The Kursk Gamble

Peloni:  The mounting debacle at Kursk is proving to be a public humiliation for Russia which has the potential of changing the bargaining position of Ukraine, if they are able to meet the seemingly insurmountable possibility of hold Kursk for the next several months.  Yet for Ukraine to be able to do so, it would require that Ukraine be able to hold newly won grounds with no defensive entrenchments in a better fashion than they defended territories which they had prepared for defense over the course of a decade.  Hence, I would argue that Ukraine has little chance of holding these grounds for very long at all. In any event, time will tell how harmful this humiliation will prove for Russia, but even if Ukraine proves to be more resourceful at holding Russian lands against the Russian forces than it did at holding Ukrainian lands, it will only mean that Ukraine will lose the war on better terms – not an inconsequential goal of course for a country ready to accept its defeat, but as I noted, time will tell if even this limited goal is somehow miraculously achieved.

A Ukrainian Gamble for peace negotiations?

Stephen Bryen | Weapons and Strategy | August 9, 2024

The Russians got caught with their pants down in Kursk.  The Ukrainians pulled off a large-scale invasion using new tactics.  They advanced far into Russian territory, mostly unopposed, or countered only by some inexperienced territorial units.  They did it with drone power but not any other air power, mostly because they don’t have any (notwithstanding the symbolic F-16s which are based in Romania).

Russia has declared a Federal Emergency in the Kursk region.

This is written on the morning of Friday, August 9th.  The invasion started on the previous Tuesday, August 6th.  While the Russians are now pounding the Ukrainians, the Russians are only just bringing up sufficient troops and special operators to try and crush the Ukrainian advance.  This too was pre-planned by the Ukrainians (and their NATO backers).  Ukrainian forces are digging in wherever they can, as the objective is to hold territory for as long as possible.

According to Rybar reporting on Telegram, Ukrainian forces consisting of the 82nd and 80th separate air assault brigades are leading the attacks, supported by the 22nd and 61st separate mechanized brigades of the AFU. In addition, the 150th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th Air Assault Brigade, 151st Territorial Defense Battalion, and 24th Mountain Assault Brigade are participating (https://t.me/dva_majors/49105) in a limited capacity.

The Russian side still is rather disorganized.  Overall responsibility for Kursk and the northern area has changed hands a number of times in recent months, leaving confusion and lack of preparation in its wake.  The Russians are reportedly bringing up fresh forces (so far not named), including units known as “fire brigades.”  These are assault spetsnaz-type units they are well trained and effective.

Everyone knows that sooner or later the Ukrainians, despite the addition of reserve troops, will be driven out of Russian territory.  But that will take time, and “sooner” and “later” have special meaning in the context of the goals of the incursion, a topic I will return to below.

There is a lot of criticism in Russia on the lack of preparedness on the Russian side.  There is no doubt that the Russian General Command had plenty of notice on Ukrainian preparations, but did nothing to counter it, or even to prepare to counter an invasion. Part of the reason probably is the heavy focus on major gains especially in Donbass by Russian forces, leading to a number of breakthroughs that either have happened or are about to take place.  That uber-command-focus and the realization that Ukraine needed all the forces it could muster just to try and stop Russian advances, the top Russian military commanders did not think the Kursk preparations were of much concern.

Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff, is in a lot of hot water.  There have been two meetings of the Russian Security Council which Vladimir Putin presided over and where Gerasimov gave reports on the Kursk situation.  The reports, as released to the press, were extremely optimistic and suggested that the situation was well in hand.  It was not.  While we don’t know what else Gerasimov had to say, or what Putin remarked in response, there are some video images of Putin frowning as Gerasmov spoke.  It was pretty clear he didn’t believe a word of what Gerasimov was saying.

The Kursk attack was planned to be coordinated by two other attacks far south in the Kherson area.  These attacks featured naval landings.  The first took place on August 6th on the Tendra Spit, then at night on the 8th of August on the Kinburn Peninsula.  The attacks featured the heavy use of drones and electronic warfare, including Baba Yaga drones that use six rotors and carry a large 33 pound warhead.  The Ukrainians lost four assault boats and two Baba Yaga drones.  One boat was able to land but the attacking forces were eliminated. Both attacks were successfully countered and the diversion failed to work.

For the record, the Russians are reporting on losses on the Ukrainian side.  RT (Russia Today government news site), based on Russian Defense Ministry information, reports that Ukraine has lost up to 945 soldiers as well as 102 armored vehicles, including 12 tanks and 17 armored personnel carriers. The figures include more than 280 troops and 27 armored vehicles destroyed over the past 24 hours in areas bordering Kursk Region.  There is no information on Russian losses.  Russia has been pounding the Ukrainians with air power, including glide bombs equipped with precision-strike capability.

Operational Objectives

Why would Ukraine be willing to sacrifice so many troops in an operation that will “sooner or later” get rolled up?  Here are the reasons:

Firstly, Ukraine’s ability to defend its territory in Donbass is a dead end, as the Russians are carrying out relentless attacks slowly dislodging Ukraine’s defenses, even in built-up towns with high rise concrete and steel buildings as strong positions for Ukraine’s troops. On a daily basis Ukraine has been losing around 1,000 troops (killed and wounded) and morale in some brigades has gone to near zero.  The losses, even though Ukraine does its best to cover them up, pervades the society.  Much of the resistance to Ukraine’s new draft laws is the sense that raw newly-recruited troops will be thrown into combat as “meat” brigades and slaughtered. Most front-line Ukrainian brigades are well below full strength, and in many cases experienced fighters have been lost.

Secondly, Ukraine’s leadership is under considerable western pressure to negotiate with Russia, something that even Zelensky has acknowledged.  While Zelensky keeps promoting some sort of multi-nation peace conference, with Russia invited to the next one, the Russians have made it clear they are not interested.  The Russians also are pressuring Zelensky by saying he is no longer the elected leader of Ukraine and thus not a qualified interlocutor.

Zelensky also knows that if Trump wins in November he has a big problem. Mr. Trump is now saying that even before he actually takes office, that if he wins he is going to solve the Ukraine problem.

Ukraine counters that under current conditions they could be forced to give up a lot of territory and point out that as things now stand they have little leverage.  Ukraine cannot continue the war much longer, there is little hope (although a great desire) for NATO to intervene, and Ukraine fears it will be left out on its own.

Thus the Kursk offensive is a gamble for Ukraine to have leverage with Russia in a peace negotiation.

Kursk is an extremely sensitive area for Russia.  The WW2 battle for Kursk was a major turning point for the Soviet Union leading to the eventual defeat of the Wehrmacht. That battle was one of the costliest fights in WW2 and remains today the biggest tank battle in history.   Boris Sokolov places the Russian losses at 450,000 killed, 50,000 missing (POWs), and 1.2 million wounded throughout the course of the battle.

If Ukraine can hold Russian territory, perhaps for a few months, they can use it as a trading card with Russia.

But more is involved, and this should not be overlooked.

The strategy and tactics Ukraine is showing at Kursk was developed with NATO.  It is a test case for the defense of Europe in case of a Russian attack.  Why is this so?  NATO, in its present configuration, is in a bad place when it comes to defending territory.  If fighting were to break out in Poland, or Romania, or north in the Baltics, the Russians would have a significant advantage in ground forces.  One way to counter that would be exactly the kind of operation Ukraine is testing right now in the Kursk region.  One can easily imagine a similar vector in a broader European conflict, perhaps aimed at knocking out Kaliningrad or focused on St. Petersburg or even Moscow.

There are other factors in Ukraine’s operation that may play a role, such as the Sudzha Gas Metering station.  The station, located on the Russia-Ukraine border several kilometers from the Russian town of Sudzha, handles all gas flowing from Russia to Europe. The station is located about 5 miles inside Russia’s border with Ukraine.  Ukraine claims to now control the station and there is speculation that Ukraine may decide to blow it up.  If that happens then Europe will have to depend on LNG exports from the United States. Like the overall Kursk operation, the Gas Metering Station is a bargaining card, if Ukraine can hang on to it.  If they blow it up, then it becomes an economic issue for Russia and Europe.

Another possible target is the Kursk Nuclear Power plant.  It is far deeper inland than the Gas Metering Station.  Moreover any attack on the power plant could cause a Chernobyl type disaster that would not help Ukraine’s political position in Europe.  Even so, the Ukrainian press is speculating about the fate of the power plant and reporting that the Russians have decided to put better protection around the facility.

How Clever?

The big question is whether Ukraine will be successful in the Kursk operation.  Much depends on the rapidity of the Russians response and the ability of the Ukrainian forces to dig in and hold ground. While the operation is military, the outcome hoped for is political.  There is no doubt it is a big gamble.  It upsets the Russian stodgy and systematic approach to territorial conquest.  But it risks a huge reaction and utter defeat if it fails prematurely.  It isn’t clear how quickly the Ukrainians will jump at trying to force a negotiation with Russia, nor is it clear that the Russians will take the bait.