MEMRI March 14, 2023
For a variety of reasons, Russia has welcomed the Chinese mediated agreement announced March 11, 2023, between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The agreement provides for a resumption of diplomatic relations between the two states and the reopening of embassies and missions within two months from the signing of the agreement. The document also noted that Tehran and Riyadh reaffirm mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as commitment to non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
Diplomatically, Russia has cultivated strong relationships with both countries. The military dimension is predominant in Moscow’s relationship with Tehran. Russia will provide Sukhoi F-35 fighter jets to Iran while Iran has supplied drones and munitions to Russia that have aided it in its war with Ukraine. The economic dimension is dominant in Russia’s relationship with Riyadh, specifically in terms of shaping the global oil market. The Russian war effort is largely financed by energy sales and therefore Russia-Saudi cooperation on setting oil prices is of critical importance. Had the Saudis acceded to President Biden’s request to increase oil production, this would have adversely impacted oil prices, and affected Russia’s ability to fund its war. As long as relations between the Saudis and the Iranians remain on even keel, Russia can maintain a profitable relationship with both, whereas tensions between the two increase the prospects that the Saudis will seek the protection of the Americans.
The second source of satisfaction was that the Chinese had pulled off a diplomatic success in a region where the American had previously dominated diplomatic efforts. This represented the weakening of the American global position and the corresponding ascent of China. Since America is the lynchpin of the coalition supporting Ukraine and imposing sanctions on the Russian economy, any defeat for America is considered a heartening development for Russia. The prospects that Saudi Arabia could join the BRICS and that the dollar could be dethroned by the yuan were likewise developments that cheered Russia.
The choice of China instead of the U.S. as an intermediary represented a validation of Russia’s position on international affairs. Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had abandoned the confrontational style and divide and rule tactics of the Americans and had preferred to pursue their own interests. China, as opposed to the United States, did not attempt to impose its values on the parties but respected their regimes, a position that Russia concurred with.
The only sour note was the fear that Russia would not be able to influence China’s decisions in the region.
MEMRI’s survey of Russian reactions to the Saudi-Iranian agreement follows below:
Artem Adrianov: Catalysts For The Agreement
Artem Adrianov, an Arab affairs expert who works at the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Moscow State Institute of International Relations, effectively covers all the major issues in an article, titled “Middle East Storm,” published in Izvestiya online portal Iz.ru. Adrianov argues that there were two critical catalysts to the agreement. The first was the Saudi interest in getting out of the Yemen conflict that required patching up relations with Iran. The second catalyst was China’s decision to expand its Middle Eastern role from an exclusively economic one.
“Over time, Saudi Arabia realized the futility of participating in the Yemeni conflict and began to look for ways out of it. Negotiations on the normalization of relations between the two countries began in October 2021, but they advanced with long interruptions and did not lead to the results that both sides had hoped for.
“A definite breakthrough was the conclusion of a truce in Yemen on April 3, 2022. At the same time, the last, fifth round of Saudi-Iranian negotiations took place in Baghdad. After that, the parties agreed to study the issue of reopening embassies, and Saudi Arabia agreed to accept 40,000 Iranian pilgrims during the annual hajj.”
Progress was interrupted by the outbreak of anti-regime demonstrations in Iran that fueled hope for the fall of the Iranian regime. However, when the demonstrations subsided, negotiations were resumed and culminated in success.
The second factor was China’s decision to expand its presence in the region from a purely economic one to a more influential diplomatic role, where it effectively walked in through an open door:
“Many experts wondered why the PRC does not seek to convert its economic influence in the region into political [influence]. In some Middle Eastern countries, it was expected that Beijing would begin to play a more active role in establishing peace. Arab countries, tired of American experiments, sought to develop relations with China and Russia in the hope of containing U.S. influence and diversifying their foreign policy.”
China, like Russia, had an interest in stabilizing the region and preventing conflict, given the importance of energy exports from both Saudi Arabia and Iran to China. “Against the backdrop of U.S. attempts to create an anti-Iranian coalition based on the Arab countries and Israel, China decided to use its economic presence. The prospects for a Saudi-Iranian reconciliation significantly reduce the risks of a military escalation in the Middle East, and thus the risks for the Chinese economy. One of the consequences of this will be a detente in other Middle Eastern countries.”
Adrianov expected that in addition to reducing the prospects for direct hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the agreement would have a positive spillover effect in those countries where Saudi-Iranian proxy conflicts were ongoing, notably Yemen and Lebanon.
Adrianov views the agreement as auguring China’s supplanting the U.S. in the region. “The global consequences of the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation are also important. In becoming a mediator facilitating its [the agreement’s] conclusion, the PRC clearly announced its intention to eject the U.S. from the Middle East. According to many experts, Saudi Arabia, which remains one of the main pillars of the American presence, literally ‘showed the middle finger to the Biden administration.’ In an effort to diversify its foreign policy, Riyadh is increasingly drifting towards China and Russia…”[1]
Marianna Belenkaya: The Agreement Can Reformat The Region
The foreign affairs correspondent Marianna Belenkaya of the Russian daily Kommersant surveyed the agreement and reached conclusions similar to Adrianov’s. Russia was pleased with the agreement as “Russia has always advocated dialogue between these regional players.”
Another hopeful prospect for Moscow was that in addition to stabilizing Yemen and Lebanon the agreement would have a salutary effect on Syria where Russia was heavily invested: “One of the interesting questions is whether one should now expect a resumption of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Damascus.
I support Israel’s intention to sell defensive equipment to Ukraine. This is a fitting response to Russia agreeing to sell SU-35 fighter jets to Iran.
In close, direct combat between the F-35 and Su-35, the Russian jet will win due to its speed and better maneuverability. However, suppose the battle started at a distance. In that case, the F-35 will have a better chance to finish its opponent due to its stealth missiles and better radar system.
Russia has now taken Bakhmut and is advancing on all fronts.
Russi and its allies are on the verge of remaking the world order and are likely very close. It’s unknown exactly what the new order will look like. What does seem very clear is Russia and its allies are unlikely to allow the United States to survive. At least it won’t be allowed to continue in its current form. I’ve recognized the inevitable outcome to the conflict between Russia and America since at least 2005. I advised our leaders to seek an end to this conflict forthwith and try and work constructively with Russia so we have some ability to influence the development and implementation of the new order. Unfortunately they did not heed my advice. I do not see any reason for my family and loved ones to die in an unwinnable conflict against Russia and its allies. While the leadership class views this as a struggle that they are willing to die for, I do not and do not think I or my loved ones should be sacrificed for them either.