh:
    Another excerpt from the Eidelberg:

    “SADAT’S TACTICAL REVOLUTION Suppose, however, that we were to ignore Sadat’s admiration for Hitler or his application of the Nazi model of conquest to the Arab-Israel conflict. There are two ways in which a cautious observer might analyze the significance of the Jerusalem peace initiative of November 1977. 1) Sadat is not only sincerely committed to peace, but is willing to make compromises consistent with Israel’s long-range security. 2) Sadat wants “peace” but only as an alternative means to achieve the aim of war; that is, he came to Jerusalem seeking to facilitate, by duplicity, the piecemeal destruction of Israel.

    [ “Major-General George Keegan, former head of the U.S. Air Force Intelligence, has said that a “profound change in Arab strategy is now underway… It is not understood in the U.S. I have seen intelligence which very few Americans have access to, that persuades me that the first element of that strategy is that the feudal leadership in the Arab world strikingly remain committed, Messianically, to the extermination of Israel as a nation and as a people. What has changed about that Messianic determination … is the apparent Arab realization that after four futile wars, the direct [i.e., military] approach now appears to be one of such high risk that they are beginning to use the strategy of the indirect approach [namely, diplomatic duplicity].” (Jerusalem Post Magazine, August 5, 1977, p. 5 et seq.) 11]

    A prudent observer would have to admit that all the available evidence points to the second alternative. Sadat has made it clear to his “internal” audience, i.e., those who read Arabic, that he is engaged in what is for the Arabs a new strategy to win the traditional Arab goal of Israel’s destruction. In a section of his memoirs published in October on September 11, 1977, two months before the peace initiative, Sadat wrote:

    “Al Qaddafi has chosen to make the same terrible mistake that Arabs committed several years ago when they rejected everything and anything—when the Arabs turned the word `no’ into an idol which they worshipped, burned incense around, and in the process, burned all their bridges and were halted … all this because the Arabs pinned the fate of the Arab nation and three of its generations to the word ‘no.’ In the field of politics, just as in the field of sports, the best player is not the one who kicks the ball out of the playground every time he gets it. This is escapism; he prefers to escape from the situation rather than take the ball, maneuver it through his opponents and then score a goal.”11

    Notice Sadat makes no objection to Qaddafi’s goal, repeatedly trumpeted as the annihilation of Israel, but to the methods by which the goal has been pursued. On the contrary, in the same passage Sadat goes on to say that he tries to avoid getting involved in minor and peripheral battles precisely because the coming war with the Jews should be the only thing that preoccupies him, and he is unwilling to become distracted “from this confrontation which will be much more violent than the October War.”12

    There were other hints shortly before Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem that he was planning a new strategy. On September 3, 1977 Foreign Minister Fahmi (whose later resignation suggests that even he was not aware of the dramatic form the strategy would assume) argued against another Arab summit meeting.

    “The world is opposed to Israel’s actions in the territory—our main aim must be to exploit intelligently this international attitude. We must differentiate between the possible and the impossible; we must address the world in its own language and go with it as far as we can go… We must besiege Israel and isolate it internationally … It is absolutely not in our interest to allow Israel to escape from this impasse. We could raise issues which we know, without even thinking about it, that the world atmosphere is not prepared for—issues which would provide Israel with new arguments to convince sections of world public opinion that throughout the history of the conflict the Arabs have thought only about the destruction and elimination of Israel … Briefly it is not right…to allow Israel to escape the grip 12 of world society by raising ideas which would make the world forget Israeli extremism by pointing to what it might imagine to be Arab extremism …We must not take steps unless we are sure they bring us closer to our goal.”13

    That the goal had not changed, merely the desirable method of achieving it, was emphasized by Sadat once again in September 1977, only weeks before his visit to Jerusalem.

    “The October War was only the spark that set off the conflict—a conflict that is as old as the Arab nation. This conflict started when we fought against the Tatars, and later, the Crusaders, in defense of our rights, land and honor. Today we are fighting against Zionism in defense of our land and values … Now after the October War we should never look back. In fact this struggle is not just a military conflict; it is a military, economic and political conflict. They are all links in the same chain. Therefore we must prepare ourselves for a prolonged conflict and all its relevant aspects.”14

    The next stage in that conflict, for Sadat, was the Jerusalem “peace initiative.” In his Knesset speech he laid down the peace terms— unacceptable to both of Israel’s major parties—from which he has never since deviated: that Israel return to the borders of 1949 and set up a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem). Upon returning home, he said in an interview for October Magazine, “We must take what we can get as a means for taking all that we want.”15

    Those who had followed Sadat’s earlier remarks prior to his trip could scarcely be in doubt as to what he meant by “all that we want.” Without in any way abandoning his long range goal, Sadat was able to count major accomplishments from his trip to Jerusalem. Indeed Sadat has managed to win the world’s accolades as a great peace-maker without once using the word “peace” on his trip. He used in his speech over and over again the word “salaam” which was translated as “peace” but which means nothing more than non-belligerence. Salaam was Sadat’s code message to the Arab world that he would never make Sulh, that is, real peace, with Israel. Nonetheless Sadat was able to disarm and divide Israel and neutralize the United States—remarkable accomplishments indeed. Recall how Sadat insisted on personal talks with the leaders of each of Israel’s many political parties after his Knesset speech. His main target was Shimon Peres, leader of the opposition Labor Party…”

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21. Sebastien Zorn Said:

    @ adamdalgliesh:
    What do you think of the Eidelberg piece on Sadat and how it explains Arab strategy today?

    https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://www.afsi.org/pamphlets/SadatsStrategy_Eidelberg%5B1%5D.pdf&ved=0ahUKEwiQ99aDwvrUAhXMbj4KHaU6Ae8QFghJMAc&usg=AFQjCNF_RNfvXakLnDvep2FDbBgEFyZjqQ

    (1979) Excerpt:

    “Chapter 1:
    THE MODEL FOR CONQUEST
    The preponderance of evidence indicates that Anwar el-Sadat, the
    President of Egypt, is engaged in a plan to destroy the state of Israel, and
    that he has patterned his method after the Nazi model of conquest. The
    model is a war-and-peace strategy synchronized to facilitate the eventual
    destruction of the enemy. It is suitable for use by dictators against
    democracies, that is, against regimes based on the primacy of public
    opinion—what Hitler called “the mightiest factor of our time.” Sadat, who
    taught himself German while imprisoned by the British during World War
    II for his pro-Nazi activities, has studied Hitler’s diplomatic tactics and
    methods of psychological warfare. He is applying them with cunning and
    effectiveness in his war against Israel.
    The strategy has three interrelated objectives, the achievement of
    which depends very largely on the oratorical ability of the dictator to:
    1) Shift the responsibility for war onto the enemy (while posing as the
    apostle of peace).
    2) Divide and demoralize the enemy (by courting opposition party
    leaders and peace movements in the enemy’s country).
    3) Alienate the enemy from his friends or allies (by raising the
    spectre of war and economic catastrophe).
    These three objectives may be pursued simultaneously by means of
    semantic subversion, and most effectively by using the language of
    democracy against democracy. For example, Hitler, a tyrant, appealed to
    the democratic principle of self-determination to undermine Czechoslovakia’s
    control of the Sudetenland without which the country could
    not defend itself. In the same way, Sadat, the head of a military
    dictatorship, constantly appeals to the principle of self-determination to
    undermine Israel’s claim to the West Bank—really Judea and Samaria—
    without which Israel’s heartland would be reduced to a 9 to 14 mile strip,
    rendering the country defenseless…”

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22. @ adamdalgliesh:
    What do you think of the Eidelberg piece on Sadat and how it explains Arab strategy today?

    https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://www.afsi.org/pamphlets/SadatsStrategy_Eidelberg%5B1%5D.pdf&ved=0ahUKEwiQ99aDwvrUAhXMbj4KHaU6Ae8QFghJMAc&usg=AFQjCNF_RNfvXakLnDvep2FDbBgEFyZjqQ

23. @ adamdalgliesh:
    Eisenhower tried to force Israel to withdraw by eliminating tax exemptions for individual donations to Israel in the US and even wanted a binding BDS UN Security Council Resolution but then Senator Johnson blocked him and held out for some security guarantee for Israel – which, as we see, only bought Israel ten years. The US was giving no military aid to Israel at that time. In 1967, the US was giving Aid to the Arabs but had only sold but not delivered weapons the previous year. The US was officially neutral. Not an ally. Only after the 6 day war, did the US give “aid” to Israel that mostly has to be spent here and hampers Israeli military industrial development.

    Only in 1973, did the US, thanks to Nixon’s personal intervention, rescue Israel with an emergency weapons airlift but Nixon always pressured Israel to relinquish land and PM Gold Meir wouldn’t have hesitated to act, necessitating US aid, if she hadn’t been worried about US disapproval.

    Israel needs to tell the Courts that they have no jurisdiction over government policy, the international community where they can go and and the Arabs to get out or else.

    Israel needs to expand, ethnically cleansing native populations as she goes.

    The way we did from a measly 13 colonies.

    That’s what I liked about the National Union program a few years ago. It said that Israel should annex all continguous territory from which she is attacked and expel the Arabs. Hear, Hear!

    The only

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24. @ Edgar G.:
    Sorry, I meant that for Adam and by my magic fingers sent it to Sebastien. It is similar to what I would or have sent you anyway. But It’ll teach me to look before pressing the “Post Comment”……for a little while at least.

25. @ yamit82:

    I recall the International Maratime Commissions dictum on The Straits of Tiran being an International Waterway.. I also recall Johnson, guaranteeing Israel free Passage, and his ignominous backdown, when he changed it to trying to gather an international flotilla…and failed. That, to me was the most stupid part of his whole monkeying around there. He could just as easily have sent a cruiser and 4-5 destroyers through on a courtesy visit to Eilat, to back down the Egyptians.

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26. @ Sebastien Zorn:

    Thanks Adam . This was material I was at best vaguely aware of, or passed me by.. My situation then was uncertain, no relatives in the country, no steady job, living from room to room for years.

27. @ Edgar G.:

    Israel agreed to side with the Brits and French was the intolerable almost daily deadly cross border attacks from Gaza…. Israel left Sinai but not before an agreement was made by the Americans to guarantee Israeli passage thru international waters in the Red Sea. Johnson later reneged on the American commitment and that led to 6 day war……

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28. @ Edgar G.: Actually, Israel benefited a lot from its invasion of the Sinai in 1956. Terrorist attacks inside Israel, which had been steadily increasing from 1949 to 1956, dropped sharply after the Sinai campaign. There were actually five years when not a single Israeli was killed by a terrorist. The problem was obviously caused by Egypt, since once Israel invaded Sinai, the terrorism stopped almost completely. Obviously, there must have been an informal quid pro quo. The terrorism, which had been concentrated in the Negev, had not only resulted in over a thousand Israelis killed or wounded, but had terrified the new immigrants and settlers in the area, making it very difficult for Israel to settle the Negev. Egypt abandoned its blockade of the Strait of Tiran, which enabled Israel for the first time to import oil from Iran and Indonesia at affordable prices. Before the Sinai campaign, the cost of oil for Israel had been prohibitive due to the Egyptian blockade of both the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. While Egypt maintained its blockade of Israel shipping in the Suez Canal, at least the Gulf od Aqaba (or Eilat) was broken, and Israel’s southern port of Eilat became usable. Another major benefit was that the United States and Britain stopped pressuring Israel to withdraw to something close to the 1947 partition boundaries, and l to hand over Eilat to the Egyptians or Jordanians. These successes resulting from Israel’s brief occupation of the Sinai enabled Israel to thrive and grow in the fifties and sixties

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29. @ Edgar G.:
    Sorry, I meant to address that to you. Here’s a picture of the Time Warner Center at 10 Columbus Circle in New York. It takes up the entire picture. Actually, it extends beyond the picture.

    http://gil-barindustries.com/assets/images/Time%20Warner%20Center/Commercial-HVAC-NY-Time-Warner-Center-01.jpg

30. @ Ted Belman:
    Ted, The King of Jordan has now met with Trump three times. The USA negotiated the ceasefire in SW Syria in good part on what the King requested. This appears to at least theoretically also work for Israel.

    Anyone who believes that the King of Jordan is going to be dumped by the Trump Administration in favor or someone else appears to be very very much on the wrong track.

31. yamit82 Said:

    “My understanding as to why the Sinai Campaign involved Israel is based on the news available at that time. “

    The Jacob Javits Convention center in NYC is now on 34th St. all the way west but the old convention center was where the Time Warner Bldg. is now at 59th St. and Broadway, Columbus Circle. Central Park is right across the street. I remember when they removed the scaffolding that had concealed the new building. Nobody had moved in but there was one enormous sign, the only sign, that could be seen from the Park across the Street. It said, “SWATCH, World’s Largest Watch Store.”

    I could have taken a picture and insisted that this empty building, the entire huge building, taking up the entire block, was the world’s largest watch store.,

    It had to have been and I had to have been the ultimate authority because, you see, I was there, and I saw it for myself with own two eyes. No?

32. @ yamit82:

    My understanding as to why the Sinai Campaign involved Israel is based on the news available at that time. At the very moment that it was happening, I was on a 5 day voyage across the Atlantic, emigrating to Canada, and as I recall the Hungarian Uprising was happening concurrently, and all we got were daily bulletins. After landing I was far too busy trying to acclimatize to a totally different way of life, entailing things I never had to face in my life before, having been more or less coddled and catered to-by comparison. This took months of being battered around all over the country resulting with a cross Canada drive in mid winter, arriving Vancouver 26th December after 7 days on the road, driving a car to be delivered to owner in B.C. It was so cold thata few steps to a gas station store would make my shirt into a sheet of ice, I kid you not.

    Anyway, my understanding was that Britain and France, highly offended by the high handed actions of Neguib-really Nasser- were worried about losing their short route to India, as well as the income from the Canal, plus their amor propre. Israel then, was a tiny, barely populated, still British/French leaning near satelite and was talked into believing that it would benefit them to join in, also they were in a favourable logistics position, being right on the spot. They were the ostensible movers and England.France were helping THEM. A very thin facade…….

    In the end it did them no good as Eisenhower turned against them and they were left high and dry by perfidious Albion and French “Elan”, and had to slink back out of the Sinai. It soured relations with Eisenhower for years, and he was not a sympathetic US President towards Israel.

    This is MY understanding of the matter, purely from memory and off the cuff. You in your the position obviously know and knew much more that I was never knew to and wouldn’t have understood anyway. Although well grown up, I was still a kid re international politics in which I’d never taken any interest.

33. @ yamit82:
    Thank you.

34. @ yamit82:

    My understanding as to why the Sinai Campaign involved Israel is based on the news available at that time. At the very moment that it was happening, I was on a 5 day voyage across the Atlantic, emigrating to Canada with all of a$100. , and as I recall, the Hungarian Uprising was happening concurrently, and all we got were daily bulletins. After landing I was far too busy trying to acclimatize to a totally different way of life, entailing things I never had to face in my life before, having been more or less coddled and catered to-by comparison. This took months of being battered around all over the country resulting with a cross Canada drive in mid winter, arriving Vancouver 26th December after 7 days on the road, driving a car to be delivered to owner in B.C. It was so cold that a few steps to a gas station store would make my shirt into a sheet of ice, I kid you not.

    Anyway, my understanding was that Britain and France, highly offended by the high handed actions of Neguib-really Nasser- were worried about losing their short route to India, as well as the income from the Canal, plus their amor propre. Israel then, was a tiny, barely populated, still British/French leaning near satelite and was talked into believing that it would benefit them to join in, also they were in a favourable logistics position, being right on the spot. They were the ostensible movers and England.France were helping THEM. A very thin facade…….

    In the end it did them no good as Eisenhower turned against them and they were left high and dry by perfidious Albion and French “Elan”, and had to slink back out of the Sinai. It soured relations with Eisenhower for years, and he was not a sympathetic US President towards Israel.

    This is MY understanding of the matter, purely from memory and off the cuff. You in your the position obviously know and knew much more that I was never knew to and wouldn’t have understood anyway. Although well grown up, I was still a kid re international politics in which I’d never taken any interest.

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35. Edgar G. Said:

    Before the 1967 War Israel was quite content to have a status quo in the Sinai, and acted swiftly and effectively when it became apparent that the enemy was crowding them. I’m nor roaming in the ether, I’m sticking strictly to the point that you made and which I answered.

    Huh? What the hell do you think Israel’s participation in Sinai campaign was all about….Israel after 56 still had daily terror attacks from West Bank and Gaza and we retaliated to each attack and provocation….. The attacks never ceased. Both Sadat and Mubarak aided terrorist in Gaza to attack Israel claiming they couldn’t stop it. They did under el Sisi proving the BS of Mubarak… You don’t need 100K crack troops in Sinai to defeat a few K Bedouin terrorists either…. Egypt just want to militarize the Sinai thus wiping out the only positive result of the Camp David Accords. Stupid cowardly BB has agreed and it will cost us dearly for his stupidity and cowardice.

36. @ Edgar G.:
    This is different from the other essays of his I have read. Please read.

37. @ Edgar G.:

    In the 1980s and 1990s, fighting was primarily in Cairo and Upper Egypt. Individuals would go to Sinai to train but not have much to do in terms of carrying out attacks,” Gold said. That changed when a terror group that would eventually provide members and inspiration for Sinai Province introduced suicide bombings to Sinai in 2004, launching the peninsula’s own battle with Islamic militants.

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/08/sinai-magnet-for-terror

    Please read the article first, and then let me know if you have a problem with the facts laid out therein and if so, on what sources, evidence and reasoning you base your counter-argument.

    Can you name a single piece of territory that Israel relinquished that has not become an independent launching pad for terror at some point?

    Can you name a single piece of territory under complete Israeli control where terrorists are able to function as a unit for very long?

38. @ yamit82:
    Sounds like a plan.

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39. We don’t want or need your stinking Piece Plans.

    Peace comes ONLY as a result of war or conflict and only after a complete and decisive victory..

    No territorial realignment or agreement has ever come through only a diplomatic process.

    What happens if only 50% or less of all Palis agree to take money and leave? Paying out billions for nothing? It must be all or nothing.

    Even the Arabs don’t want the refugees in Syria and Lebanon back… It would destroy them from within…. a couple of million illiterate unemployable criminals.

    Even if most Arabs agree to any of your plans a significant minority will resist and continue acts of terror against Israel and what they consider as traitorous Arab ‘Uncle Toms’ .

    By paying Arabs to leave Israel concedes that the Arab claims were correct and just. Therefore it will boomerang and is most immoral from Israel’s POV and long term interests.

    Who needs an agreement? Israel can live with status quo for another 500 years. The real problem for us are those Arabs with Israeli citizenship and permanent resident status. IMO First take care of our home grown fifth column.

    We must destroy as with Jews all illegal Palis dwellings, collect all taxes under same penalty as with Jews including municipal taxes. Stop all affirmative action policies and bar them from our universities unless they merit entrance and can pay. They must all serve in the IDF and Arab women as well even if in separate units. Stop all national Insurance payments known as child allowances to Arabs (What kind of Zionism Jews paying Arabs to breed?)..Every Arab criminal except capital offenses will be offered deportation in place of prison.

    New restrictive laws can be enacted as necessary. In ten years there will be few young Arabs living in Israel they will self deport themselves and once gone will bring others to follow them. It is already happening on a smaller scale.

    Lastly it’s in Israels interest to see so called Palis Arabs distributed as far from our borders as possible we don’t want another potential enemy state on-our Eastern border…..We already have Russia and Iran on our northern borders no justification to add Jordan to that already toxic mix.

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40. @ Sebastien Zorn:

    It may have been gestating, but it was as visible as a 3 month pregnancy..-maybe 4 month….

41. @ Edgar G.:
    Terror in the The Sinai was gestating during the 80s and 90s. Hudna. The Eidelberg lays out the wider Arab companion strategy to the phased plan. The 2002 Saudi Plan is part of its implementation. It is not subjective except in as much as it uses psychological warfare against the West. It is currently succeeding. I believe it explains what is going on. There is no failed Arab or Palestinian leadership. They are winning. . Pls read it. It is not dated. It’s the strategy Hitler came up with in the 30s that made WW2 possible.

42. @ Sebastien Zorn:

    Before the 1967 War Israel was quite content to have a status quo in the Sinai, and acted swiftly and effectively when it became apparent that the enemy was crowding them. I’m nor roaming in the ether, I’m sticking strictly to the point that you made and which I answered.

    Your extra research is fascinating and evocative, and I have previously come across most of it.

43. @ Sebastien Zorn: Everyone in the national camp must be mobilized to stop this outrage. There is no reason why Israel should give any permits whatever to Arabs for area “A.” They should not provide any money for new Palestinian developments and expansion anywhere in Judea-Samaria. My impression is that Israel has promised a lot of money for new Palestinian settlements and cities. Outrageous!

44. @ Sebastien Zorn:

    I’ve read lots of Eidelberg, but that isn’t the point we’re discussing. My point, following your comment, is that Sadat kept the Sinai quiet, and kept the treaty, as did mUbarak after him. I’m not looking into the esoteric workings of Eidelberg’s brain, nor Sadat’s either.

45. @ Abdul Ameer: An excellent point. The Palestinians are just one actor in a larger holy war against Israel.

46. @ Edgar G.:
    “How Sinai Became a Magnet for Terror”
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/08/sinai-magnet-for-terror

47. @ Edgar G.:
    “…
    “A no” tomorrow, after all the hapless and confused compromises and “initiatives,” will bring the same crisis near Tel Aviv, Beersheva and Netanya…” 1976.

    41 years later:

    “Construction in Qalqiliya: ‘Someone’s lost their mind’
    IDF regulations ignored to allow Arab city to expand to within 50 meters of security fence.
    Arutz Sheva Staff, 15/06/17 21:24”
    http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/231107

48. @ Edgar G.:
    Here’s what Rabbi Kahane said,

    also like Prof. Eidelberg, at the time. Not everyone was fooled (Munich was ubiquitously cheered as “Peace In Our Time.”)

    “…Their refusal to make the difficult choice of telling the Americans “no”, now, at this moment, will see them making the retreats they hope will avert American anger; it will see this effort fail even as the frontier moves from its present lines within the Arab heartland to new ones close to the Jewish cities; and most important, the Americans will make the same demands they always have envisioned since the days of the Roger Plan-total Israeli withdrawal. And since this is a thing that not even the most dovish of Israelis will agree to, the result will be an ultimate Israeli firm “no”, an ultimate American anger of the kind all men of “new initiative” propose to avert today by compromise, and exactly the same conditions of confrontation that would come anyhow if the Israelis said their “no” today. There would be one great difference, however, a “no” today will bring the crisis while Israel stands poised near the Arab capitols. A “no” tomorrow, after all the hapless and confused compromises and “initiatives,” will bring the same crisis near Tel Aviv, Beersheva and Netanya…”

    Israel, US and the Stinking Fish – 1976

    http://barbaraginsberg-kahane.blogspot.com/2014/09/israel-us-and-stinking-fish-1976.html

    And, as I mentioned, When the Camp David Accords were signed in March 1979, I was 19 1/2, old enough to remember. The age my father was.

49. @ Edgar G.:
    I guess you didn’t read or disagree with Professor Eidelberg’s assessment of Sadat. If the latter, I’d like to hear your critique. The truth of his argument seems obvious to me. You can read it here free. It’s also available on Amazon in book form.
    “PDF]
    Sadat’s Strategy (1979) – Americans For A Safe Israel
    AFSI.org › SadatsStrategy_Eidelberg[1]
    Paul Eidelberg is Director of the Institute for Statesmanship in Jerusalem and visiting professor of political science … in the United States, Sadat’s veiled threat to go to war on behalf of this principle has enabled him to …”

    https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://www.afsi.org/pamphlets/SadatsStrategy_Eidelberg%5B1%5D.pdf&ved=0ahUKEwiQ99aDwvrUAhXMbj4KHaU6Ae8QFghJMAc&usg=AFQjCNF_RNfvXakLnDvep2FDbBgEFyZjqQ

50. @ Sebastien Zorn:

    There was very little or no attacks from Sinai. Sadat and Mubarak gripped Egypt with a closed fist and there was silence and peace in that area for many years. It really only began to heat up when the supposed “Refugees” fought their way up through several countries where they could have stayed, to Israel which basically had nothing more than a wire fence along thr demarcation line. It was then, around which time, terrorist attacks becam troublesome, that Egypt approached Israel asking to be allowed to deploy substantial troops in the demilitarized Sinai, against the agreement, an agreement which had been faithfully kept by Egypt for many years. And Israel, seeing the neccessity which benefited bot Israel and Egypt, agreed.

    So I think you are being a bit anachronistic here. Re Sadat and his “tears” you are grasping at an urban legend of the “piece of paper…. Sadat, was a Nazi supporter like nrearly all Arabs during the War. Just like the Arabs were Ottoman supporters in WW1.

    As the tide turned, so did their “support” A person’s inner thoughts can’t be monitored. and that picture of Sadat with Hitler, or Himmler in Berlin has been worn out years ago. He was murdered because he made peace with Israel, a peace which he was taking great pains to make stick, and stick it did.

    Begin slipped up with Yamit. YOu do not recall, or were not old enough to realise the giddy, heady, rarified atmospheric clouds in which Israel lived in those days. Yamit began as a political bluff, showing Sinai ownership it never was intended to keep permanently, ,and later became PR serious to the extent that Begin began to say that he was going to retire to live in that town etc. all BUMF, that ran away with itself.

    It was a HUGE, momentous achievement to make peace with Egypt, cold as it is because of the, fierce animosity emanating from there, and that Egypt was the Major and Main enemy without which, there could be never be any future encompassing war against Israel. And sll the borders have been very quiet since that date, since Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem…