Sinwar’s Playbook, and Netanyahu’s Firm Response

By Hugh Fitzgerald | Sept 12, 2024

Israeli academic Gadi Taub notes that the anti-Netanyahu protesters, demanding that he “bring them [the hostages] home” now by agreeing to whatever terms Hamas has proposed, are playing into Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s hands. By holding onto the hostages, and now by threats of executing still more of them — the way he did with the six whose bodies were just recovered — the Hamas leader hopes to enroll Israelis in a campaign to force Netanyahu to accept Hamas’ outrageous terms for a “ceasefire-and-hostage deal.” More on Sinwar’s playbook, and Hamas’ latest terms that few of us were aware of, can be found here: “Sinwar’s useful idiots,” by Gadi Taub, JNS, September 8, 2024:

…The mainstream media,  itself a major player in the Never-Bibi info op, was not eager to emphasize the way the demonstrators are following Sinwar’s playbook. Predictably, the usual suspects rushed to blame Netanyahu for everything, as they always do. Prominent columnists such as Haaretz‘s Yossi Verter, Maariv‘s Ben Caspit, Yedioth Ahronoth‘s Nadav Eyal, Channel 12‘s Amnon Abramowitz and Channel 13‘s Raviv Druker unfurled the party line: it’s all on Netanyahu. Netanyahu has deliberately thrown in new demands (this time it was the Philadelphi Corridor, we were told) because staying in power is more important to him than saving the hostages.

Netanyahu has not made new demands. He has always insisted that the IDF had to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor. He may, in fact, have shown himself willing to make more concessions to obtain a deal — he no longer seems to be talking about retaining military control of the Netzarim Corridor that separates north from south Gaza. He has not changed his stance on the number of Palestinian terrorists to be released for Israeli hostages — it is Hamas that keeps increasing that number. But to those leftist Israelis who hate him, none of this matters. They seem more inclined to blame Netanyahu than Hamas for the continuing plight of the hostages.

Since this is what the Israeli media keeps repeating in both Hebrew and English, much of the foreign press assumes it’s true, and that Israelis generally believe it to be true.

But, alas, that’s wrong on both counts. Netanyahu could not have saved the hostages by giving up the Philadelphi Corridor even if he was so inclined. The corridor was never the only bone of contention. Giving it up (which Israel should not do) would not have brought about a deal.

As Khalil al-Hayya, Sinwar’s deputy for negotiations, recently reiterated, Hamas’s demands for a deal have not changed. They are tantamount to an Israeli surrender:

1. A permanent ceasefire.

2. A complete withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from all of the Gaza Strip, including the security parameter along the border, the Philadelphi Corridor and the Netzarim Corridor (which cuts the north of the strip from the south just below Gaza city).

3. Rebuilding the whole of Gaza.

4. An exchange of 50 terrorists for every female IDF soldier and 30 for every civilian in the first stage, then 500 terrorists for every male soldier in the second….

It’s an incredible list. A permanent ceasefire would leave Hamas still standing, its remaining fighters able, in the absence of IDF fire, to quietly regroup, and to recruit still more members, including from among the prisoners Israel will presumably free in an exchange for hostages. Hamas would become the hero of the Arab street everywhere, the “resistance” that faced down the mighty IDF. Think of how many young Arabs in Gaza and the West Bank would want to sign up with the terror group, and how many Arabs elsewhere might want to contribute to Hamas’ coffers.

If it complied with Hamas’ demands, the IDF would have to completely withdraw from Gaza, giving up even the control of both the Philadelphi Corridor on Gaza’s southern border with Egypt, and the Netzarim Corridor which separated north and south Gaza. We all know what happened the last time – in 2005 — when Israel withdrew completely from Gaza. Hamas took control, and almost twenty years of intermittent attacks on Israel by Hamas in Gaza followed, culminating in the attacks of October 7, 2023. There is no chance that the IDF will give up control of the Philadelphi Corridor; the Netzarim Corridor is less important, as it does not involve preventing arms smuggling, but is useful in enhancing Israel’s ability to monitor north-south movements of both civilians and terrorists.

Hamas demands that Israel rebuild the whole of Gaza. It’s utterly preposterous. Hamas started the war with Israel when 6,000 of its operatives smashed into Israel on October 7, raping, torturing, mutilating, and murdering 1200 Israelis and kidnapping 251 others; it was a war that Israel did not want and did not expect; Hamas is responsible for the consequences, including the buildings damaged or destroyed in Israel’s counterattack. The rebuilding of Gaza will cost some $30 billion. Hamas’ financial backers, without whom it could not have started the war or continued it, are the ones who should be paying for Gaza’s rebuilding. These backers — Qatar and Iran — ought to be held responsible for Hamas’ attacks, and thus for the IDF’s counterattacks. They should pay for the damage. Of course, another way for the Gazans to raise money is for the people of Gaza to demand that the three Hamas leaders who stole billions in aid money meant for the people of Gaza — the estate of the late Ismail Haniyeh ($4 billion), Khaled Meshaal ($4 billion), and Mousa Abu Marzouk ($3 billion) — must disgorge those colossal sums. And if the rich Arabs of the Gulf want to chip in with a week’s worth of oil revenues, by all means let them do it.