Partnership with Greece and Cyprus is a game changer, giving Israel vital strategic depth during a conflict.
By Col. (Res.) Dr. Eran Lerman, JISS Aug 9, 2023,)
Eli Cohen’s Visit to Greece as an Indication of Israel’s Priorities
The convincing win by Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ Nea Dimokratia (ND, New Democracy) center-right party in the second round of the Greek parliamentary elections on June 25 stabilizes the political scene in Athens. Since the Greek constitutional system significantly rewards the party with the most votes in a second round, ND now has an absolute majority of 158 out of 300 in parliament. In effect, it completes a cycle of elections in key Eastern Mediterranean nations, confirming experienced political figures in office:
-Binyamin Netanyahu in Israel, governing since December 29, with a firm parliamentary coalition (despite the significant turmoil over judicial reform);
-Nikos Christodoulides, formerly foreign minister, sworn in as president of Cyprus on February 28;<
-Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who won the second round of the presidential election in Turkey (May 28) and was sworn in for a third term of office (June 3).
That implies that “old hands” are in charge across the region, with the capacity to plan (in Egypt, Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi does not need anything but the mere semblance of democratic niceties to confirm his power). That, in turn, may create opportunities for strengthening existing bonds of cooperation – and exploring new options for resolving or reducing old conflicts.
In this context, the visit of Israel’s Foreign Minister, Eli Cohen (July 6) – the first of its kind to be hosted by new Greek Foreign Minister Giorgios Gerapetritis – signaled the importance both countries attach to their cooperation and their role as the strategic anchors of a new alignment of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Common perceptions of threats and opportunities, an affinity of values, and the prospect of economic cooperation, specifically but not exclusively in the energy field, are all part of this new “bridge over the Mediterranean.”
Israel is extensively involved in enhancing Greek military capabilities. Israelis have become a significant part of Greece’s tourist trade and major investors in Cyprus. Israel firmly supports the position taken by Greece and Egypt on delineating the EEZ borders in the Eastern Mediterranean – as opposed to the lines drawn by Turkey and the Government of National Accord in Tripoli. Ultimately Greece is likely to become, if not a hub than a conduit of Mediterranean energy to Europe. Meanwhile, Israel should be able to reassure Greece and Cyprus that no understanding would be reached with Erdogan, which runs against their interests.
What should be Netanyahu’s agenda in Turkey?
The recurrent hints and pressures Erdogan and his government used to persuade Israel to export the gas from its Mediterranean fields via Turkey (helping it establish itself as an energy hub) are ultimately pointless. Such a project would immediately run into conflict over the use of the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone. Israel has no wish to become tethered to a mercurial leadership in Turkey which still harbors hostile sentiments and might turn radically against Israel at times of crisis, particularly a confrontation with Hamas. Moreover, as detailed below, there are viable alternatives.
What, then, should be on the agenda during Netanyahu’s visit to Ankara if he rejects (no matter how politely) Erdogan’s push for a pipeline to Turkey? There are, as things stand, significant other fields over which the two countries – despite the bitter differences of the recent past – can find common ground, even if Israel avoids such a commitment and refuses to trade away its strategic partnership with Greece and Cyprus.
The scope of trade – distinctly skewed in Turkey’s favor – keeps growing, and may do so even more (albeit marginally) if the present Israeli government proceeds with its plans to lower the cost of living by allowing agricultural imports. The poor performance of the Turkish economy in recent years seemed at some points to put Erdogan’s political survival in question: better relations with Israel, as well as with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, can help extricate Turkey from its present predicament.
At the strategic level, Israel shares with Turkey – as demonstrated in mid-July by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s visit to Baku – a keen interest in Azerbaijan’s ability to defend itself during growing tensions with Tehran. A traditional ally of Turkey (and speaking a Turkic language), Azerbaijan has enjoyed a strong security relationship with Israel over the years and recently opened an embassy after years of hesitation and delay. Turkey may take an ambivalent position toward Iran (there were only two members of the UN Security Council in 2010 who opposed the sanctions resolution 1929: Turkey and Brazil), but in Syria as well as over the future of Azerbaijan. Ankara and Tehran are on the opposite sides of the conflict.
Ultimately, on the question of Mediterranean identity and institutions, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus have been taking a nuanced position, which leaves the doors of the “club” open to all who can prove to be “like-minded.” Erodgan’s neo-Ottomanism of the previous decade could not fit, nor can a posture that claims half of the Aegean in the name of “Mavi Vatan,” the “Blue Homeland” doctrine. If Erdogan is willing to distance himself from such fantasies, Israel could help chart a path toward broader regional integration (which may also reflect on Turkey’s standing in Washington) – but not at the expense of what has been achieved already.
Gas Export Options and Their Implications
In addition to existing exports to Egypt and Jordan – of national security importance and offering stable and secure markets – what Israel should seek in the Eastern Mediterranean (and elsewhere) are arrangements that create the highest possible degree of flexibility. Pipelines, in addition to their daunting costs, are not the best solution: LNG facilities would be, whether built in Cyprus (Israeli local authorities pose an insurmountable “Not In My Back Yard” resistance to any attempt to make them on Israeli soil) or onboard floating facilities at sea.
Their option is also to build a power station in Cyprus and connect it (and Israel’s production) by cable to the European grid. All these solutions would require a close relationship with both Nicosia and Athens. Some would also oblige Israel to stand firm in support of the Greek-Egyptian position over EEZ delineation, as opposed to the one drawn by Turkey and the “Government of National Accord” in Western Libya.
Turkey does not need to be left out: growing LNG/FLNG capacity could also provide gas (Israeli, Egyptian, or Cypriot) shipped to Turkish de-liquefication facilities, but in this manner, flexibility rather than a rigid mutual dependence could be secured.
The Importance of Cyprus for Israel’s Strategic Depth
One of the key reasons for Israel’s need to sustain and broaden its trilateral relationship with Greece and Cyprus has to do with the possible role they may be asked to play if Israel becomes involved in an all-out confrontation in the North (as it seems increasingly likely, given Hezbollah’s recent provocations), potentially drawing in Gaza as well. Given the scope of Hezbollah’s missiles and rockets, Israel’s ports and airports may come under a degree of threat that foreign commercial operators will not accept. In such a scenario, it would be the national carriers, such as El Al Airlines and Zim Shipping company – in which the government has a decisive stake enabling it to use them in an emergency – which must sustain the national lifeline: and the nearest logistical “base” from which they could do so would be Cyprus and Greece.
Neither Turkey nor Israel’s Arab peace partners can be relied upon under such circumstances.
Interestingly, references to “strategic depth” came up in the comments made by senior Cypriot officials and officers at the latest round of the Israel-Hellenic Forum, organized by the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs in cooperation with B’nai B’rith World Center – Israel and the IDIS (Institute of International Relations of Panteion University) and held June 19-21 in Nicosia. It is this potential aspect – already bolstered by the large-scale military exercises conducted by the IDF in the Troodos Mountains on an annual basis – which makes it important for Israel to support the ongoing ability of Cyprus to make its own foreign policy and national security choices, free of a veto by Ankara.
Even if there were to be renewed progress toward an agreed permanent status on the island as a whole – which Israel, and all others in the Eastern Mediterranean, should warmly welcome – this requirement for the retained independence of decision, vital to all parties, must be upheld.
Reposted from the open domain without the author’s permission.
Peloni–the Ukrainian change og government in 2013 (not 2014) was a genuine popular revolution, not a coup. The large crowds that assembled to protest alleged fraud in Ukraine;s (then) recent elections weren’t manufactured by NATO. Representatives of nearly every community in Ukraine, including Ukrainian Jews, were present in the crowds. It is much harder for anyone, even NATO, to manufacture a popular uprising than it is to organize a military coup, The American embassy in Kiev did move quickly to take advantage of the revolution. They steered money to the political parties and leaders who supported the revolt. They also mediated discussions between these leaders and tried to dictate which ones would serve in the new government and which were to support it “from thr outside” In particular, the Americans wanted to exckude from the government the parties with known fascist or neo-Nazi tendencies. However these efforts at manipulation by the U,S, embassy failed, as unfortunately these parties were included in the government.
As far as I have been able to learn, there was no discussion of NATO military aid to the new regime at this time. MIlitary aid from NATO to the new regime was only put on the table and only began to arrive in 2015, about a year after Russia took over Crimea and supported the “secession” of the two eastern Ukraine provinces. Ironically it was the Obama administration that began this military aid. But Obama was careful not to give the new regime any verbal support, and the official State Department line was neutrality in the Ukraine-Russian territorial dispute.
The U.S. complicity in the Ukraine “regime change” gave Russia justified caused at being thoroughly pissed off at the United States. Russian intelligence had apparently thoroughly penetrated the American embassy, with the result that they were able to widely publicize the American meddling, They werte even able to obtain videotapes, with both visual and audio, of the negotiations between the American embassy and the various Ukrainian factions. These included tapes of the Ambassidor herself, and of the internal discussions between U,S, embassy officials concerning which UKrainian factions to support or withhold support from. The Russian widely distributed these tapes to both foreign journalists and govenments and the Russian and Ukrainian presses. However, the taped did not created nearly as much of a stir internationally as the Russians expected. I guess everyone abroad, including the U.S. Congress, took American meddling everywhere for granted. The result was an international yawn.
Peloni, you said,
Of course he isn’t! If he were, he would have folded long ago. And you are correct — if he WERE afraid of NATO, this would have justified his claims that NATO is the aggressor; but he is not: He will prosecute this war to the last dead Russian.
We can thank God that Erdogan’s megalomania falls short of Putin’s.
One person Putin DOES fear, BTW, is Donald John Trump. Thank God for that; and may “The Donald” live and prosper!
@Michael
First of all, your initial statement cited “those [claims] of Russia in Crimea” which did not indicate the wider war. You have never, to my recollection, connected the dots between the February coup of 2014 and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, so forgive me if this was your intention and not Russia’s claims in Crimea as your statement indicated. In fairness this is not clear in either of your first two statements in this thread.
Ignoring this, I continue to find serious fault in these statements you make:
This is simply wrong. The American seizure of Ukraine’s independence was the beginning of the war in Ukraine, and Russia’s invasion of Crimea was simply the response to that violent, illegal, reckless act. Is it really your decided opinion that Russia’s advance into Crimea on February 27, 2014 was not related to the US led coup in Ukraine which took place three day earlier on February 24, 2014?
Again this is simply not supported by the facts. If Russia were not afraid of NATO, the war in Ukraine would have taken place in 2014 when it was provoked, not in 2022 after 8yrs of failed negotiations by Russia to peacefully resolve the matter. Russia is still afraid of NATO and well they should be. It is led by a collective bunch of half-wit and incompetents who would rather lead the world to the bring of nuclear war than to recognize that their attempts to defeat Putin with a Ukraine sized war has failed. In addition to this, NATO has the ability to seriously test the limits of the Russian military, and no matter if is capable of winning or not, Russia has no interest in opening that door, or they would have widened the war when the US attacked Russia with the Nordstream attack, or sooner. In fact, if Russia were not afraid of NATO, the super-sonic weapons falling on Ukraine would otherwise be seeking out distant NATO targets where they might actually have an effect on those who are leading this war against them. Unlike the feckless, foolish, foulups who have led the US to abandon reason while pursuing their fantasies of conquering Russia, Russia has been quite measured in its responses to the various attacks taken by NATO against them, and it is because they do not want further ‘NATO intervention’ than has already been deployed against them. Do you really believe that Russia is not afraid of NATO?
Peloni
With hundreds of thousands now dead as a result of the Russian invasion of Crimea and its aftermath, you seem to have blown a fuse in your conscience to say stuff like this. Why should anyone listen to you? The Russian invasion of Crimea was the beginning of the current war. If anything, this is the major DIFFERENCE between Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine and Turkey’s aggression in Cyprus — and this is because the Turks are genuinely afraid of NATO intervention. Putin, apparently, isn’t. (and I might add, he never was –except when Trump was in power).
@Michael
My only problem is that, despite the similarities which you draw between these two situations, which are interesting enough, you ignore a great deal which demonstrates the great disparity which distinguishes these two campaigns.
For instance, you fail to note that Russia’s Red Line in Ukraine had been breached with the US coup which precipitated the Russian occupation of Crimea, and there is no such similarity in Cyprus. More than this, the Budapest Memorandum had been violated more than once by the US coup, for which there is no comparison in the events in Cyprus. Similarly, both the UN Charter, and the principles stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act were violated by the US coup in Ukraine, with no comparable trigger initiating the events in Cyprus. The precipitation of Russia’s seizure of Crimea, however, is only part of my problem with your analysis.
When Russia took control of the Crimea there was no displacements, whereas in Cyprus 150,000 people were displaced due to the invasion. Also, following the Russian occupation of Crimea, there were no casualties, not one dead Crimean, not one dead Russian, no one died. In Cyprus some 2,000 people died. In Crimea, there was no military response to Russia’s occupation, not from the naval forces in Crimea and not from the Ukrainian army in Ukraine. This was far from true in Cyprus. In Crimea, many if not most of the Ukrainian sailors actually joined the Russians following the Russian occupation. Again there was no similar sign of support from the Cypriot military for the Turkish invaders.
So, while the specific features which you highlight are common in both campaigns, I would suggest that they are very far from being an “almost exactly match” as you state. So far different were these situations, that I could really not recreate the comparison which drew you to make the statement you made, which is obviously why I requested you to explain it further. It was not my intent to offend you, which it seems I did, only to explain that the distinguishing features of these events are far greater than the similarities as you describe them.
Russia not just felt but was threatened
That is the essence
And this is what causes danger of nuclear war
“New Ukrainian government was interested in joining NATO. Russia felt threatened”
Turkish-speaking minority votes in favor of separation from Greek-speaking majority, after invading Turkish troops stage plebiscite. Cyprus was originally part of Ottoman Empire. New Cypriot government was interested in joining NATO, Turkey felt threatened
Russian-speaking minority votes in favor of separation from Ukrainian-speaking majority, after invading Russian troops stage plebiscite. Crimea was originally part of the Russian Empire. New Ukrainian government was interested in joining NATO. Russia felt threatened
Looks pretty close to me, Peloni. What’s your problem?
@Michael
I would be interested in hearing you try to defend this claim.
Turkey’s claims in Northern Cyprus almost exactly match those of Russia in Crimea.