Jewish Virtual Library debunks all these Myths

6 Comments / 6 Comments

1. “The Hamas Covenant explicitly calls for the destruction of Israel.”

   That’s an understatement, especially odd since that passage links to a footnote emphasizing that the Hamas Covenant specifies that genocide against ALL Jews is a religious imperative. Even the Iranian Mullahs don’t go that far in their propaganda, satisfying themselves with promising another Holocaust against Israel’s 7 million Jews.

2. “What Abbas advocates is ethnic cleansing.”

   Merely advocates? Jews are already banned from the areas Arabs control, now, on penalty of death, Areas A, B, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt pretty much all of the Arab countries and no go enclaves in western and other countries with minor, probably temporary exceptions.

   And these inhuman savages have the temerity to accuse Israel, to accuse Jews of anything? They should ge n their nees.

3. “Begin remained determined to continue the peace process and froze Israeli settlements in the West Bank to facilitate the progress of negotiations.”

   Huh? This is the Begin who famously stood up to Senator Biden and told him where to go when Biden threatened to cut aid if Israel didn’t end Jewish settlement in Yesha? In such a hurry to make peace with a thrice defeated enemy that he was willing to give away the store while making heroic Zionist speeches? Another Churchill?

   I’m shocked. I didn’t know that.!!!!

   https://youtu.be/RbTaP0_Galg

4. “Israel is unlikely to contemplate any compromises on the Golan Heights unless and until a stable, peaceful government emerges in Syria and the radical forces are expelled.”

   Israel annexed the Golan Heights. Annexation is neither temporary nor conditional.

5. “Historic Palestine included Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan.”

   That’s all?

   “The Gaza Subdistrict (Arabic: ???? ???, Hebrew: ??? ???) was one of the subdistricts of Mandatory Palestine. It was situated in the southern Mediterranean coastline of the British Mandate of Palestine. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the district disintegrated, with Israel controlling the northern and eastern portions while Egypt held control of the southern and central parts – which became the Gaza Strip, under Egyptian military between 1948 and 1967, Israeli military rule between 1967 and 2005, part of the Palestinian National Authority (with some aspects of retained Israeli rule until the 2005 withdrawal) after the Oslo Accords until 2007, and is currently ruled by the Hamas as a de facto separate entity from the Palestinian National Authority. The parts which Israel held since 1948 were merged into Israeli administrative districts, their connection with Gaza severed…”

   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Subdistrict,_Mandatory_Palestine

6. “Sadat made a courageous decision to make peace with Israel”

   Not quite.

   “Sadat has made it clear to his “internal” audience, i.e., those who read Arabic, that he is engaged in what is for the Arabs a new strategy to win the traditional Arab goal of Israel’s destruction. In a section of his memoirs published in October on September 11, 1977, two months before the peace initiative, Sadat wrote:
   “Al Qaddafi has chosen to make the same terrible mistake that Arabs committed several years ago when they rejected everything and anything—when the Arabs turned the word `no’ into an idol which they worshipped, burned incense around, and in the process, burned all their bridges and were halted … all this because the Arabs pinned the fate of the Arab nation and three of its generations to the word ‘no.’ In the field of politics, just as in the field of sports, the best player is not the one who kicks the ball out of the playground every time he gets it. This is escapism; he prefers to escape from the situation rather than take the ball, maneuver it through his opponents and then score a goal.”11
   Notice Sadat makes no objection to Qaddafi’s goal, repeatedly trum- peted as the annihilation of Israel, but to the methods by which the goal has been pursued. On the contrary, in the same passage Sadat goes on to say that he tries to avoid getting involved in minor and peripheral battles precisely because the coming war with the Jews should be the only thing that preoccupies him, and he is unwilling to become distracted “from this confrontation which will be much more violent than the October War.”12
   There were other hints shortly before Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem that he was planning a new strategy. On September 3, 1977 Foreign Minister Fahmi (whose later resignation suggests that even he was not aware of the dramatic form the strategy would assume) argued against another Arab summit meeting.
   “The world is opposed to Israel’s actions in the territory—our main aim must be to exploit intelligently this international attitude. We must differentiate between the possible and the impossible; we must address the world in its own language and go with it as far as we can go… We must besiege Israel and isolate it internationally … It is absolutely not in our interest to allow Israel to escape from this impasse. We could raise issues which we know, without even thinking about it, that the world atmosphere is not prepared for—issues which would provide Israel with new arguments to convince sections of world public opinion that throughout the history of the conflict the Arabs have thought only about the destruction and elimination of Israel … Briefly it is not right…to allow Israel to escape the grip
   11

   of world society by raising ideas which would make the world forget Israeli extremism by pointing to what it might imagine to be Arab extremism …We must not take steps unless we are sure they bring us closer to our goal.13
   That the goal had not changed, merely the desirable method of achieving it, was emphasized by Sadat once again in September 1977, only weeks before his visit to Jerusalem.
   “The October War was only the spark that set off the conflict—a conflict that is as old as the Arab nation. This conflict started when we fought against the Tatars, and later, the Crusaders, in defense of our rights, land and honor. Today we are fighting against Zionism in defense of our land and values … Now after the October War we should never look back. In fact this struggle is not just a military conflict; it is a military, economic and political conflict. They are all links in the same chain. Therefore we must prepare ourselves for a prolonged conflict and all its relevant aspects.”14
   The next stage in that conflict, for Sadat, was the Jerusalem “peace initiative.” In his Knesset speech he laid down the peace terms— unacceptable to both of Israel’s major parties—from which he has never since deviated: that Israel return to the borders of 1949 and set up a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem). Upon returning home, he said in an interview for October Magazine, “We must take what we can get as a means for taking all that we want.”15 Those who had followed Sadat’s earlier remarks prior to his trip could scarcely be in doubt as to what he meant by “all that we want.”

   https://afsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/SadatsStrategy_Eidelberg1.pdf