By Lior Ben-Chorin, THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Last Tuesday, Secretary of State John Kerry testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that because of the Iran nuclear deal “there is no longer an existential threat to Israel from Iran.” He asserted that even Israel believed this was true. Kerry was referring to a speech last month by Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, head of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in which the Israeli general explained that the deal had “many risks but also opportunities.” Eizenkot also quipped that assuming the worst case scenarios was “as dangerous as imagining the best case scenarios”—a veiled jab at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who previously asserted that the deal is a “historic mistake for the world.”y establishment in Israel. However, this disagreement over how to approach the Iran nuclear deal and, before that, Iran’s nuclear ambitions is long-running and indicative of spirited debate in Israel that gets little attention in the United States.
Disagreement over how to handle Iranian nuclear ambitions began several years ago. In 2010 Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak clashed with then-IDF head Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi and intelligence head Maj. Gen. Meir Dagan over an order to have the military ready in case a decision was made to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. An Israeli investigative television program revealed that Ashkenazi and Dagan had vehemently objected to the order. Ashkenazi had apparently warned that an attack would be a “strategic mistake,” while Dagan cautioned, “You may end up going to war based on an illegal decision.”
Ashkenazi and Dagan are two of a growing cadre of security establishment leaders who have attempted to temper the forceful rhetoric against the nuclear deal coming from Netanyahu and other politicians. Former intelligence head Efraim Halevy, for example, wrote “what is the point in annulling an agreement which keeps Iran away from the bomb in order to try and insert clauses regarding terror, which is definitely not an existential threat to Israel?”
Ample speculation has surrounded this public debate between the security establishment and the Netanyahu government. Because this disagreement extends beyond just Iranian nuclear ambitions (see, for example, the disputes regarding the Gaza Seaport or jump-starting Palestinian negotiations), it is critical to understand the divergence between each side’s underlying assumptions.
An underlying assumption of many in the security establishment is that a nuclear-armed Iran is presently the only existential threat to Israel and therefore must take priority. Because the Iranian nuclear deal diminishes the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran, at least for the near-term, many think it presents Israel with opportunities despite some associated risks. The most recent former IDF head, Lt. Gen. Benjamin Gantz, stated that the deal will allow Israel to “build defensive and offensive capabilities that will be used as deterrents,” while former military intelligence head, Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, has written that the deal “buys Israel time to develop clandestine as well as overt thwarting capabilities for the long term.” The security establishment seems confident it will be able to manage the negative repercussions of the deal, which include the strengthening of Hezbollah—what Lt. Gen. Eisenkotconsiders the “major military challenge currently facing Israel.”
The governing coalition seems to see things differently. The underlying assumption of Netanyahu and other politicians is that Iran’s ability to maintain its nuclear infrastructure and continue its destabilizing regional activities eclipses the importance of delaying a nuclear-capable Iran. Shortly after the deal was announced, Netanyahu noted that the deal “does not require Iran to cease its aggressive behavior in any way,” and he commented last week that “Iran after the nuclear agreement is continuing to assist Palestinian and Hezbollah terrorists.” At the same conference where Eisenkot spoke a day earlier of “opportunities” resulting from the deal, Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Moshe Ya’alon stated that “Iran is our main enemy, after I heard voices saying different things,” in an apparent reference to the remarks by the IDF head.
Both sides agree that there are risks to the deal, but only the security establishment acknowledges there are opportunities in delaying a nuclear-capable Iran. What are some of these opportunities? For starters, they include enhancing the capabilities of existing missile defense systems and deploying the new David’s Sling and Arrow-3 systems (which will help defend against medium- and long-range missiles). After successful interception tests for both systems in December 2015, David’s Sling and Arrow-3 are set to become operational this year.
Additionally, Israel could further develop its capability to strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure should Iran make a push for nuclear weapons. During a conversation with Yadlin a few weeks ago, he told me that former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s questioning of Israel’s capability to strike Iran in 2012 undermined the credibility of an Israeli strike. Yadlin believes this crucial element of Israeli deterrence should be repaired by the United States and Israel by reaching the shared assessment that Israel does have the capability.
Furthermore, Israel could focus on managing other more immediate security concerns, including boosting deterrence and defense against Hezbollah and Hamas (especially the prevention of advanced weapons transfers from Iran), as well as reducing perennial violence emanating from the West Bank and Gaza.
The Iran deal gives Israel nothing while giving Iran everything Iran needs to attack Israel.
The Iran deal does not give Israel time because Israel already has time. Iran is in no position to use a nuclear weapon and the Iranians are intelligent enough to understand this. First of all Iran does not possess the technology to build a deliverable nuclear bomb. The issue with a nuclear bomb is not getting it to explode, but getting it to explode at the correct time and without this technology, which the Iranians allegedly do not possess, a nuclear bomb cannot be delivered by plane or missile, and delivering a nuclear bomb by donkey or camel is not a viable option. If Iran does secretly have this technology then we must assume Iran also secretly has nuclear bombs now. Secondly the one or two (undeliverable) nuclear bombs that Iran supposedly would be building absent the deal are insufficient for an attack. They are untested, and the risk of failure is much too great as using a nuclear bomb would certainly bring a devastating if not annihilating counterattack. The Iranians understand this.
What Iran lacked pre-deal was money as well as a credible conventional military. To develop a conventional military takes money and time and the deal gives Iran both. Case in point, today Iran’s nuclear facilities are extremely vulnerable. As a result of the deal Iran will be buying and installing the very sophisticated S-300 defense systems as well as restocking her air force (and her submarine fleet) with the best available fighting machines.
Iran is 60X the size of Israel and has 10X the population. From an Iranian point of view if it were to be in a direct conflict with Israel the last thing Iran wants is a nuclear war, because its size and population advantages are far more beneficial in a conventional war. Do the math. Even if Israel was 3X more effective in its attack than Iran, Iran would end the war with two-thirds of its population and over 90% of its territory still intact. Do I believe that Israel has abilities well beyond 3X, yes I do, but, it is only because of the Iran deal that these abilities become vital. Without the deal Israel would be fine solely with her acknowledged capabilities.
A major question is whether the deal actually slows Iran’s bomb making process at all. There is no evidence other than Iranian say-so that it shipped most of its Low Enriched Uranium to Russia. And since Russia sees Iran as a major source of revenue through arms sales, as a hammer against the US in the middle east, and possibly as a hammer against Saudi Arabia to get SA to cut oil production (driving the price of oil up thus rescuing the Russian economy and hurting the West as a bonus), how likely is it that the uranium stocks Iran allegedly shipped to Russia will actually stay in Russia and not return a few containers at a time mixed into shipments of agricultural supplies.
Iron Dome is very impressive. It succeeded against garbage missiles that had almost no sophistication. What happens when the volume of missiles increases 10 to 50 fold, the missiles have more range, the missiles have guidance for accuracy and avoidance, and are joined by the 60-100,000 more advanced missiles that Hizbollah has? There is no mystery about Iranian intentions as they have publicly stated their plan – create an environment of danger and terror through proxies that will eventually cause all Israelis who are able to leave the country to leave, leaving Israel fatally weakened. This strategy does not require a nuclear bomb, nor does it impose much risk to Iran as the dirty work will be done through terrorist proxies. All it requires is time and money, which the Iran deal lavishes on Iran, and a credible conventional military to backstop the terrorists, something the Iranians would not have at all without the deal.
Hopefully Eizenkrot is actually far more intelligent than his public comments would suggest, but if he isn’t, then the only question is which is the greater danger to Israel, Eizenkrot and cronies, or Iran?
Eizenkot is my nominee for most ignorant human being ever.
Worst case would be all the Jews die.
What is the corresponding best case?
Please tell me this is satire and Eizenkot is actually a janitor in charge of scrubbing the latrines.
I have mold growing in my shower that is smarter than this guy.