Hostage Deal and Rafah Offensive Reach Tipping Point, and Israel Could Fall Either Way

The hostage deal is stuck between Netanyahu’s ‘rock’ and Sinwar’s ‘hard place,’ as the world waits for Hamas’ answer to the current proposal ? The much anticipated Rafah offensive has been mythologized to Stalingrad status, but its strategic value is hardly the ‘total victory’ it has been chalked up to be

Amos Harel | Haaretz | May 3, 2024

Israeli soldiers rest on top of a tank, near the Israel-Gaza border, Thursday.Credit: Amir Cohen/ REUTERS

As the wait drags on for the reply of the real decision-maker – Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip – it’s best not to develop inflated expectations this time either. As of Thursday evening, Sinwar, located somewhere in “Lower Gaza,” was still silent. But top Hamas figures abroad, though it’s unclear whether they speak in their leader’s name, maintain that their view of the latest Egyptian mediation proposal is negative and are hinting that behind the proposal is an Israeli scheme.

Only a surprising move by Sinwar – a completely positive response, and not its rejection in whole or in part (via the “Yes, but” method) – can bring about a breakthrough at this time. Without it, the war will continue and the United States will not succeed in forcing a deal on him and on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who also appears not to be interested in a deal under the conditions being proposed.

The details of the Egyptian plan were published on Wednesday in Arab media outlets. It contains complicated formulations and sub-formulations, with the goal of bringing about the phased return of all 133 hostages the terrorist organization is holding, both the living and the dead, in return for a gradual cease-fire followed by the full withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the Gaza Strip.

But the transition between the first phase, which is humanitarian in nature, in which some of the hostages (the elderly, women, the ill and the wounded) will be freed, and the second phase, when all the others will be released, is apparently not sufficiently guaranteed to suit Sinwar.

As this column has reported, this has been Hamas’ first priority almost since the start of the war on October 7. The organization wants a total cease-fire, which will ensure the survival of its rule in Gaza. That is something Netanyahu is not capable of giving, at least now, because acceding would mean forgoing his declared goals in the war and creating for himself a high political risk from the right.

Bezalel Smotrich and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, last year.Credit: Sraya Diamant

To understand what is happening in the negotiations, we need to go back to the events of the end of last November, in the first hostage deal, which included a weeklong pause in the hostilities. Then, too, Hamas strove for an end to the war.

Sinwar thought, mistakenly, that after the return of the women and the children, from the first group of those freed, it would be possible to play for time (and play Israel) by means of a daily or weekly trickle of additional hostages, while conducting stubborn negotiations that ultimately would bring about an end to the war. By then, he apparently believed, Netanyahu would be deep within the squeeze chute and would be unable to resume fighting.

In practice, the opposite happened. From the moment that Hamas ceased to abide by the terms of the deal, and proposed returning a smaller group of hostages and with them bodies, Israel balked. The cease-fire collapsed and the IDF entered Khan Yunis. In response, Hamas suspended the contacts for a deal.

The talks didn’t resume until January, when it became clear to Sinwar that Israel was not succeeding in achieving its goals in Khan Yunis: assassinating him and the other top leaders of Hamas (of that group, only Marwan Issa was killed, in an attack in the Nuseirat refugee camp) and freeing the hostages by force. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant boasted that Sinwar heard the IDF bulldozers above his head and threatened that he would soon encounter Israeli rifles, but the Hamas leader was able to get away.

A Palestinian vendor prepares to make falafel sandwiches on a makeshift stall next to building rubble in Khan Yunis, Thursday.Credit: AFP

And when the talks did resume, a great deal of time was wasted. Israel fudged its replies to the mediators’ proposals, while Hamas also created difficulties. It wasn’t until mid-April that Israel responded positively to the new proposal, which entails multiple concessions on its part and effectively leaves it with few cards to play in the last stage of the deal. But in the meantime even this isn’t enough, because Sinwar remains suspicious and is sticking to his original goals.

It’s not that Netanyahu doesn’t want a deal. He does want one, but on his terms. Like in the old joke, the prime minister is looking for a loan without interest, without payments and without returning the money. However, at the moment no such deal is available. And Hamas, unfortunately, doesn’t believe in the principle of good faith under international contract law. They are an organization of murderers with a structured plan of action and couldn’t care less about the distress of their people, still less about the Israeli captives.

Sinwar has scored two major achievements: the conquest of the communities of the Western Negev for almost an entire day, and changing the regional agenda by placing the Palestinian issue at its top (and in the meantime he’s basking in the glow of a third achievement: the unbelievable chaos on American campuses). At the same time, as was clear from the first day, he has inflicted a horrific tragedy on the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip.

Now Sinwar is looking for a solution that will enable him to reprise the “armchair stunt” of 2021, when, at the conclusion of Operation Guardian of the Walls, he had himself photographed sitting in an armchair in his bombed-out office, in order to show that the Israeli attacks had not broken him and were not a threat to his rule. This time, too, he wants to say to the Arab masses: “I am the only one who has stood up to Israel and has brought it to its knees. What seven armies didn’t do in 1948 and two in 1973, Hamas under my leadership did.”

For him, the Israeli captives are the most effective tool to get what he wants. Accordingly, no generous gestures should be expected in the future, without Sinwar getting what he considers an appropriate price.

Palestinian Stalingrad

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken this week described the Egyptian proposal as “extraordinarily generous” for Hamas, and tried to put the ball in Sinwar’s court. At the moment, there are no signs that the Hamas leader is convinced. He also apparently thinks, based on what Blinken said, that the United States will not lend a hand to a sweeping Israeli operation in Rafah. He seems to be in no hurry.

The ultra-right wing in Netanyahu’s government also understands the reality that has been created, and so is pressing the prime minister to conquer Rafah already now. A two-phased hostage deal will put the contacts on track and make it difficult for Israel to shift gears again and go into Rafah with all its might. U.S. President Joe Biden is no longer as patient as he was in December.

In the meantime, the status of Rafah is swelling to the proportions of a Palestinian Stalingrad. The main difficulty doesn’t lie in Hamas’ strength in the city. Four battalions remain there, not the organization’s strongest, along with many terrorists who fled from the north of the Strip. The major problem is the million-plus civilians who are still crowded into Rafah (tens of thousands went back north, to devastated Khan Yunis, when the IDF pulled out of that city).

This is what is worrying Washington – the U.S. wants to ensure an orderly evacuation of this population. Netanyahu is already committed to enter as a result of his public promises and the pressure being exerted by ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.

The IDF is capable of conquering Rafah. The question is what it will achieve by this. Gallant and IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi have told Netanyahu that an invasion of Rafah will degrade the battalions and the organization’s infrastructure, but will not bring about the “total victory” over Hamas that he has promised the public.<

In the meantime, Hamas will rehabilitate its military and governmental capabilities in other parts of the Strip. And in a few months, after the conquest of Rafah, we’ll be back to square one: Hamas battered but active, with no other governing alternative in Gaza (in part because Netanyahu refuses vehemently to discuss this with the U.S. and the international community).

Israeli forces await orders to enter Rafah, on Sunday.Credit: Eliyahu Hershkovitz

Accordingly, the army is proposing to try for a hostage deal and then deploy for a possible entry into Rafah. All the IDF’s efforts to initiate a strategic discussion on this matter in the war cabinet and the security cabinet have been blocked from above.

In the absence of a deal, and in the light of America’s opposition, the operation in Rafah might be more limited than what people envisage. The IDF can push out the majority of the population, seize the outskirts of the city and bomb it from the outside, without immediately charging ahead for a full conquest.

That option too will not be “sterile” or without losses. Together with large numbers of Palestinians being killed, it will also cost soldiers’ lives. And it’s already totally clear that expanding the military move will endanger the lives of captives, some of whom are being held in Rafah. Hostages were killed in all the IDF’s previous offensive actions, some murdered by their captors, others killed in Israeli attacks.

The Biden administration is continuing to push ahead with the big Saudi deal and is holding the door open for Israel, for the possibility that it will include also a cessation of the war in Gaza. But high-ranking U.S. officials are hinting that a more limited deal might be possible, in which some or all of the Saudi requests from the U.S. (defense pact, advanced weaponry, civilian nuclear project) will be met, without this involving immediate full normalization between Riyadh and Jerusalem. The background to this is the emerging stalemate in the hostage deal talks and Netanyahu’s refusal to make any gesture in regard to renewing the diplomatic process with the Palestinian Authority.

The signal to Israel is clear: If you don’t board this train, it will leave the station without you. But as usual for the administration, the positive thinking skips over a few potential obstacles. Although normalization is definitely an incentive for Israel, it’s important to remember that when top Hamas figures were asked about the reasons for perpetrating the massacre on October 7, they mentioned the desire to disrupt the Israeli-Saudi agreement which was then looming. In other words, Hamas has no interest in being a small part of a large deal that will indirectly help tighten the anti-Iranian alliance in the region.