After Snagging Elections, This Time Netanyahu Might Fundamentally

T. Belman. One of the big frustrations the Right has had with Bibi was that he was too centrist. He now has to be more aggressive in subduing Arab terrorism and the Arab narrative. And more aggressive in draining the swamp and in reforming the High Court and making the Knesset  the voice of Israel and not the Court.

The Religious Zionist Party will insist on it.

The former prime minister hasn’t been big on military adventures or changes to the judicial system, but his need to cancel his corruption trial is converging with far-right partners keen to curb the Supreme Court

By Amos Harel, HAARETZ

Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud party waged an amazingly well-engineered and disciplined campaign over the past two months. Likud’s loudmouth backbenchers were silenced until the polling stations closed.

The alliance with far-rightist Itamar Ben-Gvir was downplayed and Netanyahu came across as responsible, almost statesmanlike. Every time he was asked if he envisioned dramatic legislation if he became prime minister, he was deliberately vague.

But one election billboard stood out, the gloomy-looking one with the caption: “That’s it. We’ve had enough.” It depicts outgoing Prime Minister Yair Lapid and his coalition partner, Mansour Abbas of the United Arab List. Thanks to the wonders of Photoshop, it also includes Arab lawmakers Ayman Odeh and Ahmad Tibi, who actually did all they could to help Netanyahu topple Lapid’s “government of change.”

The “had enough” message seems to have sunk in among supporters of Likud, Religious Zionism and the ultra-Orthodox parties. It’s likely that the message also helped Netanyahu win Tuesday’s election. Along with identity politics and support for Netanyahu’s battle for survival against a legal system that, by his account, is persecuting him, another critical factor was in play Tuesday: hatred of Arabs and the desire to keep them out of positions of power.

As is his wont, Netanyahu skillfully played on racist sentiment while spreading nonsense claims about the Bennett-Lapid-Gantz government giving 53 billion shekels ($15 billion) to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.

The fear and hatred toward Arab Israelis intensified after the riots in mixed Jewish-Arab cities during Israel’s air war with Gaza in May 2021 – which, by the way, took place toward the end of Netanyahu’s last term as prime minister. Another development also apparently didn’t get enough media attention: a jump in Arab crime against Jews (burglary and agricultural theft, protection rackets, rioting), mainly in the Galilee and Negev.

These developments, which increased during Netanyahu’s tenure, worsened over the past year. The general sense was one of a loss of governance and personal security – the issue actually is more with Arab Israelis than with Palestinians in the territories. Likud continues to hitch a ride on clear demographic trends, taking advantage of the fact that for many Israelis – “traditional,” religious-Zionist and ultra-Orthodox Jews – Arabs in the government are a red rag that must be fought with all one’s might.

And while Netanyahu was bolstering his camp early in the election campaign, forging agreements, the other side – from the disastrous arrogance of Labor Party leader Merav Michaeli to the infighting among the Arab parties – was causing self-inflicted wounds.

In his 15 years in power – two stretches interrupted by a decade – we’ve witnessed Netanyahu’s many faces. Often there have been gaps between his belligerent rhetoric and his actions. His threats against Israel’s enemies haven’t translated into military adventures, and his attacks on the legal system haven’t yet resulted in attempts to fundamentally change Israel’s democracy.

But this time, of course, the circumstances are different. Now we’re seeing a confluence between a need (legislation to cancel Netanyahu’s corruption trial) and a capability (a new far-right government with partners who would happily curb the Supreme Court’s power – and that of the police and state prosecution).

The few times when Netanyahu has commented on possible legal reforms, he has blurted out something about a committee that would consider the issue and make recommendations. We can assume that the members of such a panel have been identified, along with the objectives. The outcome would be the suspension of Netanyahu’s trial, but it would be accompanied by legislation that could fundamentally change Israeli democracy. Jurists following the issue say the new governing coalition can easily complete the process in months, subject maybe to new street protests against Netanyahu.

The left wing’s traditional moaning and groaning about the country coming to an end isn’t of much use. Contrary to assessments that have been floated in recent days, it’s doubtful that Israeli newspapers will be shut down or that members of the LGBTQ community will be thrown off rooftops – or that concentration camps will be set up for opponents of the regime. But what’s planned is bad enough.

We can’t ignore the meteoric rise of a party half of whose people are supporters of Meir Kahane espousing a racist ideology. This is where politics and ideology have possible implications on the security situation. The next cabinet will include politicians on whom the Jewish division of the Shin Bet security service has thick files. Now Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar and his people may have to share sensitive information with them.

Security-cabinet decisions that potentially could bring Israel to the brink of war will be made with the participation of officials whose connection to military service, let alone combat missions, is very tenuous. A clear majority of United Torah Judaism’s voters and party leaders, as well as some of Shas’ voters, don’t serve in the army at all.

The Religious Zionism alliance has leaders who did reduced army service or had their service deferred (for those in tracks that combine military service and yeshiva studies or who worked as kashrut supervisors). Others the army didn’t want due to their extremist views. In recent weeks, there has also been justifiable renewed interest in the conflicting accounts that Lapid has provided about his military service. He ended up serving at the army’s now defunct Bamahane magazine.

Still, compared to some of the members of the incoming security cabinet, Lapid is almost a general. And in the cabinet that’s taking shape, the Religious Zionism chiefs are seen as itching for battle.

All this presents obstacles that Netanyahu will have to consider down the road, but they’re expected to receive priority only after the judicial system. Netanyahu could consider appointing retired general Yoav Gallant as defense minister, but he might seek to keep a large degree of influence over the ministry for himself. In such a case, Netanyahu’s appointments for national security adviser and Defense Ministry director general take on major importance.

We can cautiously assume that the two officials currently in these posts, Eyal Hulata and Maj. Gen. (res.) Amir Eshel, won’t stay on for long. Among the possible candidates are a national security adviser under Netanyahu, Meir Ben-Shabbat, and reserve generals Eyal Zamir and Amikam Norkin.

In January, Herzl Halevi takes over as military chief, and Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar and Mossad head David Barnea will remain in their positions. Halevi and Bar were appointed by the outgoing government, while Likud tried to stand in the way of Halevi’s appointment by a caretaker government. Once a new coalition government is formed, it won’t take long for the media to start using the hackneyed term “gatekeepers.”

November 3, 2022 | Comments »

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