by Yaakov Lappin, IPT March 23, 2018
Throughout its deep involvement in Syria’s civil war, Hizballah did not neglect its ‘second’ and primary front – its south Lebanese border with Israel, which today lies quiet, but could ignite into conflict at any time.
Hizballah has converted an estimated 200 mostly Shi’ite Lebanese villages and towns into military bases. It has packed residential buildings and underground bunkers with surface-to-surface rockets and missiles, and pointed them directly at Israeli cities.
These bases, deliberately embedded in the heart of Lebanese civilian areas, are protected by rings of heavily armed Hizballah cells, trained to engage the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in ambush-style, urban warfare.
Altogether, Hizballah has amassed an arsenal of 120,000 projectiles, representing a level of firepower that is larger than most NATO states. These weapons are produced by Iranian and Syrian regime arms factories, and smuggled into Lebanon via a trafficking network run by Iran’s Quds Force.
Hizballah’s war doctrine is based on the idea of threatening the Israeli home front, and Israel’s national strategic targets, while tightly defending its Lebanese bases. Hizballah’s presence in neighboring Syria means that it could use that territory too, as a future base of attack.
Hizballah’s deputy leader, Sheikh Naim Qassam, recently alluded to these preparations when he said, “We are working to fortify our front, and to be ready.” These activities all run directly contrary to UN Resolution 1701, which banned Hizballah from moving arms into south Lebanon. Hizballah’s bases are also deployed in parts of Beirut, and in Lebanon’s eastern Bek’aa Valley.
In the face of this threat, IDF ground forces have launched major changes to their training, structure, and doctrine. The goal of these changes is to better prepare them for the possibility of conducting a ground invasion into southern Lebanon (as well as Gaza, the home turf of Hamas), should the need arise.
According to senior Israeli military sources, the program aims to redesign IDF units for combat in built-up areas, against the type of hybrid, guerilla-army that Hizballah has become. These plans take into account the fact that Hizballah has amassed a wealth of combat experience from its battles in Syria.
It is important to stress that there are no indications that Hizballah is, at this time, keen on initiating a full-scale armed conflict. But the explosiveness of the region, and the ongoing Iranian-Hizballah arms trafficking runs, as well as Iran’s activities in Syria, are creating significant tension that could lead to inadvertent conflict.
In case of conflict, Israel’s objective would be to, as quickly as possible, put an end to Hizballah’s terrorizing of the Israeli civilian population through mass rocket attacks. Hizballah could fire hundreds of projectiles per day, and pierce Israel’s air defenses, which would, in such a scenario, be stretched beyond full capacity.
The objective: Quickly Stop Hizballah Fire
As they look ahead to this possibility, IDF planners have designed a 360 degree protection shield for maneuvering Israeli forces. The shield would defend IDF units from enemy attacks, which can come from the air, the ground, and underground.
In Lebanon, Hizballah has dug a network of tunnels and bunkers, where it stores and moves weapons, fighters, and command and control posts. The 360 degree defense concept is designed to protect advancing IDF forces from all manner of Hizballah firepower, from any direction. It will use things like interceptors, and electronic warfare, to disrupt incoming enemy fire.
The IDF’s restructuring program also combines infantry and armored corps units, creating new kinds of combat teams which are better prepared to operate in Lebanon.
Such combat teams would storm Hizballah positions across Lebanon. In addition, the IDF has divided up its ground forces into three new categories. The first, dubbed ‘Gideon’ by military planners, will include the brigades whose job will be to move rapidly into enemy territory.
All of these changes will enable “a rapid and lethal ground maneuver against the enemy’s centers of gravity,” a senior military officer told reporters during a recent briefing.
Israel’s ground forces are also receiving an array of new capabilities, including their own drones and an ability to precisely strike targets. They will also be able to share data on the location of enemies, in real time. This is vital when facing a foe like Hizballah, which specializes in striking and disappearing quickly.
Instead of training in open hilly areas, the IDF is building 13 urban warfare training locations in the next two years, which will replicate the kinds of conditions soldiers can expect to encounter in southern Lebanon, as well as Gaza.
These bases will feature mock villages and give the units an indication of what it is like to battle an enemy that has entrenched itself in a civilian, built-up area.
A second category of IDF brigades, made up of elite commando units and paratrooper units, would also take part in such a conflict.
Together, both kinds of brigades would assault Hizballah targets from multiple directions.
They would be backed by air power, which air force planners say would reach a strike rate not yet seen in military history.
In addition, the IDF’s ground forces are receiving new weapons, designed to quickly detect and strike targets – the kind of targets that appear and disappear quickly in urban settings.
The new weapons systems include: A new artillery gun that will fire accurate, guided shells, tanks that can intercept incoming missile fire, and guided surface-to-surface rockets.
In addition, a guided, shoulder-fired missile will soon enter service, which can punch holes through walls, giving field units the ability to hit enemies hiding in structures from any angle.
Radars, capable of tracking the movement of people, will serve a range of units. New observation systems, that use augmented reality technology (which superimpose information on real images), will give field commanders the ability to instantly identify targets, and order strikes on them.
Self-driving autonomous logistics trucks will be able to enter high-risk, enemy territory under fire, delivering essential equipment.
And large drones are due to enter service soon, which will be able to deliver supplies, and evacuate wounded soldiers under fire.
Although Israel does not seek war, and Hizballah is not likely to deliberately start one any time soon, the growing threat posed by the Iranian-led radical axis is making the Middle East less stable, and more explosive.
The IDF’s preparations are designed to ensure that if new conflict does break out, Israel will be ready.
Yaakov Lappin is a military and strategic affairs correspondent. He also conducts research and analysis for defense think tanks, and is the Israel correspondent for IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly. His book, The Virtual Caliphate, explores the online jihadist presence.
@ adamdalgliesh:
Those matters that you point out are exactly correct and I am in full agreement, having thought the same for many years. The only point where we might differ is that I believe that if there were any signs that Russia might move on Israel, the US would step in to prevent it. It’s just a feeling, but a strong one.
I think your last word in the last sentence, very apt as it is, was to have been “when our strength faileth”.
Also, let me wish you and your family and friends, a very meaningful Pesach, with a warning…. “it’s 4 (FOUR) cups of wine, not 14…”.!!
I agree with you, Edgar, that there are some long-term strategic similarities in the Israeli response to Hizbollah, Hamas, Fatah and all its enemies, and the American failures, not only in Vietnam, but in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Syria. Both countries have failed to use adequate force to defeat its enemies decisively and put an end to the conflict. Only the sort of decisiveness that the Allies showed in demanding an achieving the enemies unconditional surrender in World War II (and which they failed to demand at the end of World War I) can end a conflict for good. And even though the Arabs have not shown the same degree of discipline, self-sacrifice and military competence as the Vietnamese Communists did, they have of course in their own waged a long war of attrition for more than a hundred years.
This attrition is taking its toll on the Israelis, as is evidenced by the high rate of emigration and net emigration, and all of the suicidal concessions Israel has made to the PLO. Another difference, though, from the American military failure has been the fact that Israeli “restraint” and halfway measures have been largely determined by external pressure from its “friends,” the United States and the EU. The threat of trade and arms embargoes, as well as the danger of direct Soviet intervention, has made Israel understandably afraid to act decisively. The American military failures have been by choice, however. America is a great power, unlike Israel, and is truly independent and can do what it wants to do. Also, America could afford to lose all of the wars it has lost, while Israel faces total destruction if it doesn’t achieve a decisive victory at some point. I wish I had the answer to Israel’s strategic dilemma, but I admit I don’t. We must do all we can, and then pray passionately to God to rescue us “when our own strength faith.”
@ adamdalgliesh:
You are very reassuring to my ears. I know everything you say about the Vietnam war is correct, as I began keenly following all that was happening, since my meeting with that astonishingly tanned young woman. I’ve also read books by experts which are mention the conflict in similar terms to yourself.
I did not intend to inject Vietnam from the angle you are relating, but purely in the way that the Vietcong were allowed to gradually get used to facing larger and larger forces instead of being swamped by an overwhelming flood of troops all at once. however casual, from the beginning.
Israel could have deterred Hezbollah the very same way that they respond when Gaza shoots off a few rockets. This would have prevented the massive array facing us today. I believe so anyway. Tactically it would have been the best way to stop the buildup, and strategically there would not now be this immediately menacing Northern enemy with more weaponry than most medium sized countries. In fact , I believe that if we had made them keep their heads down, they would not have been able -for all intents and purposes- to seize control over Lebanon. We have been more concerned with the traumatic experiences of those living along the Gaza border because Hmams have been far more aggressively active than thave Hezbollah. But that does not mean that facing 150,000 rockets would not be equal, or more so, wearing on the nerves of the population living close to the Lebanese border. It just hasn’t been in the news the same way.
Actually, the situation is very different from Vietnam, Edgar. First of all, the Israelis will be fighting to protect their families from a massive armed attack by Hezbollah. This provides a powerful motive for soldiers to give their all too an offensive operation to stop the onslaught. The U.S. G.I.s in Vietnam were fighting an enemy that was 12,000 miles away from the Continental U.S., 6,000 miles away from Hawaii, and that posed no obvious threat to their families. The G.I.s had no clear idea why their government had sent them to fight in Vietnam, which meant that their motivation was weak.Inadequately motivated soldiers have difficulty giving their all. Third, the American soldiers could not speak the Vietnamese language and knew nothing about Vietnamese culture. As a result, they couldn’t tell friend from foe in many cases. By way of contrast, many Israelis know Arabs and their culture very well and intimately. Many can understand colloquial Arabic, and quite a few can speak it fluently as well. This makes it much easier for them to understand their enemy , to obtain information from the “locals,” and tell friend from foe. Fourth, the war in Vietnam went on continuously for years, and it was difficult to say whether any real progress toward victory was being made. No one saw “light at the end of the tunnel.” People become impatient with a seemingly endless war. By way of contrast, Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah has proceeded with intense bursts of fighting lasting a short time, followed by long truce periods. A brief, intense round of fighting, even if there are heavy casualties, is less demoralizing to soldiers than a seemingly endless war of attrition. Fifth, the PAVN commander of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, was a military genius, a master of doing the unexpected, striking with surprise, coordinating regular with guerrilla forces, constantly changing tactics, infiltrating enemy territory, infiltrating the enemy at all levels with large numbers of well-
trained spies, etc. He was a master of deception, able to make it appear that his forces were much stronger than they really were. The whole gamut of asymmetrical warfare. Some of Hizbollah’s commanders are pretty good, but I doubt if any of them are in Giap’s league. Sixth, the Israelis, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, are very experienced at coping with asymmetrical warfare, and in waging counter-guerilla operations. Seventh, because of the long truce since 2006, neither side is entirely familiar with the new weapons and tactics that their enemies have developed over this twelve year period. But the Israelis have on the whole a superior intelligence operation to Hezbollah’s and probably know much more about what to expect from Hezbollah in the next war than vice versa. These are Adam Dalgliesh’s ‘seven pillars of wisdom” about the approaching Israel-Hezbollah war.
What Israel has done to allow this massive buildup of weaponry, directed at the
life-s blood of Israel is exactly the way the U S allowed the Vietnam War to escalate slowly until it was a huge mudpit. First they sent in a couple of thousand “advisors”..then it increased to 5000 (if I correctly recall),,and around that time I found a tennis partner at courtside one day with the most astonishing tan. In conversation she said that she worked in the Dept of Defense (or maybe State) and had just returned from Vietnam for a well needed break. We discussed Vietnam, which, at that time I knew almost nothing about (except as above) and I distinctly recall that she said that sh’e sure that by year end or at latest the next year, there would be a half-million troops there.
And that’s exactly what happened; the incremental-like increase, allowed the Nth. Viets to become acclimatised to the stronger pressure gradually, until they were capable of coping-at least somewhat. I saw a comparable “laissez-faire” from the Israel Govt. allowing the Hezbollah buildup.
@ Bear Klein:
All very true and reassuring, I wrote on this site a couple of months back that I visualised the surprise, rapid bomb-runs, turn-about- re-fueling, re-arming, taking off again etc. just like the 1967 attack on the Egyptian Air force..
Yet I still feel that with any battle with Hezbollah/Lebanese Army, they would not be completely crushed-which is what’s needed- if there are also no “boots on the ground”, to complete the destruction and mop up any survivors. The physical possession of the area would stamp finality to the many years-long threat of those mamzerim.
@ Edgar G.:
Part of the IAF firepower is that each plane can fire simultanenously 10 missiles to 10 different targets at once precisely hitting the target. So if they were to fly in formations of 24 planes that is 240 targets at one time. They could fly wave after wave of these planes.
The key to getting maximum benefit is to do a preemptive attack destroying command and control plus most of the most dangerous sites in the first few hours of a war.
Israel also now has precision rapid fire artillery that hits very long distances that do some of the same work planes used to do in the past because of the precision and distance.
13 new facilities in the next 2 years will be exactly 18 months too late. It’s wonderful that the IDF has been so busy evolving new strategies and tactics and defences etc. and spending billions on them, but when battle begins, all plans are thrown into flux. Nothing works as it’s supposed to. Human, mechanical, technical errors creep in.
Why..Oh Why did Israel not attack the sprouting rocket emplacements before they became hardened and sunk underground etc. We should have made it very clear that we are the TOP DOG in the area and NO weaponry is allowed to be installed and pointed at Israel under ANY circumstances. We should not have been satisfied with merely destroying the offending item, but gone a bit extra as a warning, increasing the “extra” each time..
They allowed the build up, KNOWING that it was directed at them. Another typical example of “following the market UP” (this time) Always a bit behind the developments going on right under their noses.
I’m sure Israel will conquer, but at a vastly increased price, maybe in manpower but definitely in treasure. And the underneath nervous pressure on the population for all these years never knowing when their next breath might be their last. THAT should not be neglected as a potential cost.