https://www.meforum.org/64120/
Seth Frantzman, a Middle East correspondent at the Jerusalem Post, executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis (MECRA), and author of Drone Wars: Pioneers, Killing Machines, Artificial Intelligence, and the Battle for the Future, spoke to a January 30th Middle East Forum Webinar (video) about the significance of evolving drone technology and its impact on global conflicts. The following is a summary of his comments:
Frantzman’s analysis of drone technology and its transformation of warfare suggests the question, “Are drones for warfare what the tank was for warfare in the thirties and forties?” Available drones range from small, inexpensive handheld models to unmanned surface vessels at sea. The $200 million U.S. Global Hawk, a remotely piloted vehicle, also called an unmanned aerial system (UAV), conducts massive surveillance similar to the U-2 spy plane of the 1950s, but differs in that it is unmanned. The prototype for the U.S. Predator, a UAV regarded as the “sine qua non” of drone technology in the nineties and early 2000s, was developed by an Israeli in America after the U.S. Defense Department applied lessons learned from Israel’s drone innovations. The result was that both countries became known as the drone “global superpowers” of the 1980s and 1990s.
Although technology to build remote control planes already existed, Israel revolutionized the medium in the 1980s by marrying the relatively inexpensive drone technology with real-time video. The airborne drones were used to detect the location of Syrian air defenses in Lebanon and surrounding terrorist groups that used mobile surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) against Israel. The intelligence gathered by the expendable drones was then used by the Israel Air Force (IAF) to destroy the missile threat while mitigating the risk to pilots and expensive aircraft.
The explosion of drone warfare technology in the nineties and 2000s can be seen in the current state of affairs in the Middle East and elsewhere. Iranian drones built since the 1980s were used in the Iran-Iraq war, but the technology was unsophisticated. However, during the global war on terror, Iran was able to retrieve downed U.S. drones and “reverse engineer them.” Although the Islamic Republic does not possess the manufacturing capacity of the U.S., it does utilize its factories built by American technicians during the reign of the Shah.
A recent drone attack against a military facility in Iran is illustrative of the arsenal of advanced tools of warfare being employed by countries in conflict, but what Iranian drones lack in sophisticated technology, they make up for in volume. Thus, Iran is able to create an “instant air force” by arming its numerous drones with munitions and attacking Saudi oil facilities and ships in the Gulf of Oman. It also exports a large quantity of drones to Russia, which Moscow uses to “wage war on the cheap” against Ukraine. In return, Iran expects to receive technology transfers from Russia.
Israel is pioneering air defense systems to stop drone attacks, including lasers that are more efficient and cost-effective to deploy than the expensive Patriot and Iron Dome missiles. Israel has also provided unmanned surface vessels to the U.S. for patrolling the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
China, a rival for global hegemony with the U.S. and the West, uses its massive manufacturing capacity to build thousands of “knockoff” drones. While superior to Iranian drones, they are still not as effective or “durable” as drones with U.S. technology. China “has flooded the world’s drone market,” prioritizing sales to those willing to buy, regardless of their human rights record. Gulf States customers buy Chinese drones to fill the vacuum left by the U.S.’s unwillingness to provide armed drones that could be used to violate human rights. In the event of a conflict in the Pacific, China’s tactic would be to use an “overwhelming” mass of drones and hypersonic missiles against the U.S. Navy or a U.S.-friendly navy.
The next generation of drone technology in the West will be characterized by its use of artificial intelligence (AI), in which the drone utilizes deep learning to anticipate enemy behavior. AI’s predictive technology equips a soldier with the ability to deploy and control a portable drone that can be recalled and outfitted with a fresh battery or armed with munitions to “point and click” from a laptop and take advantage of a “target opportunity” to neutralize a terrorist.
Because it is a short-range air defense system that can shoot down drones, the Iron Dome is better suited for a small country like Israel than for a much larger country like Ukraine with its battlefield extending over a vast territory. Although Ukraine would have been well-served had it acquired more drones and better air defenses before the war, ultimately it will be the technology sent to Ukraine that will “decide that war” more than the “people in the field.”
Israel, the “most heavily defended air space in the entire world,” keeps ahead of drone threats because it cannot afford to have even one penetrate its defenses. While Iran outfits Hezbollah with drones that target gas platforms off the coast of Israel, Frantzman does not see them as a “game changer” because Iran and its proxies have been unable to unleash a drone swarm to attack “sensitive infrastructure” and overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome. Instead, he regards Hezbollah’s missile and precision- guided ammunition threat as Israel’s serious challenge. Tehran’s approach is to “give Israel lots of front lines everywhere” in order to make it more difficult for Jerusalem to counter the regime’s aim to destroy Israel.
An important case study cited by Frantzman is the role drones played in the recent conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Although Azerbaijan has the support of Israel, Turkey and the West and is financially sound, it was unable to acquire F-16s. Instead, it purchased a large number of Bayraktars, a smaller, cheaper version of the Predator drone from Turkey, as well as Israeli drones. Armenia, which used “old Soviet systems” and neglected to upgrade its air defenses, “was totally asleep at the wheel.” Azerbaijan dealt Armenia a blow and destroyed its “slow” army.
Azerbaijan accomplished its “limited goals” by using the drones, which do not win wars, but “fill a niche” by decimating an enemy’s ground forces. Manned aircraft, such as the F-35 stealth planes, a fifth generation aircraft with sophisticated technology, will still play an “important” role in waging warfare and will not become obsolete, despite the emerging advances in drone technology. Although a drone cannot do what the F-15 and F-35 can, the next step in drone technology will be “optionally manned” bombers.
Frantzman’s takeaway lesson for smaller countries like Azerbaijan is not to “waste money” waiting for an F-16 when drones have proven to be effective. As for the “big wars” such as Ukraine, Russia is not winning with its drones, and Ukraine may well “begin to win” if it receives help from the new “battlefield technology” drones with AI. That said, drones are “not at the point yet of being what the tank was for the Germans in 1940.”
Marilyn Stern is communications coordinator at the Middle East Forum.
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