Despite Its Clear Military Advantage, Israel Was Unable to Dictate an Exit Strategy From Gaza Op

It was clear to Israel that it had not much to gain from the continuation of the operation and that the longer it lasted, the harder it would be to locate and hit new targets, while the risk of mistakenly hitting civilians would only increase but the key to a cease-fire wasn’t necessarily in Israel’s hands

Amos Harel, HAARETZ  May 14, 2023 12:50 am IDT

After multiple efforts, it seemed Saturday night that Egyptian intelligence managed to achieve a cease-fire between Israel and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, after almost five days of fighting.

According to Egyptian and Palestinian sources, the cease-fire went into effect at 10 P.M. Right up until that time, rockets were launched from Gaza at the south, in what appeared to be an attempt by Islamic Jihad to land the last blow in this round of the clash.

A statement from Islamic Jihad, Hamas and other groups in Gaza declared the fighting was over and warned Israel against “returning to” its policy of targeted killings. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu subsequently issued a statement appearing to confirm the cease-fire. Rocket sirens sounded in border communities again an hour after the cease-fire went into effect.

Throughout Friday and Saturday, Israel had anticipated the aid of Egyptian intelligence in the hope that it would achieve a lasting cease-fire with Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip. The series of successes recorded so far during Operation Shield and Arrow, of which the focal point was the assassination of six of the top Islamic Jihad militants in the Strip, is what makes it difficult to reach an agreement.

The organization’s leadership, whose top officials are in Beirut, was looking for some kind of achievement before the fighting ended and didn’t seem particularly anxious to end the clash. Not for the first time, it seemed easier for the government in Jerusalem to open a military move in Gaza than to bring it to a conclusion.

Israel, despite its clear military advantage and the limited damage caused by Islamic Jihad, was unable to dictate an exit strategy, neither at the time nor with the conditions it sought. It was clear to Israel that it had little to gain from the continuation of the operation and that the longer it lasted, the harder it would be to locate and hit new targets, while the risk of mistakenly hitting civilians would only increase.

This is why IDF and Shin Bet officials have been recommending to the government since last Thursday to strive for a cease-fire. The danger for the Israeli decision-makers was also political: The continuing rocket attacks could have caused Israelis to lose their patience and reduce their support for the government’s actions.

But the key to a cease-fire wasn’t necessarily in Israel’s hands. It’s possible that Islamic Jihad learned from the previous round, which lasted three days in August of last year during Operation Breaking Dawn, and decided it was worthwhile to continue the clash for a bit longer. Even if it failed to cause multiple Israeli casualties, the fact that it was able to continue and hold out for a while in a confrontation with the IDF could be considered an achievement.

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Islamic Jihad is a small organization with an extreme ideology. It has no civilian control of the Strip or a commitment to maintain the well-being of its residents. The key decisions are made by the leadership in Beirut, which is probably listening to Hezbollah officials and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards more than being preoccupied with the increasing human suffering in the Strip.

Even if about 20 percent of all rockets launched landed in the Gaza Strip and caused more casualties there than in Israel, Islamic Jihad had an incentive to continue to try wearing down Israel. This is how, despite the initial military success, Israel was stuck until Saturday in a trap that didn’t allow it to end the operation, and to some extent echoed the lack of a way out of its overall strategy regarding Gaza.

What Islamic Jihad wasn’t able to do was to drag other organizations into the scuffle or to bring about clashes in other arenas around Israel. Hamas was comfortable, at least to a certain degree, that Islamic Jihad clashed with Israel and exacted a toll on it. Until Saturday, there weren’t any signs that the larger organization intended to take an active part in the fighting. This could have happened, especially if many Palestinian civilians became casualties as the operation continued.

There were no signs of a violent escalation in Jerusalem, the West Bank, near the borders of Lebanon and Syria or in areas near the Green Line. International interest in what’s happening in Gaza is also not high. The Al Jazeera network, which broadcasts from Qatar, devoted long broadcasts to the conflict, but the international press was mostly still engrossed in a seemingly much bigger news story – the war between Russia and Ukraine.

Israel’s security establishment trusted the rather close relationship that has formed between Egypt’s intelligence chief, Abbas Kamel, and Islamic Jihad leader Ziyad al-Nakhaleh. In the last 24 hours, in what appeared to be an attempt at psychological warfare, someone hiding as “a senior Israeli official” began to point the blame at Hamas, which until now was absolved of any responsibility for the events.

The new Israeli claim was that Islamic Jihad, assisted by Iran, was getting stronger at the expense of the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip and that the continuation of the fighting reflected the weakening of Hamas’s control over the situation.