As donors meet in Cairo, concern that talk of rebuilding Gaza will not yield rapid action

Jerusalem and Hamas want the coastal enclave rehabiliated quickly as political interests converge, but Cairo and the PA are more wary

BY AVI ISSACHAROFF, TOI

Members of the Palestinian Authority security forces gather around the car carrying Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah on a tour to destroyed houses in an area east of the Beit Hanoun border crossing in the northern Gaza Strip, Thursday, Oct. 9, 2014. (photo credit: AP Photo/Adel Hana)

[…] The question is what will happen in practice. The residents of the Gaza Strip, well versed in disappointment, are already sounding more cautious and realistic. A month and a half has passed since the war, and until now, nothing has changed. It’s certainly possible that in the coming days, the coastal enclave will be awash with building materials, and the reconstruction will kick into high gear. But in reality, housing construction has not yet begun, and winter is coming.

A friend in Gaza told me Saturday that houses destroyed in 2004 and 2005 by the IDF during the large campaigns in the Rafah area, on the border with Egypt, have not yet been rebuilt. In those campaigns, hundreds of homes were partly or completely demolished, and nearly 10 years later the homes have not been fixed.

In the past decade, various countries have pledged to transfer money to Gaza or to the PA on dozens of occasions, but the funds were either only partially granted or weren’t handed over at all.

So what might be different this time? It’s unclear. But Hamas and Israel share a common interest (which is not rare) in the quick rebuilding of the Gaza Strip.

For Hamas, delay in reconstruction and the non-opening of the border crossings would mean a stinging defeat in its past war with Israel. Whereas reconstruction and the opening of the borders, easing the blockade, will buttress the claim that Hamas has been making from day one of Operation Protective Edge: that it defeated Israel.

To guarantee the reconstruction, Hamas is willing to give up civil authority over the borders, and control of day-to-day life in Gaza, but under no circumstances will it give up its security measures and weapons.

The Israelis want reconstruction since it will allow for the continued implementation of the Netanyahu government’s “quiet will be met with quiet” strategy, seeking calm with no solution of the root problems, even if Gaza is not demilitarized and Hamas keeps its arms. All of which would allow Israel to buy a few months of false quiet, until the next round of fighting starts.

Meanwhile, Egypt and the PA are more problematic. They understand that the rebuilding, should it occur too quickly and without any change to Gaza’s government, will strengthen Hamas. This is seen as less problematic for Israel, which views Hamas as a business partner but PA President Mahmoud Abbas as a strategic enemy. Cairo and Ramallah are troubled by this, and will likely drag out the reconstruction process.

Another tricky factor, which is taken into account less at this point, is public opinion in Gaza. Hamas and the PA have made a mistake in the past weeks by raising hopes among the residents of Gaza. They have repeatedly thrown out promises of quick reconstruction, the openings of the border crossings, the easing of the blockade, entry to workers from Gaza for employment in Israel, and even ways to open “a safe passage” between Gaza and the West Bank.

Quite some time will pass before most of these come to fruition, if they ever do. Many of the factors in the unstable Gaza-Israel-Egypt equation are likely to change in the coming months and impair the process of reconstruction.

In the likely event of disappointment, the Gaza street will point an accusatory finger not only at Israel, the PA, and Egypt, but at Hamas as well. And the latter will likely try to quell any such dissent and protest through an escalation of hostilities against Israel. This is how it has always acted in crisis; this is what it did this past summer.

No less interesting is Israel’s relative quiet on the subject of the reconstruction. During the Gaza war, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman, and Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon issued many statements, but now, none of them has bothered to present to the Israeli public the government’s understandings with the PA (and indirectly, with Hamas) as regards the reconstruction. This, Israel leaves to the Palestinian side.

The Israeli public, which has been told that Hamas is the enemy, that Israel won the war, and that Netanyahu does not bow to terror, will slowly discover a slightly different and more gloomy reality: Netanyahu and the Israeli government are fairly flexible and ready to compromise with the terror organization, even after it was seemingly defeated on the battlefield by the IDF.

October 12, 2014 | 10 Comments »

Leave a Reply

10 Comments / 10 Comments

  1. Excellent discussion. Israel’s changing policy or strategy is of major concern. I agree that Netanyahu is leaning in the wrong direction. No doubt he is going for the center and is willing to lose the Israeli right to Bennett. In one of my prefaces I stressed the need at a minimum for Netanyahu to declare that Israel will never return to the ’67 lines. I should add, not just for security reasons but to keep some of what we are entitled to. That is not to say that I want to give up the rest. I want it all.

    It is unclear what is happening in the aftermath of Protective Edge. The Donors Conference ignored Israel in their deliberations. But how can they follow through without Israel’s cooperation. I am not impressed with the pledges which are probably conditional on other things happening. Beside most of the Arabs never fund their pledges. Qatar who pledged the most did so to be in the driver’s seat of who benefits. Israel will not let Hamas get it and Qatar won’t give it.
    I hope to write about this towards the end of the week but need much of the present fog to lift.

  2. LtCol Howard Said:

    handling some of the major issues. One is exactly what should Israel’s announced policy be toward preventing future missile attacks

    To Expand on this thought even those of us who agree on most solutions re: Israel disagree on many things as well.

    The government of Israel must first decide what it wants and build a policy around that aim. So far they haven’t and operate in reflexive and ad hoc modes. Impossible to unite around a non policy and conflicting messages.

    We can expect that Iron Dome was a temporary solution and tactics such as jinking missile trajectories; saturation attacks; multiple warheads, etc. plus the expense per missile will soon make the system ineffective. Further, the ability to remotely launch and the small signature of the Hamas launchers will make them undetectable and if detected would not result in the crew being neutralized. Thus, some form of believable and implementable assured destruction is necessary.

    While a technological success it has vast limitations and I opposed it from the start. Yes it saved some lives and much property damage and gave most people a sense of security it also is a military and political liability because rather than bepro active and use the military to it’s functional capabilies the Politicians and Senior Staff of the IDF used to a large extent the Iran Dome as a protective shied for the Army which was held back and this guided a military thinkingg of limiting the hurt we could have imposed and the damage we could have inflicted on Hmas.

    Here too we have left our enemy largely intact and undeterred to fight another day… Never historically sound military or political thinking. They just kicked the can down the road. That’s what weak politicians do everywhere. Let the next guy worry!

    If Hamas gains control of the West Bank I think Jordan has more to worry than we do. IDF military intelligence and the Shabak unlike in Gaza has a handle on the situation there. Fatah will cooperate with the Because stopping Hamas is in their own interest.

    I happen to think counter-intuitively that for Israel it would be a good thing if Hamas governs Gaza and the West Bank.

    It will force any Israeli government to come to terms and act accordingly.

  3. Ted posted this article. Reading it disturbed me since it seems that Israel will move in the wrong direction:

    Ron Ben-Yishai

    Easing Gaza restrictions is the new two-state solution
    Analysis: Israel now admits that the almost-airtight blockade of Gaza has done more harm than good; on eve of Cairo truce talks, Israel shifts its focus to easing the lives of Palestinians in return for greater oversight over Hamas. This is how Israel hopes to restore calm to its south.

  4. (@ yamit82:@ Yamit82. I always enjoy and appreciate your comments.

    You, Ted Belman and several other commentators would make a hell of an effective writing team in handling some of the major issues. One is exactly what should Israel’s announced policy be toward preventing future missile attacks. We can expect that Iron Dome was a temporary solution and tactics such as jinking missile trajectories; saturation attacks; multiple warheads, etc. plus the expense per missile will soon make the system ineffective. Further, the ability to remotely launch and the small signature of the Hamas launchers will make them undetectable and if detected would not result in the crew being neutralized. Thus, some form of believable and implementable assured destruction is necessary.

    Also I am concerned that much of what I hear concerning Hamas was stated about Hezbollah. Remember, it was a counter to the PLO in Lebanon? There is a statement that says: “be careful of what you pray for… Your prayers might be answered.

    Obviously I am more concerned with Hezbollah than Hamas. However, I am very concerned with Hamas. Wiping out Israel would be easier from West Bank,senior Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar told Palestinian news outlet Al-Ayyam

    Senior Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar told the Palestinian news outlet Al-Ayyam.”… …when Hamas establishes a foothold in the West Bank, we will be able to wipe out Israel and build an Islamic state in Palestine, ALL OF PALESTINE.”

    The interview, translated and posted by Palestinian Media Watch on Sunday, revealed Hamas’ previously covert intention of taking over the West Bank.

    According to al-Zahar, if Hamas could “transfer what it has or just a small part of it to the West Bank, we [Hamas] would be able to settle the battle of the final promise with a speed that no one can imagine.”

    Al-Zahar then alluded to Hamas’ goal by citing a passage from the Quran: “Then when the final promise came, [We sent your enemies] … to enter the Temple in Jerusalem, as they entered it the first time, and to destroy what they had taken over with [total] destruction,” implying a war in which Israel is wiped out.

  5. @ LtCol Howard:

    There is a good side and a bad side.

    A-takeover by Hamas of the West Bank would put paid to any peace process and all the international pressure against Israel.

    B- Pollcy wise Israel would view the Palis as an enemy entity and all that entails.

    Since the economy of the PA and Gaza is almost totally integrated into the Israeli economy including currency
    Israel can bring them to their knees without firing a shot almost.

    C- Israel in such an eventuality would and should annex all the territory she now holds and controls in the West Bank.
    D- Hamas to date has no air-force or armor. Any attack by such an entity would be a casus belli for a major invasion and retaking all of the West Bank! We can deal with a min of damage and casualties if we don’t allow them free hand to do what we allowed Hezbollah to do in Lebanon

  6. @Yamit. Israeli response must be that the enemy and the population that they rule will feel: “never again”. Anything short of this absolute feeling is not deterrence.

    I would be concerned about Hamas taking over the West Bank, destabilizing Jordan, etc.The leading Palestinian authority figures will jump to the winning side.

  7. @ LtCol Howard:

    My contacts within Hezbollah were clear that had Sheikh Nasrallah contemplated the extent of destruction that Israel would take on Lebanon he would not have kidnapped the Israeli soldiers. What may have deterred Hezbollah from subsequent attacks was the devastation that the IDF subjected Lebanon to.

    Yes Col that is what has been reported in our media quoted ad nausea by our politicians and military leaders and spokespersons.

    What was also reported in some of our media was that Iran was furious with Nasrallah because he wasted billions in Hezbollah military infrastructure and as much in munitions meant to be used in attacking Israel if and when Israel attacked Iran. Word then was Iran was considering replacing him. That said Israel did a No NO, she left her enemy intact with a lot of the offensive capabilities intact and settled for our version of MAD.

    They have by now something like 100K rockets of all description: Long medium and short ranges covering all of Israel. Word is that some of Assad’s rockets with Chemical warheads are now owned by Hezbollah. It’s they have have the real deterence against us and not the other way round. Hezbolah fighters fighting againt Assad and in Iraq are now battle experienced and ha learned the use of lethal modern weapons.

    Hamas today represents a minor irritant but not an existential threat Hezbollah just might fall into the category of existential threat.

    There is now only one way to defeat the threat from the North and that is through good Intel, Massive early Bombing and hitting them on the ground with whatever we have in a classic pincer move from the South and from the sea. No Target in Lebanon should be spared for any reason. Israel simultaneously must depopulate all of Southern Lebanon to the Letani river and keep it.

    In the meantime, I would fire the entire IDF planning staff who have demonstrated that they are incapable of coping with an enemy who is imaginative and determin Reconstructinged.

    I agree

  8. Many articles in the Israeli press herald a return to the thinking that led to the disaster of the Oslo Accords.

    As an American military planner who has been deeply involved with the Soviet Union, North Korea, Iran, and the Middle East it is clear that Israel must deter her potential enemies otherwise Israel will face unrelenting terrorism and periodic attacks.

    My contacts within Hezbollah were clear that had Sheikh Nasrallah contemplated the extent of destruction that Israel would take on Lebanon he would not have kidnapped the Israeli soldiers. What may have deterred Hezbollah from subsequent attacks was the devastation that the IDF subjected Lebanon to.

    The facts are simple: “For Hamas, delay in reconstruction and the non-opening of the border crossings would mean a stinging defeat in its past war with Israel. Whereas reconstruction and the opening of the borders, easing the blockade, will buttress the claim that Hamas has been making from day one of Operation Protective Edge: that it defeated Israel.”

    To regain its position eventually, Hamas is willing to give up the APPEARANCE of control. However, it will maintain its ability regain control when it desires since “under no circumstances will it give up its security measures and weapons.” In addition it will have gained a foothold on the West Bank.

    :”So what might be different this time?” The answer is simple: NOTHING! Hamas, like Iran and like the Palestinian Authority want to destroy Israel. Their only difference is in the day-to-day tactics.

    Let the damage in Gaza serve as an everyday reminder to the Gazans that if you choose Hamas you have chosen self-destruction.

    In the meantime, I would fire the entire IDF planning staff who have demonstrated that they are incapable of coping with an enemy who is imaginative and determined.