By MARTIN SHERMAN, IISS
Israel is approaching a point when it must decide to destroy enemy capabilities, rather than attempting to deter the enemy from using them.
To remain at peace when you should be going to war may be often very dangerous…Let us attack and subdue…that we may ourselves live safely for the future.
– Thucydides (c. 460–395 BCE)
No government, if it regards war as inevitable, even if it does not want it, would be so foolish as to wait for the moment which is most convenient for the enemy.
– Otto von Bismarck (1815–1890)
…it is possible that the dangers into which we are steadily advancing would never have arisen. But the world and the Parliaments and public opinion would have none of that.. When the situation was manageable it was neglected, and now that it is thoroughly out of hand we apply too late the remedies which then might have effected a cure…
Winston Churchill (1874-1965), House of Commons, May 2, 1935.
In the past few days, senior IDF officers have publicly warned that the chances of war on Israel’s northern border in 2018 are growing significantly –see for example here and here.
100,000 missiles just for show?
The specter of renewed fighting presents Israel with a daunting dilemma.
Since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War, poorly conducted—and even more poorly concluded—by the Olmert government, the arsenal of the Iranian terror proxy, Hezbollah has grown exponentially in both the quantity and quality of its weaponry—now reportedly over ten times its pre-war size, and vastly enhanced in terms of its precision and destructive capacity.
Indeed, no one even vaguely familiar with the brutal nature of the organization—its gory past, and chilling proclamations of future intent—could even remotely entertain the hopelessly naïve belief that it was stockpiling over 100,000 missiles just for show.
Accordingly then, the working assumption underlying Israel’s strategic planning must be that, at some stage, they will in fact, be used against Israel and its civilian population centers. Certainly, any policy discounting such a possibility as implausible would be wildly irresponsible.
As Israeli military sources point out—the likelihood of such a grim scenario has been increased by several other factors—over which Israel has little to no control.
The one is the winding down of the civil war in Syria, in which Hezbollah has been embroiled to support their ally, Bashar al-Assad, who appears to have regained control of much of the country. This allowed Hezbollah forces to begin disengaging from the fighting and to refocus their attention on the hated “Zionist entity” to the south. The other is the undisguised efforts of Iran to establish a permanent military presence in both Syria and Lebanon—including the deployment of troops and the production of weapons in these two client states—and the completion of a Shia crescent, creating an effective land bridge from Iran to the Mediterranean coast.
Who decides when?
Given the assumption that, bolstered by its patron’s pervasive physical presence, Hezbollah will in all likelihood, eventually, use the vast arsenal at its disposal, the inevitable question is: Will Israel allow its deadly adversary to choose the time, place and circumstances for a major attack against it? Indeed, more to the point, can Israel afford to allow Hezbollah such a choice?
To grasp the consequences of permitting Hezbollah the chance of a large-scale first-strike, it is necessary to understand that the organization now poses a much graver threat than that of an asymmetric war with a guerrilla army, as it did in the past. Thus, a study published in July 2017 by a well-known security studies institute warned:
“…military buildups by Iran and Hezbollah – in Syria, and the production of high quality weapons in Lebanon – could mark the start of a new era… and could be seen as an attempt by Iran and Hezbollah to create a symmetrical strategic equation with Israel, if not more than that, i.e., achieving the capability to inflict significant damage to critical military and civilian systems in Israel”.
Accordingly, Hezbollah has become as a strategic danger to Israel, and while on its own it is clearly unable to invade and conquer large tracts of territory, it is eminently capable of wreaking massive damage on Israel’s civilian population and its strategic infrastructure.
“Unprecedented threat to infrastructure…”
Both the sheer numbers and greatly improved precision of Hezbollah’s weaponry, relative to 2006, could pose an almost insurmountable challenge to Israel’s missile defense systems. For now, not only would a far greater number of missiles be launched, but far fewer would be off target, and could therefore be left to fall un-intercepted, causing neither damage nor casualties…
Thus, the previously cited study cautions: “the threat represented by even a small number of precision missiles that breach Israel’s countermeasures and strike critical systems, such as electricity generation, could be unprecedented. The picture is similar with regard to other critical systems, such as national electricity management; natural gas infrastructure; sea water desalination (only five facilities supply about half of Israel’s drinking water); and many other examples from civilian and military fields.”
As the authors, former government minister, Gideon Sa’ar, and experienced Israeli air force veteran, Ron Tira, point out: “Israel is exceptionally vulnerable to attack by precision weapons, as on the one hand it is an advanced Western country dependent on sophisticated technologies, and on the other it is small, with very concentrated infrastructures and very little redundancy.”
The effects of the accompanying civilian casualties, the disruption of vital services and socio-economic routine—and consequent corrosive impact on public morale of such an assault are difficult to overstate. Indeed, there are certainly liable to be far-reaching and irreversible ramifications for the future resilience of the county—which must be averted at all costs.
Degrading deterrence?
Moreover, if a surprise precision missile attack were launched at Israel’s major air bases, even if the aircraft were left unscathed, damage to runways and infrastructure could render them inoperative—thus crippling, or at least severely curtailing, Israeli ability to retaliate.
After all, the very perception of the feasibility of such a scenario on the part of the enemy could, in itself, erode Israeli deterrence, based as it is—at least in conventional contexts—largely on airpower. This might well prompt the enemy to launch such an attack, in the belief that, if successful, it could then proceed to bombard the country with relative—albeit temporary—impunity.
Indeed, the very concept of ongoing deterrence, as the term has been used in the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict, in which large-scale military clashes flare up regularly, typically after a tense interbellum of several years, should be critically examined. In the intervening period between fighting, Israeli sources attributed the relative calm to the effectiveness of Israeli “deterrence”.
However, Israel’s adversaries, whether Hamas or Hezbollah, have not been deterred in the sense that they have had their will to engage in combat broken. Quite the reverse. Not only have they emerged from each engagement still spoiling for a fight, but after a period, they have emerged with new and vastly enhanced capabilities to be employed in the next round of battle.
So rather than being deterred, both Hamas and Hezbollah have merely been forced to regroup, rearm and redeploy—ready to attack when the time appears opportune.
But for the grace of God?
Certainly, with regard to Hezbollah, claims that it has been deterred, rather than compelled to regroup, rearm and redeploy—seem, to be charitable, unpersuasive. After all, what adversary, if deterred, proceeds immediately to expand their offensive capabilities by over a thousand percent?!
Indeed, it is an open question as to whether Hezbollah—had it not been enmeshed in the Syrian civil war in 2014—would have joined Hamas during Operation Protective Edge in a coordinated bombardment of Israeli cities to overwhelm the defensive capabilities of the Iron Dome anti-missile system.
It is an equally open—and ominous—question as to whether it will do so in a fourth round of fighting in Gaza—something numerous pundits consider unavoidable.
Regarding the situation on the northern border, several pundits have advocated a process of limited strikes on specific targets to foil the Iranian buildup, and convey the message that Israel will not tolerate such developments—and will not finch from escalation to prevent them.
This, however, is a prescription that is very likely to fail, increasing dangers, rather than diminishing them. Indeed, given manifest Iranian resolve and proven difficulty in breaking Hezbollah’s will to fight, it is liable to lead not only to the hardening of targets— for example by converting them from surface to underground sites—but to familiarizing the enemy with Israel’s methods and capabilities.
So what then, should Israel do to confront the emerging strategic peril in the north?
Deterrence vs. preemption: the doctrinal clash
At the risk of sounding repetitive, I have been warning for years that successive Israeli governments have been backing away from confrontations in which Israel can prevail, thereby risking backing the country into a confrontation in which it may not—or only do so at exorbitant costs.
Such a situation may well be brewing on the northern border today—with Iran at the gates in Syria, with Hezbollah deploying in the Golan, with a massive arsenal in the Lebanon trained on much of the country, and with the possibility of a coordinated attack in the south from Gaza. And if Israel waits until Iran can spread an effective nuclear umbrella over its Judeocidal proxies….?
Simple common sense and survival-based logic would seem to mandate one course of strategic action to contend with these ominous developments: Massive preemption to destroy the enemies’ ability to attack, not deter them from doing so.
In this regard, it is important to gasp that there is a doctrinal clash between the ability to attain effective deterrence and to achieve successful preemption. After all, in order to deter adversaries, one needs to convince them that they will suffer unacceptable damage were they to attack. But to convey such a message, one needs to reveal one’s capabilities to wreak such devastation—for otherwise, how could one’s potential attacker be convinced not to attack?
By contrast, successful preemption typically calls for surprise to overwhelm the enemy with an unexpected assault—which requires concealing one’s capabilities so that the enemy cannot make preparations to thwart them.
The choice of which of these somewhat antithetical doctrines to adopt may soon be upon Israeli policy makers.
1967 triumph vs 1973 trauma
In weighing this strategic dilemma, Israel’s leadership will, in effect, have to decide whether they are willing to risk sacrificing Israeli lives to appease the deity of political correctness. For in the past, restraint has often proven ruinous.
So the choice is between incapacitating the enemy while you can; or continuing to deter the enemy—until you can’t!
In making this decision, it may well be instructive for today’s policymakers to look back at the nation’s history and compare the triumph preemption brought in 1967, to the trauma wrought by deterrence failure in 1973.
Seen in this light, the lesson seems unequivocal… Or is that just me?
Martin Sherman is the founder and executive director of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies
@ Bear Klein:
I meant to add to my post above the simple story of “the Russian officer of a crack rifle regiment, who when passing through a Jewish village noticed a series of target circles drawn on many walls. In the very centre of each was a single bullet hole. He was hugely interested and asked to meet the super marksman, whom he wanted for his regiment. He was directed to the local inn, and found that the marksman was the innkeeper’s idiot son. He spoke to the son asking how he had acquired such a wonderful accuracy.
The idiot said..”Well… FIRST I shoot the bullet, and THEN I draw the circle around it”………That’s exactly what Israel should do in this dangerous time.
Strike First! I worry much less about potential boycotts especially for attacking Hezbollah and Iran. I do not even think that is very likely. Right now the USA is firmly in Israel’s camp. I do not believe that a weapons freeze would happen for attacking the same enemies the Trump administration singles out.
FIRST STRIKE Iran and Hezbollah they are clearly trying to get ready to attack Israel and say it almost daily. Being to indecisive to take the appropriate action is what got so many soliders killed in the Yom Kippur War. Golda was told we were going to be attacked but failed to act. We do not need a repeat of that were in fact civilians will also die. Hit first hard fast and non stop until the enemies capabilities are demolished.
@ adamdalgliesh:
Yes Adam I know and agree with you; but a surprise attack on Israel where the sky would be blotted out by the immense number of rockets, would stop all that and moreover throw Israel into a panic. We are portrayed as sturdy fearless warriors, but we are just ordinary people who would immediately be rushing around at a loss like any other people, until the security and aid authorities, themselves badly battered, could establish some control, And all this whilst under massive fire. It would be heroic.
Of course the work to protect Israel’s “vitals” should happen, but so far the first bulldozer hasn’t even been switched on. Perhaps a fatalistic demon pervaded Israeli society which says that Our Creator performed numerous miracles for us in the past and up to this day, so something good will happen to protect us.
These things happen only one in a millennium, and we had ours already in 1967. We also had our Creator’s displeasure in 1993 Oslo still ongoing.
I think it would be far worse for Israel to be attacked by overwhelming masses of rockets whilst much of it’s energy is being expended on doing what should have been done 20-30 years ago already. We could expect nothing but chaos. But if we strike first, and destroy the enemy, we’ll have time to selectively protect and disperse the vital industries and dangerous chemical complexes as you have suggested..They should never be near any large population centres anyway, without massive protection against mishaps, It was very short sighted. The start-up nation wasn’t thinking when they planned their siting..
I see no alternative to pre-emption as Martin has advocated. We have been seamlessly successful in major wars any time we did so, and far less successful when we became “second-strikers”. This time the rules are not the same the weaponry is vastly more dangerous, and I am NOT optimistic that if we subject ourselves to a surprise first strike, that we can muster the where-with-all to effectively damage the enemy so as to cause his destruction. Crushing of the enemy MUST be complete this time. And NON nuclear (which would open a huge Pandors’s Box.)
As for the Hasbara,and Diplomatic Support from the International Community, that must come second. This process is long and convoluted, and perhaps slow of success;many are inherent Jew-haters. We must strike first, and WIN overwhelmingly, then look for the ‘green light”.
The only change should be that the enemy will be in the position that the “green lighters” expected Israel to be in, with vice versa, Success covers over many things, and I believe that an Israel, fresh from having CRUSHED it’s bitter homicidal enemy will find it comparatively easy to get retro-active acceptance of the facts on the ground.
@ adamdalgliesh:
You write:
At last!!!!
Precisely!!!
This is what I have been saying for years
See:
IF I WERE PRIME MINISTER…
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Into-The-Fray-If-I-were-prime-minister-330300
The first order of business would be to devise and deploy a political “Iron Dome” to protect Israel from the incoming barrages of delegitimization and demonization…
MY BILLION-DOLLAR BUDGET: IF I WERE PM (CONT.)
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Into-The-Fray-My-billion-dollar-budget-330947
Perhaps the most important lesson the pro-Zionist advocates of today should learn from the Palestinians is this: “If you will it, it is no fantasy.”
DERELICTION OF DUTY
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Into-The-Fray-Dereliction-of-duty-329723
Continued impotence and incompetence in the (mis)conduct of Israel’s public diplomacy is becoming not only strategic threat to the country but is beginning to imperil Jewish communities abroad.
INTELLECTUAL WARRIORS, NOT SLICKER DIPLOMATS
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Into-the-Fray-Intellectual-warriors-not-slicker-diplomats
Israel’s greatest strategic challenge, its gravest strategic failure, its grimmest strategic danger is the (mis)conduct of its public diplomacy.
@ Edgar G.: Edgar, thanks for pointing out these extremely troubling facts to me. I still think that Israel should move ahead with infrastructure-protecting projects even if they come too late to protect against a Hisbollah surprise attack.If Israel mananges to survive such an attack, there are sure to be others that follow.
I also still believe that the risks to Israel of a preemptive attack “out of the blue” would be considerable. Whether they would be greater than waiting things out until Hibollah and/or Iran and/or other pro-irina militias to attack is a question I cannot answer. The best option for Israel would be to commence a massive international public relations and diplomatic campaign to persuade the American and European publics, and hopefully at least the American government, that Israel has no choice but to strike first. If Israel can secure an informal “green light” for such an attack, and can persuade West European governments to confine their response to a Israeli preemptive strike mainly to angry noises, it would be with it for Israel to strike. However, Israel has neglected public relations and diplomacy even more than it has neglected infrastructure protection, and there are absolutely no signs that the present government intends to change this.
I cannot write about this in full as I would wish AT THIS MOMENT but to do nothing in the face of the threat of Iran/Hamas/Hezbollah is not possible.
Yet done as a partial action as Bibi will probably do will at best just be kicking the can further down the road.
I will introduce here a new concept and call it “The Young Socialists” (my movement) and will propose a perspective.
@ adamdalgliesh:
My observations were not concerned about whether the enemy had nuclear weapons or not. they were based in non nuclear attacks. Your suggestions are very true except that they should already have been done years ago, but the long-time:”manana” attitude of the Israelis kicked in first. It would take YEARS, even with a crash programme and they are still today building facilities which are open to attack.
In previous scares, they build and converted many air raid shelters, and they were all supposed to be weekly inspected and kept stocked with the appropriate items including medical supplies and provisions, After a few years when the next scare came along they were inspected, so as to be ready for use, and were full of dust and rubbish, never kept in trim. This is the Israeli psyche.
We are today discussing a huge conflict which seems imminent, and my comments were based on that.
When I lived in Israel, EVERY single house or apartment block built had a “Miklat” a specially hardened and heavily reinforced room of an appropriate size complete with toilet, heat and water supply. It had a very heavy steel door. That was the proper way to do it, but of course, with no immediate need to use them they, lacked upkeep and inspection, became storage dumps like attics in old houses. If an emergency had erupted, there would have been no facilities working.
Israelis are the new “Mexicans”…all iterating Kol BeSeder.
@ Edgar G.:Edgar, these are very astute observations. Israel is between a rock and a hard place. If Israel attempts a first strike against its enemies, it will face international isolation; but if it allows its enemies to strike first, it may face total annihilation. The best that Israel can do is to improve its intelligence capabilities to the point where it can determine whether its enemies possess nuclear weapons, and whether they are preparing to use them, and then decide if a first strike on the weapons, command and control centers, etc. are essential. In order to cope with non-nuclear weapons, however, a better approach might be to move as much of Israel’s industrial, communications, military and water infrastructure underground as much as possible, in extremely case-hardened bunkers. That would enable Israel to survive a first strike with conventional and chemical warheads. Gas masks to the entire population, of course, much improved bomb shelters throughout the country. Heavy training for firemen. Perhaps antidote medication and masks could be distributed in advance to lessen the damage from a biological attack. With a thorough defensive-war program, Israel could probably survive a large-scale rocket attack such as Dr. Sherman describes, and then hit back hard with an offensive second strike.
@ adamdalgliesh:
Israel is making it clear even today what a threat Hezbollah and Iran. Bibi is doing this today in D.C. A group of friendly Senators visited Israel recently and came to realize the threat and internalized the threat and likelihood of war. So your assumptions may have some serious flaws in them.
Defensive Wars is a way to loose the wars.
@ ms: Dr. Sherman, while you have written some very perceptive columns in the past, you have more recently published numerous columns that assume that Israel can take action against Israel’s enemies without having to take into account the likelihood, or at least the possibility, of states that are not now in a state of war with Israel may side with these enemies and take reprisals against Israel. As I have explained many times, any attempt by Israel to remove the Palestinians west of the Jordan and the Arava to some other country would lead to indignant accusations of “ethnic cleansing,” and harsh reprisals against Israel by the EU, the United States, Russia, and of course the entire League of Arab states. If Israel takes military action against Hizbollah without some obvious and serious attack on Israel beforehand by Hizbollah, Russia would of course feel very threatened. So, for that matter, would the EU states, which depend heavily on Iran for their oil supplies and whose businesses are frenziedly competing for contracts with Iran, would feel threatened as well. They might well respond with both an arms embargo against Israel and crippling economic sanctions against her.Russia would certainly respond by arming Iran and Hizbollah to the teeth, and might well take direct military action against Israel, the United States, eager to avoid military involvement and to avoid offending its European allies or a fortiori, to avoid war with Russia would most likely stand aside, leaving Israel on its own. The Americans, under pressure from their own State Department bureaucrats, might also at least for the time suspend all arms shipments to Israel in the belief that this would cool things off and avoid a wider war. It is irresponsible to suggest preemptive military action by Israel without at least serious considering and discussing these very real possibilities. At the root of the problem, of course, is that the Islamic bloc has been successful in painting Israel as the aggressor and damaging its reputation throughout the world. And with an Israeli government oblivious to public relations, there is no way to change this tragic reality in the short term. As a result, Israel has no choice but to avoid doing anything which is likely to reinforce its public perception that it is an aggressor, no matter how unfair this allegation is, and no matter how righteous her cause is in fact. These are the reasons why Israel cannot initiate military action, even against the likes of Hizbollah, without facing an international isolation that would have even direr consequences than a Hibollah-Iranian attack. The only viable option is for Israel to install protective shields over its vital infrastructure, possibly by moving much of it underground to heavily reinforced bunkers, greatly expanding public bomb shelters, etc., in order to survive a first strike, and maintain the capability for a second strike.
@ Bear Klein:
My response….. ANYTHING…ANY ACTION, “properly executed” when not precisely expected, is almost certain to succeed. It requires no great intellectual capabilities to realise this. The chances of Israel “winning” the war are much increased by a preemptive precision attack. Just yesterday, on this page, 2-3 posts above this one, I posted that if Iran got even a few non-nuclear ballistic missiles through the Israeli defences–as they would be bound to do– they could devastate most of Israel, and not even need to be precision guided; overwhelming all security and aid groups. AND..which I neglected to add, it would obviously greatly hamper Israel’s non-nuclear retaliatory powers………
Others have written almost the same things, because they jump up and grab us by the throat, they are so obvious.
So no great revelation is required to see that the focus of this article is correct. Israel MUST pre-empt…..and on more than one front.
@ Bear Klein:
Precisely
An offensive war properly executed is most likely to succeed than a defensive war done on the enemies terms.
In the first couple hours of battle Israel would be able to destroy much of the enemies potential offensive capabilities. Knocking out their command and control would leave the enemy knocked off balance finding difficulty to regroup itself to retaliate.
If you know war is inevitable why would wait until the enemy is prepared to attack you and attack you massively on their terms.
@ adamdalgliesh:
You write:
I beg to differ – strongly. I am keenly aware of the “diplomatic and public relations contexts”
See:
IF I WERE PRIME MINISTER…
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Into-The-Fray-If-I-were-prime-minister-330300
The first order of business would be to devise and deploy a political “Iron Dome” to protect Israel from the incoming barrages of delegitimization and demonization…
MY BILLION-DOLLAR BUDGET: IF I WERE PM (CONT.)
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Into-The-Fray-My-billion-dollar-budget-330947
Perhaps the most important lesson the pro-Zionist advocates of today should learn from the Palestinians is this: “If you will it, it is no fantasy.”
DERELICTION OF DUTY
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Into-The-Fray-Dereliction-of-duty-329723
Continued impotence and incompetence in the (mis)conduct of Israel’s public diplomacy is becoming not only strategic threat to the country but is beginning to imperil Jewish communities abroad.
INTELLECTUAL WARRIORS, NOT SLICKER DIPLOMATS
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Into-the-Fray-Intellectual-warriors-not-slicker-diplomats
Israel’s greatest strategic challenge, its gravest strategic failure, its grimmest strategic danger is the (mis)conduct of its public diplomacy.
@ adamdalgliesh:
One point that looms LARGE in your post is that the weaponry and technical assets then were very primitive by comparison with today’s,….also each of the countries mentioned had large “buffer” spaces etc. Whereas, if Iran gets off a few “loaded” ballistics, non-nuclear, that get through the defensive screens, much or most of Israel could be destroyed in moments overwhelming all security and aid groups.. They wouldn’t even need to be guided precisions.
Just this morning Ted published an article which says that Iran is already right on the verge, from within, that more sanctions, particularly bank cut-offs, combined with the Arabs lowering the oil price with destroy the whole Iranian fabric speedily, within months. Completely cut the country off from the world. Stop all flights in or out, etc. I’m sure you’ve all read it, the last of the Daily Digest.
Dr. Sherman’s quotations, when we go back to the original sources and the historical events linked to the, do not make a good case for preemptive strikes. Thucydides did not propose himself that Athens should strike Sparta first instead of waiting for Sparta to gather strength-Thucydides was a “dove”-but rather was quoting the opinion of Athenian Statesman Pericles, which Pericles used to persuade his fellow Athenians to declare war on Sparta. Athens ended up losing its preemptive war, which raged on and off for 28 years; it lost at least one third of its territory and all of its empire. Athens never recovered from the Peloponnesian war, and later in the fourth century B.C.E. it lost its independence to Macedonia. As for Bismarck’s advocacy of a preemptive strike against Germany’s enemies, Germany followed his advice in both World Wars I and II. The result: Germany lost millions of people and much of its territory, along with its international standing and reputation. It has never regained its great power status. And there are other examples of the failure of a preemptive military strike. George W. Bush attempted a preemptive war against Iraq in 2003. The result has been to enable Iran to establish the “Shiite Crescent that concerns Dr. Sherman.
Dr. Sherman’s repeated error in analyzing Israel’s admittedly grave strategic predicament is to ignore the diplomatic and public relations contexts of war. France pushed purely defensive strategies in both World Wars I and II, and saw part of its territory occupied in the first world war, and all of it occupied in the second. Yet it ended up on the winning side of both wars. Unlike Germany, it regained its great power status, and even regained Alsace-Lorraine. The reason was that French politicians and military men skillfully enlisted the sympathy of public opinion in Britain and the United States, which bailed France out in both wars. Russia allowed Germany to attack it in World War II. While the initial military consequences were devastating, Russia ended up not only on the winning side of World War II, but as the world second superpower, in possession of a vast empire. Once again, Russia succeeded by playing the victim card and persuading Britain and the United States to bail them out.
Israel now faces a similar predicament to that of France and Russia in earlier wars. The sort of preemptive strike that Dr. Sherman now recommends would probably result in Russian intervention on the Iranian Hizbollah side, with our Western “friends” looking on as malevolent neutrals. This is why Netanyahu, rightly or wrongly, has preferred appealing to American and even British and French public opinion for help in dealing with Israel’s formidable enemies to going it alone with a preemptive strike.
We have no other choice but preemptive action this year. The sooner the better. Not only should we destroy all their missiles but we should also go after Iran big time and deal a very heavy blow to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), the MUllahs and the atomic installations.
The goal must be victory rather than ceasefire.
In addition we should support the minorities in Iran to fight in a very tangeble way. Words alone are not enought.
@ sabashimon:
Well, that’s the impression they want to send out… On the other hand it’s never a good idea to underestimate the enemy.
One vital aspect unremarked upon by Mr. Sherman is the enormous benefit to Hezbollah fighters that combat experience brings. The next war will be, like all war, brutal. And while I do not worry about the bravey, motivation, and professionalism found within our troops, I do think that years of intense war in Syria has brought to Hezbollah a generation of battle-hardened vets that can give it a decided advantage in certain scenarios.
Absolutely correct in all items. Israel has far too many vulnerabilities, and Hezbollah could shoot off successive waves of 1-200 rockets all day and night. As for the aerodrome runways, If israel doesn’t have vast piles of material handy to fix the runways within minutes, depending on how fast their bulldozers are.. I would be shocked.
I have often mentioned a military movement that I feel would be a good way to curtail and likely utterly destroy all the emplacements situated between the Litani and the Border. The distance from Northern Israel to the Sea is about 35 K. The IDF could assemble in the night around Kiryat Shemona, and cut right across, below the Litani, to the the sea, swinging around the little spur of the river which turns south. They must know the positions of almost all the rocket emplacements, and whether they are as strongly defended at their rear as they are in the front, pointing at Israel. They could then detach several columns south, and attack the rear, which should be a decided advantage…assuming they are stronger frontally.
A co-ordinated precision saturation bombardment of the area from say a kilometre from the expected IDF line below the Litani, just before the IDF moves from Kiryat Shemona, would be bound to leave the emplacements in a state of disarray and distraction, if not completely out of action. So they would get a double wallop. Although the IDF would have the problem of navigating through wreckage which might hamper it’s movement…… They’d have to work that out.
The alternative is…. A complete aerial destruction, which would also kill many civilians.
Whatever it may turn out to be, Martin is correct; it HAS to be pre-emptive. In the last 2 MAJOR wars, the 1967 pre-emption was successful beyond any expectation, and the 1973 War, where they waited too long, and were in dire straits for a few days, until they put their head together.