Silent Ben and Pragmatic Bibi

By Victor Rosenthal

Benny Gantz wants to negotiate a two-state solution with the PLO and divide Jerusalem. No, wait, he wants to annex Area C and offer the Palestinians autonomy in less-than-a-state enclaves. Who knows? Nobody, because Gantz won’t say. But more important, nobody seems to care what Silent Ben’s actual positions on anything are. A recent poll shows that in a contest between Gantz and PM Netanyahu, Gantz came in a close second with 38% of respondents favoring him to Netanyahu’s 41%. Apparently, Gantz’s experience as a former IDF Chief of Staff plus his prime ministerial appearance is enough to make him a viable alternative to Netanyahu, who is certainly one of the most successful Israeli prime ministers in history.

But maybe that’s because Netanyahu’s legal problems are deterring voters? Nope, polls show that, like Gantz’s extreme reticence, Bibi’s possible indictment on several counts of corruption simply doesn’t matter. Those who like him believe that the accusations are either stupid – I mean, after all, so what if someone gave him expensive cigars and champagne? – or criminalization of politics as usual, such as the government’s granting benefits to the Bezek communications conglomerate and its owner, Shaul Elovitch, in return for favorable coverage of the Prime Minister on its Walla website. Supposedly, the personal benefit for Elovitch was in the millions of shekels. The cases against Bibi are based on evidence provided by state’s witnesses, or, if you prefer, rats who will say anything to save their own skins.

There seem to be two kinds of people that dislike him. There are those who hate him for being instrumental in keeping the Left from realizing what it believes is its natural right to rule the country, all the more so insofar as he has been far more successful than they were in avoiding war and guiding the economy to its best condition ever. And there are those who simply dislike his personality, seeing him as shady and manipulative. One day I was waiting to cross the street when several people crossed against the traffic light. A man was standing next to me with a small boy:

Man: “We don’t cross on red. We are not Bibi.”
Boy: “Who is Bibi, grandpa?”
Man: “Bibi is one who always crosses on red. Don’t be like him.”

Monday night Bibi  made what he had said was going to be a dramatic announcement. Speculation ranged from “he is going to resign” to “he is going to invade Syria,” but it turned out that he wanted to demand the right to confront his accusers publicly. The speech was treated very negatively in most of the media, and I don’t think it especially helped (or hurt) him, but he has a point. For – literally – years, there have been almost continuous leaks to the media about how any minute now there will be stunning revelations of corruption that will bring down the Prime Minister; but in fact, until recently none of it amounted to a hill of beans. For example, who remembers the “deposit bottle scandal” in which Sara Netanyahu was accused of – can you imagine? – returning empty bottles that had been bought for official functions and keeping the money!

Every time – and there were dozens of times – that Netanyahu or his wife were questioned by the police, illegally leaked stories about what had transpired appeared on the evening news. Nobody in the police seems to have been punished, or as far as I know, even investigated about the leaks.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a general feeling that Bibi “has been Prime Minister long enough.” At age 69, he is possibly a little tired. If he isn’t ready to retire today, he certainly will be in a few years. One of his foibles is that he has never been able to abide anyone in his party that he suspects could challenge him, which means that there are few natural successors. The danger is that when he does step down, the majority of Israelis who have supported a right-wing coalition in recent years will fragment and the result will be that the Left will return to power. This could be facilitated by so-called “centrist” parties who lean to the right during the campaign, but when elected implement left-wing principles. This is the approach taken by Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, who promised during his campaign that there would be no direct talks with the PLO, no return to the pre-1967 lines, and no additional state between Israel and Jordan. As everyone knows, a year later he was shaking hands with Arafat on the White House lawn. So when Bibi says of Gantz – another former soldier like Rabin – that someone who won’t say whether he is left or right is probably left, right-wing Israelis are understandably worried.

Bibi himself has sometimes taken actions that can’t be understood from a right-wing perspective. For example, the illegal Bedouin settlement of Khan al-Ahmar, which can fairly be described as a joint provocation by the European Union and the Palestinian authority, and which the Supreme Court has (surprisingly) agreed ought to be demolished, still stands. Why? Perhaps Bibi has been threatened by the UK or other European countries, but it seems to me that a strong stand on this issue would be both good policy and good politics. Bibi doesn’t see it that way.

Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked, who have recently separated from Beit Yehudi to form a new party called Hayamin Hehadash (The New Right) have sharply attacked him over his extended delay in removing the settlement. They have contrasted it to the recent violent removal of right-wing squatters from the wreckage of the community of Amona that was dismantled in 2017 by order of the Supreme Court over controversial Palestinian claims of ownership of part of the land.

In addition to the security concern posed by the location of Khan al-Ahmar, next to the strategic Route 1, there is the aspect of honor/humiliation/deterrence that I’ve written about so many times. From Israel’s point of view, it has a perfect right and a legitimate reason to enforce its building regulations in Area C. By allowing the Arabs and their European backers to thumb their noses at our sovereignty, we yield it to them, sending a message that we are too weak to defend our land, and therefore don’t have the right to keep it. Or perhaps Bibi doesn’t think that Judea and Samaria, even Area C with its Jewish majority, should be part of Israel. It’s hard to know what he thinks, which is one of the reasons many Israelis have a problem with him. If you hide your principles under a rock, people think that you are ashamed of them.

This is why I am disappointed with him. He is a pragmatist who tends to ignore the psychological and spiritual dimensions of power, which, especially in the Middle East, can be as important as the power of your air force or the number of tanks you can deploy. I see Bibi accepting too much humiliation, losing too much status, and not fighting the information war at all. He would say that our military and economic power has never been greater, and he would be right. But the degree of respect that we can command, both from our friends and our enemies, has declined in recent years.

I’ve always supported Bibi and Likud. But this April, I might vote for a party with more clearly articulated principles – and one that is likely to stand up for them.

January 11, 2019 | 1 Comment »

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  1. The following article from BESA indicates that Israel is in deep trouble because the iDF is unprepared for war. Benny Ganz did nothing to prepare it for war when he was the IDF’s chief of staff. Someone willing to reform and bolster the IDF is desperately needed for Prime Minister.

    Is the IDF ready for all-out war?

    INN – The question of just how ready the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is for war has dominated Israel s headlines in recent weeks. The issue came to the fore following the stormy end to the 10-year tenure of IDF Ombudsman Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Brick.

    Brick released a scathing report and multiple statements claiming that the military s ground forces are grossly underprepared for conflict. He went so far as to say, during an address to the Knesset s State Control Committee, that the IDF is undergoing a process of deterioration that has reached its peak in recent years.

    Brick s alarming assessments have been outright rejected by military chiefs, including outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot and the Commanding Officer of the ground forces, Maj. Gen. Kobi Barak.

    While Eizenkot has ordered the military to examine Brick s claims, he has consistently affirmed that the IDF s war readiness has improved dramatically in recent years. Eizenkot focused his four years as Chief of Staff on improving readiness, meaning that Brick s criticisms are being leveled directly at the heart of his efforts and legacy.

    Dr. Eado Hecht, a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, is a defense analyst specializing in military theory and military history and a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan. Hecht also lectures at the IDF Command and General Staff College.

    In conversation with the author, Hecht agreed with Brick and other critical voices who think the IDF is unprepared but added that this is not a zero-sum argument. There are areas in which the IDF has done excellent work, and there is a reason why foreign militaries come here to learn from it, said Hecht. On the other hand, there are areas in which the IDF is not good enough.

    Neglecting ground forces in favor of high-quality intelligence and long-range firepower

    Hecht explained that the way in which Brick and military command measure war readiness is different. To understand this difference, it s necessary to dive into the IDF s history. The Second Lebanon War of 2006, Hecht said, was the second-lowest point in the history of Israel s military. The lowest was in the years 1950-53. The difference between these two points is that while in 1950 to 1953, the IDF did not know how to conduct routine security missions and did not know how to conduct major wars, in 2006, the IDF knew how to do continuous security in an excellent manner, Hecht said. Hence, it defeated the Palestinians in the Ebb and Flow War [the so-called Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000 to 2006].

    However, it was during those years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada that new concepts were taking hold regarding the future of warfare. The concepts were that there will be no big, high-intensity wars anymore, and in the unlikely event that such wars do occur, they should be fought with high-quality intelligence and through the use of long-range firepower, mostly delivered by fighter jet, to destroy enemy targets.

    As a result, the IDF deliberately neglected the necessary requirements for ground combat, said Hecht. By the time Lt. Gen. (ret.) Dan Halutz became Chief of Staff in 2005, the ground forces had suffered major neglect, leading to significant failures in the war that erupted with Hezbollah the following summer.

    The strategic gains Israel received from that war came despite tactical failures, noted Hecht. Those failures led the next Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Gabi Ashkenazi, to demand a return to basics for the ground forces. They underwent a major upgrade during Ashkenazi s tenure. But then, under the leadership of Defense Minister Moshe Ya alon and Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. (ret.) Benny Gantz, this trend was stopped. The older trend of focusing on airpower and intelligence, which dominated before the Second Lebanon War, made a comeback, according to Hecht.

    The current outgoing Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, brought back Ashkenazi s trend, Hecht said. However, the reference point for Eizenkot and the General Staff compares today s IDF to the military of 2006. Brick s reference points compare today s IDF to the military when it was at its peak, 40 to 50 years ago.

    The bottom line, said Hecht, is that compared to its performance in 2006, the IDF of 2019 has undergone a terrific improvement. At the same time, he warned, there is a need to take stock of the growing threat posed by Hezbollah, which today is equivalent to some five infantry divisions, in terms of relative power.

    Hezbollah is like the PLO and the Syrian army in Lebanon in 1982 combined. True, they [Hezbollah] do not have tanks, but they have many things that the Syrians and the PLO did not have then, said Hecht, pointing to powerful guided anti-tank missiles as one example.

    They are moving ahead with the fortification of southern Lebanon at a scale that did not exist before, and they are much more professional and skilled than the PLO was back then, he said.

    According to public sources, in 2006, Hezbollah s forces in southern Lebanon were equal to perhaps two infantry brigades, and the organization was armed with far fewer anti-tank missiles, mortars, and other powerful weapons. Hezbollah today is some six times more powerful than what it was in 2006, said Hecht.

    Is the IDF s order of battle big enough for enemies on multiple fronts?

    Crucial questions revolve around the IDF s ability to battle foes on multiple fronts simultaneously.

    What will happen if the IDF needs to fight against more than only Hezbollah? If, for example, a rebuilt Syrian military faces it in the Golan Heights, backed up by Shiite forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran? And at the same time, Hamas begins bombarding our home front from the south? Does the IDF have a sufficiently large order of battle to deal with all of these enemies at the same time? We would have to call up reserves against Hamas on its own. Against a smaller Hezbollah in 2006, we had to call up reserves. Since then, we have cut reserves very sharply entire divisions and brigades have been canceled, Hecht said.

    He cautioned that there are also open questions about how long it would take to get reserves to emergency weapons storage facilities, as well as the state of readiness among military vehicles in light of decreased maintenance personnel numbers.

    True, Eizenkot placed a major renewed emphasis on the ground forces. Still, Hecht said, most of the focus is on increasing firepower. But is this firepower capable of giving the State of Israel the strategic reply it needs to force Hezbollah to cease firing and to prefer a ceasefire? asked Hecht. And until it does that, can this firepower decrease the quantity and efficiency of Hezbollah s [own] firepower on the Israeli home front? The only way to effectively decrease Hezbollah s fire is through a large-scale ground offensive. To do that, the IDF needs to conquer a large, hilly area containing dozens of Shiite fortified villages and towns, he said.

    Each Shiite village, however, will likely have a Hezbollah force as big as one or two military companies lying in wait.

    This is what the IDF s units will have to pass in order to reach the rocket-launch cells that are firing on the home front, Hecht said.

    The IDF has greatly increased its war training, Hecht acknowledged. But according to Brick, it has not yet reached adequate levels, particularly among the Armored Crops and the Artillery Corps.

    We have made great improvements

    In one of his final speeches in uniform, delivered on Dec. 23, Eizenkot gave an assessment of the situation. At the end of 2018, the balance of Israel s national security is greatly improved, he said, while at the same time, an unstable region has created very high levels of explosiveness.

    Of course, this obligates us as a military to be at a very high level of readiness. We have made very big efforts to improve the IDF s readiness. The IDF is a very large military by any standards, especially when reserve forces are added to it. And there are very high costs for holding a military of this scale, particularly the ground forces, at a very high level of readiness.

    Ultimately, stated Eizenkot, the IDF s capabilities have been greatly improved.

    On Dec. 19, the Knesset s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee released a report that followed its own investigation into the IDF s readiness. The report found that the level of readiness in the IDF for war has significantly improved since [the 2014] Operation Protective Edge [against Hamas in Gaza].

    The inquiry found that on almost every parameter, there has been a dramatic increase in the level of readiness whether in the number of training sessions, the ammunition inventory, replacement parts and others.

    The report praised Eizenkot for leading a multi-year working program, dubbed Gideon, which prioritized the building of combat divisions that can fight on any front.

    Two days after that report, an inquiry launched by the IDF s own Comptroller, Brig. Gen. Ilan Harari, in response to Brick s scathing report, also found that the military s state of readiness has dramatically improved.

    At the same time, the inquiry agreed with Brick regarding the need to make improvements in areas such as logistics, personnel, command and control systems, and the service of non-commissioned officers at war-storage facilities.

    According to Channel 10 News, the inquiry called for an increase in the military s annual budget by 1.5-2.5 billion shekels ($400-667 million) to ensure that the ground forces remain in good shape.

    If the IDF is missing 2 billion shekels to complete its readiness in the list of aspects that it brings up, that means that Brick is actually correct, Hecht said. The IDF isn t ready.

    Yaakov Lappin is a Research Associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He specializes in Israel s defense establishment, military affairs, and the Middle Eastern strategic environment.

    A BESA Center Perspectives Paper, published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family