Egypt’s relationship with Hamas: What does history tell us? – analysis

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1. It was a slippery slope and Kahane warned about it even before Eidelberg. The first deadly mistake was to agree to Resolution 242 in the first place. Nobody gives a damn whether it said “territory” or “territories” to be withdrawn from. It’s like the Geneva Accords, passed after the Shoah was over in response to it, much like closing the barn doors after the horses have already fled and after the world did next to nothing to stop it when it was going on but just a legal weapon to be used fraudulently against Israel to facilitate another Shoah. all these well-meaning international treaties and institutions need to go. – SZ

   Israel, US and the Stinking Fish – 1976

   “KAHANE” MAGAZINE September 1976

   Israel, US and the Stinking Fish
   Rabbi Meir Kahane

   Many times I have spoken of the Talmudic parable of the king, his servant, and the fish. Never was it more apt. [Events of today between Bibi and Obama.]

   Once there was a king who sent his servant to buy a fish. The servant returned with a fish that stank. In fury the king gave the servant a choice of three punishments: “Eat the fish, get whipped for the fish, or pay for the fish.” In common with most people, the servant chose not to reach into his pocket and he decided to eat the stinking fish but after two bites the stench made him give up and he decided to get whipped for it. The pain of the lashes, however, made him stop that, too, and he cried out, “I will pay for the fish!”

   And so the fool ate the fish, got whipped for the fish and, in the end, had to pay for it, anyhow. Those in Israel and without, who refuse to understand that nothing will deter America from demanding that Israel make the maximum concessions, play the same fool. Those who do not understand that there is nothing that Israel can possible do, that there are no compromises it can make, that there is nothing short of full retreat to the 1967 borders that will satisfy the United States-are the same fools as the servant who ate, got whipped and in the end had to pay anyhow,

   Their refusal to make the difficult choice of telling the Americans “no”, now, at this moment, will see them making the retreats they hope will avert American anger; it will see this effort fail even as the frontier moves from its present lines within the Arab heartland to new ones close to the Jewish cities; and most important, the Americans will make the same demands they always have envisioned since the days of the Roger Plan-total Israeli withdrawal. And since this is a thing that not even the most dovish of Israelis will agree to, the result will be an ultimate Israeli firm “no”, an ultimate American anger of the kind all men of “new initiative” propose to avert today by compromise, and exactly the same conditions of confrontation that would come anyhow if the Israelis said their “no” today. There would be one great difference, however, a “no” today will bring the crisis while Israel stands poised near the Arab capitols. A “no” tomorrow, after all the hapless and confused compromises and “initiatives,” will bring the same crisis near Tel Aviv, Beersheva and Netanya.

   This is what happens when foolish and confused Israelis, by refusing to pay the price of saying “no” to the stinking fish of pressure, attempt to eat it, submit to getting beaten over it and then learn to their dismay that there is no escape from the difficult decision that they should have made in the first place.

   Let the Israeli government, its men of “new initiative” and the Jewish leaders in America understand several basic axioms:

   1) America is committed to the Roger Plan and the world’s interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242, i.e. Israeli withdrawal from all (but insignificant) parts of the lands of 1967. This includes the Golan Heights, Gaza, the entire West bank and the entire Sinai as well as changing Jerusalem’s present Jewish sovereignty status.

   2) American interests lie, in the minds of most officials in Washington, with Arab oil, the huge potential Arab market and with supplanting Soviet influence with American. This means, at best, an “even-handed” policy rather than a pro-Israeli one.

   3) America is moving steadily to recognition of the “Palestinians” as a people and of whomever they decide to have as their leaders. Those leaders are clearly the PLO and already the move to “moderate” the PLO, “public-relations-wise” is underway so that Washington can more easily pressure Israel into recognizing them.

   4) The Ford-Kissinger administration is determined to prevent stagnation and will pressure Israel into concession after concession.

   5) No administration will got o war for Israel and no administration will continue the present aid level no matter what Israel does or concedes. The frantic search for human allies will end as unsuccessfully as those Jews in the past who forgot what faith in the Jewish G-d was and who turned to Egypt or Assyria or other “allies” for help, only to learn to their dismay that the allies betrayed them.

   Stinking fish are not made to be eaten or to get whipped or. One must have the courage to look at the truth and pay the bitter price of honesty. America is tired of the Israeli nuisance and wishes it would ea t the fish already. The time to loudly proclaim “no” is now.
   Israel, US and the Stinking Fish – 1976

   “KAHANE” MAGAZINE September 1976

   https://barbaraginsberg-kahane.blogspot.com/2012/12/israel-us-and-stinking-fish-1976.html

2. OSLO-SHMOSLO-

   Israel and Jews generally have never seemed to get it firmly fixed in their heads that there can Be NO real peace with Arabs. They hate us viscerally.

   Israelis have consistently fooled themselves into thinking “now is the time”.

   The crowning foul-up was Oslo, bringing thousands of malignant terrorists and their abominable leader back from positive obscurity into the centre of holy Eretz Yisrael. Even giving them weapons and every aid to become self supporting.

   The doers of this can only have been deranged , utterly crazy.

   And we have suffered ever since.

   I was disappointed that Begin succumbed to Sadat’s flattery and fake sincerity. But even that monstrous error pales in comparison to OSLO.Israel has always gone to the brink-and over, in search of true peace, often fallen to fake simulacra.

   And since then we have proceeded from Very Bad to massively worse.
   And we have allowed the International Community to stick it’s collective nose into our Internal affairs .Israel a So called Sovereign nation, with top quality offensive and defensive military might.

   And so called cast iron allies, who dictate to us what we can and can not do

   We seem never to have progressed from being the bent shouldered Jew, dependent on succour from others…..and always at a heavy price.

   We CAN do better have proven we can, but why don’t we??????

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3. What does it tell us? It tells us that Eidelberg was right, after all.

   Here he was merely pursuing the first objective of the Nazi “peace
   offensive”: to shift the responsibility for war onto the enemy. Despite the
   fact that Egypt precipitated five wars against Israel in twenty-five years,
   Sadat went on to denigrate the Jewish state by declaring: “I tell you, you
   .have to give up once and for all the dreams of conquest and give up the
   belief that force is the best method of dealing with Arabs.”

   “In his Knesset speech and on countless other occasions, Sadat
   declared that the right of the “Palestinian people” to self-determination is
   the “crux of the entire problem,” even of the entire Middle East problem
   (Hitler said that the rights of the Sudeten Germans to self-determination
   is the “core of the problem,” of the entire European problem!). What we
   see here is the application of a simple idea to many problems of
   enormous complexity and gravity. “The receptivity of the great masses,”
   writes Hitler in Mein Kampf, “is very limited, their intelligence small, but
   their power of forgetting is enormous. In consequence of these facts, all
   effective propaganda must be limited to a very few points and harp on
   these in slogans.”9 Actually, the Arab-Israeli conflict is enormously
   complicated by issues of religion, social structure and the Arab attempt
   to reassert greatness as against the Western technological world. From a
   religious point of view, the mere existence of a Jewish state in the Land of
   Israel places in question Muhammed’s prophecy and challenges the
   validity of the Islamic religion. Moslems take this seriously no matter
   what the rest of the world may think…”Major-General George Keegan, former head of the U.S. Air Force Intelligence, has said
   that a “profound change in Arab strategy is now underway… It is not understood in the U.S.

   “I have seen intelligence which very few Americans have access to, that persuades me that
   the first element of that strategy is that the feudal leadership in the Arab world strikingly
   remain committed, Messianically, to the extermination of Israel as a nation and as a people.
   What has changed about that Messianic determination … is the apparent Arab realization
   that after four futile wars, the direct [i.e., military] approach now appears to be one of such
   high risk that they are beginning to use the strategy of the indirect approach [namely,
   diplomatic duplicity].”
   (Jerusalem Post Magazine, August 5, 1977, p. 5 et seq.)

   “…Sadat has made it clear to his “internal”
   audience, i.e., those who read Arabic, that he is engaged in what is for the
   Arabs a new strategy to win the traditional Arab goal of Israel’s
   destruction. In a section of his memoirs published in October on
   September 11, 1977, two months before the peace initiative, Sadat wrote:

   “Al Qaddafi has chosen to make the same terrible mistake
   that Arabs committed several years ago when they rejected
   everything and anything—when the Arabs turned the word `no’
   into an idol which they worshipped, burned incense around,
   and in the process, burned all their bridges and were halted …
   all this because the Arabs pinned the fate of the Arab nation
   and three of its generations to the word ‘no.’ In the field of
   politics, just as in the field of sports, the best player is not the
   one who kicks the ball out of the playground every time he gets
   it. This is escapism; he prefers to escape from the situation
   rather than take the ball, maneuver it through his opponents
   and then score a goal.”11

   Notice Sadat makes no objection to Qaddafi’s goal, repeatedly trumpeted as the annihilation of Israel, but to the methods by which the goal
   has been pursued. On the contrary, in the same passage Sadat goes on to
   say that he tries to avoid getting involved in minor and peripheral battles
   precisely because the coming war with the Jews should be the only thing
   that preoccupies him, and he is unwilling to become distracted “from this
   confrontation which will be much more violent than the October War.”12
   There were other hints shortly before Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem that he
   was planning a new strategy. On September 3, 1977 Foreign Minister
   Fahmi (whose later resignation suggests that even he was not aware of
   the dramatic form the strategy would assume) argued against another
   Arab summit meeting. ..”The world is opposed to Israel’s actions in the territory—our main aim must be to exploit intelligently this international
   attitude. We must differentiate between the possible and the
   impossible; we must address the world in its own language and
   go with it as far as we can go… We must besiege Israel and
   isolate it internationally … It is absolutely not in our interest to
   allow Israel to escape from this impasse. We could raise issues
   which we know, without even thinking about it, that the world
   atmosphere is not prepared for—issues which would provide
   Israel with new arguments to convince sections of world public
   opinion that throughout the history of the conflict the Arabs
   have thought only about the destruction and elimination of
   Israel … Briefly it is not right…to allow Israel to escape the grip ..of world society by raising ideas which would make the world
   forget Israeli extremism by pointing to what it might imagine to
   be Arab extremism …We must not take steps unless we are
   sure they bring us closer to our goal.13”

   “That the goal had not changed, merely the desirable method of achieving
   it, was emphasized by Sadat once again in September 1977, only weeks
   before his visit to Jerusalem.

   “The October War was only the spark that set off the conflict—a
   conflict that is as old as the Arab nation. This conflict started
   when we fought against the Tatars, and later, the Crusaders, in
   defense of our rights, land and honor. Today we are fighting
   against Zionism in defense of our land and values … Now after
   the October War we should never look back. In fact this
   struggle is not just a military conflict; it is a military, economic
   and political conflict. They are all links in the same chain.
   Therefore we must prepare ourselves for a prolonged conflict
   and all its relevant aspects.”14

   The next stage in that conflict, for Sadat, was the Jerusalem “peace
   initiative.” In his Knesset speech he laid down the peace terms—
   unacceptable to both of Israel’s major parties—from which he has never
   since deviated: that Israel return to the borders of 1949 and set up a
   Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem).
   Upon returning home, he said in an interview for October Magazine,

   “We must take what we can get as a means for taking all that we want.”15

   “Those who had followed Sadat’s earlier remarks prior to his trip could scarcely
   be in doubt as to what he meant by “all that we want.”

   “Without in any way abandoning his long range goal, Sadat was able to
   count major accomplishments from his trip to Jerusalem. Indeed Sadat
   has managed to win the world’s accolades as a great peace-maker
   without once using the word “peace” on his trip. He used in his speech
   over and over again the word “salaam” which was translated as “peace”
   but which means nothing more than non-belligerence. Salaam was
   Sadat’s code message to the Arab world that he would never make Sulh,
   that is, real peace, with Israel. Nonetheless Sadat was able to disarm and
   divide Israel and neutralize the United States—remarkable accomplishments indeed…

   “…I was in our village for the summer vacation when Hitler marched forth
   from Munich to Berlin, to wipe out the consequences of Germany’s
   defeat in World War I and rebuild his country. I gathered my friends
   and told them we ought to follow Hitler’s example…
   Anwar el-Sadat
   Autobiography (1978)(1)
   Chapter 1:
   THE MODEL FOR CONQUEST
   The preponderance of evidence indicates that Anwar el-Sadat, the
   President of Egypt, is engaged in a plan to destroy the state of Israel, and
   that he has patterned his method after the Nazi model of conquest. The
   model is a war-and-peace strategy synchronized to facilitate the eventual
   destruction of the enemy. It is suitable for use by dictators against
   democracies, that is, against regimes based on the primacy of public
   opinion—what Hitler called “the mightiest factor of our time.” Sadat, who
   taught himself German while imprisoned by the British during World War
   II for his pro-Nazi activities, has studied Hitler’s diplomatic tactics and
   methods of psychological warfare. He is applying them with cunning and
   effectiveness in his war against Israel.
   The strategy has three interrelated objectives, the achievement of
   which depends very largely on the oratorical ability of the dictator to:
   1) Shift the responsibility for war onto the enemy (while posing as the
   apostle of peace).
   2) Divide and demoralize the enemy (by courting opposition party
   leaders and peace movements in the enemy’s country).
   3) Alienate the enemy from his friends or allies (by raising the
   spectre of war and economic catastrophe).
   These three objectives may be pursued simultaneously by means of
   semantic subversion, and most effectively by using the language of
   democracy against democracy…”

   “Sadat’s Strategy” (1979) by Paul Eidelberg

   https://www.amazon.com/Sadats-strategy-History-making-Eidelberg/dp/0969000103

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4. @dreuveni Don’t you think the Oslo (really beginning with the withdrawal from Sinai – witness Sisi’s treachery – and allowing the Americans to make Israel so dependent militarily) mentality of the Deep State left establishment and the lapses of the top brass in the military despite all the warnings from the observers on the scene that led to Oct. 7th fell under the fourth category of “what we do not like to know?”

5. @Sebastian: this question of known unknowns and unknown knowns is polical double speak. If I don’t want to say something, it is certainly a known. Any other result is Orwellian.

6. There are unknown unknowns

   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_are_unknown_unknowns

   “Rumsfeld’s statement brought attention to the concepts of known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns, but national security and intelligence professionals have long used an analysis technique referred to as the Johari window. The idea of unknown unknowns was created in 1955 by two American psychologists, Joseph Luft and Harrington Ingham in their development of the Johari window. They used it as a technique to help people better understand their relationship with themselves as well as others.
   The term was also commonly used inside NASA…The terms “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” are often used in project management and strategic planning[8] circles.
   Contemporary usage is largely consistent with the earliest known usages. For example, the term was used in evidence given to the British Columbia Royal Commission of Inquiry into Uranium Mining in 1979:
   Site conditions always pose unknowns, or uncertainties, which may become known during construction or operation to the detriment of the facility and possibly lead to damage of the environment or endanger public health and safety. The risk posed by unknowns is somewhat dependent on the nature of the unknown relative to past experience. This has led me to classify unknowns into one of the following two types: 1. known unknowns (expected or foreseeable conditions), which can be reasonably anticipated but not quantified based on past experience as exemplified by case histories (in Appendix A) and 2. Unknown unknowns (unexpected or unforeseeable conditions), which pose a potentially greater risk simply because they cannot be anticipated based on past experience or investigation. Known unknowns result from recognized but poorly understood phenomena. On the other hand, unknown unknowns are phenomena which cannot be expected because there has been no prior experience or theoretical basis for expecting the phenomena.[9]…Psychoanalytic philosopher Slavoj Žižek says that beyond these three categories there is a fourth, the unknown known, that which one intentionally refuses to acknowledge that one knows: “If Rumsfeld thinks that the main dangers in the confrontation with Iraq were the ‘unknown unknowns’, that is, the threats from Saddam whose nature we cannot even suspect, then the Abu Ghraib scandal shows that the main dangers lie in the “unknown knowns”—the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about, even though they form the background of our public values.”…German sociologists Christopher Daase and Oliver Kessler agreed that the cognitive frame for political practice may be determined by the relationship between “what we know, what we do not know, what we cannot know”, but stated that Rumsfeld left out “what we do not like to know”.[14]
   The event has been used in multiple books to discuss risk assessment.[3][15]…”

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