Israel-Hamas War: IDF Says It Needs Months,

By Amos Harel, HAARETZ

The war in Gaza entered its 35th day this morning, November 10 – one day more than the 2006 Lebanon war, which at the time was described as a frustrating stalemate in which Israel found it difficult to vanquish the enemy, Hezbollah. The circumstances this time, in a war that is currently focused on Hamas, are harder.

Israel went into the war with a terrible deficit, as a result of a harrowing intelligence and preparedness failure on October 7. By the time the Israel Defense Forces recovered and started to fight back effectively, nearly 1,200 Israelis had already been killed and about 240 abducted in Hamas’ murderous terrorist onslaught. Since then, all that has been done, and will be done, is comparable to a desperate attempt to pursue a foe that has already turned on the burners and is speeding ahead.

In practice, Israel waited almost three weeks before sending the ground forces into the Gaza Strip, due to various constraints. The evening of November 10 will mark two weeks since the start of the ground offensive. The IDF sent three divisional forces into the northern Gaza Strip and demanded that the Palestinian civilians there leave their homes and make their way to the south of Gaza. The massive aerial attacks of the first weeks became even fiercer from the moment the air force was called upon to provide close support for the ground forces. The progress since then has been slow and devastating, using the “shredder” method. The armored and infantry forces unleash extremely heavy fire in the face of every manifestation of resistance. That is apparently the main reason for Hamas’ decision, in many cases, to remain in the tunnels and avoid a direct military clash.

The IDF is sustaining losses when Hamas snipes at forces who enter a static mode, or when it attacks facilities that are more critical for Hamas, around which a more intensive defensive effort takes place. Senior figures in the military General Staff have told Haaretz that the area where the IDF is now operating is the densest in which such a move has ever been undertaken. The difficulty – compared to the American-Iraqi offensive against ISIS in Mosul around five years ago – is compounded by two elements: an extraordinarily ramified network of tunnels below ground, and many tall buildings above ground, though a considerable portion of them were destroyed in Israeli attacks.

The United Nations estimates that nearly half the buildings in the northern Gaza Strip were hit or leveled in the attacks. Foreign analysts, relying on satellite images, reported on Thursday that in the seafront sector in western Gaza City, a small opening remained in the Israeli encirclement, about four kilometers wide, but it too leads only to the sea, which is controlled by Israeli vessels.

There are several quite positive signs resulting from the Israeli troops’ progress. It’s evident that the IDF has recovered from the initial shock and is now operating better in the Gaza Strip. The rocket fire into the south of Israel, and more so into the center, was very much reduced this week, possibly reflecting difficulties in Hamas’ command structure. Some 15 battalion- or equivalent-level commanders in the organization have been killed in the IDF’s actions, and in some cases their deputies were also killed.

Hamas is disseminating fake news about the killing of senior IDF officers and massive destruction of armored vehicles, apparently attesting to difficulties in displaying genuine achievements to date. The flow of refugees fleeing from the north to the south in the Gaza Strip is growing apace, despite interference by Hamas. That too is a sign of distress in its ranks. The IDF is showing signs of inflicting more systematic damage on the tunnels (though a move is still needed that will help transform them from an asset into a burden for Hamas). Ranking figures in Hamas, such as Saleh Aruri, are complaining to Hezbollah for its refusal to mobilize fully in the battle for the benefit of the Palestinians.

Brutal message

The first goal of the war, as set forth to the IDF, is the destruction of Hamas’ military capability and governing infrastructure. In the desired concluding state of affairs, it’s stated, “no security threat emanates from the Gaza Strip for an indefinite period.” The army is also being called on to beef up the sense of personal security and national resilience among the country’s citizens, to restore the sense of security to the residents of the Gaza Envelope – the Israeli communities adjacent to the Gaza Strip – to establish security buffer zones in the Gaza Strip, to create conditions for the return of the captives, to deter enemies and project strength in all sectors and to prepare for possible escalation in the northern arena.

That is more professional and substantive language than the bellicose public rhetoric being spouted by the political decision-makers. IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi prefers to speak in terms of dismantling Hamas’ capabilities, and is also being careful not to scatter promises about eradicating the seed of Amalek (referring to an enemy of the Israelites mentioned in the Bible). But even the official goals are ambitions, and the ability to achieve them depends on three factors: wielding effective military might, allocating sufficient time, and the ability to operate in the southern Gaza Strip as well, where attacks on Hamas have been relatively few because of the large-scale movement of civilians to that area.

IDF chief Herzl Halevi and Shin Bet head Ronen Bar in their situation assessment.Credit: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit

Haaretz chief editor Aluf Benn wrote on Thursday that Israel has already executed another dramatic move, stemming from the sheer fact of evacuating the civilians to the south and the immense destruction that has been wrought in the northern Gaza Strip. These results will preclude a reasonable way of life in the northern area for a lengthy period, the more so as Israel will likely prevent the return of people as long as the confrontation with Hamas continues. That too is part of the brutal message that Israel is sending the region following the blow it sustained, and in an attempt to prevent the fighting from spreading to additional arenas.

Still, the same trap that Israel fell into in the past lurks here as well, in the form of trying to impose Western logic on the analysis of the enemy’s intentions and capabilities. After all, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar went into the campaign knowing full well that Gaza would take a blow powerful enough to stir echoes of the 1948 Nakba. Nevertheless, in deciding to hugely escalate the struggle against Israel despite the tremendous damage that would certainly be caused to the 2 million people under his rule, Sinwar never blinked. It would be a serious mistake to infer from the difficulties he now faces that he will surrender or even be deterred under the pressure he is now under. We’ve already heard enough about a “weakened and deterred Hamas” from the government and from the IDF after the earlier, smaller operations in Gaza. No one will buy those used goods again.

Extensive reports this week in the New York Times and the Guardian detailed Hamas’ secret preparations for the terrorist attack and the underlying strategy. According to the Times, the assault was so murderous that it served one of the central aims of its planners: to decide the dispute within Hamas about the organization’s purpose – as a ruling body in Gaza, or a fighting body. The leaders in the Gaza Strip, Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, won that argument, and Hamas is now trying to impose a permanent state of combat against Israel, in the territories and on the borders, and to drag in the radical Shi’ite axis and Arab states.

From Israel’s standpoint, the time element of the operation is critical. The IDF commanders in the field are talking about a time frame of months to rid the northern Gaza Strip of military capabilities, but Washington is signaling that there won’t be more than a few weeks, even after a limited deal for the release of captives. After that, the U.S. is pressing for the fighting to take place in a different format.

Halevi’s predecessor as chief of staff, Aviv Kochavi, has been completely absent from public appearances in the media since the war began. This week he visited Britain as part of Israel’s efforts to secure European support for prolonged military action in the Gaza Strip. Participants who took part in a meeting Kochavi held with London’s Jewish community told Haaretz they understood from the former army chief that Israel needs several months to complete an effective operation against Hamas. After that, he thought, there will be no choice but to deal with the problem of the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s commando unit, which is deployed along the Lebanon border and possesses greater military abilities than its Hamas counterpart, the Nukhba Force, which Hamas sent to carry out the massacre on October 7. Like his successors in the IDF, Kochavi also admitted that the army had failed in its mission to protect the country’s citizens. It was, as one participant said, “a sad, sobering and a slightly frightening evening.”

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is now waging a rearguard political battle and is not balking at any dirty trick, even at the expense of the security personnel who are subordinate to him. Not only is the government failing in regard to addressing the needs of the citizens, but the strong parties in it (the far right and the Haredim) are continuing to insist on maintaining wasteful, superfluous ministries and on the continued flow of the coalition funds, even though the situation in the country has been totally transformed.

High motivation

Visits to Northern Command and the Air Force in the past week provided some relief from the still harsh situation in the south. In both venues, which were not directly responsible for the October 7 debacle, one sees a faster recovery than was registered in the General Staff, Military Intelligence, Shin Bet and Southern Command, amid the guilt feelings and the shock that the massacre fomented. Even so, the feeling of responsibility for the failure is collective. “I’ve been in uniform more than 35 years,” says a senior officer, “and all my life I was taught that my role is to be a barrier between the citizens and danger. On October 7 we failed. That’s not something you snap back from easily.”

Nevertheless, there’s no escaping the conclusion that the great offensive war machine that was upgraded in recent years in the IDF and in the intelligence community has resumed functioning. Those in Northern Command and in the Galilee Formation (91st Division) are not enthusiastic about the fact that the front against Hezbollah has dropped to second place in importance, given the events in Gaza. Like Kochavi, they too understand that the continuing presence of the Radwan Force along the security fence will not allow the inhabitants of the border communities to return home. The understanding in the north is that Gaza takes precedence at the moment, amid awareness of possible escalation with Hezbollah – and the need to deal with that problem afterward.

The United States is now putting out initial feelers toward working out a diplomatic mechanism which will again keep Hezbollah stationed north of the Litani River. The prospects here are not great, because Iran continues to view Hezbollah – Radwan, and especially the organization’s large arsenal of missiles – as its insurance policy against an Israeli or American attack targeting its nuclear facilities.

In this regard, it’s worth mentioning the uselessness of UNIFIL, the United Nations force in southern Lebanon. At the conclusion of the 2006 war, its status was upgraded and its size increased. In Security Council Resolution 1701 it was also tasked with keeping Hezbollah north of the Litani. Not only didn’t that ever happen, with Hezbollah creating a massive military force in the villages of the south, but staring in May 2022 the organization also started to deploy observation posts along the border itself.

The United Nations did nothing, and Israel didn’t dare attack the posts, just as it refrained (at the IDF’s recommendation) from taking action against Hezbollah’s manufacture of precision-guided missiles in Lebanon. Since Hezbollah started launching attacks along the fence, on October 8, UNIFIL has been thinning out its forces and distancing its personnel from danger. That’s an important lesson, both for the possible future situation in Lebanon and for the hopes of stationing an international force in the Gaza Strip in the future.

In the defenses in the north, the performance of the reserves has been impressive in the management of the sector (subject to Northern Command and the divisional command centers), with the majority of the regular force having been sent south or remaining as a reserve. The systematic blow to antitank and rocket squads of Hezbollah, with the aid of the air force and Military Intelligence, continues. The danger here at the moment is of a mistake being made (an attack on Lebanese civilians) or of an inordinate success. Too many losses for Hezbollah – to date more than 80 Lebanese fighters have been killed, including from Palestinian organizations – is liable to prompt the organization’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, to escalate the fighting, such as by launching rockets at the Haifa region. This week a small volley was fired at the Krayot, Haifa’s suburbs, and intercepted.

The aerial photographs received in the command centers show the immense damage wrought by the attacks, with the goal of distancing the danger. Before the war, in conjunction with the judicial coup legislation and the government’s attempts to widen the rifts in the nation, a systematic, toxic campaign was waged against the pilots. At its nadir, a video was posted in which a pilot supposedly refuses to assist a ground force that needs to be extracted, until he finds out where they stand on the coup issue. Nothing could be farther from the reality in Gaza. Every commander I spoke with emphasized that it would be impossible to act successfully without the regular aerial assistance.

That wasn’t enough, of course, and if the air force had received a prior alert, it might have been possible to deploy several pairs of Apache helicopters, which would likely have foiled the attack. But the pilots must not be blamed for what is not in their sphere of responsibility. The failure was a general one, of the entire security establishment, and not specifically of the air force.