An Israeli-Palestinian crisis sparked by irresponsible actions, combined with an Israeli drift away from liberal values, could reshape a decades-long relationship between the U.S. and Israel
By Alon Pinkas, HAARETZ
Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Vice President Joe Biden in Jerusalem in 2010.Credit: Ronen Zvulun/Reuters
It’s fashionable in the punditocracy and in the incoming Israeli opposition that a crisis in U.S.-Israel relations is inevitable. Not a day has gone by since the election without a report on “U.S. concerns,” “the administration is warning privately,” “Israeli policies will be watched vigilantly” or “Washington is unhappy.”
Perhaps. The ingredients are definitely there, but for a visible crisis to erupt, an Israeli policy has to be perceived as provocative. Forecasting a crisis without such evidence is speculation and political expediency.
On the flip side, dismissing a potential crisis by saying “this is the democratically elected government” and “don’t listen to incendiary statements, look at the policy in due course” is conveniently gullible or delusional.
The next year could be an inflection point in U.S.-Israeli relations – not a comprehensive rupture or a public exchange of resentment, but an incremental yet fundamental shift away from the unwavering alliance between two shining cities on a hill.
There’s an important distinction here. An Israeli-Palestinian crisis sparked by Israeli actions that Washington warned against and deems contrary to its interests is one thing. But if that crisis also evolves out of antidemocratic legislation considered inimical to U.S. values, the rift is unprecedented.
The United States is calling for “restraint” and imploring Israel to “refrain from unilateral steps.” This will end the moment the Netanyahu government does just one or two of the things it pledges to do in the West Bank.
At that point Washington will have to make a decision: Ignore it, unless the situation directly affects U.S. interests, or confront Israel head-on, something a Biden administration focusing elsewhere may be averse to. The Americans will be disappointed to learn that they don’t really have an Israeli opposition to flirt with as allies. The disorganized opposition has a domestic agenda, but on the Palestinian issue or Iran, there is no real opposition.
For many years, Israel’s center-left has suffered from a false-romance syndrome regarding the United States. It’s the wishful allure of “American pressure” to force Israel “to do the right thing” and end the occupation, coupled with withdrawal symptoms leading to panic.
Wake up. The United States won’t intervene in Israeli politics, won’t apply pressure, won’t threaten to withhold military or diplomatic assistance, and won’t coerce Israel and the Palestinians into an agreement. Israel, believe it or not, isn’t on the top-10 list of U.S. foreign policy priorities.
For many years the Israeli right and far right – now a merged entity – suffered from a false-bravado syndrome regarding the Americans. It was a combination of “we won’t let the U.S. dictate Israel’s policy,” “the U.S. can’t be trusted as an ally, they desert allies,” “they don’t get the Middle East (but we do, of course),” and “we can manage without them, and anyway, Netanyahu has an American accent and Donald Trump loves him, so he’ll maneuver and manage.”
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Wake up. The relationship is already fractured. On a host of foreign policy issues the disparity is already wide. A new Israeli government that threatens confrontation with the Palestinians and takes Israel to the brink of apartheid through legislation and actions may tangentially damage U.S. interests. This could become a significant disincentive for the United States to defend Israel in international forums, whether the United Nations or the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
Netanyahu knows he’s under a powerful magnifying glass in Washington, based on his conduct with the Americans over the years. Arguably, he’s confident he can steer Israel’s relations with the United States and avert a crisis.
He’s probably wrong. To placate Washington, he would almost inevitably have to renege on his coalition agreements. That wouldn’t be a first for Netanyahu, but given that his only agenda is to legislate a way out of his corruption trial, he’s far more a hostage of his coalition than he ever was.
At some point in the next three or four months, Netanyahu will travel to Washington. He’ll proclaim that “Joe and I go back 30 years.” He’ll put on the most innocent of faces and sanctimoniously say that no one but no one has diligently protected the idea of bipartisanship more than he.
He’ll then reiterate his great relationship with Democrats over the years, noting that even the closest friends sometimes have different ideas or approaches, and this never affected his profound love for America. He’ll pledge that Israel will refrain from any “unilateral steps.” “I assured the president,” he’ll declare in his baritone, “that Israel won’t initiate any status-quo-altering steps and policies, and the U.S. will be apprised privately of everything.”
He’ll then be asked about the “senior administration sources” who say that any unilateral Israeli moves regarding the settlements, the Temple Mount, creeping annexation and friction with the Palestinians will “damage security cooperation between the U.S. and Israel.” Netanyahu will respond that this is an affront to his good intentions and respect for the administration, and whoever said this is bent on undermining his goodwill.
As the platitudes flow, he’ll be repetitious about the “unshakable alliance,” “shared values,” “sister democracies” and “the fight against terrorism,” as the two sides “jointly confront Iran’s nuclear ambitions.” Knowing that he must change the narrative to accommodate his political agenda, Netanyahu will rekindle the Iran issue. Once again he’ll warn that Tehran is threatening Western civilization. Once again he’ll alert the world that it’s 1938 again – and he’ll seek U.S. assurances.
Except that now in Washington he’s considered the least credible messenger about the looming Iranian threat. After all, there was his 2015 speech in Congress against Barack Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran (recall who the vice president was), and Netanyahu’s encouragement of Trump to withdraw from the deal in 2018. And now Iran is continuing its progress toward fissile material that puts it firmly on the “nuclear threshold” spectrum. So Netanyahu’s credibility on Iran is dubious.
The Biden administration has little if any expectations of Netanyahu’s far-right government. Washington’s best-case scenario isn’t forging a “peace process” – that won’t happen – but avoiding an escalation of violence. A weak Palestinian Authority, a far-right Israeli government and a disengaged U.S. administration focusing on Ukraine and China aren’t conducive to U.S. involvement.
But Biden, who also knows Netanyahu for 30 years and has probably reached a different conclusion on the quality of their relationship, may be compelled to react. Even before Netanyahu has a coalition, the incendiary rhetoric is dominating. There’s a long list of issues that the United States may be forced to respond to: the Temple Mount, expulsions, annexation, the legalization of settlements, the ending of any chance for territorial contiguity for a Palestinian state, and a welter of antidemocratic legislation that questions the “shared values” concept.
In the next few months the United States will be politely and quietly observing where declarations and rhetoric become policy. As long as the actions are domestic, Washington won’t officially comment, even though Democrats in Congress and the vast majority of American Jews will be increasingly alienated by what they see. For some, America’s diplomatic umbrella for Israel, an almost no-questions-asked policy for decades, will become untenable.
Could this fellow possibly be as naïve as he sounds?
Or is this mindset just the result of years of intellectual atrophy in and among the elite?