While Syria and Iraq are being torn apart, an independent Kurdish state may emerge • Saudi Arabia tries to establish a NATO-like Sunni coalition, but challenges abound • Meanwhile, Israel would be wise to avoid other people’s battles • A year in review.
By Yaakov Amidror, ISRAEL HAYOM
The changes currently sweeping over the area surrounding Israel are so significant and will so profoundly impact the future of the region that it is difficult to say how it will look in the coming years and onward. From time to time it is important to stop and take stock — make an interim assessment — and the end of the calendar is a good time to do just that.
The concept of “nation-state” has taken quite a blow this year. Three states have entirely collapsed (Iraq, Syria and Libya) and several others are on the verge (chiefly Yemen), and no one would be surprised if additional nations join the list in the future. Even in states that have ostensibly remained intact, deep rifts have emerged that will be difficult to bridge therefore the unrest will not soon abate.
In Syria there are three wars being waged simultaneously. The bitterest one is the war between the Alawi regime and the various Sunni rebels. The regime, which was on the verge of collapse despite being propped up by Hezbollah and Iran, was ultimately saved thanks to Russian involvement, which brought enormous firepower. But even Russia can’t tip the scales, and it certainly can’t grant the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad any real legitimacy. Today, the Assad regime rules over about a third of the area of Syria, and after some 4 to 5 million refugees have fled, it also rules over most of its current inhabitants.
The second war, against the Islamic State group, is being waged primarily by Iraq and the United States, and to a certain degree by France and Russia. The Iraqi army’s recent victory in the central Iraqi city of Ramadi may be a sign of things to come there, but in Syria, it is likely to be a long battle. The main challenge will be obtaining accurate intelligence, because the battle against IS in Syria is being waged primarily from the air.
The third war is the one between Israel and the Hezbollah-Iran camp. Hezbollah has been taking advantage of the chaos in Syria to gather the best Iranian and Russian weapons systems (initially sold to Syria) and to prepare the Syrian Golan Heights for battle with Israel. For its part, Israel has been taking action to diminish Hezbollah’s capabilities there in various ways, including conspicuous strikes in Syria. Despite the expanding Russian presence in Syria, Israel has maintained its freedom to maneuver. The military cooperation with the Russians is working well, apparently.
But the wars in Syria and in Iraq have generated such a jolt that the aftershocks are felt well outside these countries’ borders. Turkey now understands that if it continues on its current course it could lose control over an area that houses more than 15 million Kurds in the southeastern part of the country. Kurdish autonomy is gaining steam in Iraq and to a great extent in Syria as well. If this process is allowed to continue unchecked, a Kurdish nation could arise in Iraq and Syria, despite the bitter disputes between the different Kurdish organizations. Such a nation would generate enormous internal pressure in Turkey, and it is impossible to foresee what the results of such pressure could be. One possibility is that part of Turkey will be “torn” away.
Moreover, Turkey’s hasty response to the deployment of Russian forces in Syria, which prompted Turkey to down a Russian plane, has created a rift between the two former allies. Turkey has reverted back to its historical concerns over Russian pressure on the Turkish Straits, connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Therefore, Turkey has approached NATO — an organization of which Turkey is a member and with which it has a defense agreement. But now, the Russians can play the Kurdish card and cultivate an independent Kurdish state. Such a development could further strain the relations between Russia and Turkey, so much so that an overt Russian confrontation with NATO could render it powerless to help the Turks. The Kurdish motif could potentially influence the region in the near future more than it ever has in the past.
The nuclear agreement between world powers and Iran, which allowed Tehran to retain important nuclear capabilities, in conjunction with the Russian arrival in Syria to support the Alawite regime, have prompted grave concerns among the Sunnis. The Sunnis constitute the overwhelming majority of the Muslim world (some 85%), but the Shiites represent the more unified, dynamic force. One of the results of this power dynamic is Islamic State’s draw as the protector of Sunnis. Another result is the understanding among Sunni countries that they need to prepare to defend themselves against a growing Shiite coalition led by Iran.
In order to withstand these threats, the Sunni countries need to join forces despite the many disagreements among them and despite the fact that no Sunni country is willing to accept another Sunni country’s leadership. If Egypt was once viewed as the natural leader — as the largest of the Arab states — today its status has eroded, primarily because it requires massive financial assistance that comes from the Gulf. Turkey, which was considered the leader of the Sunna in Ottoman Empire terms, cannot realize its dream of reassuming this leadership role because the Turks are reviled in the Arab world — any mention of the dream of resurrecting the old Ottoman Empire sends shivers down the Arab world’s collective spine.
Saudi Arabia is trying to fill this void and seize the leadership role, both because it is home to the holiest Muslim city Mecca and because of its enormous wealth. But its power is extremely precarious — the source of its wealth is oil, which has devalued significantly. Therefore, the Saudi kingdom has been pulling massive amounts out of its currency reserves, which, as large as they may be, are still finite. And regardless, the Saudi royal family is currently facing the challenge of passing down the leadership to the next generation. Friction between various members of the royal family has already begun to make waves, which proves that this difficult transition has not yet been completed.
And still, Saudi Arabia is trying to found a new umbrella organization unifying all the Sunni states — a sort of Sunni NATO. This organization is supposed to represent these countries’ interests and help the Sunnis fight the Alawites and their allies — Hezbollah, Iran and Russia — in Syria (and, in the future, possibly not just in Syria).
If this move succeeds, it could alter the balance of power in Syria. Such a success could create a serious problem for the Russians. This effort by the Sunni states should underscore the distinction between Islamic State — which the new organization would fight — and the other rebels, which they will support.
One of the key questions that has yet to be answered is whether Turkey will cooperate. Past experience teaches us that Sunni coalitions of this kind are unable to overcome the difference among their members. Certainly in this instance, the Kurdish factor will stand in the way of any serious coalition efforts.
What should Israel do in the face of this tumultuous world? As a rule, it must not get sucked into the conflicts around it. They are deep, wide, and will continue for a long time. The state of Israel needs to invest its resources in those areas where its involvement will contribute to its security and development, prevent clear dangers and generate opportunities. Israel must not waste its strength on other people’s battles — we don’t know when and how these battles will end or who will benefit from them.
@ Salomon Benzimra:
Good point.
I take exception with this sentence in this otherwise very good article:
If these nations (Syria, Iraq, Libya, etc.)are blowing up, it is precisely because they are NOT real nation-states. They are “multi-national” states, very much like the former Yugoslavia was before it too “blew up”.
Real nation-states have an inherent stability because of the homogeneity of their population, where the founding people represents an overwhelming majority. Hence, a warning to Israel where its 77% Jewish population ratio may be considered a lower limit.
LOL, time to get the popcorn!
we might see the beginning of the last phase I spoke of 2 years ago, the spread of the jihadi “arab spring” to Iran. I expect the saudis to start an internal destabilization of Iran. It is possible then that Moscow may cut its own deal to separate Assad from Iran and perhaps even Hezbullah as they have become a liability to their interests. In any case there is less of a chance of resolution in syria and Iraq which is good for Israel. If Saudi opens a destabilization of Iran then Israel would likely cooperate in that effort with them covertly. In such a case I would expect BB to be even more amenable to winding down any conflict with the Pals and they also may be given the same message by saudi. Iran will continue to heat up the pals using their proxies in the west bank and gaza and even hexbullah. In any case I think if it gets worse then for Israel it will get better. Even the US and west may move away from their deal at this pivotal point of deciding now on sanctions for the ballistic missiles.
the plot thickens, the next act begins in the saudi iran war.
Israels behavior appears to be short term as it is obvious that if Sisi goes and a Morsi type returns that there will be grave danger from these violations