How Does the Israeli Right Continue to Strengthen Following October 7?

Peloni

Shlomo Fiber, the co-owner of Direct Polls and former Director-General of the Ministry of Communications, gave the following response when challenged by @LittleMoiz with the question of how it might be possible for the Israeli Right to continue to strengthen in the year following October 7:

Here is my response to him and to others who are interested in what has been happening to the right and to opposition voters over the past year:

1. October 7 was a national trauma for the entire nation—both coalition and opposition alike.
2. Opposition voters, most of whom had already been engaged in an aggressive year-long protest and struggle against the government, saw this event as the final nail in the coffin of the Netanyahu government.
3. However, about half of the opposition voters agreed that under these circumstances—of an existential war—they needed to “get under the stretcher” (a Hebrew idiom for joining collective efforts), fight, and win, and only afterward return to investigation and drawing lessons. This was the narrative that supported Gantz and Eisenkot’s decision to join the government.
4. This “unity”—and the question of when it counts as “victory”—was challenged in the first half of 2024 by the protest movement (who returned to the streets on January 15 with the slogan “the war is over”), by the U.S. administration, and by quite a few commentators and “expert generals” in the media who pushed for a ceasefire and a move toward an agreement.
5. This debate—what is preferable, victory or a ceasefire and the release of the hostages—turned from a crack among the war cabinet members into a full-blown rift that led to Gantz’s departure on July 7.
6. From that point on, two parallel narratives developed in Israel. The opposition counted, every day, how many days the hostages remained in Gaza as proof of failure. The right counted, every day, how many enemy forces were destroyed as proof of victory.
7. Right-wing voters believed from the very beginning in the slogan “total victory,” mobilized (both literally and figuratively), agreed to pay heavy prices in blood and money, and bit their tongues in order to remove, once and for all, the existential threat surrounding us.
8. This right-wing narrative was shared by not a few opposition right-wing voters, who had never voted for Netanyahu or Likud but believed in the security strategy Netanyahu presented, aimed at pursuing victory and defeating the enemies (including Hezbollah and Iran).
9. That segment of right-wingers in the opposition—whom I referred to as “the right-wing flank of the National Unity camp”—reached the opposite conclusion from what Gantz and Eisenkot’s advisers had predicted when they decided to withdraw. Instead of causing Likud voters to defect in their wake, they abandoned support for the National Unity camp, which began to collapse, in what they saw as “quitting in the middle of the war.”
10. Those 6-8 mandates from the opposition, who in all the polls I present support the government’s moves (even if not its specific members), also looked for a new political home. Their two options were Liberman or Bennett, who were perceived by them as security activists. A certain portion of them had already decided to return to Likud in the summer, along with Sa’ar.
11. Starting from July 2024, Israel, led by the cabinet, experienced a series of stunning military successes—from the elimination of [senior Hamas leaders] Deif, Haniyeh, and Shoukair, to operations in Rafah and southern Lebanon, a successful strike in Iran, and the collapse of the Syrian regime.
12. All these actions restored Israelis’ confidence in themselves and in our ability to defend ourselves successfully. The sense of national security is returning (and this is currently the most dramatic factor in every political decision of every voter). Also, the security-political horizon with Trump, who is perceived as pro-Israel and an ally of the right-wing government, strengthens the “total victory” narrative.
13. Netanyahu (despite all the criticism of him and his government) is credited with leading these military successes. As they said: “You’re the head, you…” And all these moves began to bear political fruits this week.
14. Both for me and for others, Likud has gained 3 mandates this week, coming from those security-oriented opposition supporters who were convinced by the policies, which are important to them, and who see no point in Bennett or Liberman. For the first time, there is a significant shift of voters from the opposition back to the coalition. At the beginning of the term, we saw 4-5 mandates from Likud moving to Gantz—those have returned. But also new voters who had never voted for coalition parties before.
15. The most interesting indicator of this phenomenon, which could continue, is the suitability figures for the prime minister. For the first time, Netanyahu crossed the 50% mark yesterday, reaching 52%-53%. This indicates that 3-4 more mandates of opposition voters currently believe he is the most suitable to serve as prime minister.
16. Of course, what goes up can also come down, and it is clear that after the battles subside, internal social issues may emerge to reshape the balance of power (conscription, the status of the Supreme Court, the economy, and other issues).

To your question, @LittleMoiz, this past year, this has been the right-wing narrative (which is completely silenced by Channels 11/12/13), which is why even someone like you barely knows about it.