Qatar’s isolation is appropriate

By Irina Tsukerman, ISRAEL HAYOM

After taking a trip to Qatar, Professor Alan Dershowitz seems to have adopted a one-sided narrative on the Gulf crisis, apparently agreeing with every word of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani’s version of the events.  While the events leading up to and following the blockade of the small Gulf state by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and others may indeed be more complicated than propagandists from either side would have it, the interpretation offered in his article stretches the boundaries of credulity.

Dershowitz begins by duly admitting that his visit was offered and paid for by the emir. That may not be a reason to reject a visit, but it is certainly a reason to ask tough questions and to remain skeptical throughout. The article is peppered with disclaimers about how “everything should be verified.” Why, then, write an opinion piece, which is essentially an argument exculpating Qatar and laying blame on its Gulf neighbors, if the information on which this argument rests is unverified?  Is it not, then, in essence the knowing peddling of likely false information under the approval of Dershowitz’s name?

First, Dershowitz states that the attempted shuttering of Al Jazeera is an attack on free speech. That is rather a surprising argument about a media entity connected to government funding – essentially, Qatar’s Pravda –  which spreads disinformation about Israel and Jews, the United States, and Qatar’s regional rivals. It has promoted Islamism and in Arabic, called for the bombing of Saudi and UAE airports. In essence, it has promoted and supported terrorism, hosting the Islamist Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the spiritual pillar of the Muslim Brotherhood. Shutting down adversarial propaganda is not a violation of freedom of speech any more than stopping any other active measures by foreign intelligence is.

Second, Dershowitz claims that Qatar’s hosting of Hamas was in response to a request by the United States. That is simply not true. Under the interpretation of events most favorable to Qatar, the small state, which was trying to play off its bigger, stronger neighbors, tried to maintain ties with the full spectrum of regional actors, including, initially, Israel, and later Hamas. There is no denying that Qatar once hosted former Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mashaal. This story is not new. Qatar’s links to Hamas go back many years.

However, if then-U.S. President Barack Obama had asked Qatar to host and support Hamas, that was news to Congress, which investigated these connections at the time and heard from experts who recommended sanctioning Qatari individuals and entities. Likewise, Qatar has a long history of support for the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Brotherhood was designated a terrorist organization by a number of Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, and was acknowledged to have generously supported various terrorist organizations, including Hamas. Its Western shill organizations – the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Islamic Society of North America and others – were unindicted co-conspirators in a series of trials against Islamist charities that laundered donations supporting terrorism.

Those in the foreign policy establishment who have posited that the Gulf standoff over the Muslim Brotherhood has been largely manufactured are right about one thing: The Muslim Brotherhood’s connections with Qatar did not happen overnight.  This relationship has been an ongoing source of tensions within the GCC prior to the escalation six months ago. What changed? The Saudi leadership, which has had enough of the Islamist threat in the region, and has decided to boldly confront the problem and anyone connected to that problem. Part of the issue is that Hamas and other such organizations have been funded by Iran, which became increasingly aggressive and expansionist over time. UAE and others in the past have traded with Iran, despite tensions and differences; however, with its march through Iraq, involvement in Syria, completion of a land corridor to Syria, and the arming of the anti-Saudi Houthis in Yemen, Iran is now perceived as a direct existential threat – which was not nearly the case even two years ago.

Finally, without citing any specific evidence to that effect, Dershowitz paints the Saudis as the “not necessarily the good guys” in the story. He claims that the other Gulf states do far more business with Iran and that due to the blockade, the destitute Qatar has had to increase trade with Iran. The first claim is hard to dispute because Dershowitz cites no numbers or specifics of such trade. The second issue is laughable. Qatar is a wealthy country which has not been devastated by the blockade. Moreover, it has continued trade and good relations with Morocco, has grown even closer to Turkey, continues its strong relationship with the United States, housing a large U.S. military presence at Al Udeid Air Base, and is a significant resource for Japan, China, and other Asian countries, among other partners. It is not desperation for trade partners that drove Qatar into the arms of Iran, but rather, perhaps, Iran’s far more aggressive stands and more extensive military preparedness than Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s push to have Qatar choose between the two regional rivals and cut off Iranian proxies backfired.

Intellectual honesty demands healthy skepticism in the pursuit of truth. Professor Dershowitz’s oeuvre has these qualities; there should be more of both in his future writings about Qatar.

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security lawyer based in New York.