Demilitarization: Policy pertinent parameters

The proponents of demilitarization in Gaza seem unaware of the fact that Gaza is already supposed to be demilitarized under the 1993 & 1995 Oslo Accords.

Martin Sherman |  Sept 29, 2024

Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a?Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a?Germany rearmed in violation of a?solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building—Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, on the erosion of demilitarization.

The principal problem is not reaching an agreement on demilitarization but the honoring of such an agreement in practice. The number of agreements that the Arabs have violated is no less than the number to which they have adhered. Shimon Peres Tomorrow is Now, 1978.

We don’t need to issue a daily report to Israel on the operation [in Sinai] as it is a matter of sovereignty and national security—Egyptian Military, Reuters, August 21, 2012.

As the war rages on unabated in Gaza, the idea of demilitarization has once again taken center stage in the debate on how the fighting is to end. However, its proponents seem blissfully unaware of the fact that Gaza is already supposed to be demilitarized right now under the terms of the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords.

A unique context?

The stunning failure of demilitarization in Gaza as a means for attaining peace makes a thorough probe into the notion—its theoretical rationale, its practical feasibility, an analysis of its past practice, and an assessment of its future prospects for success—both timely and apt.

As a cautionary aside, it should be noted that this paper is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of all examples of demilitarization across the globe (such as the Solomon Islands and Costa Rica); or a comprehensive study of the history of demilitarization since the initial implementation of the notion (arguably from the 1856 Treaty of Paris).

Rather, it is meant to be confined to instances where demilitarization arrangements are likely to have policy relevance for Israel, making examples such as the demilitarization of Japan or in the Korean peninsula beyond the scope examined.

Indeed, the policy-pertinence of demilitarization regarding the Middle East conflict, in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, has its own unique characteristics and exigencies. Accordingly, inferences valid in numerous other instances may not be readily transferable for application in this case. Indeed, as a Foreign Policy article correctly underlines:

“None of the existing states and territories without armed forces compare to the uniquely difficult circumstances faced by Israelis and Palestinians, and none offers a model that can simply be adopted to resolve one of the most intractable conflicts in one of the world’s most restive regions.”

The sovereignty imperative

According to Oxford Public International Law:

“The concept of demilitarization denotes the reduction or even total abolishment of armaments…and military presence in a specific geographic area. In operational terms, it implies the dismantlement of arms, ammunition, and armed forces in order to put them beyond military use. Demilitarization also connotes the process of sustained reductions in the influence of the military in a given State and society”.

For the purposes of this analysis, we distinguish between “Demilitarization,” an externally imposed arrangement (see below), and “Demobilization,” which refers to the voluntary reduction in the size of the demobilizing party’s army.

As such, demilitarization cuts against the grain of the overarching organizing concept of the international system—that of sovereign nation-states existing in an anarchic system in which there is no recognized hierarchical order. It is, thus, a process that is antithetical to the existential nature of a sovereign political organism. Indeed, one might say that it runs directly counter to the “primal DNA” of the nation-state.

Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that the political landscape is littered with the burnt-out wrecks of demilitarization agreements that have failed—more often than not, with disastrous results. Indeed, in an analysis of the “special challenges” demilitarization poses, the late Professor David Bederman warns that such attempts are often doomed to failure. He elaborates:

“…the chief reason for the failure of demilitarization is the weakness of institutional mechanisms to effectively encourage and monitor compliance, as well as to punish transgressions.”

Significantly, the same malaise can, to a large degree, be discerned in the events leading up to October 7.

Demilitarization: A violation of the sovereignty imperative?

In essence, “sovereignty” is the supreme authority within a defined territory. As such, it does not recognize the legitimacy of any other source of authority in that territory as superior to it.

Now, any demilitarization arrangement effectively annuls the right of the demilitarizing country to determine what weapons it can deploy, how many it can deploy, and where they can be deployed.

Thus, by its very nature, demilitarization entails a violation—or at least, constriction—of the sovereign rights of the demilitarizing country.

Clearly, there are only two ways such an arrangement can be maintained. Either by the imposition on the demilitarizing country by a more powerful external force (such as an alien state or a coalition of such states); or by the willing acquiescence of the demilitarizing state to refrain from—or limit—the deployment of military forces in that state—or in a portion of the state.

Accordingly, demilitarization, as a stable reality, can prevail only as long as the demilitarizing party continues to agree to be demilitarized. For, if such agreement is revoked, it will either lead to the restrictions previously consented to being thrown off and militarization reinstated, or to their forcible reimposition by external parties.

The history of the past hundred years has included several major demilitarization agreements, few of which instill great confidence in the idea as an effective remedy for conflict.

Arguably, the most significant example—and the one whose collapse precipitated the gravest consequences—was the demilitarization of the Rhineland after WWI and whose violation precipitated WWII.

Demilitarization as a harbinger of war

The gory battles of WWI ended with the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed complex and comprehensive constraints—both quantitative and qualitative—on the German military with the purpose of stripping it of the ability to instigate future offensive action. These also included the demilitarization of the Rhineland, with the demolition of existing fortification 50 km east of the Rhine River, and a prohibition on the construction of new ones.

Germany was severely limited as to the kind and amount of weapons it could possess, manufacture, or store and was even forbidden completely with regard to others, such as submarines (Article 181) and an air force (Article 198).

However, as Germany rebuilt its national capabilities—and the resolve of the Europeans waned—the demilitarization arrangement fell apart.

Indeed, it was Winston Churchill, in his epic chronicle of the history of the outbreak of WWII, The Gathering Storm, who vividly described how the demilitarization conditions were eroded out of existence. He wrote:

“Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a Germany rearmed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building; the Berlin- Rome Axis established; Austria devoured and digested by the Reich; Czechoslovakia deserted and ruined by the Munich Pact, its fortress line in German hands, its mighty arsenal of Skoda henceforward making munitions for the German armies… the services of thirty five Czech divisions against the still unripened German Army cast away… all gone with the wind.”

Indeed, as demilitarization disintegrated, an increasingly confident Germany with its arsenal replenished unleashed a wave of aggression that culminated in the bloodiest war in the history of humanity, in which an estimated total of 70–85 million people perished, or about 3% of the estimated global population of 2.3 billion in 1940.

Sinai: A fraying accord

Another example of a demilitarization agreement, signed to bring hostilities between Egypt and Israel to an end following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, was included in the 1979 Camp David Accords.

In recent years, this agreement is also showing signs of strain and is beginning to “fray around the edges.”

For well over a decade, Egypt has been champing at the bit to shake off the restrictions on the deployment of military forces in the Sinai,

Annex 1 of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Accords established a system of security arrangements intended to allow Israel to withdraw from Sinai without incurring serious risk. Unequivocal constraints were placed on Egyptian military activities and deployments in the area. The rationale was clear: Should Cairo’s disposition toward Israel change for the worse, Sinai would continue to comprise a buffer between Egyptian forces and the Israeli border. If Cairo deployed any sizeable ground forces or armed aircraft into the peninsula, it would comprise a clear violation of the Accords and provide a warning of aggressive intentions. Thus, should war break out, Egypt’s long lines of supply in Sinai would be vulnerable, particularly to Israel’s powerful air force.

However, with the passage of time and the deteriorating internal situation in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula—given the dilution of military power (due to demilitarization) and the commensurate decline of Cairo’s ability to impose its will in the remote region—became a tempting target of Islamist insurgency.

Insurgency as justification for remilitarization

This provided Egypt with grounds to claim that the demilitarization clauses in the peace accords with Israel denied it sufficient forces to impose law and order in the peninsula.

Indeed, as early as 2007, Israel allowed the Egyptians to deploy additional troops into Sinai to fight weapons smuggling particularly to Jihadi elements.

Since then, at least two processes have fueled the attrition of the demilitarization of Sinai.

The one is the ongoing modernization and acquisition of offensive arms by the Egyptian military; the other is the deeply ingrained animus towards Israel and affiliation with Palestinians, particularly in Gaza. Indeed, as an analysis from the American University in Cairo underscores:

“Even after three decades of formal peace, most Egyptians still view Israel as a threat to national security and as an enemy, not only of Palestinians but of all Arabs.”

As the years passed, Jihadi attacks on Egyptian forces in Sinai intensified. This provided Cairo with grounds for demanding forces beyond those specified in the 1979 peace agreement. Gradually these violations increased—enabled either by ex-ante Israeli approval, or` ex-post Israeli approval, or despite no Israeli approval at all. When Egypt, in 2023, ` eventually managed to rein in the jihadi insurgency, the post-October 7th fighting in Gaza–particularly close to the Southern border of Rafa, gave Egypt fuel for continued allegations to bolster its forces in violation of the treaty.

Thus, in a Foreign Policy analysis, entitled Egypt’s Remilitarized Sinai Is a Future Powder Keg, the Washington Institute’s David Schenker provided a cautionary critique of the developments in the Peninsula up to mid-2022:

“…Israel also allowed Cairo to flood Sinai with troops and heavy equipment substantially in excess of the treaty’s limits…The longer Egypt’s additional forces remain in Sinai, especially now that the Islamic State appears to be under control, the more challenging it will become to revert to the limits imposed by the treaty”.

A poor bulkhead against war

Sadly, Israel’s history provides ample testimony as to the inadequacy of demilitarization as an effective barrier to war—or even as a device for reining in violence.

Indeed, immediately following its inception in 1948, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) established on the Golan as a means to separate Israeli and Syrian forces failed to prevent periodic clashes between the two militaries, which—among other things—eventually led to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War.

But quite apart from the manifest difficulty sustaining demilitarization in an area such as Gaza, there are, perversely, no less acute difficulties that could arise if, in fact, it was achieved. Indeed, the possibilities for unintended—and undesired—consequences seem boundless.

After all, if, Israel were somehow to compel the rulers of Gaza to disarm and to deny them the capacity to rearm, this would inevitably undermine, not only their ability to impose law and order internally in the Strip, but externally against more radical opponents from within the adjacent Sinai Peninsula. Indeed, if some future disarmed successor regime were faced with a significant challenge to its rule, whether from domestic or foreign sources, who—would be called upon to defend it?

If some foreign military force, this would imply the remilitarization of Gaza—leaving open the question of to whom such a force would be answerable.

If Israel, it is difficult to conceive of a more absurd scenario than one in which IDF forces need to be mobilized to prop up an Arab regime, so “unsavory” that cannot be trusted with the wherewithal needed to defend itself.

The preceding discussion—both of the political-scientific theory and the empirical case studies—ought to provide Israeli policymakers with sufficient caveats against succumbing to the temptation of a repeat attempt at adopting the failed and fatally flawed formula of demilitarization as a means of inducing—if not peace, them at least stable and durable non-belligerence. This is particularly true when the demilitarizing party is governed by an authoritarian regime that, on the one hand, places considerable stock on martial might and, on the other, has scant regard for implications violation of the demilitarization may have for its own citizenry, (Emmanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, 1799).

There appears, therefore, little option but to embrace the dire warning against demilitarization as a prudent policy prescription, once forcefully articulated by the very person who later endorsed it—with calamitous consequences.

This was Shimon Peres, who counseled:

“ …the idea of demilitarization…seems to me a dubious remedy, The principal problem is not reaching an agreement on demilitarization but the honoring of such an agreement in practice. The number of agreements that the Arabs have violated is no less than the number to which they have adhered.”