Moshe Ya’alon: Strategic thinker and leader

By ISI LEIBLER, JPOST

Candidly Speaking: Ya’alon is perhaps the most understated minister in the government and is considered a highly untypical Israeli leader.

VICE PREMIER Moshe Ya’alon

A recent interview by journalist Ari Shavit with former IDF chief of staff, now vice premier, Moshe Ya’alon, provides a fascinating insight into the thinking of one of Israel’s most sophisticated political leaders and covers the crucial challenges facing the nation. It deserves to be widely read.

Ironically, the extensive interview was published in the weekend magazine of Haaretz, the Israeli daily notorious for promoting the very views which Ya’alon’s interview devastatingly demolishes.

Coincidentally, precisely seven years ago I devoted a column to Ya’alon, describing him as one of the most adroit strategic thinkers to have headed the IDF. He was then accused of being disgruntled and embittered after his premature termination as chief of staff by then-prime minister Ariel Sharon in response to his fierce opposition to the withdrawal from Gaza – for which he was subsequently totally vindicated.

Ya’alon was retired in the wake of his successful military response to terror which demonstrated that, contrary to the mantras invoked by the bleeding-heart leftists, resolute military action can significantly neutralize terrorism. He was also proactive when he instituted dual-track initiatives of targeted assassinations and construction of the security fence, the combination of which effectively brought an end to the second intifada.

In my earlier column, I expressed frustration and anger that, in a country facing existential threats from its neighbors, a retiring chief of staff’s explicit warnings of disastrous repercussions arising from the policies of prime minister Ariel Sharon had been totally ignored by the government and opposition. Regrettably, his predictions were subsequently basically realized.

Although highly politically incorrect at the time, Ya’alon also asserted that Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas and his predecessor Yasser Arafat were birds of a feather. Far from being peace partners, he insisted that they were primarily committed to ending Jewish sovereignty in the region.

He furthermore predicted that the Arab “right of return,” which other Israeli leaders contended was merely a PA negotiating ploy, was set in stone and would remain a cornerstone of the intransigent Palestinian demands.

He also warned of impending missile attacks directed toward Israel’s civilians unless the government took steps to enforce tougher deterrence.

Vice-Premier Ya’alon is certainly not typical of contemporary right-wing activists. He is a follower of Ben- Gurion rather than Jabotinsky. He is a kibbutznik with a Labor background who displays traditionally liberal approaches in relation to most social, religious and economic issues. Yet while not religiously observant, he enthusiastically endorsed Jewish heritage educational programs designed to promote national consciousness in the IDF.

This new interview provides fascinating insights into Ya’alon’s view of the current imbroglio and reaffirms his primacy as a profound strategic thinker in relation to Israel’s external military threats.

A major component is devoted to the Iranian nuclear threat. Ya’alon stresses that we must not, under any circumstances, stand by and enable “the apocalyptic-messianic regime of the ayatollahs” to obtain the bomb. Although hopeful that Israel will not be obliged to go it alone, Ya’alon insists that “we are not bluffing” and that despite the likelihood of considerable Israel casualties should armed conflict ensue, it is unquestionably preferable for us to bomb rather than to be bombed.

He points out that the IDF has the ability to hit the Iranian surrogate Hezbollah with 150 times the explosive power they could direct against us, which should make the Lebanese government weigh the consequences if they enable missiles to be launched against Israel from their territory.

Ya’alon also articulates what few other Israeli leaders are willing to say publicly. “I was ready to divide the land but they are not… because they say ‘either them or us,’ I say ‘us’… as long as the other side is not ready to recognize our right to exist as the nation state of the Jewish people, I am not ready to forgo a millimeter. I am not even willing to talk about territory. After land-for- peace became land-for-terror and land-for-rockets, I am no longer willing to bury my head in the sand.”

He adds, “One of our biggest problems is that we have become solution-oriented and expect a solution now…. We need to look not for a solution but for a path. There are problems in life that have no solution.

At the moment the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a problem with no solution…. Anyone suggesting otherwise is promoting a false illusion. A golden calf. Selfdeception.”

Yet Ya’alon remains optimistic. “When I see where my grandparents and parents were and where my children are – I see that time is not working against us….The secret of Zionism is that when our ethos is to build and the ethos of the other side is to destroy, our ethos will triumph…. We must free ourselves of being solution- orientated and discard self-blame. We must free ourselves of thinking that if I give in to the enemy and please the enemy, the enemy will give me quiet. That is an Ashkenazi way of thinking unrelated to the reality of the Middle East.”

Ya’alon was asked, “As a Mapainik, a kibbutznik, a Rabinist, how did you become a Likudnik?” To which he responded, “The Labor movement had Yitzchak Tabenkin and Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin.

Even Rabin from the Oslo process was never from Peace Now. He supported the Allon Plan in the broad sense and firmly opposed withdrawal to 1967 lines.

Before his assassination he spoke in the Knesset about an eternally united Jerusalem and about the Jordan Rift Valley and about a Palestinian entity that would be less than a state.”

Ya’alon is perhaps the most understated minister in the government and is considered a highly untypical Israeli leader. He is not an adept political street-fighter.

He is soft-spoken, even dour, and certainly lacks charisma.

Despite his low profile he is one of our most capable leaders. He was a brilliant chief of staff who can take credit, to a large extent, for creating the strategy that brought an end to the era of the suicide bombings.

His moral integrity would qualify him to serve as a role model for most Knesset members. Irrespective as to whether or not he rises to more senior positions in the government, it is comforting that a man of his caliber is today a senior member of the security cabinet and influential in the formulation of defense policies.

It is also reassuring to know that if Ya’alon ever considered that the government was initiating policies endangering the country, unlike numerous other politicians, he would not remain silent.

June 29, 2012 | 7 Comments »

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7 Comments / 7 Comments

  1. @ Mladen Andrijasevic:

    Most importantly of all, and this is for some reason difficult for many who do not live in Israel to understand, is that Israel does not have much of a choice. It is either that Israel destroys the Iranian nuclear sites or gets incinerated in a nuclear attack since Iran cannot be deterred. The choice is quite stark. Moshe Ya’alon put it this way: ” But if the question is bomb or be bombed, the answer is clear: bomb”

    I lived in israel during the time 0f the invasion of Lebanon which was also put in terms of “not having a choice”. So I am quite familiar with this specious argument. That venture or misadventure resulted in a twenty year disaster. I had the misfortune of losing members of my extended family in a project that destroyed the spirit of the Nation of Israel. So please don’t give this no choice baloney.

    Besides there are just too many high up in the military and intelligence ranks that would totally disagree with you.

    The bottom line is no one knows just how an attack on Iran will play out.

  2. @ babara:

    >>That assumption is that the act will inevitably be successful and the consequences will not be far reaching and drastic.

    I will answer in three parts. First, what is defined as success? Here is Moshe Ya’alon :
    “Let me reply in greater detail to the argument that Iran will hurtle toward nuclearization on the day after the bombing. Those who focus the debate on the narrow technological aspect of the problem can argue that all that will be achieved is a delay of a year or two, not much more. If so, they will say, ‘What did we accomplish? What did we gain?’ But the question is far broader. One of the important elements here is to convince the Iranian regime that the West is determined to prevent its acquisition of nuclear capability. And what demonstrates greater determination than the use of force?

    “Therefore, it is wrong for us to view a military operation and its results only from an engineering point of view. I want to remind you that in the discussions of the security cabinet before the Israeli attack on [the nuclear reactor in] Iraq, the experts claimed that Saddam Hussein would acquire a new reactor with a year. They were right from the engineering aspect but mistaken historically. If Iran does go confrontational and tries openly to manufacture nuclear weapons, it will find itself in a head-on confrontation with the international community. The president of the United States has undertaken that Iran will not be a nuclear power. If Iran defies him directly, it will have to deal with him and will embark upon a collision course with the West.”

    >>and the consequences will not be far reaching and drastic.
    Here is an excellent analysis what the Iranian reaction to a preemptive strike may look like:
    Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Iran’s Likely Responses to an Israeli Preventive Strike
    http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyNote11.pdf

    Most importantly of all, and this is for some reason difficult for many who do not live in Israel to understand, is that Israel does not have much of a choice. It is either that Israel destroys the Iranian nuclear sites or gets incinerated in a nuclear attack since Iran cannot be deterred. The choice is quite stark. Moshe Ya’alon put it this way: ” But if the question is bomb or be bombed, the answer is clear: bomb”

    As to what is the probability that those Iranian leaders embracing the apocalyptic variant of Shiism might seize control of the regime is not clear. The Center for a New American Security’s report thinks the believes that such an event is “unlikely”. The report does not quantify what that means. Five percent? Ten percent?

    http://www.madisdead.blogspot.co.il/2012/06/center-for-new-american-securitys.html
    “Even if Iran’s current regime is rational, the regime could change in ways that make deterrence less viable.

    Some fear that leaders embracing an apocalyptic variant of Shiism (sometimes referred to as the “cult of the Mahdi”) might eventually seize control of the regime. On the surface, this seems plausible because President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and some individuals within the IRGC appear to subscribe to these beliefs.

    Such messianic leaders might nihilistically welcome destruction to usher the return of the Twelfth Imam and the “day of judgment.”

    Although it is impossible to predict the precise course of future events in Iran, this scenario seems unlikely “

  3. @ Mladen Andrijasevic:
    I wish we can all predict the future but no one can really do so with certitude. Those who predict that we MUST bomb Iran to prevent their acquisition of a bomb are making a very doubtful assumption. That assumption is that the act will inevitably be be successful and the consequences will not be far reaching and drastic. Who really can truly know that.

  4. You obviously have not read neither the blog nor the original Ha’aretz article. You are right that the sentence should be “The consequences of a nuclear Iran WOULD be catastrophic.” But the text is from the Ha’aretz English translation, and this particular sentence I did not correct as I did “But if the question is bomb or be bombed, the answer is clear: bomb.” [The Ha’aretz English translation has ‘bomb or bombing’ which is confusing]

  5. @ Mladen Andrijasevic:

    “The consequences of a nuclear Iran will be catastrophic.”

    Is this prophecy, Mladen? It’s a common mistake for people to use the indicative mood when the subjunctive is intended. I prefer:

    “The consequences of a nuclear Iran WOULD be catastrophic.”

    As stated, you are assuming that they indeed will become a nuclear power, and that catastophe will indeed ensue. Frankly, I do expect an unthinkable global tragedy within a few years, with Israel suffering at least as much as everyone else; and it’s a sign of our collective insanity, that we have done virtually nothing to prepare for it. A case in point? Our major hospitals are almost all located in major targets — because hospitals are constructed on the basis of immediate profit, not long-term need. As for Iran, though, I am holding out considerable hope that SOMEONE will put the kabotch on their enterprise. You may be more on the mark than I, though.

  6. Most significantly of all, Moshe Ya’alon understands that Iran is much more dangerous than Pakistan or North Korea.

    http://www.madisdead.blogspot.co.il/2012/06/moshe-yaalon-they-are-completely-unlike.html

    But the Iranians are rational, and the use of nuclear weapons is an irrational act. Like the Soviets, they will never do that.

    “A Western individual observing the fantastic ambitions of the Iranian leadership scoffs: ‘What do they think, that they will Islamize us?’ The surprising answer is: Yes, they think they will Islamize us: The ambition of the present regime in Tehran is for the Western world to become Muslim at the end of a lengthy process. Accordingly, we have to understand that their rationality is completely different from our rationality. Their concepts are different and their considerations are different. They are completely unlike the formerSoviet Union. They are not even like Pakistan or North Korea. If Iran enjoys a nuclear umbrella and the feeling of strength of a nuclear power, there is no knowing how it will behave. It will be impossible to accommodate a nuclear Iran and it will be impossible to attain stability. The consequences of a nuclear Iran will be catastrophic.”

  7. It is also reassuring to know that if Ya’alon ever considered that the government was initiating policies endangering the country, unlike numerous other politicians, he would not remain silent.

    In the three years of the current BB machine Ya’alon has been part and parcel of the current governments actions and decisions and bears equal responsibility.

    Ya’alon did voice opposition to BB’s agreeing to moratorium of construction in t territories and Jerusalem. He openly voiced his opposition and was red the riot act by BB meaning shut up or your fired, He hut up!!!

    Leibler an old time has-been Labor Zionist, comes from the same political and ideological milieu as Ya’alon would feel comfortable with the past COS IDF.

    He raises the point that Ya’alon was opposed to the evacuation of the IDF from Gaza, true but he would have carried out Sharon’s orders if he had remained instead of resigning holding a press conference and explaining to the Israeli people his reservations and reasons for resigning.

    That said he was never opposed to the removal of Gush Katif settlements or the 4 Settlements in Northern Sharon. His calculations appear to be militarily pragmatic not ideological.

    Ya’alon in favor of returning the Golan for peace with Syria as Chief of MI.

    Former IDF Chief of Staff Lt-Gen Moshe Ya’alon: Even if we don’t reach a peace treaty, renewal of dialogue with Syria will weaken Iran and Hezbollah
    No way to go to war
    By Ari Shavit Haaretz Magazine 15 September 2006

    http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/762890.html

    Did you favor negotiations with Syria?
    “Yes. In the summer of 2003 I suggested to prime minister Sharon that he accede to the requests of Bashar Assad and enter into negotiations with him. I thought that the very existence of negotiations with Syria on the future of the Golan Heights would crack the northern alignment of
    Iran-Syria-Hezbollah and perhaps also cause its dismantlement. Sharon rejected my suggestion outright. He preferred the disengagement.”
    Would you be ready to cede the Golan Heights in return for peace with Syria?
    “I never sanctified any piece of ground. If a territorial concession will bring about true peace and full recognition of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, I am not against that. However, even if we did not reach a land-for-peace agreement, the very fact of the renewal of the dialogue channel with Syria would have distanced it from Iran and would have weakened the northern alignment, which I defined as a strategic threat.
    ” Nevertheless, the rockets kept piling up and you did not take action against them.
    “You have to understand the limitations of power. Those who do not understand them must not be in command of power. At this moment Syrian missiles are aimed at Israel. Why don’t we attack them? Why don’t we attack The Iranian Shihab [missiles] already today? One could argue that we should also attack the Egyptian missiles. Egypt has a large army and many missiles, so why shouldn’t we attack them now, because who knows what will happen 10years down the line?
    “You have to understand that the use of military force is a last resort. You don’t use it offhandedly. And in order to use military force a legitimate strategic context is required. There was no such context regarding Hezbollah. However, beyond all that, it was clear to me that Hezbollah is a rooted phenomenon and will not be eradicated by military action. It was also clear to me that there is no unequivocal military solution against the rocket deployment. I therefore encouraged political activity, which in the end would lead to the disarming of Hezbollah as a result of an internal Lebanese process, and concurrently I drew up a military plan intended to address a scenario of a Hezbollah offensive that would oblige us to deal with the organization militarily.