Peloni: The Lebanese lack agency as they lack any independence from their Iranian task masters in Tehran. Iranian control of that captured nation will remain fixed til either some outside force frees them from the Shia control domination, something which is not likely to ever take place, or til the Mullahs controlling Lebanon as its vassal state are overthrown in Iran. Hence, while the time to free Lebanon is at hand, it would require decisive action to take place in Iran, not in Lebanon.
By David Daoud | December 10, 2024
The Assad regime has fallen. Meanwhile, the dreaded Third Lebanon War, during which Israel gave Hezbollah an unprecedented drubbing, is either over or in a ceasefire-induced lull. But the Iranian-backed organization has neither been conclusively defeated nor is it past the point of regeneration. Recognizing this situation, the ceasefire deal’s drafter, US envoy Amos Hochstein, included safeguards ostensibly meant to prevent Hezbollah’s regeneration—to ensure, in his words, this would be the final Hezbollah-Israel war. However, Hochstein made a critical mistake, one that will likely prove fatal to his anticipated objectives: much like UN Security Council Resolution 1701, the latest agreement made action by the Lebanese government and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against Hezbollah the cornerstone of the ceasefire.
Time has always been Hezbollah’s friend—even more so after the November 27 ceasefire that halted its latest war with Israel. The more time that passes from the conflict, the more time Hezbollah will have to take stock of the harm it has suffered, regroup, and prepare for any potential hostile movement against it or its arms in Lebanon. Time will allow Hezbollah to call upon its vast support network—Iran and wealthy Shia supporters in Latin America and West Africa—to refill its arsenal and coffers and begin the vital work of reconstruction that will help the group rally its domestic support among Lebanese Shia.
Regardless of Hezbollah’s need to rally its base, there wasn’t much evidence throughout this war that the group had lost a critical mass of supporters. A January poll found up to 93% of Lebanese Shia supported Hezbollah, while a September poll by Arab Barometer reported that only 5% of that demographic distrust Hezbollah, and 85% trust the group. After the war, as hundreds of thousands of predominantly Shia Lebanese returned to their destroyed homes and villages ravaged and ruined by Hezbollah’s latest bout of adventurism against Israel, there was no massive outpouring of anger against the group.
It is true that Hezbollah’s propaganda outlets and threats of violence can hide or subdue minor and scattered flare-ups of outrage against the group. But such efforts would be helpless to stem a tide of overwhelming Lebanese Shiite anger—a reaction that has not happened.
To the contrary, many of the Lebanese returnees who were forced to evacuate during the conflict have been praising Hezbollah and its “victory” over Israel, waving the terror group’s iconic yellow-and-green flag amidst the rubble that was their homes. Thousands appeared to attend Hezbollah’s post-war vigil for its slain secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, at the location of his assassination. The group is also planning a larger funeral for Nasrallah and his would-be successor, Hashem Safieddine, at an undetermined future date—an event that will be equal parts mourning for the fallen leaders and a show of domestic power by the group.
Hezbollah wouldn’t likely be planning this public spectacle if its leaders weren’t certain that throngs of supporters would flood the streets because doing so would be gambling with their future if Nasrallah’s official funeral attracted paltry numbers. In contrast, if hundreds of thousands turn out, Hezbollah will have assertively staked its claim to a future in Lebanon. Whether those supporters show up out of love, threats, or some other inducement is also immaterial; their mere presence will demonstrate Hezbollah’s continued sway.
Proponents of the “Hezbollah’s demise is imminent” line of thinking will argue that the anger will come in time—especially when reconstruction aid isn’t forthcoming. However, this reasoning is based on the faulty and unsubstantiated assumption that Hezbollah’s finances were entirely spent or destroyed during the war with Israel, and its sources of future funding have dried up. Hezbollah is already rolling out an Iranian-funded reconstruction plan, and assumptions about its lack of resources fail to account for international reconstruction aid that will be channeled through the Lebanese government, with whom Hezbollah has already expressed its intention to cooperate financially.
Beirut will have no choice but to rebuild pro-Hezbollah Shia areas like all the others damaged by the war, which will end up quelling potential anger and freeing up resources for Hezbollah. If the Lebanese government opts to withhold funding from these areas, then Hezbollah can flip the responsibility—and anger—onto the government and away from itself. Either way, Hezbollah ends up winning.
Regardless, Hezbollah is currently at its weakest point. Inside Lebanon, the group’s organizational apparatus has been severely degraded by Israel, and events in neighboring Syria have cut its most vital supply line. The time, then, for the Lebanese government and LAF to act, if they ever intend to, is now—before Hezbollah and Iran can establish alternate supply routes to Syria and begin rebuilding the group.
The LAF’s proponents would counter that the army’s action will not come until a prior political decision. But this, too, is unconvincing. The current government could give that order, especially if—as is alleged—Hezbollah is so weakened and public anger, including from within its Shia base, is so overwhelming. Despite being a caretaker government, it would have complete legitimacy to act by virtue of this alleged public backing. If, as is baselessly alleged, caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and Druze chieftain Walid Joumblatt have genuinely soured on Hezbollah, and LAF Commander Joseph Aoun is raring to disarm the terror group, there will never be a better time than the present.
Instead, Lebanese officials—including Berri’s closest aide—have returned to their old word games to gut the ceasefire deal of any impact, as they did with UN Security Council Resolution 1701 that ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war and restated Lebanon’s obligations to disarm the group. In fact, Mikati insisted on December 5 that the matter of Hezbollah’s arms would be resolved through “national consensus” and dialogue.
The idea that electing a Lebanese president—a post vacant for two years—will set in motion a process inevitably leading to Hezbollah’s demise is also unconvincing. Taking this at face value, Lebanon’s next presidential election, conducted by parliamentary rather than popular vote, is scheduled for January 9, 2025, a month during which Hezbollah can prepare for and discourage any potential moves against it.
This line of thinking also presumes that parliament will succeed in electing a president during the January 9 election, despite the failure of the current legislative constellation to settle upon a figure for two years. If the election fails, the situation buys Hezbollah more time. Believing that these political developments will disarm Hezbollah also presumes that the president elected will be one willing to give the order—rather than another “consensus” figure or even a pro-Hezbollah president like Berri’s favored candidate, Sleiman Frangieh.
Even if this presidential election effort succeeds, it’s only one piece of the puzzle. The order for LAF to disarm Hezbollah must also come from the cabinet, Lebanon’s true executive power, which sets government policy in “all fields” and controls the armed forces. The process of selecting a prime minister—whose cabinet’s policy statement will then have to win the confidence of parliament or else be powerless—will also take time and is not guaranteed to succeed in the first round. Under the best of circumstances, this time-consuming process will allow Hezbollah a further opportunity to recuperate—and it is far from clear that the current constellation of parliamentary forces is even ready to elect a president or endorse a cabinet that wishes to act against Hezbollah.
Assuming the war has, in fact, shifted public opinion against Hezbollah, parliamentary elections could solve the problem. But dissolving the parliament now requires a presidential decree, and Lebanon lacks a president. Otherwise, the next Lebanese legislative elections—assuming they happen on time—are not set to occur until 2026, giving ample time for public anger to subside and Hezbollah to regain its footing.
As Hezbollah is afforded this time to shore up its domestic status, Lebanon—assuming it possesses any willingness to act—will have to pay a higher price to rein in or disarm the group. This delay will make it more difficult for Lebanon to distance Hezbollah from south Lebanon, dismantle the group’s infrastructure, or prevent weapons shipments from reaching it through Lebanese borders. A regenerated Hezbollah will be even more discouraging to action from a Beirut that only ever tepidly mumbled displeasure at the group’s behavior.
Regardless, there’s no indication that Lebanon has undergone a change of heart against Hezbollah sufficient to move against the group. Some analysts believe this may be the case, as Lebanese officials walked back their prior endorsement of Hezbollah coupling the Lebanon and Gaza fronts on October 2, and later accepted a ceasefire deal while Israel continued to occupy dozens of Lebanese villages.
However, Lebanon acted similarly when Resolution 1701 ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in August of that year, while Israeli troops maintained a presence in south Lebanon until October 1. As for the decoupling of Lebanon from Gaza, this seems little more than a ruse by Beirut—empty promises, much like in 2006, induced by Israel’s war effort—to give Hezbollah a needed face-saving off-ramp from its conflict with Israel. Now that the Israeli inducement appears to have ended, Lebanon is showing all the signs of going back to business as usual: obscuring the question of Hezbollah’s arms from the international community in the labyrinth of Beirut’s dizzyingly byzantine politics until the world, again, loses interest as more pressing crises demand its attention. Various scenarios may play out, but what is virtually certain is that the Lebanese government and LAF will not act significantly against Hezbollah.
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