By Evelyn Gordon
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is being assailed by his own base for his restraint last week following Hamas’s massive bombardment of southern Israel. But in considering what Israel’s policy should be, it’s important to realize that for now, the option of permanently ending Hamas terror doesn’t exist—not because it’s beyond Israel’s capability, but because it lacks sufficient public support.
If someone came up with an idea for destroying Hamas that could be executed quickly and with minimal casualties, Israelis obviously would support that, but nobody has. Thus the only plan with proven capability to suppress terror over the long term remains the one Israel executed in the West Bank in 2002 in response to the second intifada: The army goes in, and it never leaves. That’s how Israel defeated the second intifada, and how it has kept West Bank terror within tolerable limits ever since.
But doing the same in Gaza would have very high costs—in soldiers’ lives, in international opprobrium and possibly in saddling Israel with responsibility for Gaza’s civilian problems. It would be far more costly than it was to reoccupy the West Bank because Hamas has used its 11 years of total control over Gaza to become far better armed and far more deeply entrenched than West Bank terrorists were in 2002.
No democracy could undertake such a costly plan without widespread public support, but especially not Israel, because any major military operation requires a massive call-up of reservists, and Israeli reservists tend to vote with their feet. They’ll show up in droves for an operation with broad support, but an operation widely considered unjustified will spark major protests.
That’s exactly what happened when, during the second intifada, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon thought Israelis’ overwhelming support for reoccupying the West Bank created a golden opportunity to do the same in Gaza. He was forced to scrap that idea after a massive public outcry, especially from reservists.
The crucial difference Sharon had overlooked was the level of pain that Israelis were experiencing. The West Bank was wreaking havoc nationwide at that time. A wave of suicide bombings and other attacks in cities throughout Israel killed 452 Israelis in 2002, including 130 in March 2002 alone. But Gaza was causing most Israelis very little pain. Though there were attacks on soldiers and settlers in Gaza itself, there were almost no attacks from Gaza inside Israel. Consequently, most Israelis weren’t willing to pay the price that a major operation in Gaza would have entailed.
And for all the differences in today’s situation, that same basic fact remains true: Gaza isn’t causing most Israelis enough pain to make them willing to reoccupy the territory. It has made life hell for residents of communities near the border for the last seven months, and it did the same for the entire south during last week’s rocket barrage. But the vast majority of Israelis have been completely unaffected. For people in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem and most other major population centers, life continued as normal.
Hamas understands this very well. That’s why it deliberately confined itself to bombarding the south, despite having missiles capable of reaching most of Israel. It wanted to cause as much pain as possible without crossing the threshold that would provoke Israel into war—and it succeeded.
But with the option of reoccupying Gaza unavailable, the two main options left are both short-term fixes.
One is a smaller-scale military operation. The last such operation, in 2014, bought the south three-and-a-half years of almost total quiet, but at a price (for Israel) of 72 dead and massive international opprobrium. Another such operation might buy a similar period of calm, but at a similar or even higher cost. And it would have to be repeated again in another few years, by which time Hamas may be better armed and capable of exacting an even higher price.
The second option, which Netanyahu evidently favors, is to negotiate a long-term ceasefire. This might buy a similar period of quiet, though since it hasn’t been tried before, there’s no guarantee. And it has several obvious advantages: no deaths, no international opprobrium, and most likely, greater support within Israel (though judging by past experience, not abroad) for a more forceful response once the ceasefire collapses, as it will at some point.
But it also has some obvious downsides. First, it’s devastating to Israeli deterrence, since it shows that firing rockets is a good way to get Israel to capitulate to your demands. Second, it ensures that when the inevitable next round arrives, Hamas will be able to inflict much more damage than it could today.
To grasp just how much, consider that since the 2014 war, Hamas has been under a tight Israeli and Egyptian blockade. Yet according to Israeli intelligence, it has nevertheless managed to completely rebuild and perhaps even exceed the arsenal it had then. Indeed, Hamas fired more than 450 rockets in just two days last week, almost three times the daily average of 85 rockets during the 2014 war. If it managed such a massive rearmament despite the blockade, one can only imagine how much more military materiel it would acquire under a long-term truce that would relax the blockade and pour cash into Gaza (ostensibly for civilian projects, but Hamas makes sure to take a cut of every dollar that enters).
Either of these options would only postpone the inevitable: Barring a miracle, Hamas will eventually become overconfident and cause Israel enough anguish to provoke it to reoccupy Gaza. By postponing that day, and thereby allowing Hamas to further arm and entrench itself, Israel merely ensures that when it comes, it will come at a much higher price—in Israeli casualties, in Palestinian casualties and in international opprobrium.
But knowing that doesn’t change the political reality that such an operation isn’t possible now. In today’s reality, the most that Netanyahu can do is buy a few more years of quiet. And his only choice is whether to do so via a ceasefire or a limited military operation, each of which carries its own major price tag.
This article was originally syndicated by JNS.org (www.jns.org) on November 21, 2018. © 2018 JNS.org
Create a legal battalion troop only Israeli bar members, let them go in and seveve papers to vacate to all in azza
Why Israel let Hamas win
Winners don’t quit. Losers do.
.
@ adamdalgliesh:
Once there was a king who sent his servant to buy a fish. The servant returned with a fish that stank. In fury the king gave the servant a choice of three punishments: “Eat the fish, get whipped for the fish, or pay for the fish.” In common with most people, the servant chose not to reach into his pocket and he decided to eat the stinking fish but after two bites the stench made him give up and he decided to get whipped for it. The pain of the lashes, however, made him stop that, too, and he cried out, “I will pay for the fish!”
And so the fool ate the fish, got whipped for the fish and, in the end, had to pay for it, anyhow.
This is how Israel for many years under different leaders have operated. 6-day war was an anomaly …..Israel faced a no choice option, had no superpower backing and relied on her own devices very effectively. That was the the last war we can look to as having won.
Are we sure that all this apparent, no solution talk and talk of unpreparedness may be a strategic move in order to mask an. Israeli intention to stop this silly and deadly restraint in the face of terrorism once and for all. I sure hope so, because the only way to stop a war is to win it – decisively.
@ Bear Klein: All excellent points, Bear.
@ dreuveni: Spot on, Reuven.
I never knew anything about deserters in 1982 and luxurious steamboats used to bring them back. Could you please post again and tell us this story in detail?
@ yamit82: Many thanks, Yamit, for calling our attention to this damning expose by true military expert and war hero.
Obviously, chief of staff Eisenkat, who has allowed the operational quality of the IDF to deteriorate very badly, is a major part of the problems plaguing the IDF, and his replacement is a necessary first step in restoring the iDF’s operational capabilities.
@ yamit82: Thanks so much for calling our attention to this vital information, Yamit.
@ Edgar G.: Absolutely right, and very perceptive, Edgar.
Israel’s tragedy is that Benjamin Netanyahu is no Churchill, and Reuven Rivlin is no George V!. Both bear a closer resemblance to the appeasers Neville Chaimberlin and Lord Halifax.
What Gordon fails to face is that if Israel continues to kick the can down the road in an effort to avoid heavy casualties, the Military power of Hamas will continue to grow, as it has steadily since 1991. In the end, Israel will be forced to fight a coalition of Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and Syria, all armed with even more deadly and accurate weapons than the formidable arsenals that they have now. Hamas may well acquire nuclear weapons, whether given to them by Iran or Pakistan, or home-made. The longer Israel delays in taking firm action against Hamas and Hezbollah, the heavier its casualties, civilian and military, will be when all-out war cannot be avoided any longer. And Israel may not survive this final reckoning with its enemies.
As to the alleged unwillingness of most Israelis to go to war as long as they have not personally been impacted by the Hamas terror offensive against the South, history shows that peope will endure great sacrifices and hardship in a war if they are led by someone who explains the necessity of enduring great hardships to enable their country to survive a vicious, fanatical enemy. The classic example is Churchill’s. and King George VI’s leadership of the British people in World War II.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_bPNUEZig4
IDF Ombudsman Issues Dire Warning on State Of Readiness For War
Israel’s preparedness for war is worse than at any time since the 1973 Yom Kippur war, IDF ombudsman Major-General (res.) Yitzhak Brik has warned.
In a letter addressed to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman and National Security Advisor Meir Ben Shabat, the contents of which were published Thursday by public broadcaster Kan, Brik criticised a committee appointed last week by IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot to examine the IDF’s level of preparedness for war in the wake of a previous report that Brik published in June.
Brik warned that as Eisenkot had already rejected his findings, the committee appointed by the chief of staff would suffer from a conflict of interest.
“The committee has no mandate to examine some of the issues, especially since two of the committee members have already expressed their firm support for the chief of staff’s position,” Brik wrote.
“It is better to carry out a test before the next war breaks out and not after it, when no one will have the ability to say ‘I did not know.’ The chief of staff’s statements about the IDF’s readiness do not stand up to the test of reality,” Brick wrote, adding that IDF’s preparedness for war, particularly that of the ground forces, has deteriorated to a point that he could not remember “from the day I was drafted.”
Brik was drafted in 1965 and served in the Armored Corps rising to the rank of Major General. He received the medal of valor for his role as commander of a reserve tank company in the Yom Kippur War.
Brick recommended that Netanyahu appoint an external commission headed by a retired Supreme Court justice and experts from various fields to investigate and formulate a work plan “that will fundamentally restore the organizational culture in the IDF.”
Redux of pre-Yom Kippur War???
Secret Dossier Warns: The Israeli Army Is Unprepared for War
Defying chief of staff, Israeli general makes unprecedented call for independent inquiry
Liberman: Army chief largely agrees with ombudsman that IDF not combat-ready
Former defense minister tells conference that Hamas ‘stronger than before 2014 Israel-Gaza war’ and that government policy will allow it to be ‘as powerful as Hezbollah’ in a year
Former defense minister Avigdor Liberman on Thursday continued his broadside against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s security policy, telling a conference that the government was “buying short-term” quiet in Gaza and harming long-term security, as Hamas gradually bolsters its military power.
Ombudsman fires fresh salvo in ongoing battle over IDF’s readiness for war
In letter to Knesset committee, Maj. Gen. (res) Brick says officers are ‘afraid’ to speak truthfully about military’s preparedness
A Defense Ministry ombudsman accused army commanders of lying about the military’s preparedness for war, in a letter sent to a powerful Knesset committee Wednesday, as part of an ongoing spat between the retired general and the IDF General Staff.
Real Reasons
IDF ombudsman presents gloomy report of military shortfalls
In fresh annual report, General (res.) Yitzhak Brik bemoans the fact that soldiers and commanders continue to use smartphones during operations, risking unit positions, casts doubt on IDF’s readiness for next war, laments falling standards among senior staff; ‘If I read this, you would fall over.’
The IDF Ombudsman warned on Monday that a new gloomy annual report which he has produced points to a plethora of shortcomings in the military’s operational capabilities, casts doubt on its readiness for a conflict in the south and highlights the subpar standards in the quality among senior military staff.
I suggest that the writer read some of the posts on Israpundit. There have been several doable, easily workable plans posted on this site, and even a few that allow the inhabitants the time to move into the Sinai.
I don’t recall any regret announced by NATO after pulverizing mainly helpless civilian targets in Serbia unapposed by Serbia and certainly not objected to by any of the Civilised Western Nations. After all it was they who were doing it so it was O.K..
But if Israel attempted the same thing it would be excoriated up and down the line. …But think…this is our normal position with the “Civilized Nations” so why care about it. I have several times mentioned that we have become a nation of lawyers. There is NO place for a lawyer in the middle of a battle for survival. The man who proposed …”First we kill all the lawyers” knew what he was talking about although he was not aware that he’d created a “timeless” saying that has reverberated ever since.
Lawyers running amok is what happened in Israel, …considering that the Jewish State is tied and bound to strict legal actions formulated by those who need to be reined in and reversed…(except for the “machers” they get a pass) and it will be much harder than digging out blackberry roots to put them back into their slot………….AND KEEP THEM THERE..
The writer, usually very acute, is going through the same tired old reasons, possibilities and probabilities that have been thoroughly examined intensely over many years. She has no solution….And the restraint and negative actions taken so far are alienating the Israel public as never before.
“Damned if you do, and damned if you don’t”… seems to be today’s feeble plea substituting for positive action.
@ dreuveni:
In 2014 they did NOT decimate everything before they went in, that is the issue why it was more dangerous than it needed to be. Plus Israel was listening to Obama required cease fires and the lawyers were pre approving targets. So if the IDF is allowed to decimate the enemy such as in 1967 everything would get cleaned up.
The will to destroy the enemy is what is needed or choose that more Jews will die in the end one way or the other.
Unfortunately, this article is far removed from reality.
So the air force pummels everything they can see (with the lawyers permission) and then the army goes in to clean up the rest. This is where the problem lies. Based on the bad experience of 2014 and previous excursions in the Gaza strip, most lucrative buildings will be booby trapped so that entering them really places Israeli soldiers in danger of their lives. The answer to that is easy: a tank shell will solve the problem permanently (the lawyers permitting). If all the right people are cleaned up, the problem goes away, but the army will probably have to stay there for a lengthy period of time. If the reservists object (who asked them anyway?), they should be assigned to reservist duty in the towns near the Gaza border.
The argument that the country can’t support a lengthy period of reservists call-up is only kicking the can down the road a couple of meters.
The argument that Hamas can fire rockets on the rest of the country, especially Tel Aviv, might persuade reservists that a visit to Gaza might not be such a bad idea after all. Of course, with all the intelligence Israel has accumulated, they should know which locations to bomb immediately at the start of the hostilities.
Providing steamboats (luxurious, of course) to pick up the deserters like in Lebanon in 1982 IS NOT ON. They will come back to live in Tel Aviv in a couple of years with the expected pressure from the international community which goes into severe uproar every time an Israeli farts.
Sorry guys, we need a better solution like the crowd control weapons we have been hearing about recently.
Planes can fly in formations of 24. Each Israeli fighter Jet can hold 10 missiles. They can hit ten different targets simultaneously. So if Israel flies in waves of 24 planes it can hit minimally 480 targets per hour. Do that for 10 hours and you can hit 4800 targets in Gaza. This would eliminate Hamas military capability in less than one day. This is aside for hitting targets by artillery and naval units. All bunkers, buildings covering bunkers, tunnels and all terrorist facilities would be hit quickly and without notice.
The problem is that the lawyers are running the IDF and too many Gazans would be killed. Yes Israel could be warn them and tell them to get to the ports and have Cruise liners or other large ships waiting to take the Gaza refugees to Turkey, Libya, Algeria or elsewhere to other Med Ports.
Israel could and should bomb all the underground facilities were the Hamas operatives would be hiding if Israel unleashed its air, artillery and naval power simultaneously.
So Israel has three choices:
1.status quo;
2. Massive initial military attack (air, sea, artillery) with subsequent ground attack that would mop up terrorist stragglers while taking over Gaza;
3.Preparatory air attack but let the lawyers approve targets (as now) and long term ground invasion that will minimize Gazan causalities at the expense of IDF causalities.
So fight a war against the enemy ruthlessly or allow it to terrorize Southern Israel is the choice.
So Gordon saying there is no plan that would work without large scale Israeli causalities is not accurate at all. It takes the will to win and exact the pain on the enemy minimizing the risk to Israeli soldiers.