INSS Insight No. 532, March 24, 2014
Pnina Sharvit Baruch, Olena Bagno-Moldavsky
In a series of rather rapid moves, Russia, ignoring international criticism, annexed the Crimean Peninsula. In the immediate background to the annexation are more than three months of violent protests in Ukraine, which ended on February 21, 2014 with a coup and the flight of President Yanukovich, and with the establishment of a transitional government that will be in effect until elections in May. Rather than easing the turmoil in Ukraine, however, Russia’s annexation of Crimea has broadened the crisis, especially given the many attendant repercussions in the international arena, where a confrontation of powers is underway between Russia and the West.
In a series of rather rapid moves, Russia, ignoring international criticism, annexed the Crimean Peninsula. The annexation began in early March with a non-violent military takeover, followed soon by a declaration of independence ostensibly initiated by the local population. A few days later (March 16, 2014) a popular referendum on joining Russia received support from some 95 percent of the voters. On March 18, 2014 the official annexation occurred with the support of most of Russia’s citizens.
President Putin signs final decree on annexation of Crimea, March 21, 2014; Image Bank/Getty Images
In the immediate background to the annexation are more than three months of violent protests in Ukraine, which ended on February 21, 2014 with a coup and the flight of President Yanukovich, and with the establishment of a transitional government that will be in effect until elections in May. Rather than easing the turmoil in Ukraine, however, Russia’s annexation of Crimea has broadened the crisis, especially given the many attendant repercussions in the international arena, where a confrontation of powers is underway between Russia and the West.
Russia, which viewed itself as negatively affected by the results of the Ukrainian turmoil, chose to respond by annexing the Crimean Peninsula. However, its actions regarding these developments were in fact reactive, given the challenge it faced from the ongoing trend of the West’s “eastward expansion” toward the territories that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Russia has its own plans for these territories. In its understanding, the Ukrainian crisis, which ended with Ukraine moving into the Western camp (in Russia’s view, not without subversive assistance from the West), forced it to take some steps to stop the serious deterioration in its international standing and the damage to its plans to reconstruct the “empire,” which without Ukraine are very difficult to implement. Therefore, Russia’s clear interest is to restore the status quo ante, that is, to prevent Ukraine from joining forces with the West and return it to Russia’s sphere of influence. In this sense, the move in the Crimean Peninsula was not only intended to restore “historic justice” by returning it to Russia; it was also meant to create a lever of pressure on Ukraine, through a threat to take action to divide it and annex other areas of the country. The implicit threat likewise extends to other countries formerly part of the Soviet Union that have already crossed the lines or intend to do so.
Thus it is likely that Russian activity will now focus on obtaining an understanding with both Ukraine and the West on preventing Ukraine from joining the Western system, or at the very least, reaching an interim arrangement that preserves the status quo. In any case, Russia has already submitted its proposals on this matter, including the proposal to federalize Ukraine, which the United States has rejected.
For its part, the West, i.e., the United States and the European Union, faces a dilemma regarding the appropriate response to the unfolding situation. On the one hand, the West clearly intends to continue to promote its policy of preventing Russia from regaining its superpower status, mainly by removing areas formerly in the Soviet Union from the Russian sphere of influence and absorbing them in the Western system, preferably by non-violent means. On the other hand, Russia’s conduct in response to these trends creates new challenges that make it necessary to restrain it, preferably without being drawn into an all-out conflict. Therefore, the Western response, comprising various economic and political sanctions, at this point appears to be the best possible option.
Interestingly, both sides have been careful to make legal claims in support of their position. Russia contends that the residents of the Crimean Peninsula, in declaring a separation from Ukraine and deciding on annexation to Russia, are realizing their right to self-determination. The Russians are relying on the precedent of Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia, which was recognized by most Western countries (though not by Russia). Ukraine and the Western countries contend that these actions constitute harm to the basic principle of protecting the territorial integrity of the country, which takes precedence over the right to self-determination, and that this is a belligerent annexation by Russia. In their view, Kosovo was a unique case that cannot serve as a precedent for the current situation.
In the current international situation, a number of consequences are beginning to emerge. These include:
1. On the international level: Russia’s relations with the West are in the nature of an open conflict not only over the future of the territories formerly part of the Soviet Union, but also in the Middle East, which has become a secondary front in the competition. Meanwhile, beyond the increased tension in the international system caused by the sanctions regime, this situation can be expected to lead to conflicts based on efforts to create geopolitical changes in other regions. It is not inconceivable that in the foreseeable future, a Russian-Western compromise will nevertheless be obtained regarding Ukraine and the regional order in Eastern Europe as a whole. In any event, if the developing friction continues, then against the backdrop of a variety of existing international challenges it may lead to instability in the international arena and a loss of confidence in the various international arrangements, which will be translated into a reexamination of existing international relationships and norms.
2. The Middle East: More than in the past, the Middle East has become an additional arena for Russian-Western friction in which Russia will continue to work to establish its status and promote its objectives in the international arena. Furthermore, Russia is expected to take advantage of the region as another arena for conflict with the West to divert attention and efforts from Eastern Europe. On the practical level, Russia will work to deepen its grip in countries with which there is cooperation. It will also increase its efforts to expand the circle of regional partners using economic means, particularly weapons exports, and political means, that is, damage to the standing of the Western powers in the region. At the same time, Russia will likely work to strengthen support for the Assad regime; seek weapons deals with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq; and increase its cooperation with Iran, notwithstanding requests from the West to the contrary, through alluring economic proposals that have the power to disrupt the sanctions regime. On the geopolitical level, it will work to reshape the regional order while supporting various regional actors that can interfere with Western interests in the region.
3. On the level of international law: It is evident that all of the parties involved consider it important to present a legal basis for their actions and do not think it sufficient to base themselves on pure political interest. This suggests yet another reflection of the increased “legalization” on the international level. On the other hand, the fact that conflicting legal arguments are presented indicates that in this area, the legal rules are fluid and serve mainly as an explanation to the outside world and not as a true basis for conduct.
As for Israel, the friction between the major powers in the Middle East has potential consequences for Israeli interests, whether due to changes in the policy of supplying weapons or the increased support for Israel’s enemies, including active involvement in the realm of security. These issues require monitoring and a matching approach by Israel in its relations with the large powers and the various actors in the region. However, as of now, Israel has no interest in becoming involved in crises in Eastern Europe, other than regarding the security of the Jewish communities, which is a serious issue insofar as a variety of players are playing the anti-Semitic card. Therefore, Israel for now would do well to avoid involvement and one-sided positions on Crimea and the grater confrontation between Russia and the West.
@ bernard ross:
@ yamit82:
That’s pretty much what I thought…. 🙁
So useless… So futile… What a waste
Were the late rabbi kahane (hyd) alive, I am certain that he would have had a ‘farewell speech’ and reminded everyone that ‘whoever blesses Israel- will be blessed, whoever curses Israel will be cursed…’
the phoenix Said:
It’s like belonging to the country club: everyone who is everyone belongs to it. Israel probably contributes more in knowledge and technology than it gets, I suppose there are some international sub agencies which are mutual aid societies. the UN probably has a large influence on global trends, maybe. Israel would probably be able to retain the beneficial links on a bilateral basis.
The real question is does Israel have a plan B for dealing with BDS from the UN and global community.
Certainly it should at least have legal arguments which allow those who wish to support Israel to do so.
Certainly it should have a plan of legal attack on the PA in the global courts rather than just a reaction of defense.
Certainly it should have a plan if the UN allows them as an admitted state in full membership.
Certainly it should decide whether it will annex C or all if the PA claims all they claim with UN support and the feygeles abstention.
In war there is usually a plan B and this is war.
@ the phoenix:
@ bernard ross:
Today’s riddle:
What is: The belief that a cosmic Jewish Zombie who was his own father can make you live forever if you symbolically eat his flesh and telepathically tell him you accept him as your master, so he can remove an evil force from your soul that is present in humanity because a rib-woman was convinced by a talking snake to eat from a magical tree… makes perfect sense, no?. 🙁
the phoenix Said:
A- A feeling of belonging, needed by a majority of Jews even if it’s a fallacious desire. Jews feel very uncomfortable with the thought of being alone with no friends.
Never worked out well historically when we aligned with Assyria, Persia, ROME and later Britain, France and America in modern times. We are a stupid stiff necked people who never learn.
B- The UN provides many high paying and low paying Jobs for Israeli diplomats. many cocktail parties and lots of NYC shopping opportunities.
@ yamit82:
@ bernard ross:
What is the (perceived) advantage to Israel continuing to be a member in the UN?
I do not foresee this present administration having the courage to tell this whole criminal organization to ‘really know each other in a biblical sense’.. (There are still so many red markers left…would be a shame to waste them..no?)
Are there ANY reasons to still be a doormat and a spit owl for the bastard members?
yamit82 Said:
I think they will do the same as iraq which basically will end up independent as everyone knows. semi autonomous zones in a Federal state which will disintegrate over time. Look at the turk kurd oil deals now.
yamit82 Said:
EU will say it is the occupiers responsibility to come up with the funds. I think they want a solution so as to dump the huge expenses gong into PA leaders pockets. I think the euros dont really care but have to play to their street.
Israel could use its covert experience to set up a smuggling ring, or expand existing ones, and smuggle young west bank arabs to europe. Provide them ID’s etc perhaps even use them for false flag ops, or set up businesses to hire them, or set them up to rob banks, etc. The smuggling ring could probably even get some of them to pay to be smuggled into europe or make them pay through criminal activity after they get there. I am sure that if Israel had deeper, dirty networks that they could make such ops profitable and get rid of the pals at the same time. they could do this without anyone knowing it was them doing it.
bernard ross Said:
I’m sure they did have a good deal. This could increase the cost of Gas to Europe and even put a heavier drag on the EU economies. 🙂 Good!!!
Obama will force them to militarize adding to their budget deficits and debt. Good!!! 🙂
I’ll bet they don’t cut their aid to the Palis and NGO’s working to undermine Israel.
Israel should immediately cut their economic support to the PA as soon as negotiations are officially terminated and before the Palis exercise their threats to go to the UN. Let the EU come up with Israel’s share and input to the Palis economy.
bernard ross Said:
Will the West sanction the Kurdish autonomous area of Syria for breaking away from the central government of Syria?
yamit82 Said:
perhaps they had a good deal? I hope they get screwed for harassing Israel.
@ bernard ross:
If there are so many alternative sources to Russian Gas why haven’t they exploited it till now?
US is hoping to bring more LNG facilities for export onboard soon to get higher prices in Europe and Japan; then US gas prices will skyrocket.
@ dweller:
Link did not complete, above.
Here’s the rest of the article cited:
http://www.wumag.kiev.ua/index2.php?param=pgs20043/74
@ David Peters:
His actions don’t appear at all ‘arbitrary.’ He’s playing to the galleries, his remarks are entirely for domestic consumption; ‘look at me, I’m tough.’
When he uses the word “Russian,” he typically uses the term Russisskye — rather than Russkye; which is to say, he’s clearly appealing to Russian ETHNICITY, without regard to Russian commitments.
Khrushch is a Ukrainian word for the cockchafer (or May bug; altho in Russia, this beetle is called maysky zhuk, that is May bug) and thus Khrushch-ev has, for Russians, definite Ukrainian associations.
However, altho Russians understandably associate him with the Ukraine, Khrushchev was not ‘Ukrainian-born.’ He was born in the land of Kurshchyna, the borderland between Russia & Ukraine. The earlier part of his career as a Party functionary figures prominently in relation to Ukraine:
Whatever the circumstances or the ethnic repercussions of the transfer, it was lawful from an internal USSR perspective. Putin’s seizure is a violation of the territorial integrity of an independent neighbor state. If you are suggesting that Khrushchev LACKED the authority to transfer Crimea to Ukraine, then say so.
— If that isn’t your point, what is?
A true gift incurs no obligation.
— They gave up their army & their nukes. That hardly sounds like a ‘gift.’
If so, then what Putin has done is hardly calculated to make NATO & EU less likely to feel a need to expand eastward. . . .
It always amazes me how people can comment on something without even a pretense of looking behind the screen to gain any semblance of context. While Mr. Putin’s actions may appear arbitrary, there are good reasons behind them.
1) These areas of Ukraine (the eastern regions all the way to Crimea) were Russian, until the Ukrainian-born premier of the USSR unilaterally transferred them to nominally-independent Ukraine. The premier? That old shoe-banging peasant himself, Nikita Khrushchev. When? 1954. Needless to say, the ethnic Russians who were traded away never reconciled themselves to it. One reason for it: to suppress the Nazi-aligned Tatars who were being allowed to return from exile by Stalin. When Ukraine became formally independent after the break-up of the USSR, they kept the gift, which included the warm-water ports of Sevastopol and Odessa (subject to treaty for autonomous operations of the Russian Navy).
2) Considering that Russia has been invaded from the West many times in the last two hundred years, it is understandable for Russian to be apprehensive at the expansion of NATO and The European Union by adding members) to their doorstep. Whether this apprehension is justified is another matter, but it must be recognized. While the EU is an economic union, NATO membership is explicitly military. To be sure, the Baltic states are NATO members, but they were never part of Greater Russia. Ukraine used to be called The Ukraine, when it was but a region within Russia, where the language only become distinct less than 250 years ago.
Ignore history and you get bitten.
Sure.
And so were the Sudeten Germans.
And the Kosovars.
And for that matter, the Tejicanos.
It wasn’t unique. It was just as far-kahk’d as the seizure of Crimea.
And if it can happen to the Sudetenland, Kosovo, Crimea & (arguably) Tejas
— then it can happen to Judea & Samaria too (and even more easily, as long as they remain unincorporated).
It is important for israel to change its paradigm of negligence in the arena of international Lawfare and take its affect on events and outcomes very seriously. Israel must give solid legal bases for future and current scenarios in order to give countries with electorates sound reasons to their voters for supporting Israel publicly whether for the status quo or annexation and transfer. It appears that israel is going to encounter BDS regardless and in such a case should at least annex C to get something for paying the price.
this will occur also in Syria
“Interestingly, both sides have been careful to make legal claims in support of their position. ”
this is a demonstration of the best use of Lawfare: after the action so as to rally potential supporters to ones side. Giving the legal excuse to those who still wish to do business. Israel should learn this for the event of annexation and then transfer. All the legal, moral and practical arguments are strong for both annexation and transfer and it would be wise to prepare those abroad for this possibility through its repetition. Unacceptability of double standards for jews, precedents and principles of Quid Pro Quo are the support for these legal arguments.