By Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, BESA
In a recent press conference, Defense Minister Naftali Bennett presented a goal for IDF activity in Syria: “To cause Iran to give up its attempt to entrench itself in Syria.” Unlike the common tendency toward ambiguity in defining strategic objectives, Bennett dared pronounce a clear and measurable goal. But is the goal he presented achievable? And is it right to declare a strategic goal in that way?”
Moshe Dayan, photo via IDF Archives Flickr CC
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,368, December 10, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In a recent press conference, Defense Minister Naftali Bennett presented a goal for IDF activity in Syria: “To cause Iran to give up its attempt to entrench itself in Syria.” Unlike the common tendency toward ambiguity in defining strategic objectives, Bennett dared pronounce a clear and measurable goal. But is the goal he presented achievable? And is it right to declare a strategic goal in that way?
Military correspondents have reported that in the IDF General Staff’s assessment, it is doubtful whether expanding offensive activity—however successful—can cause Tehran to renounce its vision and its ambitions in Syria. The Iranian regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) are driven by an expansionist Islamist ideology. The constraints of reality are certainly forcing them to make changes and adapt to circumstances, but that is not the same as forsaking their imperialist vision.
A historical perspective is needed here.
Having been enjoined to make sweeping cuts in its order of battle in the wake of Israel’s War of Independence, the IDF found it difficult to find a workable solution to the fedayeen terrorism of the early 1950s. With the forming of commando Unit 101 and its merging with the Paratroopers Brigade under the leadership of Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, a concept of retaliation gradually developed as a response to this problem. It quickly transpired, however, that despite a string of operational successes, the approach did not bring about a real decline in fedayeen terror.
The Israeli government was perplexed—but Dayan, with his quintessential creativity, reinterpreted the logic of the retaliation operations and posed a different systemic objective for them. Identifying the gap between the tactical aspects of the operations and their strategic significance, he introduced a groundbreaking conceptual framework that gave renewed relevance to the retaliatory actions.
Although the deterrence of fedayeen terrorism continued to be the immediate rationale behind the retaliation policy, it was oriented toward a wider objective: positioning Israel and its military prowess in the evolving regional and international system. In Dayan’s words: “Our victories and our failures in small battles along and across the border are of great importance. Not only because of their direct effect on day-to-day security, but also because of their impact on how the Arabs assess Israel’s power and Israel’s belief in its power.”
In that way, a strategic framework was created that was open to regional developments in anticipation of two possible courses of action: either the ongoing retaliatory strikes would gradually curtail the terror, or they would lead to war and a new regional order. Meanwhile, by taking the opportunity to undertake operational friction with the regular forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the IDF built up its capability and established an awareness of that capability in the eyes of both the enemy and the international arena. The quality of the IDF’s performance in these operations undoubtedly contributed to the eventual collaboration with France and Britain in the 1956 Sinai Campaign.
Applying Dayan’s thinking to today’s strategic context, the fighting against Iranian forces in Syria, especially on the Golan border, can be viewed as a means of initiating a clash with those forces out of a defensive motive rather than a direct interest in a full-fledged war.
Having the audacity to use force, especially in a situation that hovers on the very real threshold of war, does entail the risk of escalation, but also holds the potential to give Israel a prominent role in the crystallizing anti-Iran regional coalition. The objective of such a clash would be to showcase Israel’s operational superiority by proving its military capability and strategic daring, thereby making clear that Jerusalem does not fear a military conflict in defense of its vital interests.
A goal of that kind, in the spirit of Dayan’s conceptualization and in contrast to Bennett’s clear-cut and closed formulation, can manage unforeseen and uncontrollable developments. Therein lies its special nature as an achievable strategic objective.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen is a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He served in the IDF for 42 years. He commanded troops in battles with Egypt and Syria. He was formerly a corps commander and commander of the IDF Military Colleges.
Permanent Israeli presence inflammatory, you say? I thought that the permanent existence of Israel and the Jews was inflammatory for the Moslems.
Frank Adam Said:
So what? They lost territory because they were militarily defeated not because they were appeased. And they didn’t lose all of India. They got Pakistan and Bangladesh, which were originally Buddhist until they wiped or drove the Buddhists out. Three things keep them in line. Fear of being defeated again. Fear of going broke as oil loses its clout. Fear of Iran. Fear of Trump. Four things.
@ Frank Adam:
“Further permanent Israeli presence would be even more inflammatory to the Moslem World than the loss of Palestine, Spain and India.”
Boo hoo…..wouldn’t that just be such a pity. Are you on your knees while typing?
This aticle is very confused. What Bennet is doing is exactly the same as what Dayan and Ben-Gurion did 1949-1956. It does not “contrast” with the Dayan strategy. Israel has made it clear that it intends to drive the Iran-sponsored terrorists out of Syria and parts of Iraq–just as Ben-Gurion and his chief-of-staff Dayan made it clear they were determined to drive the Egyptian-sponsored terrorists out of Gaza, Sinai, Judea and Samaria in the 1949-57 period. This general criticizes Bennet for declaring a “strategic” goal–which of course is absolutely necessary to motivate solddiers to fight and civilians to support them. This general is probably an appeasement oriented Gantzite.
Very ungenerous Sabasarge! Illegal archaeology – very naughty. As for the Temple Mount I am glad that our own extremists are deprived of public animal sacrifices there as it would embarrass any number of marginal Jews to leave. Further permanent Israeli presence would be even more inflammatory to the Moslem World than the loss of Palestine, Spain and India.
Returning to the military meat of Gershon HaCohen’s paper, it summarises as manoeuvres with live enemy to intimidate enemy rank and file and their masters. As such it worked in that the Sinai Campaign trimmed Nasser’s horns for eleven years relative quiet in the South.
It is corroborated by Bill Slim British field commander in Burma who after the Japanese victories of 1941 organised a series of training operations to restore self confidence and perfect jungle warfare techniques. These were organised progress – a “puissance” for the horsey folks – from smashing Japanese section posts with companies to cracking Japanese platoons with battalions and Japanese battalions with a division. It worked and when General Wingate of the Haganah Special Night Squads showed how to spend air supplied weeks in the Jungle, the Japanese over-reached themselves to break on the well supplied entrenched resistance of Imphal and Kohima. The sooner the Iranian ayatollahs over-reach the better for the Iranian people.
For historic footnote Arab infiltration and border trouble started in 1949 and the first to deal with it on a permanent basis was CoS Motti Makleff who organised the border guard companies to avoid (1) interrupting army training, and (2) the time to ask the army to aid civil power and then to direct a unit to …. . The border companies were initially given the residual British personal weapons and fairly soon turned over to the police as the civil power to be available quickly on the emergency telephone call system in an area they had got to know.
Sorry, but for all the “quintessential creativity” possessed by Dayan I still want to puke every time I hear his name. Forget about his disgusting grave robbing, antiquities stealing habits…. far more unforgivable was this atheist bastards decision to return to the Wakf the keys to the Temple Mount. The Arabs, having just been routed, were astounded and we have never stopped paying the price ever since.
Personally I hope he’s rotting in hell.