By David Weinberger, AM THINKER
One of the most pervasive “isms” of our time is moral relativism, the idea that there is no standard of right and wrong independent of either our personal beliefs or our societal conventions. But in his book, A Refutation of Moral Relativism. Interviews With an Absolutist (Ignatius Press), philosopher Peter Kreeft exposes not only the incoherence of this thinking, but where it comes from, and why it remains so seductive.
The book is written in dialogue form, which makes it very readable for the non-philosopher. It begins by examining the nature of moral relativism. At its most basic level, relativism holds that morality is “subjective.” That is, morality is a matter of convention, like the laws of society. Just as laws differ from place to place, so standards of right and wrong vary from society to society, and even from one time period to another. For example, slavery was once widely regarded as acceptable, whereas today it is not. Ergo, morality changes, and we are responsible for changing it.
Now, this thinking is unfortunately quite popular, but not for its logic. In fact, as we will see, it is self-defeating. Yet one reason for its popularity is that it makes its adherents feel “open-minded” and “tolerant,” and it is difficult to dislodge an idea, no matter how logically problematic it is, when it provides its believers with a sense of moral superiority. Another reason for its popularity is that it offers a (false) sense of empowerment. After all, determining our own moral principles can feel empowering, as if we are little gods. But the truth is that real power lies in conforming ourselves to principles we discover rather than rules we make up. If there is any doubt about this, simply compare someone who obeys the principles of piano and performs Beethoven to someone who disregards those principles and haphazardly pounds whichever keys she feels like. Between the two, who displays real power over the piano? Likewise with morality. The virtuous person, the person who demonstrates self-mastery, is the one who follows objective moral principles — not the one who does whatever he wants.
However, if we want to know what grounds these principles, we must grasp a philosophical understanding that has its roots in Plato and Aristotle. For centuries, philosophers believed that to understand something required knowing four distinct explanations (or “causes”). First is the “formal cause,” which reveals the essence or nature of a thing. It answers the question, “What is it?” For example, identifying this pen as a “pen.” Second is the “efficient cause,” which is what causes something to exist. In the case of the pen, the machines that assembled it constitute the efficient cause. Third is the “material cause,” which explains what a thing is made of, i.e. the plastic, the ink, and the other relevant materials that make up the pen. Fourth is the “final cause,” which explains the end or purpose of a thing, which, in the case of a pen, is to write. This doctrine is known as “the four causes.” Now, what does it have to do with morality?
As Kreeft shows, because natures and purposes (formal and final causes) were traditionally understood to be built into the fabric of reality, philosophers believed that by investigating the nature of something, it was possible to discover purposes within it, and that fulfilling these purposes enabled the thing in question to flourish as a member of its kind. For example, by observing dogs we come to understand that properties like barking, tail wagging, walking on four legs, panting, and seeking affection exhibit the nature of dogs, or “dogness” (the formal cause). We can also see that this nature “points to” or “aims at” certain ends (final causes), and that fulfilling these ends is what makes a dog flourish as a member of its kind. For instance, dogs seek affection, so showing them love and attentiveness is good insofar as it fulfills their nature and helps them thrive as members of their species; conversely, neglecting to give them care and attention is bad insofar as it frustrates the ends built into their nature.
This conception of natures (formal causes) and purposes (final causes) was believed to permeate all of reality, including the human person. This meant that, as with dogs or anything else, we could investigate human nature and its ends to discover what is required for human flourishing, so that acting in accord with those ends constitutes what is good for us, while acting contrary to those ends constitutes what is bad for us. In other words, moral principles are discernible based on our nature. In philosophy this is known as “natural law.”
Unfortunately, this understanding changed following the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution, when the notions of “formal cause” (the nature of a thing) and “final cause” (the end or purpose of a thing) were either abandoned or reduced to “efficient cause” (what causes a thing to exist) and “material cause” (what a thing is made of). No longer were natures or purposes treated as legitimate features of reality, which meant that the notion of objective morality lost its intellectual basis. If there is no such thing as human nature — that is, if we do not know what makes a person a human being rather than, say, a lion or a stone — then we cannot know what fulfills the ends that are built into our nature and act according to them, meaning that we cannot derive moral principles from nature itself. Morality thus becomes “relative.”
That, unfortunately, is the prevalent attitude today, despite the fact that it is self-refuting. To see why, simply ask: Is it relative that “morality is relative”? Either answer dooms the thesis. If “yes,” then it is not true. If “no,” then it turns out that there is in fact an objective moral principle after all (that “morality is relative”), meaning that relativism is false. Of course, there are other problems with relativism too, and Kreeft does a nice job surveying them in the book.
He also refutes common objections to objective morality. One such challenge alleges that there is not in fact an absolute basis of morality because morality is simply the product of evolution — a mere instrument for biological survival. According to this view, our ancestors who cooperated with one another and practiced altruism were naturally selected for survival, and we have simply inherited these instincts. Ergo, morality is nothing but instinct. But this objection, Kreeft shows, does not wash. While there is no reason to doubt that we have inherited instincts from our ancestors, including the survival instinct, it nevertheless remains the case that we choose which instincts to follow and which not to follow. After all, our instincts often conflict with one another, so we must decide among them. Kreeft uses a brilliant analogy here. Our instincts, he says, are like the keys on a piano, and morality is like the sheet music. The sheet music tells us which keys to play. Likewise, moral principles tell us which instincts to engage and which to ignore, meaning that morality itself must be more than mere instinct.
But this is just a small sampling of the many insights in the book. For that, and for the fact that we stand at such a morally confused moment in history, A Refutation of Moral Relativism packs a message that we can simply no longer afford to ignore.
“The Thesis of
Domains of Belief
The major assumption of this thesis is that there are 4 intrinsic demands which are made by the human psyche:
Demand to explain – why do trees grow this way? Or why do they bear fruits in one season and not another etc. This demand produces an enormous array of beliefs which we call Scientific Knowledge
Demand for influence and control in our environment (both physical and social) – techniques by which we can transform things to suit our needs – This is the demand that leads to Technology.
Demand to justify – our own actions and ask for the justification of others’ actions – This is the demand that leads to Ethics
Demand to seek significance in our existence – what is it that gives a point to my existence? What is the purpose of my life? – This is the demand that produces Religion.
Each domain has its own clear and distinct methodology, with its own set of rules, as well as its own distinct area of application.
Today we can separate these domains. However, in the early history of humanity there was no clear understanding of the separation of these domains. As civilizations advanced, the various demands gained prominence and separated from the collective – forming their own distinctive domain of belief.
To apply the rules and methodologies of one domain to the applications of another is what is creating tremendous confusion and intellectual transgression. Conversely, the clear application of the methodologies of each domain to applications within the same domain will present clarity and the disappearance of much of the intellectual confusion in discussion and debate, as well as in daily life.
For an in-depth discussion, please see the interview.”
https://www.kdirani.com/dob.htm
The interviews can be atched for free on Youtube.
@Edward That’s the Christian version attributed to Jesus of which George Bernard Shaw quipped, “Don’t do unto others as you would have them do unto you, they may have different tastes.” *
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The Jewish version, attributed to Hillel, a few years earlier, is harder to mock:
“Don’t do unto others that which is hateful to yourself.”
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* Shaws quip reminds me of the joke about the sadist’s nasty reply to the masochists’s pleas to hurt him: “no.”
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But both of those, are in their turn, reasonably turned on their head by the dictum in the Babylonian Talmud, “If somebody is coming to kill you, get up early in the morning and kill him first.”
If this sounds extreme or impractical in a civil context, it did not, when Bibi quoted it to justify Israel’s pre-emptive attacks on Iranian positons in Syria and was obviously a valid justification for the attacks on Iraq and Syria’s nuclear plants, the pre-emtive jump, by a matter of hours, against Egyptian forces in 1967, which Israelophobes love to cite as an examole of Israeli aggression, and so much more.
I believe everything is context bound. My Philosophy of Science Professor, K.D. Irani, who had come to Princeton on Einstein’s recommendation, said that Einstein gave up on his goal of formulating a universal field theory because he found that the more useful a formula the more particular the application, and the more universally accurate descriptively, , the less useful it was,
Professor Irani came up with his theory of “Domains of Belief.” There is a several part series of interviews with him.
He also was, though I didn’t inow it at the time, the leader of New York’s Zorastrian Community. He was a courtly elderly gentleman from an Indian family who left Iran generations before and had a thick, jovial Indian accent and a white ghotee.
He said he used to travel wirh his father, who was a famous professor, when he was a boy, and regaled us with many delightful personal and professional anecdotes of famous early 20th century philosophers.
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I might add the much came out of Eastwrn philosopgies
I believe this dissertation on moral relativism is more complex than it need to be. Moral relativism is a product of the modern Left that has abandoned the signposts and guideposts of Judeo-Christian morality because it has erroneously focused on the past failings of Western civilization instead of focusing on how much progress has been made from Western civilization’s beginnings among the Hebrew prophets and Greek philosophers.
In effect, the Left has lost patience with the slow pace of civilizational progress and has decided to replace a divinely-inspired, faith-based system of morality (that has withstood the test of time) with a completely new system of relative morality based on the vague concept of “wokeness” and on an absolute belief in the communist credo that established religion “is the opiate of the masses.”
Remarkably, the Right understands that Western civilization has not gone off-the-rails, and that Judeo-Christian morality has been the driving force behind the progress that has been made to date.
As some (unnamed) person said to Woody Allen…”You’re a better horn player than you sound”‘…..
Moral relativism is only a tactic for those out of power. Triumphant revolutionary moralists have their own alternate code and are always more draconic in enforcing it at least as back as Moses, whether Left or Right.
Ahh so !
Why not do unto others as we would have them do unto us ?
Eddie
“ The fastest way to succeed is to look as if you’re playing by somebody else’s rules, while quietly playing by your own.“ — Michael Korda British writer 1933.
“ Several recent inaccurate references on the Harpsichord List to the
notorious “You play it your way, and I will play it his way” anecdote
finally goaded me into going to a dear and treasured friend who was an
eyewitness to the incident and asking her for a written account in the
hope that, in the future, people will not only recount the story
accurately but also in a way that truly reflects the spirit with which the
“infamous” remark was made.
Denise Restout, as almost every subscriber to this List knows, came to
Wanda Landowska as a pupil in 1933, and stayed with her until Landowska’s
death 26 years later as amanuensis, friend, and confidante. Denise still
lives in WL’s house in Lakeville, Connecticut, and, as I know first hand,
this warm, gracious, and ebullient lady has preserved it and its contents
so carefully that the visitor expects WL to walk into the room at any
moment.
Denise was present when the exchange took place and remembers it vividly.
With her gracious permission and with the generous forebearance of Dave
Kelzenberg, I now share her recollections, verbatim and in their entirety,
with the List:
Dear Teri:
As per your request, here is the true story of “You play it _your_ way and
I play it _his_ way”.
On June 26, 1941, Casals — who resided at Prades, Pyrenees Orientales,
away from the Spanish Government, came to visit Wanda Landowska in
Banyuls/sur/mer, a few miles away, where she had been living since she had
to leave St-Leu under the threat of the Nazi’s invasion. By that time
(June 1941) she had received, thanks to a generous loan of money from a
student, a Pleyel harpsichord. It was housed in a small ground floor
room, not far from our apartment.
Casals came with his secretary and a couple of friends, Mr. & Mrs.
Alavedra. Wanda played for them, and she and Casals began to discuss some
aspects of Bach’s interpretation, especially the question of
ornamentation. Casals asked Wanda why she played the trills starting with
the upper note, admitting that he was not certain that it was always the
case. Wanda explained to him her reasons, and — for further evidence —
she asked me to go to the apartment to fetch the original edition of
Leopold Mozart’s _Violinschule_, one of the very few precious books we had
saved from St-Leu. It contains a clear description of the way trills
should be realized. Casals listened, looked at the book, but still was
not convinced. So, with a smile, Wanda said to him:
“Mon cher Pau (as she called him) ne discutons pas davantage. Continuez a
jouer Bach a _votre_ facon et moi, a _sa_ facon.”
“Let us not fight anymore. Continue to play Bach _your_ way and I, _his_
way.”
They both laughed and went on to other subjects.
A great and long friendship existed between them as well as a very sincere
mutual admiration. Wanda’s “boutade” was taken exactly for what it was:
a jestful pun.
When I was told, years later, that this story was attributed to Landowska
towards Rosalyn Tureck, I was very surprised. I had no proof of it and
always doubted that it ever happened that way.
I wish that we could put an end to this stupid distortion of the facts.