FaJaJ INTELLIGENCE September 16, 2024
1. Summary: On September 15, 2024, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) entered the Balata Refugee Camp near Nablus, a hotspot for militant activity. Around 1,000 militants, mainly armed with assault rifles and skilled in using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), were reported to be active there. The move into Balata marked an escalation in Israeli operations following Hamas’s attacks on southern Israel in October 2023, which killed over Israeli 1,200 civilians. Previously, the IDF had focused on other conflict zones like the Jenin and Tulkarm camps. During the Balata clash, Palestinian militants fired on IDF forces and detonated an IED, damaging a bulldozer. The confrontation lasted into the night with no reported casualties. On September 16, the Al-Quds Brigades, affiliated with Islamic Jihad, claimed responsibility for the battle, though their claims of Israeli casualties were dismissed by Palestinian sources. The Balata camp is also a site of external influence, with Jordanian intelligence reportedly using militants there for political leverage against Israel. Several influential figures in Nablus have ties to the Jordanian government.
Troublesome Balata
2. On the evening of September 15, 2024, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) moved into the Balata Refugee Camp, located southeast of Nablus. Known as one of the top three hotspots in the West Bank, the camp has a long history of clashes between Palestinian militants and the IDF. According to an Israeli military source, around 1,000 militants are active in Balata, mostly armed with assault rifles and skilled in setting up improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Increased Israeli Operations Following Hamas Attacks
3. Since Hamas’s deadly attacks on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, which killed over 1,200 civilians, Israel has intensified its operations against Palestinian militants in the West Bank. The entry into Balata marks an escalation, as the IDF had previously concentrated its efforts on other conflict zones like the Jenin and Tulkarm refugee camps.
The Clash in Balata
4. On the night of September 15, 2024, IDF forces entered Balata, led by D9 bulldozers. Palestinian militants opened fire on Israeli troops near the Market axis and around Abu Wardeh Pharmacy on Tebnine Road. During the engagement, militants detonated an IED under one of the bulldozers, damaging it. The skirmish stretched into the night, with no reported casualties on either side.
Al-Quds Brigades Claims Responsibility
5. On September 16, 2024, the Al-Quds Brigades issued a statement claiming their “Nablus Battalion, Balata Group” was responsible for the clashes with Israeli forces. They boasted about intense confrontations with Israeli troops the night before.
Eyewitness Claims and Israeli Response
6. Al-Quds Brigades further alleged that eyewitnesses saw Israeli ambulances evacuating wounded soldiers from the area and claimed to hear their screams. However, Palestinian sources in Nablus, as well as officials from the Palestinian Authority, have dismissed these assertions.
The Role of External Forces
7. Comment: The Al-Quds Brigades, also known as Saraya Al-Quds, is associated with the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a militant organization committed to the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel. Founded in the late 1980s, the Brigades are based primarily in the Gaza Strip and have been involved in numerous attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets, including rocket fire and armed assaults. They are considered a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, and the European Union. The group maintains close ties with Iran, receiving financial and logistical support to continue its operations. The Balata Refugee Camp is also known for Jordanian intelligence operations, as militants there have historically been used as leverage against Israel in political negotiations. Several Nablus elders, who are linked to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, hold significant positions in the Jordanian government.
So none of our “Peace Partners” is a real partner. Egypt continues to lie about their support of Hamas, allowing, if not encouraging, the smuggling of everything Hamas wants into the Gaza Strip. The Jordanians promote getting everything the militants in Judea and Samaria want into those territories. The Lebanese continue to support all efforts of Hezbollah to get whatever they want to provoke Israel and the Syrians were never, ever, close to being a peace partner.
Only Abraham Accord signees and aspirants are even slightly friendly but essentially non-active.