The Turks are coming – to Syria

Arab hatred of Turkey is so extreme that the last thing the Arab states wish to see is the return of the Ottoman Empire whose police tortured and killed them without mercy. This can and should lead to strange alliances.

By Mordechai Kedar, INN

Anyone following Turkish media cannot help seeing the long lines of military transport vehicles – tanks, artillery, troop carriers and auxiliary vehicles – making their way south towards the Turkish-Syrian border. The Turks have no plans to attack Syria – their objective is to nip in the bud Syrian Kurd aspirations to establish an autonomous entity south of the border, the region in which the Kurds reside.

This is not the first time Turkey has invaded the region northeast of Aleppo, Syria. Two years ago, Turkey conquered the border city of Jarablus in order to break the westward contiguity the Kurds had attempted to create in order to have direct access to the Mediterranean Sea.

Now Turkey threatens to conquer the city of Manbej, south of Jarablus and northeast of Aleppo, in order to consolidate its control over the Kurdish region and destroy any hopes of permanence for Kurdish autonomy born in the shadow of the chaotic period that began to envelop Syria in March 2011.  Turkey’s designs against Syria received a shot in the arm two weeks ago from US President Donald Trump, who handed Erdogan an open check to do whatever he wishes to do in Syria.

It would be foolish to underestimate Erdogan’s intentions. He hates the Kurds with a passion, both those living in Turkey and those in neighboring countries. The Kurds comprise between a fifth and a quarter of Turkey’s population, and that fraction is constantly increasing because the Kurds have a higher birthrate than the Turks and because Turks have a inordinate tendency to emigrate to foreign lands.

Almost every city in Turkey has one or more Kurdish neighborhoods, filled with citizens, who despite their infighting, are a demographic and security  threat to the Turks. The government defines the Kurdish Workers Party as a terrorist organization to all intents and purposes, and is fighting a war to the death against it.  Over forty thousand civilians, both Turks and Kurds, have been killed in the struggle between the government and the Kurdish rebels who are Turkish citizens – with no end in sight.

Most of the Kurds live in one region, Kurdistan, divided, at the end of WWI among four countries – Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The Kurds in Turkey, like their brothers in Syria, Iraq and Iran, have two basic problems that prevent their gaining independence. One is that they live in an enclave with no access to the sea, allowing the countries that surround them to place them under siege and hold them in a political and economic vise. The second is their own internal disputes, preventing them from reaching a decision which a large majority will accept.

The internal conflicts came to the fore in September 2017, when Massoud Barazani, the Iraqi Kurdish leader, held a referendum among the Kurds over whether or not to separate from Iraq. Most of those who voted in the referendum voted to separate, but another part of the Kurdish nation, led by Jelal Talabani, did not take part in the vote due to opposition to the referendum and its results. The ensuing siege by the four states surrounding the Kurdish enclave convinced Barazani to give up on the idea of separating from Iraq and establishing an independent state.

The Syrian situation is similar to the Iraqi one, except for the referendum. The civil war and general paralysis Syria suffered from the latter part of 2011 onward, made the Kurds feel secure enough to establish an autonomous enclave, ignoring Turkish anger at the move. They fought ISIS and became the darlings of the West. As time went on, however, and especially after ISIS lost much of the territory it had overrun, the Kurdish forces lost their importance in the eyes of Western decision makers. The fact that they spilled rivers of blood in the war against ISIS is given short shrift today, and the world takes Erdogan into account much more than it does the Kurds.

The Kurds feeling of betrayal increased as a result of Trump’s decision to remove US forces from Syria and hand Erdogan the country on a silver platter, allowing, in Trump’s words, for Erdogan to deal with the terrorists left in Syria. The problem is that when Trump hears the word “terrorist” he hears ISIS, while Erdogan hears “Kurds.” The Kurds, fearing Turkish brutality, turned to Assad begging him to save them from the Turkish army.

Do you get it? Assad, the mass murderer par excellence, is less terrible than Erdogan – in Kurdish eyes. And Assad welcomed them, even though he knows very well that they do not really want to be his wards.

The Kurds of Syria, however, know that Assad won a colossal victory against all odds. The Russians, Iranians, Hezbollah and other Shiite militias did the dirty work for him, and as a result of this “victory,” Arab and European states are on line waiting to renew their relations with Syria and re-open their embassies in Damascus.

The reasons for this are twofold, the less important one being the desire to counter Iranian influence and convince Assad that he is better off returning to his former role as part of the Arab people rather than joining the Iranian coalition.  More importantly, the sad state of Arab economies leads to their desire to invest in rebuilding Syria in order to send unemployed workers there and garner economic gain from the operating rights to be awarded the states that invest in rebuilding Syria’s infrastructure.

Economic considerations, however, do not tell the entire story. Egypt, the United Emirates and Bahrain – Saudi Arabia’s allies in the anti-Iran coalition – suggested sending forces to help Assad deal with the situation. Arab hatred of Turkey is so extreme that the last thing the Arab states wish to see is the return of the Ottoman Empire, one hundred and one years after its defeat at the hands of Europe and humiliating ejection from the Arab lands.

The Arabs have never forgotten the Ottoman Turks’ methods of maintaining their rule, how the Turkish police whipped the soles of their victims’  feet, hanged them to die on scaffolds, hoisted them on sharp petards to mangle their insides before they died. The Syrians and Iraqis have not forgotten how in the 80s, only about 30 years ago, the Turks diverted the waters of the Euphrates River to build the Attaturk Dam, leaving millions of Syrian and Iraqi farmers standing helplessly watching their crops wither in the fields while all their labors became as naught.

Arabs neither forget nor forgive. As I have said before, the old Bedouin tale of a man avenging his father’s death 40 years posthumously and saying “I hurried” is applicable everywhere in the Arab world..

Erdogan has not only Arab hatred to take into account, but also the animosity of the Turkish Kurds who are not going to sit idly by for long  watching him attack their Syrian Kurdish brothers. He worries, and rightly so, that massive operations against the Kurds of Syria and Iraq are liable to bring the Turkish Kurds out to the streets to demonstrate at the very least, but possibly also to sow destruction and carry out terror attacks in the worst case. If that happens, he will be forced to break up the demonstrations by using force and find himself facing funerals which can turn into bloody and violent protests within minutes.

The Turkish economy is in bad shape, with a decline in the value of the country’s currency, surging unemployment and rampant corruption in every level of government. This, too, may influence the Kurdish public which suffers more than the average Turk because they are kept on the sidelines of economic, social and political arenas. Erdogan continues to enjoy popular public support, but there is a limit to what the Kurds are willing to undergo.  A crushing operation against their brethren in Syria may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.

Erdogan is also afraid of the Europeans, because if his attacks on the Kurds lead to negative headlines in European newspapers, European tourists may avoid Turkey and travel to Greece or other middle eastern countries such as Israel for their vacations. Industrialists may move their factories out of Turkey if they realize that labels stating “made in Turkey”  is a good way to ensure their goods remain on the shelves.

In sum, one can say that the Kurds in Syria are endangered by Turkey, but not on the level spokespersons are trying to make the public believe, because they have a way out. Political savvy and a realistic approach concerning the balance of power in the region, would make it possible for the Kurds to live as Assad’s subjects. Although this solution is far from ideal, in their view, it is quite possible that an alternate one might be worse, much worse, than the orderly life – limited and humiliating as it is – achieved by allying with Assad, the victor.

January 7, 2019 | 11 Comments »

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11 Comments / 11 Comments

  1. I think the YPJ and the IDF have the cutest fighters in the Middle East. Even so, I agree with Hugo’s estimation of the Kurds the most. Edgar is also right — the Kurds (who are of many factions) have had to make many compromises in order to survive. That is understandable; but understandable or not, it makes them less than completely reliable.

    That doesn’t mean I like the Turks. I don’t.

  2. @ adamdalgliesh:

    I don’t believe that the US could NOT prevent Erdogan from invading Syria. Turkish power compared to that of the US is like that of a flea to a dog. Trump must have other reasons; besides it’s been reliably reported that he won’t leave the Kurds in danger; that he has made arrangements about it.

    This may or may not be true, we have to wait and see. At any rate the US leaving is not precipitate, but declared as being slow. That also we have to wait and see.

  3. I think both that the CIA and DoD advised Trump that the long-standing alliance with Turkey is more important to the U.S. than the more recent and informal alliance with the Kurds. While DoD has reservations about “abandoning” the Kurds, Trump probably recognized which Defense Dept. officials refused to face, that the U.S. could not be allied with both of these enemies at the same time. One or the other had to be “abandoned,” so he decided, probably reluctantly that he would withdraw support from the Kurds rather than abandon the alliance with Turkey. He also probably concluded, from talking to Erdogan, that he was determined to invade Syria, and the U.S. could not prevent him from doing so even if tried. Still, Erdogan is so evil and hostile to U.S., European and Israeli interests that I think it was the wrong decision. But was well thought out, and grounded in the information that the USG’s experts had given him.

  4. @ Hugo Schmidt-Fischer: Fascinating. Thanks for keeping me informed about Kurdish internal politics, Hugo. Everything I read about the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts leads me to believe that Trump is much better informed than the media claims, and that his decisions about U.S. policy in the region have been well thought out, even if some people in DoD disagree with him. I notice that CIA director Pompeo has not resigned and is defending Trump’s policies. Most of the information on which Trump has based his decisions probably comes from the CIA.

    It seems that Trump doesn’t believe that the Kurds have been as loyal allies as the media and possibly DoD believe. That may partially explain his decision to “abandon” them, if indeed that is what he has done.

  5. This from the JNS news service. An order-all assessment of the threats to Israel from Syria.

    A new Mideast order is taking shape, says ex-senior Israeli intelligence officer | JNS.org
    (January 7, 2019 / JNS)
    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Security Cabinet members get a tour with the North Front Command in the Golan Heights, on Feb. 6, 2018. Credit: Kobi Gideon/GPO.
    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Security Cabinet members get a tour with the North Front Command in the Golan Heights, on Feb. 6, 2018. Credit: Kobi Gideon/GPO.
    The era of chaos in the Middle East is drawing to a close, and a new phase, which contains its own set of dangers, is taking shape, a senior former intelligence official has told JNS.

    Brig. Gen. (res.) Eli Ben Meir, former head of the Assessment Department at the Israel Defense Force’s Military Intelligence Directorate, said the period of the “Arab Spring,” marked by tectonic instability and dramatic changes, is drawing to a close.

    Subscribe to The JNS Daily Syndicate by email and never miss our top stories

    The Arab Spring period featured large-scale civil wars, uprisings and the involvement of external elements in failed states, as old orders fell apart.

    “In recent years … one would get up in the morning and didn’t know who controlled Syria, or what was happening in Iraq and Yemen,” said Ben Meir, who headed the strategically vital Assessment Department in 2015 and at the start of 2016. “This was a period in which frameworks broke apart, and the old order underwent change. But from 2018 onwards, those states that were a mess have begun stabilizing. The assessment is that this will continue in the coming year.”

    Brig. Gen. (res.) Eli Ben Meir, former head of the Assessment Department at the Israel Defense Forces’ Military Intelligence Directorate.
    This trend has proven true for Syria, Iraq and even Yemen, where the Saudis and Shi’ite Houthi rebels—warring enemies—are discussing ceasefires and seeking new understandings. States that were worried about “being next” to suffer instability due to a regional domino effect, like Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have remained stable, and now understand that they are not about to crumble, according to Ben Meir.

    The time of popular uprisings, mass protests and social networks fueling regime change has vanished, he said. “Even in Syria, which experienced the biggest mess, [Syrian President Bashar] Assad has remained.”

    This does not mean that rebel assassins can’t try to target Arab leaders in any country in the region—a threat that has always existed—but regime change won’t happen through “the streets or Facebook, like the events of Tahrir Square [in Egypt],” affirmed Ben Meir.

    A new period of explosiveness

    The newfound stability in the Middle East is not, unfortunately, a guarantee for calm; rather, it most likely increases the potential for unpredictable conflict. In Syria, according to foreign reports, Israel conducted a large number of airstrikes against developing Iranian threats, taking advantage of the lack of a capable regime and military in that country.

    “Now, however, the state and military are slowly coming back to Syria. A sovereign state has military capabilities. It can retaliate or go to war. It didn’t do those things when it was busy defending itself,” said Ben Meir.

    From left: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an . Credit: Wikimedia Commons.
    Israel took advantage of the lack of a centralized Syrian regime to take preventative action, but it remains unclear how much longer it can do this without sparking an inter-state conflict.

    In addition, the new order taking shape in the region includes the Shi’ite Iranian-Hezbollah axis. This axis remains highly active in Syria, and is attempting to gain dangerous accomplishments, like the deployment of precision missiles and the building weapons factories, Ben Meir assessed.

    The new order taking shape is prone to “disruption and influence,” he said, “whether it is [Israel’s], the U.S., Russia or because of the influence of events.”

    In the Gaza Strip, he noted, fundamental problems that could lead to conflict have not been solved. The Strip remains locked in an economic crisis, and Hamas could end up going to war if its cash flow runs out.

    Rockets being fired from the Gaza Strip on July 14, 2018. Credit: IDF Spokesperson Unit.
    Referring to the arrival of Qatari suitcases filled with assistance money, Ben Meir noted that “when those $15 million run out, either another suitcase with 15 million arrives, or we will face rockets. In principle, we gained time, but we have not solved the problem.”

    Disrupting the enemy’s build-up of force

    On Dec. 11, the recently appointed Military Intelligence Directorate chief, Maj. Gen. Tamir Hyman, offered his assessment to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. While many of his comments were classified, the Knesset publicized some of them, including his view that the current period is one of “disruption, influence and [a new order] taking shape.” It is an opportunity “to act in all sectors,” as part of Israel’s campaign to interfere with enemy force build-up processes.

    Hyman noted that in Lebanon, Hezbollah possesses an arsenal of unguided projectiles, and that as of now, it “lacks an industrial ability to convert [unguided rockets into accurate ones] and manufacture precision weaponry.”

    Lebanese soldiers and a member of the Hezbollah organization (left) on a watch tower near the new concrete wall on the border between Israel and Lebanon near Rosh Hanikra in northern Israel on Sept. 5, 2018. Photo by Basel Awidat/Flash90.
    In Syria, the Assad regime is stabilizing, Hyman said, and the Shi’ite axis is entrenching itself. Israel, he warned, is committed to the goal of pushing Iran and Hezbollah away from the Golan Heights region.

    Within Iran itself, a dispute has broken out within the leadership over the price of the Islamic Republic’s attempt to entrench itself in Syria. “As a result, we recognize a trend in which [the Iranian entrenchment] has stopped, and it has been reduced on the ground by tens of percentages,” said Hyman.

    Yet the Dec. 25 airstrike in Syria, reportedly targeting a depot containing Iranian rockets, appears to be a sign that the Israeli-Iranian shadow war in Syria is far from over.

    As the Middle East enters a new order, decision-makers across the region will likely be aware that the margin for miscalculation has become smaller.

  6. @ adamdalgliesh:
    The media do not communicate on these issues, because the media are too busy creating news, mainly their own wishful propaganda, instead of reporting news.

    Still here and there, you do hear, not via the press, but from people in the know, that the Kurds are running their own little rackets in oil. That is a very troublesome matter.

    Trump has arm-twisted the Saudis to keep oil prices low. It’s good for the US consumer (though not for the US as an oil producer) it keeps inflation low and the economy growing. And a low oil price is a the most elegant and strong counterforce to Russia’s strengthening rather than engage in an arms race or risk hostilities as the never-Trump neocons and democrats seem to be demanding.

    The same is true for Iran. A low oil price is death to the Ayatollahs, and Trump rather than pick a fight today, is wisely starving the regime in Tehran first.

    By circumventing US oil blockades and cash transfers, the Kurds have been undermining this grand strategy. It is hard to believe. But if you listen to Trump’s 20 minute soliloquy after New Year, he complained about the Kurds violations. He is undoubtedly well briefed on this matter, so the assertion is true.

    Kurdistan’s internal politics are complex. The players are the Kurdistan Democratic Party (K.D.P.) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, as well as smaller fringe groups. The two major parties, both accused of graft, each look in different directions for patronage and support. The P.U.K. to Tehran, while the K.D.P. is traditionally more aligned with Baghdad, the United States and Western-aligned regional countries. The rivalries have important petroleum implications.

    In 2016 Kurdistan’s regional government (officially the Kurdistan Regional Government or K.R.G.) and Baghdad agreed to export 150,000 barrels of oil per day through Kurdish pipelines to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The resulting revenue was to be shared by both governments. The agreement only exacerbated internal Kurdish tensions. The P.U.K. accused the K.D.P. of lacking transparency; the K.D.P. accused the P.U.K. (who had always been close to Tehran) of selling Kirkuk’s oil via trucks to Iran, and keeping the money for themselves.

  7. @ Hugo Schmidt-Fischer:
    The PKK doesn’t just have Marxist leanings. They openly describe themselves as Marxist Leninists and glorify the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
    Hugo, where do you get this information about Kurdish contraband oil deliveries? This is a genuine, not a rhetorical question. I would like to learn more about this subject. Thanks.

  8. The Kurds are confronted by a range of problems, some self-made.

    Some of their factions are Marxist, their internal strifes are legendary and their betrayals problematic for allies. Selling oil to Iranian or Syrian operatives is another blemish on their record.

    The Marxist leanings of some of the Kurdish factions, such as the, PKK cannot be condoned by any means and places them beyond the political Pale.

    Their internal strifes and never ending successive betrayals are enigmatic of Muslim culture and proof Kurds cannot be relied on over time.

    Some of the Kurdish shenanigans can be justified perhaps in light of the immense pressures they are subject to, forcing them to jettison allies and abandon commitments time and again just in order to survive. Still it does not help their cause.

    Whether recent Kurdish supplies of contraband oil deliveries through their territory were a result of necessity or greed, is left open.

    Understandably, it infuriated the US President and harmed them greatly.

  9. When President Trump announed the US withdrawal from Syria, he pretty much left the Turks to face the Russians alone. I doubt that Erdogan expected that. Turkey cannot be successful in Syria, without Russian collusion.