Don’t Let Turkey Defect to Russia

NATO’s objective should be to outlast Erdogan and his provocative behavior.

By Walter Russell Mead, WSJ

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, July 10. Photo: Associated Press

Today’s crisis with Turkey over Russian weapons could be as consequential. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to import the S-400 antiaircraft system, designed to shoot down the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s airplanes, is a fundamental challenge to the West. Mr. Erdogan’s move to drill for natural gas in Cyprus’s waters has also driven a wedge between Turkey and its erstwhile allies, with the European Union now looking to cut funding to Turkey.

Ankara is likely to lose access to the coveted American-made F-35 aircraft which, like the British ships in 1914, have been paid for but not delivered. The Trump administration is also required by law to impose economic sanctions on Turkey in response to its Russian weapons purchase, though it can choose from options ranging in severity. The Turkish economy is already shrinking, with inflation at nearly 16% and unemployment at 14%. Even mild sanctions could spook investors and send the lira and stock market into free fall.

Why would Mr. Erdogan take such a risk? From Turkey’s point of view, the country isn’t so much leaving the West as reacting to Western abandonment. The U.S., Turks note, hasn’t followed up with commitments to sell Turkey the Patriot antiaircraft system, and has armed and supported Syrian Kurdish groups Ankara regards as hostile and terrorist. Moreover, the EU has made plain that Turkish membership is an impossible dream, and as Mr. Erdogan leads Turkey in a more Islamist direction, even the pretense of a serious accession negotiation becomes increasingly difficult to keep up.

The dissension presents an opportunity for Vladimir Putin. By loosening the bonds between Turkey and its allies, Russia has struck a blow against the Western alliance, opened the door to more lucrative deals (Russia is building a nuclear power plant for Turkey), and raised its profile in the Middle East.

Yet Turkey’s comfort working with Russia also reflects the diminution of Russian power. During the 18th and 19th centuries, Russia helped drive the Turks from southern Ukraine and Russia as well as the Caucasus and the Balkans. Stalin’s threats to Turkey after World War II pushed the country into NATO. If Turkey can now cooperate with Russia, that is because it is much less dangerous than imperial Russia or the Soviet Union. This reflects NATO’s success in the Cold War.

Mr. Erdogan, weakened by the flagging Turkish economy and his party’s heavy loss in the Istanbul mayoral election last month, is facing tough realities about the limits of Turkey’s power. His pivot to Russia has not prevented Moscow from helping Bashar Assad tighten his grip on the last rebel-controlled province in Syria; another million refugees could flow into Turkey at any time.

To boost his nation’s economy, Mr. Erdogan also needs to curry favor with Beijing. That’s why this aspiring defender of the Islamic world has gone mostly silent on Beijing’s persecution of the Uighurs, a largely Muslim group in western China who speak a Turkic language and with whom many Turks feel an emotional rapport. For now, Mr. Erdogan’s foreign policy—like the Turkish economy, and like his attempt to stamp out domestic political opposition—has reached a dead end.

Mr. Erdogan’s last hope may be Donald Trump. At the Group of 20 meeting in Japan, he sounded sympathetic to Turkey’s complaints about Western behavior. Last Friday the Pentagon announced and then hastily canceled a press briefing on Turkish sanctions. It was unclear whether the postponement reflected doubts in the White House or simply concern that announcing sanctions too close to the July 15 anniversary of the 2016 coup attempt against Mr. Erdogan would be seen in Turkey as additional provocation.

The potential defection of a major ally like Turkey poses a significant challenge to NATO, not least because the alliance has no legal means to expel members that default on their obligations. While Mr. Erdogan’s purchase of the Russian system requires a serious response, and the delivery of F-35s must be put on hold, Washington should move cautiously.

Turkey and the West do best when they work together. The Ottoman alliance with the Central Powers ended with dismemberment of the empire in World War I. But the rift was also costly for Winston Churchill; the Allied defeat at Gallipoli damaged his reputation and haunted him for years. The Istanbul election demonstrates that opposition to Mr. Erdogan’s increasingly erratic leadership is deepening. A century after the Great War, Washington should remember that Turkey is bigger than one man and focus on the long term.