Did Rabin know that Oslo would not lead to a final-status agreement?

By Ted Belman

I am reading Like Dreamers: The Story of the Israeli Paratroopers Who Reunited Jerusalem and Divided a Nation by Yossi Klein Halevi and highly recommend it for its insights. Much of it deals with the loss of kibbutzim power and ideology and the growth of right wing ideology.

One major event that I want to comment on has to do with the passing of Oslo ll, the Interim Agreement, in 1995. The agreement had to do with the withdrawal by Israel from cities in Judea and Samaria.

This agreement was passed by a vote of 61 to 59. To squeak out this victory Rabin had to bribe a right wing MK to switch sides and had to rely on the Arab vote. Thus it didn’t come close to being approved by a majority of Jews. Rabin told him, “I will make peace with whatever majority is available”.

A representative of the settlers, Rabbi Yoel Ben Nun, who had Rabin’s ear, met with him to discuss the agreement. The Rabbi asked, “If this is what you are giving away now, what will you have left to offer in a final-status agreement?”

Rabin replied, “There will be no final-status agreement. It is impossible to reach an agreement on Jerusalem. We will continue to manage the interim agreement and proceed in stages. i.e., “To expand the Palestinian areas, to give them more authority.”

Halevi asks, “Had Rabin come to regret legitimizing Arafat as a peace partner? Or has Rabin realized all along that only an interim agreement was possible.”

The Rabbi charged, “You have unleashed forces you won’t be able to control.” Rabin replied, “I can’t rule out the danger. We will do our best.”

Rabin addressed the Knesset when trying to get approval of the interim agreement.

He firmly declared: “The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six-Day War. We will not return to the June, 4 1967 lines.”

He also spoke about Israel retaining the settlement blocs, modeling them on Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip. Of course he did not know that ten years later, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would dismantle Gush Katif along with all the settlements in Gaza. Nevertheless the idea of settlement blocs was very much part of his thinking: “Changes which will include the addition of Gush Etzion, Efrat, Beitar and other communities, most of which are in the area east of what was the ‘Green Line,’ prior to the Six-Day War.”

One of the striking features of Rabin’s map was what he said about the Jordan Valley: “The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.” By saying the “broadest meaning of that term,” he understood that Israel’s defense line had to include the eastern slopes of the West Bank hill ridge, which rose from an area near the Dead Sea which was 400 meters below sea level to hill tops that in one case reached a height of over 800 meters.

I was intrigued by Halevi’s rhetorical question, “[H]as Rabin realized all along that only an interim agreement was possible.”

Was this agreement simply a maneuver to rid Israel of the need to occupy the Palestinian population centers and to get rid of US pressure? Unfortunately it released forces that Israel is struggling to contain.