Joint Chiefs passed US intel to Assad
It’s come to this: The Obama administration – and in particular the CIA – knowingly armed Islamic State terrorists in Syria. Okay, take it with a grain of salt. It came from Seymour Hersh.
Barack Obama’s repeated insistence that Bashar al-Assad must leave office – and that there are ‘moderate’ rebel groups in Syria capable of defeating him – has in recent years provoked quiet dissent, and even overt opposition, among some of the most senior officers on the Pentagon’s Joint Staff. Their criticism has focused on what they see as the administration’s fixation on Assad’s primary ally, Vladimir Putin. In their view, Obama is captive to Cold War thinking about Russia and China, and hasn’t adjusted his stance on Syria to the fact both countries share Washington’s anxiety about the spread of terrorism in and beyond Syria; like Washington, they believe that Islamic State must be stopped.
The military’s resistance dates back to the summer of 2013, when a highly classified assessment, put together by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then led by General Martin Dempsey, forecast that the fall of the Assad regime would lead to chaos and, potentially, to Syria’s takeover by jihadi extremists, much as was then happening in Libya. A former senior adviser to the Joint Chiefs told me that the document was an ‘all-source’ appraisal, drawing on information from signals, satellite and human intelligence, and took a dim view of the Obama administration’s insistence on continuing to finance and arm the so-called moderate rebel groups. By then, the CIA had been conspiring for more than a year with allies in the UK, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to ship guns and goods – to be used for the overthrow of Assad – from Libya, via Turkey, into Syria. The new intelligence estimate singled out Turkey as a major impediment to Obama’s Syria policy.
The document showed, the adviser said, ‘that what was started as a covert US programme to arm and support the moderate rebels fighting Assad had been co-opted by Turkey, and had morphed into an across-the-board technical, arms and logistical programme for all of the opposition, including Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State. The so-called moderates had evaporated and the Free Syrian Army was a rump group stationed at an airbase in Turkey.’ The assessment was bleak: there was no viable ‘moderate’ opposition to Assad, and the US was arming extremists.
Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, director of the DIA between 2012 and 2014, confirmed that his agency had sent a constant stream of classified warnings to the civilian leadership about the dire consequences of toppling Assad. The jihadists, he said, were in control of the opposition. Turkey wasn’t doing enough to stop the smuggling of foreign fighters and weapons across the border. ‘If the American public saw the intelligence we were producing daily, at the most sensitive level, they would go ballistic,’ Flynn told me. ‘We understood Isis’s long-term strategy and its campaign plans, and we also discussed the fact that Turkey was looking the other way when it came to the growth of the Islamic State inside Syria.’ The DIA’s reporting, he said, ‘got enormous pushback’ from the Obama administration. ‘I felt that they did not want to hear the truth.’
‘Our policy of arming the opposition to Assad was unsuccessful and actually having a negative impact,’ the former JCS adviser said. ‘The Joint Chiefs believed that Assad should not be replaced by fundamentalists. The administration’s policy was contradictory. They wanted Assad to go but the opposition was dominated by extremists. So who was going to replace him? To say Assad’s got to go is fine, but if you follow that through – therefore anyone is better. It’s the “anybody else is better” issue that the JCS had with Obama’s policy.’
But what’s more shocking is what the Joint Chiefs decided to do about it.
The Joint Chiefs felt that a direct challenge to Obama’s policy would have ‘had a zero chance of success’. So in the autumn of 2013 they decided to take steps against the extremists without going through political channels, by providing US intelligence to the militaries of other nations, on the understanding that it would be passed on to the Syrian army and used against the common enemy, Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State.
Germany, Israel and Russia were in contact with the Syrian army, and able to exercise some influence over Assad’s decisions – it was through them that US intelligence would be shared. Each had its reasons for co-operating with Assad: Germany feared what might happen among its own population of six million Muslims if Islamic State expanded; Israel was concerned with border security; Russia had an alliance of very long standing with Syria, and was worried by the threat to its only naval base on the Mediterranean, at Tartus. ‘We weren’t intent on deviating from Obama’s stated policies,’ the adviser said. ‘But sharing our assessments via the military-to-military relationships with other countries could prove productive. It was clear that Assad needed better tactical intelligence and operational advice. The JCS concluded that if those needs were met, the overall fight against Islamist terrorism would be enhanced. Obama didn’t know, but Obama doesn’t know what the JCS does in every circumstance and that’s true of all presidents.’
Once the flow of US intelligence began, Germany, Israel and Russia started passing on information about the whereabouts and intent of radical jihadist groups to the Syrian army; in return, Syria provided information about its own capabilities and intentions. There was no direct contact between the US and the Syrian military; instead, the adviser said, ‘we provided the information – including long-range analyses on Syria’s future put together by contractors or one of our war colleges – and these countries could do with it what they chose, including sharing it with Assad. We were saying to the Germans and the others: “Here’s some information that’s pretty interesting and our interest is mutual.” End of conversation. The JCS could conclude that something beneficial would arise from it – but it was a military to military thing, and not some sort of a sinister Joint Chiefs’ plot to go around Obama and support Assad. It was a lot cleverer than that. If Assad remains in power, it will not be because we did it. It’s because he was smart enough to use the intelligence and sound tactical advice we provided to others.’
I have written this for years now. The west and the GCC using their sunni jihadi proxies against the Iran and its proxies. It fell apart at benghazi which exposed the arms to the jihadis from the US AND again with the russian deal which defused the syrian chem weapons threat, which was to be the “catalyst” for the US and west invading syria like libya. Up to then the jihadis were winning and when they started to lose because the US did not come in, the IS emergence was concocted and they received their weapons supply primarily from the arms dumps left in Iraq by the US..a no brainer, no repeat of the 500 mil arms from Croatia, which the CIA had arranged for the Saudi prince to buy, OR the benghazi resupply could happen. A few months before the “sudden” emergence of IS (composed of ex saddam officers, local sunnis and imported bought mercenaries) both the US, but more tellingly,, the saudis were doing a lot of public declarations of distanceing themselves from terrorist jihadis. Knowing what their plan was for the IS they had to distance themselves from their proxies with plausible deniability. It was still the same plan but rearranged to make up for the inability to overtly go to war against assad. Most of the rhetoric and jockeying against IS by the arabs and the west is smoke and mirrors and a peanut game. In understanding the seeming contradictions one must realize certain realities in the relationship between funding puppet masters and the various named proxy jihadi cannon fodder who do their work, as follows:
1- It is not an ideological or religious sectarian war except for the public and the cannon fodder. the puppet masters are jockeying for their own interests in the area which must no necessarily end in a victory of one side. Much of the back and forth is to do with strengthening the deal making as to who ends up with what.
2- the various sunni groups with different names and supposedly differnet ideologies are basically funded and controlled by the same puppet masters. The different sectarian “goals” of individual cannon fodder groups is a delusion to raise recruits and to keep them fighting. It matters not to the puppet masters if some of their own groups fight others as the overall goals are the same. The infighting is merely part of the smoke and mirrors and a way of transferring fighters and land among groups. It is also a way to define the borders of the groups in accordance with any deals made between the puppet masters. E.G. If the US/GCC agree with Russia Iran to cede certain areas they can bomb their own cannon fodder as the elites regard them as not only dispensable but also to be a liability after the job is done. sort of like the mafia getting rid of the hit man they hired after he accomplishes what they want. this is why I expect IS to disappear in the end by the mercenaries being moved to other theatres and the locals disappearing into local political groups who will be given administration of areas according to deals made.
3- My view is that Israel and the GCC have understandings that the GCC leash hamas through egypt and qatar, that they keep the pa stable and quiet, that they keep their jihadi proxies from attacking Israel(although this can end after the deals are made) in return for Israel maintaining a low profile with the pals by acting with reatraint so as to keep the pal issues quiet in order that they can recruit cannon fodder jihadis agianst Irans proxies as opposed to the jihadis wanting instead to fight Israel. I believe this began at pillar of defense which opened with Israel targeting Iran controlled elements in gaza and ended with a cease fire arranged by qatar. This enabled the GCC to push out the MB and Iranian controlled elements in gaza. I beleive they ousted morsi because he was uncontrollable by them and was not a team player. The rhetoric should be ignored as it is a cover for the understandings. I suspect that the stabbings are really attampts by iranian controlled elements of hamas and fatah to disrupt the understandings
I doubt that Israel helped Assad at all as it is better for Israel for the chaos to continue and if there is finality for the jihadis to be on the border and for any gov in syria to NOT control the syrian golan, in that way no can claim the Israeli golan. Also, Hirsh implied that Israel fed Assad info for the americans and that the americans were pushing Assad as a condition, to reopen negotiations on the golan… this is absurd as the last thing israel wants is negotians on the golan. since the arab spring there has been little aggression on Israel from the arabs… the best thing for Israel is the continuing chaos, disorder and weakening of the enemy “neighbors”. there is no sensible reason for Israel to desire an end to the current scenario until all the enemies are spent.
Just saying.. 🙂
from the same Hersh:
“The four core elements of Obama’s Syria policy remain intact today: an insistence that Assad must go; that no anti-IS coalition with Russia is possible; that Turkey is a steadfast ally in the war against terrorism; and that there really are significant moderate opposition forces for the US to support. The Paris attacks on 13 November that killed 130 people did not change the White House’s public stance, although many European leaders, including François Hollande, advocated greater co-operation with Russia and agreed to co-ordinate more closely with its air force; there was also talk of the need to be more flexible about the timing of Assad’s exit from power. …”
In other words, no change from the intial goals of the beginning.