The future belongs to Ben Gvir

By Ted Belman

What follows is an excerpt from a Sept 12th article by Judy Maltz in Haaretz titled “Why So Many Young Israelis Adore This Racist, Politician” :

Ben-Gvir’s recent surge in the polls is often attributed to his growing appeal among young Jewish Israelis – particularly ultra-Orthodox men and traditional Mizrahi voters from the country’s geographic periphery. What became abundantly clear last week was that his appeal is spreading to less likely quarters – in this case, one of the last bastions of the secular left in Israel.

About 30 students from Blich waited outside for Ben-Gvir when he arrived at the school, greeting him with the notorious anti-Arab chant “Your village should burn.” He also earned himself a loud round of applause when he entered the auditorium to address the student body.

Soon afterward, he happened upon a group of Tel Aviv Scouts on an outing in the park – and this time it was an even a more enthusiastic reception. The encounter, which was caught on camera and went viral on social media, shows the young middle-schoolers jostling for selfies with Israel’s most racist right-wing politician.

That members of a youth movement that has produced many of Israel’s best and brightest would be fawning over such an extremist was jolting enough. That it happened in the center of Tel Aviv – a city synonymous with liberalism and tolerance – was mind-boggling. But it came as no surprise to Israel Democracy Institute researcher Or Anabi, who has been tracking the growing popularity of the right in Israel – especially among young people – in recent years.

His brand-new analysis, based on the results of half a dozen surveys conducted this year, shows that about 60 percent of Jewish Israelis identify today as right-wing. Among young Israelis (ages 18 to 24), it tops 70 percent.

Indeed, according to his analysis (published here for the first time), Ben-Gvir’s party performs significantly better among young voters.

The figures show that among this particular age group, 7 percent voted for Religious Zionism in the March 2021 election. This compares with 5.6 percent among 25- to 44-year-olds; 2.9 percent among 45- to 64-year-olds; and 3.4 percent among the over 65s.

The percentage of young Israelis who voted for Religious Zionism was more than double the percentage voting for either Labor or Meretz – the two left-wing Zionist parties.

The usual explanation for the popularity of right-wing parties among young Israelis is demographic: religious Israelis vote overwhelmingly for the right, and religious families tend to have far more children than nonreligious families.

Anabi believes this is only part of the story, though. Ben-Gvir’s recent surge in the polls, he says, reflects growing racism in Jewish society as a whole. “In the past, Jewish Israelis defined themselves as right or left based on how they viewed the conflict with the Palestinians and its solution,” he says. “But nobody is talking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the status of the territories anymore. Increasingly, Jewish Israelis are defining themselves as right or left based on their attitude to the Arab minority living within Israel.”

The violence that broke out in Israel’s mixed Jewish-Arab cities in May 2021, which was unprecedented in scope, was a pivotal factor in Ben-Gvir’s rising star, Anabi says. “It raised deep questions about whether Jews and Arabs could ever live together peacefully,” he adds.

The fact that, for the first time in Israeli history, an Arab party joined the ruling coalition a month after these events might have served as a mitigating factor. But, actually, says Anabi, the opposite is true.

“Until Mansour Abbas joined the government,” he says, referring to the head of the Islamist United Arab List, “Jews were used to the idea that Arabs are never part of the power game. But once they did become part of it, as we’ve seen, they’re drawing much more fire.”

Drawn to extremists

What concerns him is that Ben-Gvir has become normalized.

Noa Lavie, head of the political communications division at the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Academic College, was involved in a large study several years ago comparing the political views of young people in developed countries. The study found that after young Hungarians, young Israelis were more right wing than their peers in any other country.

Lavie attributes this to several factors, including Israel’s religious radicalization, an educational system that focuses on a narrative of the Jews and Israelis as victims while ignoring the narrative of the Palestinians, and growing incitement against the left.

“If Israelis are shocked by what’s happening, they need to get over it and face the fact that right now, the bon ton for young people is to be right wing and see the Arabs as the enemy,” she says. “That’s why Ben-Gvir is so popular.”

More recently. Haaretz published Will Israel’s Shifting Demographics Keep It Right-wing Forever?

Young supporters and volunteers of UTJ celebrate the right wing’s victory according to the polls, last night, at the party’s headquarters in Jerusalem.Credit: Itay Ron

Currently,12 percent of the population of Israel is Haredi. The Central Bureau of Statistics forecasts that by 2065, the percentage of Haredim in the general population will more than double, to 32 percent. If the political identification of the Haredim becomes more right-wing than religious in nature, this can mean only one thing: demography is about to dictate the final decision in the struggle over the character of the country, which would then become a right-wing state forever.

This demographic forecast paints the alliance between Benjamin Netanyahu and the Haredi parties in a different hue, as well as Netanyahu’s continued capitulation to their every demand.

Only last month, Netanyahu ceded Israel’s first chance in decades to introduce the study of core curriculum subjects into Haredi school systems by thwarting the Education Ministry’s attempt to reach agreements on this issue with the schools operated by the Belz Hasidim.

In addition, as part of his election campaign, Netanyahu actively promoted the idea of free preschools for children aged 0-3, a benefit that would encourage childbirth and primarily serve the Haredi population.

By taking these two steps, Netanyahu linked Haredi demographics to the bloc of right-wing parties: he wants to make sure that the Haredim continue their high birth rates and study as little as possible of the core curriculum. That would mean their demographic growth continuing to ensure the right-wing bloc’s majority.

Will Haredi demographics dictate the final decision on the struggle between the political blocs in Israel? Most commentators feel that that is the case. The more pessimistic among them are even forecasting that Israel is marching along the same path as Turkey – toward a religious autocratic democracy, with a secular minority that is forced to grit its teeth. But other pundits disagree.

[…]

But all this changed in 1990, in the wake of the attempt by Shimon Peres to bring down Yitzhak Shamir’s government by linking the Alignment (predecessor of the current Labor Party) with the religious parties. Shach blocked the move and explained, in a famous speech, that “there are kibbutzim that do not know what Yom Kippur is, do not know what Shabbat is, do not know what a mikveh is, and that raise rabbits and pigs. So in what way are they Jews?”

Shach thereby ensured that the Haredim would always choose the right-wing parties – not because of their diplomatic positions, but because of their emphasis on tradition and religion.

There is no argument between all commentators about the Haredi community regarding the Haredi public’s disgust for left-wing parties, thanks to their perception as being anti-religious. But what began as a disagreement with the left-wing bloc solely on matters of separation of religion and state has over the years evolved into a clear bias toward right-wing, nationalist, and even racist positions.

“The Haredim are the most illiberal and racist group in Israel,” says Shuki Friedman, vice president of the Jewish People Policy Institute. Friedman backs up his position with public opinion polls in which the opinions of the Haredi public toward Arab citizens of Israel were examined. For example, a poll from 2019 asked if Jews in Israel were entitled to more rights in comparison with Arab citizens. Approximately 76 percent of Haredim agreed with the statement, as opposed to only 20 percent of secular Jews.

Intifada memories

“The Haredim are the most right-wing population group in Israel, even further right than [the] Religious Zionism [party],” says ?aim Zicherman of Ono Academic College and the Jewish People Policy Institute, “and that is in spite of the fact that Haredim do not necessarily support the idea of a ‘Greater Land of Israel.’”

Their solidarity with the right derives from a combination of religious conservatism, absence of pluralism, lack of civic studies, a worldview that sanctifies the Jewish nation and places it before universal and democratic values – as well a withdrawal from society and a lack of familiarity with Arabs. Haredim have little or no contact with the Palestinian population, a natural consequence of not performing military service.

“It’s not that Haredim are racists,” says Hirshman, “It is a matter of beliefs. The left promotes universal values, whereas the Haredim believe in the uniqueness of the Jewish people.”

Neri Horowitz, a lecturer in the School of Public Policy at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, also cites the community’s concern for personal safety. The attacks of the second intifada, during which Haredim were exposed to heightened danger due to their greater use of public transport, left deep scars, as well as a yearning for a strongman who could show the Arabs “who’s boss.” Horowitz also cites the connection between conservative worldviews and an inferior socioeconomic situation. “Racism is the snobbery of the poor,” he says. “‘I may be poor, but I am at least better than the Arabs.’”

The success of the Religious Zionism party among Haredim stems from a confluence of circumstances. These include the charismatic figure of Itamar Ben-Gvir, the continued and closer association between the Haredim and the so-called Hardalim – an acronym for ultra-Orthodox-nationalists – and most of all, the protest vote against veteran Haredi political parties. The “Lithuanians” hear Rabbi Yitzhak Goldknopf, the Hasidic leader of the United Torah Judaism party, talking about continued seclusion from Israeli society and the prohibition on employment, and are horrified.

“There is a younger generation here that is voting with its feet,” says Rabbi Eli Paley, founder of the Haredi Institute for Public Affairs. “They feel that Haredi politicians are ignoring them. This is a generation that wants more openness, with employment and with state Haredi schools. The Haredi parties have failed to represent these interests.”

There is no doubt that the revolt against the Haredi parties is a demonstration of the increased diversity within Haredi society. Young people who are voting for Ben-Gvir instead of for UTJ are naturally those who are less committed to the Haredi establishment. Almost certainly, these are young Haredim who will both study and want to work. In other words, this is a vote that testifies to the increased openness of Haredi society – although this openness is moving politically in only one direction: the right. “Integration into Israeli society via nationalism” is how Horowitz defines it.

‘Israel will never be Turkey’

Does this mean that the Haredim have tipped the scales to the point that Israel will forever remain a state with a solid right-wing majority? A majority of the commentators feel that that is the case, but not all of them. Paley articulates the dilemma that also bothered Shach: How is it possible, on the one hand, to support the nationalism of Ben-Gvir, and on the other hand, not serve in the military?

Paley wonders if this contradiction might eventually trigger the increase of complaints against Haredim even among right-wing voters in Israel, and in so doing put distance between the Haredim and the right-wing bloc. “As long as the left-wing bloc is identified with Meretz and with the Reform Rabbi Gilad Kariv, there’s no chance of the Haredim considering any joining of forces with this bloc,” he says. “But should a centrist bloc form – one that was more traditional and that would be close to Judaism, there is definitely a chance for political change.”

Of course, the possibility of a moderate rabbinic leadership – such as that of Rabbi Elazar Shach or of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef – is always there. Such a leadership would consent to having links with the left-wing parties, even though the Haredi public is largely right-wing. But the current revolt against the Haredi parties, incited in part because they are seen as being not right-wing enough in the eyes of the Haredi youth, raises the question of whether the rabbis will dare to take a position that runs counter to that of their public.

Hirshman’s assessment is that demography is charting the political map of Israel in favor of the right, and against the left. If there’s any chance at all of change, in his view, it will only come from new developments, such as a renewed wave of immigration from Russia, a surge in the phenomenon of Haredim leaving the Orthodox lifestyle, or factionalism within Haredi society – such as the secession of the so-called Jerusalem faction, which opted to boycott the elections in Israel and in so doing reduced the electoral strength of the Haredi public by 7 percent.

Nevertheless, demography could assume a different face. Zikherman thinks that development of Haredi society will change as the proportion of Haredim in the general population grows.

“We will never be Turkey,” Zikherman says, “because the Haredim don’t want to and cannot be a controlling majority. What would the Haredim separate themselves from, if they became a majority? It is obvious that the more the percentage of Haredim in the population grows, so will the diversity within them. The gap will become increasingly wide, the phenomenon of Haredim leaving the ultra-Orthodox lifestyle will increase, and the Haredim will then focus on upholding the values of their community, at the expense of other issues.”

Even though the RZP benefitted from the support from young Haredim, Shas didn’t suffer. Shas achieved dramatically more seats (11) this time around. One must conclude that both parties benefited from the very high turnout  of the Haredim.