Turkey is short of military strength to achieve Erdogan’s ambitious goals in Syria

T. Belman. DEBKA is wrong to say both the US and Russia have created no-fly zones.  I see no evidence of that in reports.

DEBKA

The Turkish push into northeastern Syria started with the aim of conquering three border towns, Ras al-Ayn, Tel Abyad and Ain al Issa, held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). By Saturday, Oct. 12, Day 4, that triple object proved beyond the Turkish army’s strength without bringing in substantial foot and armored reinforcements and incurring many casualties, say DEBKAfile’s military sources. Turkey therefore decided to start with two targets, grabbing the outskirts of Ras al-Ayn and sections of the key M4 highway near Ain al Issa. (On Saturday afternoon, Turkish sources claimed that the town had fallen.) If Ras al-Ayn was really in their hands, which other sources deny, Turkish troops would be able to surround and overwhelm the SDF force defending the town of Kobani.

To prevent this happening, the US last week sent a small Marine force to take up position in the northeast town of Kobani and on the hill overlooking the M4. On Friday, this force came under Turkish artillery fire, which caused no harm. Turkey claimed it was “a mistake,” which is hard to believe since the Turkish officers have detailed maps of the locations of US forces in the region. At all events, by Saturday, M4 had not been captured by the Turks.

The tactic employed by the Turkish high command, given the small number of troops provided for Recep Edrogan’s Peace Spring Operation, is to aim for an important local victory in one sector, before moving on.

The SDF have, in contrast, opened up five separate fronts on the Syrian-Turkish border and were shelling Turkish border villages and towns. There have been scores of casualties on both sides, and tens of thousands of refugees fleeing affected locations, but none of the various figures published are credible.

The Turkish-Kurdish contest has so far refrained from more than exploratory skirmishes, say DEBKAfile’s military and intelligence sources. The coming days will reveal whether it is likely to develop into a long-term confrontation. Some 140,000 well-armed SDF Kurdish fighters are dug in along a 300km front east of the River Euphrates. They have set up a defense line which is heavily fortified and barricaded, studded with anti-tank traps and supplied with plentiful ammo stores.

The Turkish force in Syria aT present is too small to tackle this Kurdish force. To raise an army equal to the task of smashing the Kurds, Turkey would need a large-scale military call-up, and even then, might be short of manpower for the task. The Turks are further constrained by the refusal of both the US and Russia to allow their air force to operate in northern Syrian air space, thereby hobbling their ability to advance very far across the Euphrates.

Erdogan’s operation has been severely limited by Washington and Moscow to establishing a 200km-long, 30km-deep, safe zone along a section of the Syrian-Turkish border, from which most SDF forces were withdrawn last September. This was agreed in a phone conversation President Donald Trump held with Erdogan last Saturday, Oct. 5.

But the Turkish president has a more ambitious plan. He wants to make it impossible for Syria’s Kurds to establish an autonomous state. That objective is still way out of Ankara’s reach. Even its initial foray is hedged around by restrictions and deadlines. Turkey’s generals have no more than four or five days to achieve their first objective, before US lawmakers endorse sanctions against Erdogan, his generals and the Turkish economy. Pressure is ramping up on President Trump, including from his own Republican Party, to stop the Turkish operation in Syria.

Another date looming is Nov. 13, when Trump and Erdogan have scheduled a meeting.

In the coming weeks, too, the process may be kicked off for Syrian President Bashar Assad and SDF leaders to conclude a military pact that opens the door for Syrian military forces to enter Kurdish territory. Initial contacts to prepare these negotiations are underway. President Vladimir Putin is all in favor of any steps that restore the Assad regime’s authority to all parts of country.

These and other events yet to come take some of the steam out of the Turkish ruler’s belligerent threats and the Kurds’ cries of an imminent slaughter, (which also serve Binyamin Netanyahu’s rivals as campaign fodder for drawing a straight line from Donald Trump’s putative desertion of the Syrian Kurds and Israel’s low expectations from his friend in the White House).

As matters stand now, there are no signs of an imminent Kurdish collapse in the early stages of the Turkish thrust into northeast Syria. They are well prepared for war with the Turkish army and, armed with good stocks of US-supplied weapons, are pursuing the correct tactics for meeting the current threat.

October 13, 2019 | 2 Comments »

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  1. @ Adam Dalgliesh:
    The Iranian corridor from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean already exists . The kurds had no power to obstruct Iran, and besides that Turkey is their existential ennemy , not Iran .
    Trump has no intention to block the iranian agression .
    The real trouble is Trump administration total confusion , lacks of strategic thought ,
    lack of culture , lack of vision . Here are the victims of Trump ineptitude : Flynn- Kellog – Mc Master – Bolton – Kuperman ( 7 days ! ) – O’Brien – Who’s next ? Fritz the Cat ?
    Secretary of Defence : Mattis – Shanahan – Esper _ who’s next ?
    Secretary of State : Tillerson- Pompeo .
    For Trump , international policy is a fun game , a reality show like ” the Apprentice ” .
    It’s a damaging behavior , which put the US standing at risk , and Putin, Khamenei , Xi Jinpng have unmaskered the weakness . They play long term , when Trump plays for the next elections 13 months from now .

  2. This article from the Guardian appears to confirm Debka’s analysis that Erdogan has bit off more than he can chew, and may face a coalition of forces determined to push Turkey out of Syria.

    By invading northern Syria last week, Recep Tayyip Erdo?an achieved what many thought impossible – uniting all the regional countries and rival powers with a stake in the country in furious opposition to what they see as a reckless, destabilising move.

    A truculent nationalist-populist with dictatorial tendencies, Erdo?an has often cast himself as one man against the world during 16 consecutive years as Turkey’s prime minister and president. Now he really is on his own.

    Fighting along the border is limited, so far, but that could quickly change. “Should hostilities intensify, a broader Turkish advance into densely populated areas could entail significant civilian casualties, displace many inhabitants and fuel local insurgency,” the International Crisis Group warned.

    Even as the EU, the US, Russia, Iran and the Arab states voice their differing objections to the invasion (Turkey terms it a “peace operation”), each is simultaneously trying to adjust to it, looking for advantage or leverage as the balance of power in Syria shifts again.

    It might be thought the Russians would be happy. After all, pushing the US out of Syria (and the wider Middle East) is their long-held aim. Yet Moscow’s reaction to the invasion has been largely negative, as was the case after Turkey intervened in Syria’s Idlib province last year.

    When Vladimir Putin sent forces to Syria in 2015, he put his money on Assad to win, but victory has proved elusive, while costs – political and financial – have mounted. Erdo?an’s move further complicates matters by obstructing the peace settlement Russia, Iran (and Turkey) have been pursuing via the so-called Astana process.

    That’s why Russia is urging the Kurds, now the US has abandoned them, to agree a mutual defence pact or some kind of federal arrangement with Assad. And that’s why regime forces and pro-Iran militia are edging towards Kurdish-held areas from the south. Assad sees a chance to recapture lost territory. Erdo?an’s fatuous “safe zone” wheeze has no appeal for him.

    Iran is not happy either, but for different reasons. It, too, wants to see the back of the Americans and has no love for the Kurds, a troublesome minority inside Iran. But Turkey’s move threatens Tehran’s hopes of controlling a northern territorial corridor linking it with its Shia allies in Lebanon – what Israel calls a “corridor of terror”.

    After struggling to establish a pro-Tehran, Shia-dominated government in post-2003 Baghdad, Iran does not want to face another Sunni uprising across Syria and Iraq.

    “The US withdrawal will kindle fears in Iran of a galvanised Sunni insurgency through a renascent Islamic State (Isis),” wrote regional analyst Bilal Baloch.

    Worries about an Isis revival, considered more likely thanks to Turkey’s move, are common to all the regional players. Strangely, in this respect at least, the US, Iran and Saudi Arabia, on the brink of war a few weeks ago, now find themselves on the same side.