Israel and Worldwide Fertility Trends
In one sense, perhaps, the doomsayers could be forgiven—at least if one were to ignore the often transparently political motives behind their predictions. After all, modern society is indeed characterized by a trend of declining fertility rates. Even many poor and only partly modernized societies exhibit such a decline. But it is particularly marked in developed countries, where rising education and income levels correlate with a fertility rate that has often plunged to, or beyond, the level at which the population will shrink unless augmented by immigration. That level—the average “replacement rate” of 2.1 children per woman over the length of her childbearing years—has been effectively forgone by most economically developed countries.
Thus, in 2015, the average fertility rate of women in the 35 member countries of the OECD (including the U.S. and most EU nations) was at 1.68. Within the European Union, the average current fertility rate is about the same, albeit with wide differences between, say, France with a fertility rate of 1.96 and neighboring Spain at a catastrophic 1.3. These rates, moreover, reflect not a momentary dip but a trend that has been gathering force for a generation or more.
In one sense, perhaps, one could forgive the doomsayers: modern societies everywhere face drastically declining fertility rates.<
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Outside the EU, Russia has a fertility rate of 1.75, a number that masks a sharp discrepancy between an abysmally low rate among ethnic Russians and a much higher rate among the Muslim minority. A similar discrepancy is discernible in West European countries including France and Germany.
In East Asia, where in-migration has been negligible until now, the sharply falling fertility trends are even more dramatic than in Europe or North America. In China the fertility rate is at 1.57, in Japan at 1.46, in Singapore at 1.24, in South Korea at 1.05, and in Taiwan at 0.9. All of these societies are now grappling with the daunting prospect of a rapidly aging population coupled with a no less rapid shrinking of the workforce.
Now for the Middle East. Some countries in the region face a challenge that is even worse: a steep decline in fertility before they have achieved significant economic affluence. There the results can be catastrophic. Several countries are now approaching what has been aptly termed a “death spiral” of collapsing fertility and rapidly aging populations with few economic or social resources to fall back on. In many cases, an exacerbating factor is an oppressive regime, propping up an already brittle ethnic balance, that is now threatened by declining fertility primarily among the ruling ethnic or religious groupings.
A notable case in point is Iran, where fertility crashed from 6.2 in 1985 to below 1.7 in 2015. With an underdeveloped economy that relies solely on oil exports to keep it out of bankruptcy, Iran completely lacks the financial or social wherewithal to deal with a situation in which old people outnumber the young. That the low fertility rate is far more marked among the ethnic Iranians than among oppressed minorities like the Azeri, Kurds, Baloch, and others, who already constitute about 45 percent of the population, points to a likely rise in ethnic unrest.
In Turkey too, the fertility rate has declined steeply, halving from a rate of 4.1 in 1985 to 2.1 in 2015. While still at replacement level, the rate once again disguises a wide disparity, in this case between the western and predominantly ethnic-Turkish parts of the country, where the fertility rate is at about 1.6, and the eastern, ethnic-Kurdish parts where fertility is over 3.0 and in some areas above 4.0.
Finally, fertility rates in all Arabic-speaking countries, although still relatively high at an estimated average of 3.3, are likewise on a rapidly descending path. In Algeria (2.8), Saudi Arabia (2.6), Morocco (2.5), and Tunisia (2.2), fertility is gliding toward replacement level, while in Lebanon (1.7) it is already below that level. It’s harder to estimate the rates in countries embroiled in civil war, specifically Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, but it appears that only the last two have a fertility rate substantially higher than replacement level. Two other Arab countries with a still-high rate are Egypt (3.3) and Jordan (3.45).
Up to this point, all figures have been taken from the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” for 2017. But this brings us to Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza, where determining real fertility rates is freighted with problems.
Between June 1967 and the 1993 Oslo accords, Israel controlled these territories directly and was able to collect exact demographic data. But in the 25 years since then, the data, controlled by the Palestinian Authority, have become highly unreliable. The PA has a strong incentive, financial as well as political and psychological, to inflate both the numbers of Arabs in the territories and their fertility rates. The higher the numbers, the larger the subsidies the PA can extract from the Western and Arab countries on which most of its finances are based.
The PA has a strong incentive to inflate the numbers of Arabs living in the territories: the higher the numbers, the larger the subsidies it can extract from Western and Arab countries.<
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Accordingly, PA reports of population numbers in the 1990s and 2000s ballooned exponentially to the point where, in February 2008, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) declared the Arab population of the West Bank to stand at 2,300,000 (including some 200,000 in eastern Jerusalem), while that of the Gaza Strip was at 1,460,000, yielding a combined total of 3,760,000 people. By then, however, it was becoming harder to hide the disparities between these total numbers and other determinable data, like the number of children in schools. Nevertheless, the PCBS sticks to them, proposing that by 2015 the population in the West Bank and Gaza was at a grand total of 4,680,000.
In the past decades, however, other demographic studies—especially those undertaken variously by Yoram Ettinger, Yakov Faitelson, and a joint American-Israeli effort led by Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise—have radically challenged and undercut these PA numbers. Their general conclusion is that the PCBS has added about one million non-existent Arabs to its numbers and that the actual Arab population in the West Bank (without eastern Jerusalem) is at about 1,800,000 while in Gaza it is at about 1,600,000, for a total of 3,400,000.
Even a pro-Palestinian organization like the Norwegian Fafo Institute for Labor and Social Research has ventured to criticize the PA’s accounting. Similarly, the CIA Factbook for 2017, exhibiting its own distrust of the PCBS, estimated the Arab population of the West Bank (including some 250,000 Arabs in eastern Jerusalem) at 2,150,000, quite close to the Ettinger and Zimmerman et al. estimates, while for the Gaza Strip the CIA estimate was closer to the PCBS at about 1,815,000.
These disparate estimates of total population size influence fertility estimates as well. For the PCBS, the fertility rate of Arab women in the West Bank in 2013 was at 3.7 while in Gaza it was at 4.5. But the CIA in its 2017 Factbook put the 2014 fertility rate of Arab women in the West Bank at a much lower 2.83, and in Gaza at a somewhat lower 4.18.
As for the fertility rate among Israeli Arab women, it has declined from about 4.5 in the year 2000 to about 3.1 in 2015, in line with the trends evident among other Arab-speaking populations in the region.
But amid all of these global and regional trends, and bucking them, stands one significant exception. In the last generation, higher educational and income levels among Israeli Jews have correlated with a marked rise in fertility.
III. The Changing Face of Israeli Society
In 2015, Israel’s general fertility rate was at 3.1, with both Jewish and Arab sectors of the population at about 3.13. This represented a sea change from the year 2000, when Israeli Arab fertility, as we have just seen, stood at 4.5, while the Jewish rate was at 2.6. During the last decades, fertility among Arabs in Israel has roughly followed the general downward trend across the Middle East, with Muslim Arabs now at about 3.35 and trending downward while among Christian Arabs the rate has for a long time fallen far below replacement level. Meanwhile, the Jewish rate continues to rise, with an estimate for 2017 of 3.16—roughly on a par with or above that of Arabs within Israel as well as across most of the Middle East.
About a decade ago, when signs of the great shift in Jewish birthrates became undeniable, some demographers tried to trace the phenomenon to the poorer and religious segments of Israeli society, especially ?aredi (ultra-Orthodox) Jews. Demographic doomsayers like Arnon Sofer, forced to drop their warnings of a coming Arab majority in Israel, now began to warn of a future “non-Zionist” majority that would purportedly unite ?aredi Jews with Israeli Arabs against the Zionist spirit of the state. Granted, the ?aredim were Jews, but for all intents and purposes, according to this argument, they were to be considered a burden rather than an asset to Israel: they expected others to pay for the multitudes of children they birthed, declined to send those children to serve in the army or to engage in productive work, and in sum represented a weight that in its own way threatened to sink the Zionist enterprise.
These contentions were largely spurious. Setting aside a small minority who are actively hostile to Zionism (as is true also of a small minority among secular Israeli Jews), most ?aredim are deeply attached to the Jewish state. Nevertheless, various schemes were proposed for discouraging ?aredi families from having children.
It eventually emerged, however, not only that haredi birthrates weren’t responsible for the rise in Israeli Jewish births but that the opposite was true.<
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It eventually emerged, however, not only that ?aredi birthrates weren’t responsible for the rise in Israeli Jewish births but that the opposite was true.
A word of caution: before adducing estimates of fertility rates among various segments of Israeli society, it’s important to bear in mind that in many individual cases, definitions of religiosity in Israel overlap and are also fluid over time. Relying, then, mainly on religious self-identification among Israeli women, we can construct a timeline for the changes in fertility rates in given sectors of Israeli society over the last decades as follows:
In the year 2000, the fertility rate among ?aredi women was at about 7.5. In 2015, it was at about 6.7—a drop of 10 percent.
Among non-?aredi, religiously observant Jewish women, fertility in the same period remained almost unchanged: about 4.0 in the year 2000 and about 4.2 in 2015, for a rise of perhaps 5 percent.
Among women identifying themselves as “traditionally” observant, the fertility rate rose from about 2.6 in 2000 to 3.0 in 2015—an increase of about 15 percent.
Among “traditional” but not very observant Jewish women, the upward jump was even more striking, higher by almost 20 percent: from about 2.1 in the year 2000 to about 2.6 in 2015.
Finally, among women identifying themselves as non-observant or secular, fertility rose by almost 15 percent from about 1.8 in the year 2000 to about 2.1 in 2015.
In sum: since the beginning of the 21st century, fertility has actually declined by about 10 percent among ?aredim, risen slightly (5 percent) among religiously observant women, and risen significantly, by 15-20 percent, among all other sectors of Israeli Jewish society. While fertility among ?aredi women remains high, the dramatic rise of fertility across the Jewish population as a whole is attributable to something else: the combined decisions by millions of Jewish families, women and men of all Israeli social groups, variously described as traditionalist, non-religious, or even secular, who have chosen to have more, many more, children.
Eventually, even the most obdurate naysayers have had to concede that the rising fertility levels in Israel are for the most part the choice of mainstream, educated, middle-class Israeli Jews. Although so far no serious studies exist to explain this unusual and sustained phenomenon, we may point to some plausible contributing factors.
IV. What It Means to Be an Israeli Jew
Israeli Jews are a notably—some would say dizzyingly—diverse lot, marked by many stark differences in affiliation, outlook, style of life, and even attire. But on some basic things they are far more homogeneous than might outwardly appear. And there is no single aspect of life in which they are more united than in the central emphasis they place on family welfare and continuity.
On some level one could say the same of every society. But all around the world, modern cultures, groups, and whole societies, even while committed to this ideal, have simultaneously acted on the proposition that the material and even the spiritual well-being of individuals is connected to the limit they place on the number of their children. For some, indeed, especially in the most affluent European and Asian societies, the stricter those limits, the greater are the chances for happiness and self-fulfillment.
At the other extreme, many tribal or clannish societies to this day continue to count large numbers of offspring as the single best measure of success and status, sometimes even endorsing polygamy for this purpose. The downside in such societies is that children are often regarded as mere appendages of the collective wealth, with little or no consideration paid to their individual welfare and development.
Various UN and OECD studies agree on the factors responsible for falling birthrates: rising educational levels in general and especially among women, more women in the workforce, marriage and childbearing postponed till later ages, a stress on career achievement and economic advancement, and so forth. These factors apply in all societies—including in tribal ones, where even small advances in education or emancipation from tribal control are associated with a sudden drop in fertility.
Israeli society has somehow succeeded in balancing rising levels of affluence and education with continued adherence to a family-oriented culture.<
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The same factors exist in Israel, too, but, for most Israeli Jews, without the same effects on fertility. It thus appears reasonable to conclude that Israeli society has somehow succeeded in balancing rising levels of affluence and education with continued adherence to a family-oriented culture, thereby developing a unique and currently stable combination in which the centrality of the family has successfully withstood the full effects of the individualist ethos. Throughout Israeli society, the educational and moral welfare of children as well as the continuity of the family remains at the center of parents’ (and grandparents’) lives, not only emotionally but as a matter of almost day-to-day practice.
This peculiarly strong culture draws sustenance from and in turn informs the equally strong sense of national solidarity. Thanks to that strongly shared national identity, Israeli Jews are unusually willing to make personal sacrifices when it comes to welcoming new Jewish immigrants into the state and into their homes—and also when it comes to stoically enduring protracted periods of violence and bloodshed perpetrated by intractable enemies. As traditional communities of origin have receded in importance elsewhere in the world, the shared sense of an Israeli nation-family underlies the habitual instinct of most Israeli Jews to regard other Jews, and especially those in Israel itself, primarily as family members rather than merely as fellow citizens.
This attitude certainly has roots in Jewish tradition going back to the Bible, many of whose formative stories involve struggles with fertility and continuity. And Jewish religious practices are also notably family-centered. With the exception of Yom Kippur, virtually all major religious holidays, from Passover to Sukkot to Hanukkah, have evolved more around the family home and table than the synagogue; and as for the Sabbath table, it is a family table or it is nothing. In Israel, many of these family rituals are also performed, whether in part or in full, by most Jews who regard themselves and are commonly classified as secular.
Similarly, the shared experience of being or representing the survivors of the Shoah, or of the Jewish communities expelled from Islamic countries, and survivors as well of decades of unrelenting wars, terror, and hostility, has forged a widespread resolve to uphold the family and its continuity.
As a result, one may say that among Israeli Jews of all kinds, having children is commonly felt as both a right and a duty—an attitude that is rapidly assimilated by newcomers as well. An excellent example here is the great wave of immigrants who arrived in the 1990s from the former Soviet Union, where birthrates among Jews were some of the lowest in the world. Indeed, it was widely expected that the arrival of these immigrants, many of them highly educated and culturally Russified, would dramatically and perhaps permanently reduce the Israeli fertility rate. In actuality, both the immigrant generation and its progeny quickly adopted the regnant view, and in time their birthrates have converged with the national mean.
Nor is this the only example testifying to the pervasiveness of Israel’s pro-child culture. In Israel, second marriages are themselves regularly cemented by the arrival of new children. Moreover, it is also now a socially accepted phenomenon for successful but unmarried single women in their late thirties to have one or two children on their own, with the help of their relatives. (Whether or not this mode of family-formation should be regarded as an unmitigated good is an issue on which analysts and others may vary.) Even among religiously observant families, where extramarital childbearing was until recently virtually unheard of, it is not uncommon for single women in their late thirties or early forties to conceive by in-vitro fertilization (IVF) and go on to raise children with the support, both financial and moral, of their strictly Orthodox kin.
An analogous trend can be observed among Israeli Jewish gays and lesbians. Although precise data are lacking, it appears that high percentages are having children and creating a much more child-oriented culture than is to be seen among their counterparts in Europe or the U.S.
Israel has become by far the world leader in fertility treatments—adjusted for population size, thirteen times the number in the U.S.<
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Finally, Israel has become by far the world leader in fertility treatments. More than 40,000 such treatments are performed every year—adjusted for population size, thirteen times the number in the U.S.—even in cases where the chances of conceiving are quite slim. Whereas wealthy European countries with generous state-funded health services offer only up to six rounds of fertility treatments, and then only until a woman reaches the age of forty, in Israel there is no limit to the number of publicly funded fertility treatments a woman can undergo if she wishes (so long as she has fewer than two children already), and the upper age limit is forty-five. Currently, more than a third of the fertility treatments in Israel are for women over the age of forty.
Israel also performs incomparably more check-ups for pregnant women than does any other country, and has developed groundbreaking technologies for surgery on fetuses with life-threating conditions. In the words of Arnon Wiznitzer, director of the women’s hospital at Israel’s Beilinson Medical Center, “we are the superpower of fertility.”
Surely, then, the prophets of demographic doom can now retire? Amusingly, some seem so reluctant to abandon the field as to have identified a new up-and-coming danger: too many Jews. The leading spokesman for this new Malthusianism is Alon Tal, chairman of the department of public policy at Tel Aviv University and the author of The Land is Full: Addressing Overpopulation in Israel (Yale). Forecasting a population three decades from now of 23 million and perhaps even as many as 36 million, he has embarked on a mission to break his fellow Israelis’ conviction that they must bring children into the world. (Incidentally, Tal, an American Jew originally from North Carolina, is a father of three.)
V. The Secret Zionist Victory
We can sum up the story so far:
In 2000, for each Arab child born in Israel there were two Jewish children: a ratio of 2/1.
In 2010, for each Arab child born in Israel there were three Jewish children: a ratio of 3/1.
In 2020, two years from now, if current trends hold, for every Arab child born in Israel there will be four Jewish children: a ratio of 4/1.
Absolute numbers tell the story even more starkly. In 2001, 95,146 Jewish children were born in Israel, and 41,440 Arab children; in 2015 the respective numbers were 137,708 and 41,016. In other words, within a mere fifteen years the number of Jewish children rose by more than 45 percent while the number of Arab children remained essentially unchanged.
The continued ingathering of Jews to Israel is an added source of demographic optimism. Since the turn of the century and the petering-out of the massive wave of Jewish immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union, smaller but still significant numbers have been coming both from the former USSR and from such countries as France, Ethiopia, and the U.S. In the last decade the net gain (subtracting returning Israelis and new immigrants who subsequently left) has been fairly constant at an average of about 20,000 annually or more than 200,000 additional Jews each decade.
These statistics tell a heartening tale concerning the demographic strength needed for Israel to survive and prevail in its existential struggle with its enemies. They also tell another tale—a Jewish tale—concerning Israel’s relationship to the diaspora.
Israel’s rising fertility rates, together with the continuing arrival of new Jewish immigrants, when placed against the opposite trends in most diaspora communities, mean that for some years now, Israel has been the world’s largest single Jewish community—something unprecedented since the period of the Second Temple. Even more significantly, Israel is or will soon become home to the absolute majority of world Jewry—something unprecedented probably since the period of the First Temple some 2,500 years ago.
Recent demographic trends mean that within the next generation, Israel will become by far the undisputed center of gravity of Jewish life.<
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But the sheer numbers reflect only part of the dramatic recalibration between Israel and the diaspora. Current data and foreseeable trends suggest that Israel is about to become home to roughly two-thirds of all Jewish children in the world, with close to 140,000 being born every year compared with some 70,000-80,000 in the diaspora. This last number is perhaps the most striking, for it means that within the next generation, Israel will become by far the undisputed center of gravity of Jewish life.
The new demographic reality presents new challenges as well as new opportunities. As many traditional Jewish communities in the diaspora are witnessing a period of rapid decline, and as the frequency of out-marriage among European and American Jews shows no sign of abating, there will be far larger numbers of unaffiliated people of Jewish descent than ever before. How to reach them will be a task to occupy Jewish policy planners for a long time to come.
Concurrently, however, individuals and groups around the world whose links to the Jewish people have become even more greatly attenuated than those in the affluent West are now actively seeking to regain some kind of connection with the Jewish core. Some of these seekers are descendants of people in Western and Eastern Europe who during the Nazi and Communist periods hid their Jewish identity or converted. Others are among the millions of descendants of Jews forcibly converted to Christianity in late-medieval Spain, Portugal, Italy and elsewhere, but whose families over the centuries preserved certain traditions and memories. Still others retain traditions of even more ancient lineage. For many, Israel will become the main and sometimes the only significant link to Jewish history and to a possible Jewish future.
All of this amounts to a striking if still largely unrecognized victory for Zionism’s 120-year-old goal of making the land of Israel once again the center of the Jewish nation and the Jewish story. In this respect as in others, Herzl’s dream is a dream no more.
@Reader
The drug is a form of chemotherapy. It has been likened to a cancer bomb by its critics, as it causes mutations in every tissue that grows, such as a fetus or GI cells or viruses. This is how it does what it does. This is why the safety data was so important, and then India canceled their studies due to lack of performance and severe side effects. That really told the story, or we thought so.
On Dec. 23 while most of the US was distracted with the Christmas holiday, the drug was granted EUA, but a very important conversation took place in the approval meeting. It turns out that the drug requires about 3 days to begin working. Well, the drug studies on it were with the original Wuhan strain and Alpha, which had a much longer period of infection than the current variants. Delta was much quicker and Omicron is crazy fast. So, unless this drug is used in the very first day or two, it is likely to miss any benefit at all in stopping the growth of the virus and providing any benefit. But all the side effects will be present, which is likely why the Indian trials were so upside down in their performance.
The Latest from India:
@Sebastien Zorn
Malthusians NEVER start (or end) with their own families to show everyone how to reduce the world’s population.
Bibi is very cautious. He campaigns to the far right and governs towards the center.
Perhaps Bibi was mostly just treading water and trying to maintain the status quo because he thought that time is on Israel’s side because of this?
Israeli culture including the secular find it the norm to have many kids. Sephardic Jews and Mizrachi Jews plus religious Ashkenazim have a tradition of very large families.
I had a friend (long time ago) who came from Haifa his father with two wives (first died) had 20 children. He was the oldest I believe and was super happy to be in the IDF and out of his crowded apartment on the kibbutiz doing Nahal. He told he thought it was the largest family in Israel at the time. If I remember correctly his father was born in Iraq.
Be interesting to see some quotations from representative interviews rather than just hear statistics, in particular why the Malthusian, presumably secular professor still had 3 children. I’d like to hear about how they see their Zionism. if that’s their motivation.
The article didn’t go into how this phenomenon destroyed the major rationale for withdrawals like Oslo and Gaza, countering the false thesis of the population bomb which Arafat boasted of, basing his Kruschev-like boast (“we will bury you” I wonder why Arafat never thought to bang his shoe on the table for effect.) on false statistics provided by his own demographic agency, which were gullibly accepted by the Israeli left.
Israel for an OECD country has a very high rate of birth’s and hence the population growth of the Jewish population.
“With an average of three children per woman, Israel also has the highest fertility rate in the OECD by a considerable margin and much higher than the OECD average of 1.7. The demographics of Israel are monitored by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics”
With all due respect, would anyone like to comment on the article?
I had to read you comment many times to discern what your thesis was.
I think your theory for which you say there is ample evidence is that China planted a bomb that would exact its toll on population over time. This is because they seek the end of the US and Western Democracies.
Then you say that the fact that bright people are screwing up so much is evidence that it is planned an coordinated.
If I got you correctly, I would say you are flying by the seat of your pants.
I do not believe that China wants to destroy democracies or reduce the world’s population. There biggest problem is to cope with their lack of young people to support their aging population.
The reason you couldn’t cut your comment down is because you meandered and wrote a stream of consciousness.
If you want people to read your remarks you will have to be more concise.
/2
I don’t believe this is actually true, but if I were bent on imagining how one might seek the end of the US and Western Democracies, knowing what we have seen and making several leaps of perhaps, maybe’s and if’s, this would be a plot towards ultimate doom that might be envisioned. It would leave no defense against it, no need of war with a chance of defeat, and no road towards safety should it all be discovered too late. Yet, it would also take a great deal of certainty to plan a terribly complicated system to act according to plan, and complicated systems never act according to plan, not even simple plans, so I think the planning thing is very remotely possible, period.
Still there is a level beyond which you have to accept that very bright people, performing very poorly, over and over and over, means that it is no accident but some staged activity, and many people are dying as a result without any concern or move to correct the problem, which could easily be corrected if treatment was no longer blocked.
I disagree with some people such as Zelenko whom I highly respect because their ideas of ultimate planning is not remotely feasible IMHO, and I see another cause that answers much of the madness without a need of precise planning which could never successfully be achieved. I think Dr. Desmet is correct about the mass formation gripping the world, and I believe that PHARMA is just doing what it does best, filling its pockets and ignoring the costs and corrupting everything they see and touch, see Viox and Rezulin. I could share some more, but this is already longer than I hoped, so I will leave it at that.
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@Ted
This will be long, sorry I can’t make it shorter.
/1
What you say is true about the women or fertility, but that would leave a bunch of very angry, dedicated men or people to seek out revenge against whomever they perceive were the culprits. Their fury would be a blind rage and might cause a great upset to those who would seek to achieve this insane plot’s end.
So, I thought of a better plot-line that actually supports a lot of details we can’t ignore as actually happening and might be called evidence by some. I can’t help but recall the story that Byrne has spoken of at least 100 times in the past year regarding the Assassin’s Mace, discussed in Pillsbury’s book and passed about in the Chinese national security literature which was an reference to an ancient story and inferred that the Chinese would act with a single blow to take out the US. But, what if it wasn’t a blow. What if the China plague was a setup and geared towards a greater aim. What if the staged fear parades were intended to have the US manufacture a cure for a slightly lethal virus in the form of a shot that carried the Assassin’s blow. But, what if the blow was actually a slow moving process, where the shots created a state of chronic illness possibly leading to widespread autoimmune conditions. It might affect the different elements of the population differently, eliminating the elderly and previously ill with quick dispatch, but affecting the young and healthy by first establishing and then increasing an inflammatory disease, one that would act like a ticking bomb exploding slowly over time. The women of child bearing age could still produce children, but a marked rate of fetal death would slow the general growth of the public, and perhaps this would increasingly become more and more of a significant outcome for successful pregnancies. Meanwhile, the men, the warriors of society(including the lady warriors, sorry), would be less robust, the middle aged would be affected before the early middle aged and the early middle aged would be affected before the young. With time and repeated shots, the chronic illness would be more and more apparent, triggering autoimmune diseases and massive increases in heart attacks and strange, aggressive cancers. The public would slowly become more ill, those who were still healthy would become more and more burdened with the care of those who were not. And the immigrants, flooding the US borders would not receive the shots, remain healthy, become a vital necessity to the nation as they slowly took over every road of power and authority. A gradual, very gradual , or perhaps a more evenly increasing, road towards the final result of a public crippled from within, trying to flee the China plague while self medicating with a series of ‘safe and effective’ injections that actually held the blow of the Assassin’s mace, and ultimately the American public would become South America across the US geography.
/1
Killing the elderly reduces by tens of millions the number of “useless eaters” who receive Social Security or its equivalent in other countries, who “overburden” healthcare, etc.
Also, getting rid of the elderly may indirectly lower fertility because in many cultures grandparents take care of their grandchildren almost full time.
It is a myth that young workers support the elderly.
The elderly worked and contributed to their pension funds and it’s not their fault that the dirty politicians stole their money.
About depopulation.
Just ONE infertile (or mostly infertile) generation would be enough to put an end to the Earth’s population.
It will take some time but everyone will eventually die out since no one will ever be replaced anymore.
Maybe the PTB are trying to create a huge fertility crisis to implement a system of producing babies in labs like in Brave New World?
But in this case you will still need a large supply of the healthy eggs and sperm.
If you want to reduce the population you don’t kill the elderly. In fact that is a benefit to countries that don’t have enough workers to support the elderly.
Instead you kill young w9men or destoy their reproductive ability.
Not to down play the importance Dr. Rabinovici’s study might provide, I think the issue may lie elsewhere than the actual health of the eggs given some troubling concerns I keep seeing with very heavy handed resolutions being employed to silence them. The hormone that Dr. Rabinovici investigated does not demonstrate the ability for a woman of child bearing age to conceive and carry to term a successful pregnancy. Rabinovici’s study is not available online but requires a request for the study directly from the authors, so ignoring anything that might be derived from the details not shared in the abstract, it does not provide evidence that the vaccines do not interfere with a potential pregnancy itself.
It is not as if we need to speculate about these matters as a peer reviewed and published prospective study which was paid for by NIH to investigate the effects of the vaccine on pregnancy contained data that demonstrated 82% still births. This led to a great deal of wobbly explanations and corrections which left them still asserting what was reported was not what was being seen. So let’s ignore this for now.
Next, Dr. Ngase and Dr. Bruchet in Canada have reports of 13 still birth abortions in 24hrs, and another hospital in Canada that had 86 still births over 6months. The matter was raised in the Parliament and Ngase served an official complaint of conflict of interest with the medical board. Following this, the informant was pressured by the associated hospital to not support the report and Dr. Bruchet was arrested for psychiatric evaluation and forcible consideration of treatment with anti-psychotic drug therapy. This happened in CANADA!! Let us ignore this as well.
Next, the Pfizer own data was recently released and of the births in which data was available, 32 in total, 28 fetal deaths occurred with the overwhelming cause of death being… still birth abortions. Pfizer refused to respond to confirm or deny these facts. These are very significantly not normal findings and the spike could explain these aberrant findings…could, which is why we should investigate it.
This is a very troubling trend that is very concerning with enormous numbers of failed pregnancies. Should any research be warranting pursuit on fertility, it really should be the issue of women being able to bring their pregnancy to term, though the egg security research is important as well. In truth these matters should all have been pursued in the testing that was skipped.
FYI, this is not to support or deny the idea that this will end humanity. My personal concern on that front would lie with the enormous increase in auto-immune diseases and chronic inflammation following the injections. Slow onset of illness, significantly reducing the general health of people in general, and this could also explain the fetal deaths. Again, could. Which is why we should do research on this, and not limit ourselves to retrospectives filled with bias and dependent on accurate billing details for “proof” that can be easily missed, as has recently been demonstrated with myocarditis. In two years we could have had a great many studies to share on all of these topics. So where is that research?
@ TED-
Did you find my missing post to Adam (in your deleted pile)
@KETZEL
Regardless of how many miscarriages etc. It will not have nearly enough time-maybe by 1-2 thousand years, to have any benefit for those who are RUMOURED to want to depopulate the planet. And even not not at all likely to happen, immunity may occur, humanity will evolve and negate all effects against depopulation.
Not a chance in a billion. 10 billion.
Full Article: https://www.jpost.com/health-and-wellness/coronavirus/article-689801
There are reports of miscarriages after vax. Migrants will have unimpaired fertility and will vote. It doesn’t have to happen overnight, but vax is damaging citizens and institutions, including military. Not a coincidence, it’s all related.
Thank you for the explanation.
i@Ketzel-
Only if the vaccinations caused instant sterility. And even then there will be a vast amount of those not vaccinated,
Pfizer and their PHARMA associates are criminal enterprises that specialize in pharmaceutical crimes that cost lives – many lives. They rushed their research and they have been held to no level of accountability by their oversight agencies. Their spike inoculations are causing significant harms, and these harms could have been addressed or at least an attempt to do so could have been chosen by them, as they knew of the deaths that came so closely following their jabs – 25% in the first day, 40% by 48hrs and 80% by one week following the inoculations. Yet, instead, they chose to setup 2 and three boosters, inject children and the very young, while their supportive testing was based on the clever use of irregular comparisons and the low level evidence of models. How accidental is all of this? How far in the pocket of PHARMA must we all remain to ignore these certain facts.
Why they chose to do these terrible things, however, still remain as a question. Perhaps they are psychopaths bent on the world’s annihilation as Gates and others have suggested to enslave those remaining towards their publicly described fantasies of injecticidal domination of the world. Perhaps alternatively, they are Al Capone on steroids and since they bought their regulators and manipulated the world leaders and public with coercive measures, fear or simply idol worship, they only had themselves to limit their own malgovernance. The mental working of such unbridled and broken minds is hard to decipher and I have often stated these fine details describing why they did what they did are not required to recognize the reality that they did what they did.
The fact that they chose to pursue these unfortunate acts with carefully enacted policies to ignore the harms of their products, hide them among the unjabbed to properly motivate them to take their jabs is inexcusable regardless of their motivations. They hid the treatments and people died more readily than not due to this simple fact. Millions lie needlessly dead due to these actions. Should the victims have died only to advantage these PHARMA company profits and pad their pockets with the wealth of nations, these crimes against every nation’s public is no less great and warrant an intervention no less immediate..
Wrong. That question is meant for the people who do believe it.
Because of the drop in fertility , there is no need for diabolic schemes..
Ketzel raises another thought which is worth thinking about.
Yes, the globalists need to vaccinate citizens of first world countries so unvaccinated third world migrants can replace the victims.
So you actually believe Pfzier and others are trying to kill people with vaccines to reduce the population. You believe there is an international conspiracy to reduce the population? Correct me if I misunderstood. Thanks in advance.
With so many countries not having enough babies to replace their populations, do the globalists really need to resort to the vaccines to speed the process.