The Bennett government will have to make pivotal defense decisions

The security cabinet will now convene frequently and on its agenda are an immediate decision about Iran, strengthening the preparations for war in the north, preparation for the possibility of aggressive action in the Gaza Strip, and above all — defining the nature of the IDF’s relations with Israeli society.

By  Yoav Limor, ISRAEL HAYOM        06-18-2021

Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, left, and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, second from left, sit with other top IDF personnel | Photo: Ariel Hermoni / Defense Ministry

This week, the Bennett government passed its first security challenge. The flag march proceeded peacefully without provoking unnecessary shockwaves, and events in Gaza were also under control while Israel adhered to its commitment of treating balloon arson the same way it does rocket fire.

However, this is not the threshold of challenges that the new government will have to face in the coming years. It will be confronted with many issues, each requiring the formulation of policy and the drawing up of courses of action. It is likely that the security cabinet ? which rarely convened in recent years ? will now meet frequently for a series of in-depth discussions. On the agenda: Iran, the United States, the northern and Palestinian fronts, the structure and budget of the army, and more.

The first and immediate challenge is the Iranian nuclear program. The superpowers and Iran are on the verge of signing a new nuclear agreement. In fact, the United States hoped to get things done before this week’s Iranian presidential election, but it was the Iranians who hardened positions.

The prevailing belief is that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei seeks to hand the achievement of removing the sanctions that were included in the agreement to the man expected to win the election, Ebrahim Raisi, a staunch conservative (Iran’s attorney general, nicknamed the “Tehran executioner”) whose character is now being “softened,” apparently as part of efforts to groom him as the future supreme leader. His choice ? while sweeping aside every other possible candidate ? indicates that Iran will continue on its confrontational stance towards the West, including in regards to nuclear weapons, terrorism and regional establishment.

The expected agreement will not free the Bennett government from dealing with the issue. On the contrary: it will have to decide, immediately, what to do. Iran is much closer to a nuclear weapon today than it was when the United States withdrew from the agreement in 2018. Even the sabotage efforts in its nuclear program, most of which were attributed to Israel, did not deviate it from its path.

Along with preparing an up-to-date military option, deep coordination with the Americans (and with the other partners in the agreement, with an emphasis on Europeans) is needed to try and influence the administration to fulfill its commitment to an agreement that is “longer and stronger” and at the same time defines red lines, as well as determine what will be done if it turns out that Iran is crossing these lines.

This will require a synchronized diplomatic effort, beginning with paving a way to the heart of the new administration. Diplomatic-security coordination with the Americans is at the core of Israel’s power, and it needs to be strengthened. Although Israel has so far refused to ask the Americans for compensation for the imminent return to the agreement, so that it does not seem willing to discuss or compromise on the Iranian nuclear issue, once the agreement is signed it will be possible to put everything back on the table ? including capabilities previously blocked to Israel.

Iran will be the focus of three other related issues. The first is the serial production of weapons, especially long-range and accurate missiles, and unarmed aircraft, which are also delivered to its protégés in the area. The second is its efforts to open more fronts opposite Israel, mainly in Syria and Lebanon, and to a lesser extent also in Yemen, Iraq and Gaza. And third, its ongoing terrorist activity, in the region and around the world.

In recent years, Israel has been waging a constant campaign against this Iranian activity. Under the heading of “campaign between the wars,” ongoing activities are being carried out to interrupt the Iranian establishment efforts in Syria, and to disrupt the transfer of advanced weapons to a variety of elements in the region ? mainly Hezbollah in Lebanon. This campaign has so far racked up many assets and achievements, but it has not caused Iran to change its plans. Now, it would be appropriate to examine its effectiveness as well as the adjustments required to be made in it.

As part of this, decisions will need to be made regarding Hezbollah and the northern arena. Of the investigative teams appointed following the recent operation in Gaza, the one examining the implications for a future campaign in Lebanon (headed by GOC Northern Command Maj. Gen. Amir Baram) is the most important. Even before he has completed his work, it is clear that the next war in the north will be unlike anything we have seen before; Israel is required to prepare for it not only militarily, but also operationally, and especially by winning international legitimacy and preparing effective systems of public relations.

The issue of missiles and rockets also requires in-depth discussion, and serious decisions. During Operation Guardian of the Walls, 4,400 rockets were fired at Israel from Gaza, causing a tolerable amount of casualties and damage. In the war in the north ? which will probably also be the “first missile war,” in which missiles and other weapons will be launched on Israel not only from Lebanon, but also from Syria, Gaza, and possibly from Iraq, Yemen and maybe even Iran itself ? Israel will face an unprecedented threat that requires extensive investments in air defense systems as well as in offensive and technological solutions that will reduce the threat and potential damage.

Deterrence in the north is strong, but Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, in his last speech, again spoke about an “open case,” that is, his intention to avenge the killing of a Hezbollah operative in Damascus last summer. It is doubtful whether Hezbollah is interested in war, but given the partial success of Military Intelligence in reading Hamas’ moves in Gaza, it would be worth re-examining the working assumptions regarding Hezbollah and Lebanon, which is currently experiencing an unprecedented economic crisis, and whose ability to function as a state is questionable.

The Palestinian issue will also be of concern for the Bennett government, on both fronts. PA President Mahmoud Abbas is nearing the end of his rule, and often seems to lose interest and connection with reality. Those around him are forging ties with Hamas, which they identify (and rightly so) as a powerful force that will require at least some sort of future partnership.

The relative security calm in Judea and Samaria is mainly based on the efforts of the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency, but also to a large extent on security cooperation with the Palestinians. Recently, the PA’s grip on some areas has weakened, and violence has increased. Israel will not reach an agreement with the Palestinians during the Bennett period (and probably not after it, as well), but it has every interest in maintaining the peace. The road there will, it seems, also pass through the resumption of political contacts with the PA, presumably through American mediation and pressure.

Strengthening ties with the PA is also necessary as part of setting a clear strategy for the Gaza Strip, an issue that Israel has so far avoided. The Guardian of the Walls operation sought to strengthen deterrence against Gaza, but its achievements have yet to take form and the region is very fragile. It is not inconceivable that Israel will soon be required to take further aggressive action in the Gaza Strip in order to clarify its limits: absolute quiet from Gaza and the severing of its ties with Jerusalem, and subsequently entering into talks (with Egyptian mediation) that will allow the Gaza Strip to recover while limiting Hamas’ military buildup.

The Palestinian issues will also give the new government an opportunity to strengthen ties with the moderate Arab world. Egypt is a close ally of Israel, and the political relationship with Jordan ? which has been shaken in recent years due to the rift between King Abdullah and former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ? must be strengthened.

The Abraham Accords are also an opportunity to tighten coordination on a variety of issues and in the face of many threats. It is not clear how much it will be possible to expand them in the near future and add more countries to them, but below the surface, Israel will continue to have an open door in almost every capital and palace within thousands of kilometers. Still, it would be worthwhile for Israel to formulate a clear policy on what it is willing to do in exchange for peace, for example in regard to Saudi Arabia’s expected future demand for advanced military capabilities (from the Americans), similar to those received by the UAE.

The new government will also not be able to avoid discussions concerning the IDF: its structure, its plans, and its relations with Israeli society. It’s likely that it will refrain from discussing the sensitive issue of compulsory draft for all, and in any case it is doubtful whether this is necessary (despite the political interest of some of the coalition partners). But if it promotes, for example, national or civil service ? for Arab Israelis, as well ? it would do itself an excellent service, and for the state and army, where among those who continue to serve in it is a growing sense of being “suckers.”

Even before that, the government must discuss the “Tnufa” (momentum) multi-year plan, which is indeed moving forward, even though it was never approved by the cabinet, and was never funded in the absence of a state budget.

The IDF needs long-term plans, and their absence impairs its capabilities, and implicitly its competence. Although then-Defense Minister Bennett approved the plan (and Gantz approved it after him), now is the time to do the right process from the start: first ask what Israel’s security doctrine is and what it expects from its army, and subsequently to approve plans that will realize its vision.

To non-professional ears, this may sound like a theoretical-academic matter, but it is a necessary discussion. The battlefield has changed dramatically, and a clear policy is needed on a variety of issues, from defining what victory is (and by implication what it means to invest in combat systems and ground forces, and the relationship between them and the Israeli Air Force), through home front threats and responses, to technological-operational solutions that require considerable and long-term investments.

Above all, the new government must examine the structure of the army, its model of service and the nature of its relations with Israeli society, as stated above. The IDF has not been a sacred cow for some time now: the motivation to serve in it is steadily declining, and not all the good people agree to remain in service. Whoever wants to win future wars, which there surely will be, must invest in the military, in those who serve in it, and in their conditions (and in other security organizations, as well). Without this, the Bennett government will have a hard time successfully handling the complex challenges that await it.