A proactive approach against Iran’s proxies is needed.
Expert on cyber security, military strategy, and technology. AND
Military and security analyst, and chief (in the reserves) of the IDF Galilee Division Staff. JISS
Recent years have demonstrated that although Israel’s use of force may have slowed down the development of Iran’s plans, it has not been enough to derail the forces of the Shiite axis. Iran’s resolve presents Israel with a choice: either to take a strategic initiative against enemies that are still weaker than Israel is or to opt for a passive strategy that might lead to war against enemies who, together, represent conventional force close to symmetrical with Israel’s. In practice, this means a transition from a defensive strategy based on the “Iron Dome approach” to an offensive approach that places an “iron wall”1 against Iran’s ambitions.
Introduction
The IDF has long had to face dilemmas related to asymmetrical wars. A General Staff debate that took place almost 30 years ago about the future of war – occurring in the shadow of the devastation of the large regular Iraqi military by the professional U.S. Army, which in practice was much smaller in terms of fighting formations – an army expert caused some discomfort to the members of the General Staff forum by claiming that the era in which the state was the organization conducting wars was drawing to a close. The outcome would not be a world without wars, but a world characterized by asymmetrical conflicts. The future, he said, would feature wars against non-state organizations, and added that the past, including the recent past, proved that conventional armies are not well organized to confront such wars.2
This prediction has, in fact, come true. At least for now, conventional wars in our region are on the wane and the existential threat they represent has been lifted. But they have given way to wars and military campaigns that end without a clear decision. The expectation that the unquestioned dominance of Western societies would lead to global stability and that the West would be able to quell centers of opposition quickly and efficiently has proven illusory. The three decades that have passed since the “end of history” was being debated have shown that not only is the dominance of the West being challenged but there is even great doubt if overconfident Western democracies have the ability and, no less importantly, the political will needed to face the challenges of asymmetrical wars of the twenty-first century.
These insights have burrowed into the core of Israel’s military-defense theory and led to profound changes. Israel’s military doctrine, which sought to attain a military decisive victory in the context of total war, using rapid ground maneuvers against the enemy armies deep inside their territories, was replaced by ideas and approaches against new threats emanating from organizations operating irregularly, relying in particular on guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Striving for a clear victory was replaced by a desire for limited achievements, especially public opinion successes, based on the realization that the ultimate resolution would be attained somewhere other than the military theater. The desire for short wars (at the end of which it is possible to discharge the reserves who represent the mass of the fighting force) made way for limited but extended campaigns and operations. On the operational side, standoff fire replaced ground maneuvers as the central effort. These trends have profoundly affected how the IDF prepares for war, how it operates, and, obviously, how it, in turn, approaches force design and construction.
In the context of this threat, the last campaigns against Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, and Hamas, as well as the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, which also play a role in the Iranian regime’s regional strategy, have revealed some serious lacunae in Israel’s doctrine. After four rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip (and several shorter mini rounds), Israel finds itself back at square one, facing threats that are only growing more complex and menacing. On the one hand, the Iranians continue to develop their guerrilla and terrorist threats by means of their proxies, and, on the other, the nuclear project is up and running – both at breakneck speed.
Meanwhile, Israel continues to conduct its “Campaign Between the Wars” or to fight “in the gray zone.” This campaign is being run systematically, consistently, and with full force with the goal of ousting the Iranians from Syria and damaging Hezbollah’s efforts to rearm with ever more advanced weapons. Although the campaign is considered successful, it does not have what it takes to change the strategic reality of the overall campaign being waged against Iran.
What is becoming increasingly clear is the fact that Israel’s strategy – or, more accurately, Israel’s course of action – has played itself out. What is required is a new, comprehensive view of the strategic threat posed by Iran and its proxies. Long-term objectives must be articulated and new ideas on how to attain them must be formulated. These will be needed in the future to adapt the “tools” of the doctrine and the operational plans, given the challenges emerging at the security and military levels.
This essay argues that Israel finds itself at a critical decision-making crossroads. If Israel continues to maintain current trends and sticks to its existing defense strategy and force build-up, it might have to face a shrinking efficiency over the long term. This essay analyzes the challenge to security that Iran poses. Subsequently, the essay proposes guidelines for a long-term Israeli strategy whose objective is to undermine the Iranian regime’s plan and thwart the serious threat it poses.
“To Eradicate the Cancerous Growth”: The Iranian Strategy
It behooves us to understand the nature of the conflict developing between Iran and Israel. An examination to that end requires us to look at fundamental questions, such as: what underlies Iran’s ambitions; why does Iran view Israel as a central enemy; what are Iran’s strategic goals; how does Iran intend to realize them; what is the rationale behind the strategy it is advancing, and more.
Recently, there has been an increase in the worrisome signs related to the fundamentals of Israel’s national security. Iran is closing the distance to nuclear capabilities and growing more self-confident, calling into question the efficacy of any international mechanism to restrain it; as Iran’s proxy organizations – in many ways, these have become more powerful than state armies – gain in strength, threats are developing on Israel’s borders; the connections between the proxies and radical elements among Israeli Arabs, as was demonstrated to a limited measure during Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021), seem to be growing. In recent years, the Israeli defense establishment’s actions have been motivated by the desire to buy time. The dominant way of thinking is that either our situation is getting better, or the problems will solve themselves. However, the trends we see developing raise doubts about the validity of these assumptions.
From the perspective of the current Iranian regime, Zionist “colonialism” is a foreign implant, the last gasp of European imperialism in the Middle East. The obligation to eradicate it stems from the very deep cultural and religious understanding and belief embedded in the Muslim world’s historical struggle to return to its glory days and from the revolutionary ambition firmly rooted in the Shiite tradition as interpreted by Khomeini and his heirs. This is not a conflict between two nation-states in which it is possible to reach a compromise allowing one nation to live alongside another. The logical conclusion is that the Israeli Iranian conflict is characterized as a “revolutionary, anti-colonialist war” in which the occupier is destined to retreat and disappear as was the case in Algeria, Vietnam, and more recently in Afghanistan.
Paradoxically, it was precisely the intervention of the United States in the region, and subsequently the Arab Spring, that, for the Iranians, opened doors that had long been closed to them. The toppling of the Sunni bastion in Iraq by the U.S. Army and the Russian-assisted Alawite victory in Syria made possible the emergence of a Shiite arc of continuity from Yemen to the Mediterranean Sea. Regions of influence, military build-up, and self-confidence make the Iranian enemy more tangible for Israel and for the moderate Sunni nations. These factors are also responsible for the foundation of common interests leading to the forging of closer relations between Israel and the moderate Sunni states.
Iran is realizing a long-term strategy aimed at canceling out Israel’s advantage of force and accelerating the conditions for the Jewish state’s elimination by keeping low-intensity friction with Israel in the short run while building up their capabilities for the future all out conventional war. The Iranian leadership has marked 2040 as the year by which Israel will cease to exist as a state. To the Iranian regime, it is clear that Israel, as a political entity and military power, is the major barrier to the fulfillment of its vision, forming the basis for the Israeli Iranian conflict. No compromise is possible, because the achievement of Iran’s goals is insufferable from Israel’s perspective; on the other hand, ceding the dream of the Islamic revolution’s hegemony is tantamount to cracking the regime’s foundations. This meta-strategy is liable to pose a fundamental or even an existential threat to Israel in the not-too-distant future. While pronouncements by radical leaders are not unusual in the Middle East, what lies behind Iran’s ideology and declarations of intent is force build-up and real action. These, coupled with the willingness to sacrifice and pay the price are indicative of Iran’s resolve to realize its vision.
Since 1979, the vision of the Iranian revolution has been to establish a Shiite caliphate in the Middle East. This is a historic move of tremendous significance for the Shia, based on the regime’s interpretation, rather than a passing caprice or rhetorical flourish as many would like to think. The vision is meant to be a liberation from Western imperialism, which – according to the Tehran regime – is guilty of retarding Islam’s development and of aiding the dominance of the Sunnah, with which the Shia has a long and bloody account to settle. The Iran-Iraq war offered a preview of the sacrifice the Iranians are willing to make to realize their ambitions. It also seared in their memory the meaning of unconventional weapons asymmetry, a memory that lies at the core of its nuclear project.
The Iranian nuclear program was designed to create a strategic balance with Israel and allow Iran to advance its plan for achieving regional hegemony. The nuclear bomb is meant to provide Iran not only with the defense necessary against Western attacks but also to deter Israel from using the nuclear bombs. Offensively, Iran wants to advance its strategic goals by using the conventional capabilities it is constructing around Israel’s borders. The combination of a conventional fire attacks primarily by missiles on Israeli soil and deterrence of Israel from responding with unconventional means is the foundation for Iran’s entire strategic rationale.
For now, Iran’s strategy is still defensive. At this point, the major objective of the strongholds it has built is to protect its regional interests and to threaten Israel via its proxies on Israel’s borders. This is the main reason for the relative calm Israel has enjoyed for the past few years. When Iran feels that the conditions are right, it will go on the offensive by focusing attacks on what it considers to be Israel’s central weakness – its society.
The Iranian war plan is designed to generate tremendous pressure on Israel’s society and undermine its confidence, eventually leading to its gradual collapse. Massive missile fire at Israel’s home front coupled with the conquest of key territories in the Galilee and Golan and an internal uprising within Israel and Judea and Samaria can, to their mind, cause massive damage and disrupt Israel’s war effort. An extended war of attrition would result in many casualties, erode morale, and lead to a profound social crisis in Israel. The Iranian regime’s belief that the Zionists do not belong here strengthens their assessment that a severe and tough war would cause the strong elements of Israel’s population to move back to their countries of origin in Europe and the United States and leave behind a weak society that would finally implode.
This is the Iranian regime’s path to attain its goals and realize its vision. Yet, it is amply clear that Israel’s strategy has not provided an effective response to the threat, either conceptually or operationally in terms of force build-up. The traditional concepts and tools that were meant to respond to past challenges, primarily a war against conventional armies have not been adapted to fit a world of limited operations and campaigns. The results have been questionable.
Without an appropriate military strategy, small Israel, which under difficult conditions defeated the regular armies of Arab nations, finds it difficult to score victories against organizations much weaker than itself. While in previous decades Israel paid a relatively tolerable price for the unwillingness to intellectually face such conflicts, it is becoming clear that a continuation of these trends leads to a rise in threats to Israel’s national security in the near future.
“Active Defense”: Guidelines to an Israeli Security Strategy
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