Russian presence in Syria usually limits Israel while restraining Assad, Hezbollah and Iran. Israel’s recent actions, however, could provide Hassan Nasrallah with the justification he needs for the next war
On March 10 this year, the Israel Air Force intelligence chief traveled to meet a European counterpart. They discussed the situation in the Middle East, the fighting in Syria and Russia’s involvement there. They separated with a handshake and mutual compliments. Each went his own way and the following week was astonished to hear Russian President Vladimir Putin announce the withdrawal of his forces from Syria. There was no sign of it coming; no organization predicted this turn of events; and the West is still wondering whether Putin himself knew prior to his declaration that he would say what he did.
Some in the defense establishment recall this incident in order to maintain humility – not a natural characteristic of intelligence personnel and flight crews – when highlighting the challenges of predicting events in the Middle East during this age of uncertainty. And this is before U.S. President-elect Donald Trump settles into the White House, with all the question marks over his foreign and defense policies.
What’s more, Putin’s announcement had a follow-up, no less surprising: Despite his comments, nothing actually changed on the ground in Syria. Certain forces did withdraw, but others came in their place and the warfare was expanded.
On the eve of the arrival of the most advanced aircraft in the world, the F-35 (dubbed “Adir” in Hebrew), the celebratory mood in the Israeli air force is at a peak. A fighter plane unparalleled in quality – and for the most challenging missions, not for Gaza. The heads of the air force rushed to retrain for the new plane, in order to learn up close its advantages, and also to know when to recommend to the chief of staff and politicians to incorporate it into missions.
Syria today is the war laboratory of the world’s armies and organizations, just like Spain’s civil war was eight decades ago. According to a senior officer, it’s the “perceptual laboratory” and not just a testing ground for weapons. The desperate citizens and wretched enemies have become guinea pigs in a lab of ideas and methods.
The Russians especially stand out – and not necessarily because they are brilliantly impressive or have sophisticated weaponry. Instead, the West recognizes that they must not be discounted, and neither should their leader’s dream to return Russia to the standing it once held.
The intelligence community is split regarding future events in Syria. According to one theory, Putin, Trump and those of lower standing in the international community will agree within a few months to a new order in Syria: President Bashar Assad will remain, albeit with clipped wings and subordinate to Putin.
Like in the old debate between Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan over the future of the West Bank – and whether the division should be “territorial” or “functional” – the opposition to the regime will receive some of Syria’s authorities or districts. The Islamic State group will be quashed, but in the southwest of the country (opposite the Golan Heights), elements hostile to Israel are liable to remain. Russia will maintain the coastline and naval bases. Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov – which arrived in the Mediterranean with great fanfare – does not strike fear into the Israel Defense Forces.
More than the Russian presence in Syria limits Israel, it actually restrains Assad, Hezbollah and Iran. It’s a sort of updated version of the old civil war in Lebanon: Syria’s overbearing presence there balanced a fragile system; its withdrawal opened the safety catch between Hezbollah and Israel. The security mechanism and avoidance of confrontations between Israeli and Russian planes is one-dimensional only, like a car’s alarm warning of a nearby obstacle. The beep sharpens the senses and lessens the danger, but adds no knowledge regarding the intentions of the driver in a car in the adjacent – or opposite – lane.
In October 1973, there was close cooperation – perhaps too close – in the research conducted by Military Intelligence and the air force. The experts on Egypt agreed that the conditions were not yet ripe for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to realize his declared threat to start a war. Also today, there is extensive cooperation between MI and the IAF, and again it could be that the similar situation assessments may be mistaken and that the reverse is true. But now the emphases are different.
Air force intelligence, which has learned from precedents, doesn’t deceive itself that it will manage to recognize in advance the strategic turns of events; it suffices with mapping out the possible alternatives and focusing on producing targets and its assignment-based task, with pinpoint accuracy.
The surprise of 1973 diverted enormous amounts of investment into early warning. Today, the danger of Syrian MiG jets suddenly flying in and sowing destruction is not large; about two thirds of the Israeli air force’s resources are allocated accordingly, for aerial intelligence purposes. Even a nuclear Iran – as distinct from the subversive one that uses emissaries and satellite states – is no longer at the top of the pilots’ list. Iran is meticulously playing its part in the nuclear agreement with the world powers and will need much time, measured in years, to rehabilitate the infrastructure that it hurried to dismantle.
Somewhat similar to that assessment from 1973 – that Sadat would not launch a war without advanced attack planes or Scud missiles deep into Israel – it is generally accepted that the equation Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah sees in front of him to justify a war still lacks certain elements. This is what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman were referring to in recent weeks, when they spoke of thwarting the transfer of weaponry from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon (Lieberman used the weighted term “weapons of mass destruction” last week, meaning nuclear, chemical or biological munitions). But the thwarting itself is liable to ignite the war it is designed to delay.
Until now, this hasn’t happened because the intermediate situation of no war/no peace is comfortable for all sides. This has been the situation since the signing of cease-fire agreements in 1949, but Israel didn’t always reconcile itself with this reality – until the Six-Day War in 1967 forced the Arab countries to choose between restraint and escalation.
Right now, Military Intelligence predicts that all sides are reluctant to trigger extreme situations, settling instead for less-than-perfect, each side according to its own definition. Even if fighting flares again in Gaza or Lebanon, they will be content with a limited achievement and start preparing for the next round. And so on, until an internal or external leader turns up who will cut through this choking entanglement in one fell swoop.
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