September 1, 2024
To: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Members of the Security Cabinet
For the sake of the hostages and for Israel’s security, Israel must retain control of the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah Crossing areas while balancing all political considerations.
The IDSF expresses its deep shock at the cold-blooded murder of our abducted citizens by Hamas. Above all else, we commend and appreciate the IDF combatants and all the security services for their dedication, courage, and professionalism, and their confidence in the justice of the cause that brought them to the battlefield in this existential war. We also wish the speedy homecoming of all of our hostages.
Turning our attention to the trenchant debate over the standing of the Philadelphi Corridor in the hostage deal, our professional opinion is that to claim that the hostage deal may include a temporary withdrawal of several weeks from the Philadelphi Corridor is to deceive the public, materially endanger the hostages’ lives, and possibly reverse many of the IDF’s achievements in the war. It may even mean needless shedding of our soldiers’ blood in areas that were already captured and cleared, or at the hands of a Hamas immeasurably more dangerous once it returns to battle.
Any retreat from the Philadelphi Corridor, even if temporary, will enable Hamas to strengthen itself rapidly with significant quantities of weaponry and to absorb armed fighters arriving from the Sinai Peninsula into Gaza, not within a matter of weeks but within days and possibly even hours. In addition, Hamas may exploit the ceasefire and withdrawal as an opportunity to smuggle hostages out of the Gaza Strip, possibly even to Iran. It would require only hours, not weeks, to do so. In that case, Israel could find itself at great risk in return for little benefit. And Israel would be failing to preserve assets and leverage for later stages of the negotiations. Recapturing the Philadelphi Corridor after the deal, which various sources suggest is more of complicated matter than just a tank’s speed of travel. Tremendous political pressure on the part of the US, Egypt, and the international community was directed at Israel early in the war and contributed decisively to the delay in capturing Philadelphi. We foresee similar political pressure, but even stronger, in the case of a withdrawal under the deal. Israel’s takeover of the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah Crossing areas is one of this war’s significant strategic accomplishments. As a smuggling channel, they enabled Iran to arm Hamas with significant deadly weaponry which Hamas employed in the October 7 massacre. The revitalized Gaza Strip then became a terrorism hotbed right at Israel’s doorstep because of that “oxygen supply.” Israeli control is a remedy for one of the past mistakes that enabled Hamas to gain strength, and similar mistakes would be liable to allow its resurgence. This point has been proven by the many tunnels and shafts that the IDF has begun to expose in recent months.
The policy of withdrawals and reliance on international guarantees, or on Palestinian forces considered moderate, has already demonstrated its immeasurable damage to Israel’s security in the Oslo Accords, UNIFIL’s presence in southern Lebanon, and the original withdrawal from Philadelphi.
We cannot repair the damages of the past if we are to repeat their mistakes. Our leadership must share with the public the dangers that such decisions pose in terms of the hostages’ safety and the resurgence of Hamas. From the standpoint of security, Israel’s interest is in maintaining control in the strategic Philadelphi and Rafah Crossing areas. The political echelon must balance vital considerations, including societal and security considerations alike, in a way that will preserve public solidarity. The decision must be made within the limits of flexibility as managed by the political echelon in the negotiations.
In closing, we call on the public and the leadership not to fall into the trap of Hamas by returning to the divisiveness that had characterized the pre-October 7 period. We notice a discourse in the enemy’s media and social media that rejoices at the potential fissures in Israeli solidarity. The debate must be issue-based, transparent, and conducted with fraternity. Everything necessary must be done in order to ensure that the nation is unified and closes ranks for the sake of this paramount national security interest.
Signed,
The Leadership of IDSF on behalf of its 35,000 members.
When it comes to politics, generals should keep OUT!
They do NOT have the mind set required for long-term goals.
Dayan gave up the Temple mount instead of ONLY al Aqsa!
Barak ran away from S Lebanon and Israel got the Hezbollahs.
Rabing trusted a LIAR and got Intifada.
Sharon got out of Gaza and Israel got Hamas/Hezbollahs/ayatollahs/Houthis etc..
@keelie, please remember the Egyptians said that anything like your suggestion would be regarded as a declaration of war. On the other hand, they did prepare an enclosed area near Kerem Shalom in Sinai for some undisclosed reason. The obvious reason of providing shelter for Palestinians from the Gaza Strip can’t be the explanation.
Great points! I would suggest that Israel “tear down that wall” between Gaza and Egypt so that the citizens of Gaza can join up with their Egyptian allies… in Egypt…
Given what’s been happening between Gaza and Egypt, this seems like a fair and practical method of administering justice.
While I find this article was an important missive towards the government, it leaves out a number of very obvious points.
1. Egypt knowingly played a major role in the provision of all the “oxygen supply” needed by Hamas to continue the war. To be accurate, they are partners with Hamas no less than Iran and are nothing less than our enemies in this war.
2. Egypt also knowingly “closed” their border with the Gaza Strip to increase the international pressure on Israel by refusing the “innocent” Palestinians entry or transfer. This may have been encouraged by the USA.
3. Israel should have taken control of the Philadelphi Corridor latest on October 8 to limit the number of hostages who were likely moved into Egypt and beyond. This would also have limited the number of wounded Palestinians who have been recuperating in Turkey (reported) and maybe Egypt (not reported to the best of my knowledge). This leaky passage should have been sealed off immediately.
4. The situation in the North deserves some attention too. Will there be an additional message to the Security Cabinet some time soon? Sealing off the “oxygen supply” to South Lebanon is not as easy as the Gaza Strip.